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ABSTRACT 
 
Fortresses of Culture: Cold War Mobilization, Urban Renewal, and Institutional Identity in 
the Repertory Theatre of Lincoln Center and Center Theatre Group 
by 
Daniel Boulos 
 
The Repertory Theatre of Lincoln Center and Center Theatre Group were just two of 
dozens of regional theaters that emerged across the United States in the mid-twentieth 
century, but for many reasons they stand apart from most others. Because of their position as 
constituents of institutions directly tied to economic and political imperatives of New York 
and Los Angeles, they were linked more explicitly to their respective cities’ identities than 
most other theaters in the United States. New York and Los Angeles looked, respectively, to 
Lincoln Center and the Los Angeles Music Center as sources of civic pride, while theater 
makers, audiences, and critics looked to the Repertory Theatre of Lincoln Center and Center 
Theatre Group as focal points in the quest for alternatives to Broadway and the development 
of an institutionalized national theater.  
 This dissertation examines the ways in which each of the organizations studied herein 
established their authority to represent their cities and the nation as civic institutions and 
explores how they legitimated their identities as such in the context of Cold War culture. 
Lincoln Center and the Los Angeles Music Center, despite their purported cultural 
aspirations, grew out of pragmatic desires among urban elites to replace one vision of 
urbanity with another and to raise the national and international stature of their respective 
  vi 
cities. Lincoln Center had no officially sanctioned designation as a national cultural center, 
but nonetheless was said to stand as a symbol of American cultural might by virtue of its 
location in New York, whose global profile was on the rise following World War II. Los 
Angeles, meanwhile, worked to reconcile its booming population with a decidedly un-
metropolitan national image, while the city’s business elite sought to wrest control of the Los 
Angeles’s built environment from the political forces of the left, and the Music Center 
figured prominently into these circumstances. 
 The centers’ theater constituents, meanwhile, were not directly linked to the urban 
renewal efforts but were nonetheless strongly influenced by the conditions shaping Lincoln 
Center and the Los Angeles Music Center, particularly in relation to establishing the theaters’ 
legitimacy as civic institutions. In tracing the genesis of these theaters and their parent 
organizations, this dissertation seeks to make visible the plethora of forces, both internal and 
external, that converged to shape their emerging identities. Moreover, this dissertation posits 
that the rise of the institutionalized theater in the United States, a relatively overlooked area 
of study, offers a valuable site of interrogation for theater historians. To be sure, the 
individual works of playwrights, actors, and directors offer valuable insight into the ways in 
which artists respond to prevailing social, political, and economic conditions in any given 
historical moment. However, the rise of institutionalized theater caused a profound shift in 
how theatrical works are legitimated in the United States by adding a new level of 
legitimation: the institutional identity of a theatrical organization. Such institutions, therefore, 
figure as prominently into theatrical history as any playwright, actor, director, or producer in 
that their identities are as reflective of social, political, economic, and artistic circumstances 
as the works created within them.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Preamble: A Tale of Two Cities, Two Cultural Centers, and Two Theaters 
When Lincoln Center was first conceived in the mid-1950s, New York was in the 
midst of a major transformation of its landscape as Robert Moses, chairman of the city’s 
Slum Clearance Committee, pursued an ambitious program of urban renewal projects 
designed to align the city with his own vision of progress by eradicating buildings and 
neighborhoods he deemed derelict and obsolete with clusters of apartment towers and public 
buildings including university facilities, hospitals, convention centers and, of course, the 
behemoth cultural center that now stands proudly a few blocks north of Columbus Circle. 
Nearly sixty years after its 1959 groundbreaking, Lincoln Center remains a dominant 
presence on Manhattan’s West Side while the people—mostly people of color with low 
incomes—who inhabited San Juan Hill, the neighborhood bulldozed to make way for the 
Center, are all but forgotten, as is their valiant fight to save their neighborhood from Moses’s 
brand of progress that valued order and efficiency over all else.  
One of the last of Moses’s major urban renewal projects, Lincoln Center was pitched 
to the public as an important symbol of America’s cultural maturity during the Cold War and, 
its backers argued, Lincoln Center would put the world on notice that the United States 
would be second to none not only in matters of economic and military might but also in the 
arena of high art and culture. Like the displaced population of San Juan Hill, the Cold War 
rhetoric that underscored the founding of Lincoln Center has faded into memory, but the 
Center and its constituent organizations like the Metropolitan Opera and the New York 
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Philharmonic have solidified their preeminence as important and influential cultural 
institutions.  
The same cannot be said for the Repertory Theatre of Lincoln Center.  When Lincoln 
Center announced that its plans would include not just homes for the Met and the 
Philharmonic but also a permanent repertory theater, the prospect of a permanent theater 
company, free from  the commercial constraints of Broadway, was heralded as “undoubtedly 
the most exciting news to develop in a long time for the American theatre.”1 Already home to 
dozens of theater buildings, New York had been the center of theatrical production in the 
United States for nearly a century, as the “combination system” had led to the demise of 
locally produced theater across the country only to be replaced by touring productions 
emanating from New York. That centrality formed the basis for a constant refrain among 
artists and critics alike that the dominance of commercial theater in the United States 
“tolerated only plays that would appeal to the common denominator in a large and divergent 
group of people spread out over the country, and the control of that system by businessmen 
furthered the emphasis on broad popular appeal.”2  
The Repertory Theatre would, it was hoped, offer a venue where, free from the 
financial hit-flop model of Broadway, artists could produce works deemed by most 
Broadway producers to be too financially risky, such as classics and bold experimental work. 
Even more importantly, the Repertory Theatre, housed within this national symbol of cultural 
gravitas, could help fulfill what had been for many years an “obsessive purpose: the creation 
                                                
1 Lewis Funke. “Lincoln Center Prepares for Repertory.” New York Times, May 18, 1958. ProQuest Historical 
Newspapers: The New York Times.  
2 Jack Poggi, Theater in America: The Impact of Economic Forces (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1968), 
101. 
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of a single American National Theatre to rival any in the world.”3 To meet this goal, John D. 
Rockefeller 3rd, president of Lincoln Center, turned to producer Robert Whitehead and 
director Elia Kazan, two of the most influential figures working on Broadway in the mid-
twentieth century, to lead the enterprise. Whitehead and Kazan promised to create a theater 
that would at last endow the United States with an institution to rival England’s Old Vic and 
the Soviet Union’s Moscow Art Theatre.  However, from the moment of its inception, the 
Repertory Theatre faced sharp criticism from the public, and a series of missteps by Kazan 
and Whitehead would eventually turn the theater’s own board of directors against them, 
leading to the ousting of the two men before they could complete their second season. After 
eight more tumultuous seasons under different management, the Repertory Theatre of 
Lincoln Center finally collapsed under the weight of its symbolic importance and has since 
faded into obscurity.  
Meanwhile, three thousand miles away, while the Repertory Theatre was floundering, 
the foundation was being laid for the Los Angeles Music Center which would give rise to 
Center Theatre Group, where the Mark Taper Forum would emerge after its inaugural season 
as one of the most viable and influential theater companies in the nation. Much like Lincoln 
Center, the Los Angeles Music Center exerts dominance over its environment with a 
sprawling footprint. The neoclassical design of the Dorothy Chandler Pavilion and the 
colonnade linking the Ahmanson Theatre with the Mark Taper Forum conspire to 
demonstrate the civic importance of this “20th Century Parthenon on our downtown 
Acropolis.”4 The Center sits upon an elevated plaza above Grand Avenue, a broad roadway 
                                                
3 Joseph Wesley Zeigler, Regional Theatre: The Revolutionary Stage (New York: Da Capo, 1977), 5. 
4 Thomas M. Self. “The Music Center Story,” in The Music Center Story: A Decade of Achievement, 1964-
1974, ed. James W. Toland (Los Angeles: Music Center Foundation, 1974), 4. 
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that descends into the canyon created by corporate skyscrapers lining the boulevard. Walking 
on the sidewalk through this enormous canyon, the pedestrian cannot help but feel that he is 
somehow trapped in a simulacrum of a city, a stage set that lacks any trace of history. As 
urban historians Anastasia Loukaitou-Sideris and Gail Sansbury have argued, the 
contemporary environment of Bunker Hill is “an acontextual landscape.” The architecture, 
defined by monolithic skyscrapers, plazas, and malls, is unsettlingly like most urban 
downtown cores. This generic quality, Loukaitou-Sideris and Sansbury argue, is heightened 
by “the absence of ‘urban clues’—older buildings and urban artifacts that relay the history of 
the site,” preventing the pedestrian “from being oriented in space and time.”5 Even more than 
Robert Moses’s urban renewal projects in New York City, Bunker Hill reflects an 
intervention, an “episodic act”6 of total erasure for the sake of civic progress.  
When the Dorothy Chandler Pavilion opened its doors in 1964, it looked down not on 
the skyscrapers that currently dominate Bunker Hill but on a virtual tabula rasa after the 
entire neighborhood had been razed to make way for the new downtown business district. 
Built on vacant land already owned by Los Angeles County, the Music Center avoided 
becoming embroiled in any contestation over eminent domain and the concomitant eviction 
and displacement of residents and business owners that defined the Lincoln Center project in 
New York. But although the Music Center and the redevelopment of Bunker Hill were 
discrete projects, both grew out of a long struggle by the city’s business elite to reclaim 
control over the built environment of the city from what they viewed as the grip of a 
socialistic vision that threatened to stymie economic growth and prevent Los Angeles from 
                                                
5 Anastasia Loukaitou-Sideris and Gail Sansbury. “Lost Streets of Bunker Hill.” California History, 74.4 
(Winter 1995/1996), 406. 
6 Ibid. 
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assuming the stature a city of its size should have on the national and global stage. The 
“new” Bunker Hill would serve as a powerful symbolic representation of Los Angeles’s 
economic might, while the Music Center served as “the vehicle through which the city 
announced, upon its opening in 1964, that Los Angeles had undeniably become a great city, a 
city of culture and taste and refinement as well as a city of wealth and growth.”7  Separate 
though the projects may have been, their emergence in a single historical moment reflected 
the desires of individuals in government, culture, and business to establish Los Angeles’s 
preeminence as a world class city complete with all of the architectural, economic, and 
cultural amenities of cities like New York, Chicago, and San Francisco. The Music Center 
played an important role in reshaping downtown Los Angeles and, in the words University of 
California Regents President William Carter, it would help “offset the image that [Los 
Angeles] is populated largely by kooks.”8 The Center, the founding of which redefined in 
many ways the distribution and exercise of power and social status in the city, also would 
play an important role in reshaping the image of the city.  
In its conception, the Music Center was intended to consist of only one building 
whose primary purpose was to house the Los Angeles Philharmonic and provide a host venue 
for the prestigious music and opera companies, but the Center’s scope was expanded after 
Dorothy Chandler, the driving force behind the fundraising efforts to build the Center, visited 
London and, inspired by her theatergoing there, expanded the vision of the Center to include 
the two additional buildings that would become the Ahmanson Theatre and the Mark Taper 
Forum. The expanded vision would, Chandler told the Board of Supervisors in March 1961, 
                                                
7 William Fulton. The Reluctant Metropolis: The Politics of Urban Growth in Los Angeles (Point Arena: Solano 
Press Books, 1997), 64. 
8 “Brightness in the Air.” Time. December 18, 1964. 
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“give the people of Southern California a complete Center to serve all the performing arts.”9 
While the Music Center would, by providing homes for the Philharmonic and the Light 
Opera, open “avenues of opportunity,” Chandler believed that the “foremost opportunity” lay 
in “the development of a native Los Angeles theater entity.”10 Los Angeles Times theater 
critic Cecil Smith argued that Los Angeles was poised to take its place as a theatrical 
producing center, arguing that there “would seem to be audiences here waiting like a patient 
cat for the best in theater to emerge,”11 and he pointed to the success of the Theatre Group, a 
company operating under the auspices of UCLA Extension and led by John Houseman, as 
evidence of an audience hungry for serious theater in Los Angeles. In 1966, the Theatre 
Group was named as the resident theater constituent of the Music Center and it would 
eventually evolve into the Center Theatre Group, consisting of two “arms,” one producing 
large-scale productions targeting a mainstream audience in the Ahmanson Theatre and the 
other presenting smaller works, with an emphasis on experimentation, in the Mark Taper 
Forum. The Taper, led by Gordon Davidson, quickly established itself as an artistically 
adventurous company, and by the end of its second season it had become, according to 
theater critic Jules Novick, “one of the most stable and viable regional theatres in the 
country,”12 a status it maintains to the present day. Unlike the Repertory Theatre of Lincoln 
Center, CTG did not boast of becoming the de facto “National Theatre” of the United States, 
                                                
9 Henry Sutherland. “The Spirit That Built the Music Center.” Los Angeles Times,  December 6, 1964. ProQuest 
Historical Newspapers: The Los Angeles Times.  
10 Cecil Smith. “The Greatest Gift of All: The Soul of the Music Center Is Not What It Is but What It Does.” 
Los Angeles Times, December 6, 1964: ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The Los Angeles Times. 
11 Ibid. 
12 “A Report from the Press Department.” Center Theatre Group Records, 316-M, University of California, 
Library Special Collections, University of California, Los Angeles. 
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but in the space of two seasons it established itself as an important player on the national 
stage.  
The Argument: Cold War Culture, City Making, and Institution Building 
The Repertory Theatre of Lincoln Center and Center Theatre Group were just two of 
dozens of regional theaters that emerged across the United States in the mid-twentieth 
century, but for many reasons they stand apart from most of the others. Because of their 
position as constituents of institutions directly tied to economic and political imperatives of 
New York and Los Angeles, they were linked more explicitly to their respective cities’ 
identities than most other theaters in the United States. New York and Los Angeles looked, 
respectively, to Lincoln Center and the Los Angeles Music Center as sources of civic pride, 
while theater makers, audiences, and critics looked to the Repertory Theater of Lincoln 
Center and Center Theater Group as focal points in the quest for alternatives to Broadway 
and the development of a national theater.  
This dissertation examines the genesis of these organizations and argues that the 
respective success and failure of Center Theatre Group and the Repertory Theatre of Lincoln 
Center rested squarely on their ability to forge a distinctive identity while navigating the 
complexities of the relationships among their parent institutions, their cities, and the 
landscape of American theater at large in the context of Cold War culture. The organizations 
were defined in different ways and to varying degrees by a growing anxiety over the 
expression of national, civic, and cultural identity, as the United States assumed a dominant 
position on the global political stage. By the time ground was broken at Lincoln Center and 
the LA Music Center in 1959 and 1962, respectively, the United States was deeply 
entrenched in its Cold War with the Soviet Union. Both cultural centers grew out of 
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fundamentally pragmatic desires to strengthen the economic fortunes of their respective 
cities, but winning the necessary support for the projects meant establishing a critical need 
for the centers in the public imagination, and the Cold War provided the necessary rationale 
in both New York and Los Angeles, albeit in different ways.  
In the case of New York, Lincoln Center was not only to be one of Robert Moses’s 
biggest urban renewal projects, but it would also bring about the strongest resistance he had 
ever faced as thousands of residents mounted a campaign to save their neighborhood from 
the wrecking ball. For the first time, the human cost of urban renewal, which had for years 
forced the relocation of tens of thousands of New Yorkers from their neighborhoods, was 
brought to light when two grass roots organizations, the Lincoln Square Residents’ 
Committee and the Lincoln Square Businessmen’s Committee, mobilized against the Lincoln 
Square project. Although they were ultimately unsuccessful in stopping the project, Lincoln 
Square’s residents and business owners “brought a citywide audience face to face with the 
outcomes that the muffled liberal reports and studies had already predicted: renewal scattered 
a diverse working-and-middle-class community and pushed the growing Puerto Rican 
population into a shrinking pool of housing.”13 Lincoln Center’s backers, while they 
acknowledged the plight of those displaced by the project, incorporated Lincoln Center into 
the Cold War, arguing that it was a necessary weapon in the fight to establish the cultural 
supremacy of the United States. Although it was unfortunate that residents of Lincoln Square 
would be displaced, they argued, the cost that had to be borne if the United States was not to 
be seen as trailing the rest of the world in cultural matters.  
                                                
13 Samuel Zipp. Manhattan Projects: The Rise and Fall of Urban Renewal in Cold War New York (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2010), 216. 
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The Los Angeles Music Center, on the other hand, made more subtle use of Cold War 
rhetoric during its development, although the path for its creation was paved by fever-pitched 
anti-Communist hysteria. Whereas Lincoln Center’s backers emphasized New York’s 
position as the city most representative of the United States on the global stage, the Music 
Center represented a growing concern among city leaders with the stature of the city within 
the United States. The failure of Los Angeles to establish a visible cultural infrastructure had 
by the 1950s become a source of embarrassment to the city, most clearly demonstrated when 
the Hollywood Bowl, one of the only venues for high culture in the city, suddenly closed in 
the summer of 1951. As will be discussed in Chapter Three, that moment in many ways 
sparked the Music Center project by rallying public support around saving the Bowl and 
securing substantial city and county financial support, marking the local government’s entrée 
into subsidizing cultural institutions.  
However, the Music Center was also an important part of the business elite’s strategy 
to re-centralize their power in Downtown LA, which had waned during the Depression and 
the war years when the liberal left reigned in Los Angeles and instituted a large program of 
public housing projects in the city. The elite’s reclamation was made possible not by 
invoking the need to demonstrate the cultural supremacy of the United States on the global 
stage but by discrediting the liberal left coalition by painting public housing, which in 1950 
seemed well on its way to becoming the centerpiece of urban planning in Los Angeles, as a 
dangerous socialistic enterprise and replacing it with a culture-and-commerce driven vision 
of civic progress. Lincoln Center had used the Cold War rhetoric as a largely defensive 
maneuver, designed to provide the justification for the toll taken on those displaced, but in 
Los Angeles, city leaders in both government and business harnessed Cold War paranoia to 
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advance their growth agenda by launching an extraordinarily vicious red-baiting campaign 
that effectively convinced the electorate that the public housing program in Los Angeles was 
nothing short of a Communist plot to undermine free enterprise in the city.  The Music 
Center itself was not part of this campaign, but it almost certainly would not have come into 
being had public housing not been supplanted in Los Angeles, opening the door for what 
historian Don Parson calls the “corporate modernist” vision that has defined downtown Los 
Angeles’s landscape since the early 1960s, and it was the triumph of that vision that 
essentially set the stage for the Music Center’s creation. So effective was the campaign to 
defeat public housing in reshaping Los Angeles, Parson’s assertion that “modern Los 
Angeles...might be described as nothing short of the spatial expression of the Red Scare”14 is 
virtually indisputable.
  
 The rhetoric surrounding the Music Center would not rely on explicit Cold War 
rhetoric in the same way that Lincoln Center did, but instead evoked the Cold War 
atmosphere in more subtle ways, most significantly in the emphasis on philanthropic 
fundraising in the narrative of the project’s evolution. Dorothy Chandler, the wife of Times 
publisher Norman Chandler, influenced every facet of the Music Center’s development, but 
her most important contribution was leading the fundraising efforts which resulted in the vast 
majority of the funds for the project coming from private sources. Philanthropy became an 
important means of entrée into the upper echelons of Los Angeles society for those long 
excluded, most notably the wealthy Jewish elite from the west side of Los Angeles like Mark 
Taper and Howard Ahmanson, for whom the Center’s two theaters were named. Moreover, 
                                                
14 Don Parson, Making a Better World: Public Housing, the Red Scare, and the Direction of Modern Los Angeles 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2005), 198.  
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by soliciting smaller contributions from the general populace, the Center’s backers portrayed 
financial support as an act of civic participation. Although the Center received significant 
support from the county in the form of the free land upon which to build and subsidies for 
some overhead costs like maintenance, the emphasis on contributions from private 
individuals allowed the Center to be portrayed as a demonstration of the power of private 
enterprise in support of a project deemed important by the citizenry who accepts that the 
Center might demonstrate the city’s cultural gravitas to the rest of the country.  
For Center Theatre Group, the rhetoric of cultural maturity was particularly important 
in establishing the company’s legitimacy for the public of Los Angeles. Establishing cultural 
maturity was much less a symbolic imperative in Los Angeles than it was in New York. 
Despite the fact that Lincoln Center would mark the first time that high culture had been 
officially afforded a prominent swath of land within the city grid, the city was already 
recognized as a center of cultural production in the United States. The same could not be said 
of Los Angeles, which was often the target of national ridicule for having “produced nothing 
of cultural value since the orange.”15 Although Los Angeles had once been home to several 
“Little Theaters” of varying levels of professionalism, the city had failed to generate a stable 
local theater scene and instead functioned primarily as a road stop for tours of recycled 
Broadway shows. The 1959 founding of the Theatre Group at UCLA under the direction of 
John Houseman quickly changed that. From its inception, the Theatre Group experienced 
exceptional box office success, typically playing to houses at over ninety percent capacity 
and establishing itself as an artistically adventurous company, drawing on classics and 
                                                
15 Cecil Smith. "Center Theatre Group's Goal: Image of its Own." Los Angeles Times, February 5, 1967. 
ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The Los Angeles Times.  
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introducing Los Angeles audiences to works by European playwrights like Ionesco and 
Brecht. The press lauded the Group’s work, but it also repeatedly valorized the 
organization’s audience as evidence that Los Angeles was home to a long-neglected 
sophisticated audience comprised of what Houseman believed to the “true” theatergoing 
audience: the middle-class intelligentsia. The Theatre Group became an important means 
through which Los Angeles audiences could demonstrate their intellectual and cultural 
gravitas, which became an important means of establishing a relationship with audiences that 
would carry over to the Music Center when the Group was named as the Center’s resident 
theater constituent.  
The Repertory Theatre of Lincoln Center, on the other hand, did not look to a 
particular audience as a source of legitimation but rather attempted to establish its legitimacy 
on the professional reputations of Elia Kazan and Robert Whitehead. The Repertory Theatre 
would ostensibly represent the United States on the global stage during the Cold War, but its 
legitimation as the presumptive national theater grew not from any official appellation as 
such or from federal or municipal underwriting, but rather out of its relationship with Lincoln 
Center. However, it would soon become clear that the pressures of creating a “national” 
repertory theater out of thin air would be fraught with difficulties, most importantly in the 
establishment of an identity for an organization conceived in a boardroom with no artistic 
mandate. From the earliest stages of its development, the Repertory Theater was plagued by 
conflicts over how to best reflect American theatrical ideals within an institutional structure. 
Every aspect of the theater’s artistic work, from the acting to play selection to the physical 
plant, was hotly contested both within the organization and publicly in the press. At the root 
of the conflict lay a failure to establish a clear sense of identity that could withstand the 
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onslaught of criticism foisted on the theater from the press and its own board of directors. 
Rather than collaborating to develop the theater’s identity, the individual players involved in 
this story fought to protect their own legacies.  
The founding of Lincoln Center, the Los Angeles Music Center, and their respective 
theater constituent organizations reflects a relatively neglected area of study in theater 
history: the rise of the institutional theater in the United States in the postwar years, a 
movement in which debates about the future direction of American drama centered not only 
on dramaturgy and aesthetics, but also—and perhaps to a greater degree—on the need for an 
institutional structure equipped to support alternatives to the Broadway “showshop” and to 
facilitate the development of a representative national theater.  While many contemporary 
critics and scholars in the 1960s and 1970s wrote extensively on the rise of the resident 
theater movement and the push for a national theater in United States during the postwar 
years, few studies since have fully explored the intersection of theatrical institutions and civic 
and national imperatives, let alone the impact of economic forces on cultural production.  
That said, this dissertation is not ultimately concerned with the more obvious effects 
of economics on theatrical production; it goes without saying that the enormous expense 
inherent in theatrical production plays a significant role in determining which plays make it 
onto the boards, how long they run, how many people see them, and so forth. Rather, I argue 
that the rise of institutional theaters in the United States, embodied in the regional theaters 
and cultural centers that emerged in the postwar era, demonstrates an important shift in how 
theatrical works are legitimated. Whereas in the purely commercial theater, productions were 
essentially legitimated at the box office and by critics, the institutional theater has created 
another level of legitimation: the institutional identity of a given theater. Just as “direct from 
 14 
Broadway” signals to audiences in far-flung places a certain level of commercial success 
(and thereby legitimates a production as a commodity), “Live from Lincoln Center” suggests 
to the PBS viewer a production of cultural import, while many regional theaters, particularly 
the Mark Taper Forum, have attained such a level of prestige that their imprimatur has 
become an important means of legitimating the professional and artistic stature of 
playwrights, actors, and directors. These are just a couple of examples of how the rise of the 
notion of a theater institution as an entity—as opposed to the more ephemeral play-by-play 
model of the commercial theater—has affected the landscape of theatrical production, but the 
point I make here is that institutions, be they cultural centers or small regional theaters, figure 
as importantly into theatrical history as any playwright, actor, director, or producer in that 
their identities are as reflective of social, political, economic, and artistic circumstances as 
the works created within them.  
If we accept the premise that institutional prestige plays a role in establishing the 
cultural legitimacy of artistic work, then it logically follows that the roots of that prestige 
warrant interrogation. The institutions examined in this dissertation lend themselves 
particularly well to such an interrogation, because they offer the opportunity to explore the 
expression of identity—which was inextricably linked the pursuit of prestige—on several 
levels ranging from the national to the organizational. Taking it a step further, it could be said 
that the question being asked in each chapter of this dissertation is how these organizations 
attempted to acquire the authority to stand as representatives of national and civic identity at 
the time of their emergence.  
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Critical Concerns: Identity and Legitimation 
As a theater historian, I am more interested in examining the ways that material 
conditions shape theatrical art than in looking to the art itself—be it the work of playwrights, 
actors, or directors—as a site of interrogation. Of course, the close study of theatrical texts 
and practices offers the historian fertile soil for contemplation of the myriad ways that artists 
have responded to their contemporary moments both in terms of the social and political 
realities in which they worked and the aesthetic movements in which they participated or 
against which they resisted, and even the most materialist approach to the historical study of 
an institution must consider to at least some degree the works generated by that institution. 
However, as Marvin Carlson has argued, the practices championed by “new criticism,” 
which advocated for a “pure” analysis of the printed text unencumbered by contemplation of 
the socio-political factors surrounding its creation have long been viewed as inadequate to a 
meaningful understanding of how theater generates meaning for a society. “No longer do we 
necessarily approach theatre primarily as the physical enactment of a written text with our 
historical concern anchored in the interplay between that text and its physical realization,” 
Carlson observes. Rather, we now must look at theater in a more comprehensive light, “as a 
sociocultural event whose meanings and interpretations are not to be sought exclusively in 
the text being performed but in the experience of the audience assembled to share in the 
creation of the total event.”16  Carlson’s study of theatrical architecture and building, one of 
the earliest to consider the significance of a theater’s physical location on the city grid, makes 
a compelling case for incorporating urban analysis into an understanding of the theatrical 
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experience. Carlson is now just one of many scholars who have closely examined the ways in 
which theater spaces make meaning. Carlson is also just one of many scholars before me who 
have considered the importance of economic factors and who have made the case that sites of 
performance can serve as an indicator of the status that theater or other forms of artistic 
production hold within a society, but the body of literature examining the impact of 
economic forces remains limited. 
Much of the literature on the impact of economic forces has focused primarily on how 
the commercial nature of theatrical production in the United States has stymied dramaturgical 
maturity and progress. For example, Walter Meserve in Heralds of Promise, an account of 
American drama during the Jacksonian era, catalogs a number of factors, many of them 
economic, to explain the failure of American drama to thrive. The list ranges from the anti-
intellectualism of the era to the primacy of actors and “star vehicles” and the lack of 
copyright protections in the 1800s, each of which discouraged the development of 
playwriting as a viable profession, hence slowing down the development of a uniquely 
“American” drama.  
Others have argued persuasively that such development was further exacerbated by 
the dominance of the Syndicate in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, a 
phenomenon explicated most thoroughly by Alfred Bernheim. Bernheim argued that the 
collapse of the resident stock theaters and the rise of the touring “combination” system 
destroyed the local isolation and independence of theaters in the United States and brought 
about the separation of function in theater ownership and the production of plays, 
culminating in the establishment of New York as the center of production and the 
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development of the booking system that ultimately evolved into the Syndicate’s monopoly of 
theatrical real estate across the country.  
As Bernheim noted, the rise of the Syndicate clearly indicated that “the era of the 
business man had arrived” and that it was “he who has appeared to reap the fruits of the new 
organization of the theatre, to guide and to direct the theatre’s destiny.”17 Bernheim’s 
argument that the theatrical production in the United States was shaped more by business 
concerns than anything else was echoed by Jack Poggi, who wrote that the combination 
system “tolerated only plays that would appeal to the common denominator in a large and 
divergent group of people spread out over the country, and the control of that system by 
businessmen furthered the emphasis on broad popular appeal.”18 Both Poggi and Bernheim 
offer insightful analyses of the ways in which the economic conditions of the United States 
through the 1930s (Bernheim) and the 1960s (Poggi) influenced both organizational structure 
and dramaturgy. Adding to the body of work about the economic challenges facing theater 
and the other performing arts in the United States were Thomas Moore’s The Economics of 
the American Theatre and William J. Baumol and William G. Bowen’s The Performing 
Arts—the Economic Dilemma, both of which focused their arguments on the need for subsidy 
to sustain non-commercial theater in the United States and were influential in their time in 
the justification of foundational and governmental support for the arts. Each of these is a 
valuable historical resource, and although Poggi does touch on some particular institutions, 
including the Repertory Theatre of Lincoln Center, the necessarily cursory treatment cannot 
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account for all of the factors in the shaping of the company’s identity, nor can he fully 
analyze the relationship among the Repertory Theatre, Lincoln Center, and New York City.   
Since the publication of these books, little has been published about economic factors 
related to theatrical production, but a significant body of work examining theater from a 
materialist perspective has developed since the 1990s. As noted above, Carlson’s Places of 
Performance surveys the architecture and semiotics of western theaters from the ancient 
Greeks to the late twentieth century. Carlson does not venture into an analysis of the ways in 
which the performance sites influence the promulgation of particular types of work, but 
rather emphasizes how the physical structure of performance spaces as well as their location 
within the city landscape reflect the social position of theater within a given society. He 
notes, for example, the development of the “theatre as public monument in the twentieth 
century,” which “demonstrate[s] in a highly visible fashion the public dedication to the arts 
now expected of a world class city.”19 He cites Lincoln Center as one such “monument,” but 
focuses primarily on the meaning of the structure within the urban landscape without 
venturing into consideration of the work produced behind the marble façade or the 
circumstances that led to its erection in the first place. 
Mary C. Henderson also considers the relationship between theater buildings and 
their surroundings in the context of the city. Like Carlson, Henderson does not venture into 
analysis of the work happening within the walls of the theaters, but rather on how the social, 
political, and economic climate of the city influenced theater construction and architecture. 
Henderson also emphasizes the effect of changes in urban life, particularly the rise of public 
transportation, on the theater business. The rise of transit, she argues, meant that “Urban 
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existence became divided into spheres of activity, each bearing little relationship to the others 
except that all were tied together by public transportation.”20 Public transit within the city 
facilitated the centralization of the theater business at Union Square (and later further uptown 
at Times Square), and this centralization aided in establishing New York as a major exporter 
of theater to the rest of the country.  
The work of Carlson and Henderson, which focused primarily on the geographical 
situation of theaters within cities, represents just one aspect of the trend toward materialist 
and spatial analysis that has become prevalent in theater scholarship. Gay McAuley, in Space 
in Performance: Making Meaning in the Theatre, examined the ways in which the spatial 
arrangement of theaters influenced every aspect of theater production. Her analysis built on 
Carlson’s by moving beyond the architecture to offer a theorization of the implications of 
spatial politics in the running of rehearsals and the arrangement of backstage areas. Unlike 
Carlson and Henderson, hers is not a historical analysis, but rather, a kind of ethnographical 
study in which she places herself in the position of observer within the rehearsal room, 
auditorium, and backstage areas.  
Ric Knowles, in Reading the Material Theater, offers a thorough articulation of the 
materialist analysis of theatrical productions. His analysis focuses primarily on audience 
reception and addresses the ways in which the meaning generated by a performance is bound 
to the social and cultural context in which it is situated. He writes, “Reading the Material 
Theatre, then, and the 'materialist semiotics' that it articulates and puts into practice, is 
concerned with the meanings—the social and cultural work—produced and performed by 
theatrical productions in negotiation with their local audiences in particular cultural and 
                                                
20 Henderson, Mary C. The City and the Theatre. 
 20 
theatrical settings and contexts in the English-speaking theatrical world."21 Both Knowles 
and McAuley argue for an analysis of theatrical production focusing heavily on the 
phenomenological experience of meaning making and audience reception, and indeed much 
of the existing scholarship and theory relating to the cityscape has approached the 
understanding of the city from a phenomenological perspective.   
Perhaps the most well-known theorization of the city grid is DeCerteau’s essay 
“Walking in the City” in The Practice of Every Day Life. At the heart of DeCerteau’s 
analysis is the contemplation of the built environment as a manifestation of a system of 
power and the ways in which the individual at street level—the pedestrian—either affirms or 
subverts that power structure through his own decisions as to whether or not to adhere to the 
patterns implicitly imposed on the pedestrian through the arrangement of the streets, avenues, 
etc. DeCerteau further articulates this concept through the paradigm of the strategy versus the 
tactic, the city street representing the strategy and the pedestrian representing the tactic. The 
city is built, DeCerteau argues, from a strategic perspective, designed to impose order and 
structure and also to create the conditions that support and perpetuate the dominant social 
structure. The grid requires that vehicular traffic follow certain patterns; the subway system 
requires that passengers embark from pre-designated points; and sidewalks are designed to 
ensure the pedestrian is kept safe from (and does not interfere with) vehicular traffic. To put 
it another way, the design of the city grid is intended to shape at least to a certain degree the 
social practices and interactions at street level. The pedestrian has the ability to either comply 
with the existing structure or to resist it by pursuing a path differing from the one seemingly 
prescribed. Such resistance is what DeCerteau would classify as a tactic; it is through the use 
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of tactics that the pedestrian shapes his experience. Through the choices he makes, he 
contributes to the writing of the “text” that is the city, all the while being unable to read that 
text or see the way in which he fits into it. 
DeCerteau’s analysis centers on the lived experience of walking through the city. 
Although he addresses the way in which the existing built environment reflects the exertion 
of power, he considers the city as it exists when the pedestrian encounters it. This 
phenomenological understanding of the city is, to a large extent, the way that cities tend to 
acquire their identity in the public imagination. Descriptors like “the city that never sleeps” 
or “the big easy,” are provoked by visceral experiences and express what it feels like to walk 
through a city. But this understanding of the city fails to address the reality that the “energy” 
a resident or visitor encounters in a particular urban environment evolves out of an ongoing 
process driven by an array of political, economic, and social forces. In other words, the this-
ness of a city, far from being a naturally occurring phenomenon, arises from concrete 
decisions made by individuals and institutions over a long period of time. Even the changes 
that seem to happen overnight, particularly those related to the urban renewal projects to be 
discussed in this dissertation, require processes of legitimation relying on the crafting of a 
narrative drawing on a long history.  
Henri Lefebvre and David Harvey have each examined the city from a Marxist 
perspective, arguing that urbanization is an ongoing process that enables and responds to the 
development of capitalism. Lefebvre asserts that urbanization is an ongoing process that 
transcends the boundaries of any given city, and he uses the term “urban society” to refer to 
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“the society that results from industrialization, which is a process of domination that absorbs 
agricultural production.”22 
Lefebvre traces the progression from agrarian to urban society, noting the changing 
nature of the city over the course of that progression. He places the “political city” at the 
point of origin on his timeline. According to Lefebvre, this initial iteration of the city was 
essentially the seat of power and a kind of administrative center for vast territories. In these 
early political cities, functions related to commerce were excluded from the city limits and 
relegated to fairgrounds and suburbs. The process of integrating markets into the city can 
take centuries, and, he argues, “it is only in the European West, at the end of the Middle 
Ages, that merchandise, the market, and merchants were able to successfully penetrate the 
city.”23  Eventually, the incursion of the market into city limits led to the establishment of the 
mercantile city, wherein commercial exchange became the primary function of the city, 
resulting in significant moment of change in the progression from agrarian to urban society. 
With the establishment of the mercantile city came an understanding of the concept of the 
central marketplace. As a result of this understanding of the centrality of the marketplace, the 
city emerged as the primary mediator between the home and the world at large, and 
ultimately the mercantile city gave way to the industrial city with the advent of industrial 
capital.  
The theories of philosophers like Harvey, DeCerteau, and Lefebvre offer useful 
points of reference for understanding the complexities of how cities evolve over time and are 
affected by a multitude of conditioning forces. Indeed, these complexities are central to the 
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stories at the center of this dissertation. However, while an understanding of the city in 
relation to capitalism and the concomitant issues of production, consumption, surplus capital 
and so forth from a broad perspective are important, and valuable as their approaches are to 
“reading” a city, I find such theories far more useful as a means of generating questions than 
as a method of articulating answers.  To put it another way, my interest as a historian lies 
primarily in unearthing the ways in which individual people and organizations exert their will 
on the cityscape and in the shaping of institutions and how those actions and the underlying 
desires intersect with larger historical forces.  
My concern in this dissertation, then, has less to do with theorizing, from a 
phenomenological perspective, the spatial meaning of performance vis-à-vis the city than it 
does with understanding the processes through which sites of performance—which 
ultimately become the subject of phenomenological analysis—acquire their place on the city 
grid in the first place and how those processes interact to generate the identities of the 
institutions housed therein. To further refine my line of inquiry, it is important to note that I 
do not aim to define the identities of the cities and institutions considered in this dissertation, 
but rather to examine their processes of becoming. To put it another way, it is not my goal to 
look at these cultural centers—these purported monuments to high art and culture—and say, 
“this is what defines them,” but rather to deconstruct them to examine how and why they 
came to be conceived as monuments deserving of such a prominent position on the urban 
landscape and how they legitimated themselves as entities representative of civic and 
national identity.  
Indeed, legitimation lies at the heart of my inquiry. The concept of identity, 
particularly when considering entities as large as nations and cities, is complex and slippery 
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and could enmesh the historian in a theoretical quagmire were he to attempt to examine the 
concept from every possible angle, which is an important reason that I have resisted engaging 
in a phenomenological analysis, working instead to find a more manageable and pragmatic 
approach to a topic so rife with complexity. Looking to processes of legitimation serves not 
only to narrow the scope of analysis, but also provides firm terrain upon which to build a 
coherent narrative by highlighting the contestation that undergirds the development and 
expression of the identity of an entity, whether a nation, a city, or a cultural institution, which 
ultimately relies upon the ability to create and control a narrative, a process that frequently 
entails a tug-of-war among individuals and organizations with competing objectives. 
Ultimately, this project does not seek to define the identities of the entities discussed herein 
as something fixed in time, but rather to use the lens of a particular historical period to 
demonstrate the ways in which external forces ranging from material factors like dollars and 
cents to less tangible socio-political factors coalesce to determine whose vision of the city 
shapes the landscape and which cultural institutions and works win the stamp of “official” 
approval. 
The Cold War Zeitgeist and the Gathering Historical Forces of “Progress” 
 Each chapter of this dissertation closely examines the development of the institutions 
discussed herein. Chapter One considers the genesis of Lincoln Center and argues that its 
public-facing identity was shaped long before anyone performed on its stages by Cold War 
rhetoric and its imbrication in the battle to redefine New York’s urban identity in the postwar 
era. The second chapter examines the Repertory Theatre of Lincoln Center and argues that 
the symbolic weight of its presumptive status as a “national theater,” coupled with an unclear 
artistic vision, hampered the theater’s ability to forge an identity for itself, ultimately leading 
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to the ousting of its artistic leadership. Chapter Three examines the genesis of the Los 
Angeles Music Center and argues that the Center was not only an important symbol of Los 
Angeles’s cultural maturity, but was an important nexus for the accumulation and exercising 
of power as Los Angeles looked to take its place as a cosmopolitan city that could rival cities 
like New York. Chapter Four explores the founding of Center Theatre Group and argues that 
the company’s success hinged on its successful cultivation of a local audience determined to 
demonstrate its cultural maturity and the successful balancing of idealism and pragmatism.  
While much of the narrative contained in each chapter emphasizes the role 
individuals played in shaping each organization, larger forces were at work, most importantly 
the zeitgeist of the Cold War, characterized by an anti-communist fervor that seemed to rule 
the public imagination for nearly twenty years after World War II. Preventing communism 
from infiltrating the United States—the strategy of containment—not only dominated United 
States foreign policy after World War II but also extended to virtually every facet of 
American life in the years leading up to the founding of Lincoln Center, the Los Angeles 
Music Center, and the theater companies examined in this dissertation. While a full 
explication of the ways in which containment strategy was reflected politically, culturally, 
and economically is far beyond the scope of this dissertation, it is important to consider how 
it affected three particular aspects, namely cities’ built environments, the rise of resident 
theaters, and financial government support of the arts, each of which played an important role 
in laying the groundwork through which the organizations emerged and reflected the 
historical moment of their emergence.  
An important effect of the onset of the Cold War was the repudiation of the New Deal 
and the valorization of affluence and prosperity as proof positive of the supremacy of the 
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“American Way.” The Second World War forced the United States to face the reality that 
national security could not be maintained while pursuing an isolationist foreign policy. After 
nearly two centuries of believing that they were immune from attack by foreign enemies, 
largely because of geography, the bombing of Pearl Harbor, in the words of Cold War 
historian John Lewis Gaddis, “shattered the illusion that distance ensured safety: that it did 
not matter who ran the other side of the ocean.”24 The surprise attack on that U.S. naval base 
demonstrated with resounding clarity that advances in aviation and military weaponry had 
rendered geographical distance from enemies irrelevant and that an attack on American soil 
had become a distinct possibility. As a result, it became necessary, says Gaddis, “for the 
United States to assume global responsibilities. Those required winning the war against 
Japan and Germany . . . but they also meant planning a postwar world in which democracy 
and capitalism would be secure.”25 Gaddis’s phrasing here is important to note because it 
reflects what became an important touchstone in the emerging postwar identity of the United 
States: an explicit connection between democracy and capitalism. As the United States dug in 
its heels against communism in the 1950s, affluence and the perceived need to protect it 
against the threat of communism became major touchstones of American hegemonic identity. 
As historian Stephen Whitfield has argued, the FBI and Department of Justice, through their 
relentless hunting of Communists and fellow travelers, sought to protect “a lifestyle 
intimately associated with the blessings of prosperity. Above all, the American experiment 
meant—at home and abroad—abundance, which was the firmest proof of manifest 
destiny.”26 It must be noted that not everyone in the United States reaped the benefits of post-
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war affluence, but the Cold War provided the rationale for the relentless pursuit of profits, 
order, and efficiency at all costs, and that imperative dominated most aspects of public and 
private life in the United States in the postwar years. As Bruce McConachie has argued in his 
study of American theater during the Cold War, Cold War culture served to “justify the 
depredations of big business” and to “legitimate the struggle of the United States against 
international communism everywhere in the world—to separate a virtuous ‘us’ from an evil 
‘them’ without ambiguity.”27 In that context, consumption of the modern conveniences 
pedaled by Madison Avenue became as important an expression of American identity as anti-
communism hysteria, as did other visible symbols of personal economic wellbeing.     
The Cold War ethos of conspicuous consumption and visible prosperity had 
significant implications in shaping the physical landscape of cities and their surroundings. 
Nothing symbolized American prosperity more vividly than the single family suburban 
home. Postwar affluence meant that Americans had far more spending power than they had 
ever known before and, in the words of historian Samuel Zipp, the “crowning domestic 
glory” of postwar economic growth was the spread of suburban developments outside of 
cities that “seemed to represent freedom, abundance, and happiness to a generation of 
Americans seeking respite from two decades of depression and war.”28 But while the suburbs 
flourished, cities across the country were faced with economic and physical decline caused 
by the mass suburban exodus. “Despite the democratic rhetoric of equal benefits that 
accompanied the politics of economic growth,” argues Zipp, “the affluence the United States 
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enjoyed in the postwar years was a product of urban decline.”29 The decline of the urban core 
was further exacerbated by the decamping of much industrial production to outlying areas 
after the war, while cities rezoned their cores to accommodate an expanding white collar 
economy. While the suburban ideal provided a clear demonstration of the virtues of 
American capitalism and abundance, the deterioration of the nation’s cities threatened to cast 
a pall over that idyllic vision of suburban bliss. The federal government had been in the 
business of subsidizing slum clearance and public housing since the passage of the 1937 
Housing Act, but federal and local policies governing urban redevelopment shifted in the 
postwar years away from the progressive vision of New Deal liberalism toward a more 
commercially driven approach to city building in an effort to not only protect the economic 
infrastructure of the nations’ cities but to help remake their images as they endured the 
effects of industrial decentralization.  
It was in 1948 that Robert Moses assumed leadership of the newly formed Slum 
Clearance Committee, which was created in anticipation of passage of the 1949 Housing Act. 
As chairman of that committee, Moses would oversee the redevelopment projects 
administered under Title I of the new law. Originally born out of the Progressive movement 
to remedy the squalor that defined the lives of tenement dwellers, the 1937 Housing Act 
provided federal subsidies to local housing agencies to improve living conditions for low-
income residents, and it aligned with the New Deal’s imperative to combat the poverty 
sweeping the nation so clearly evident in the city’s tenements. Despite resistance from 
conservatives and private real estate interests, public housing gained significant popular 
support during the late 1930s and throughout the war years, particularly in Los Angeles, 
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which faced an unprecedented housing shortage, but that support faded quickly in the 
postwar era as the United States began to experience economic growth.  
The Housing Act of 1949, while still intended to alleviate sub-standard housing 
conditions, marked an important turning point in urban redevelopment policy in that it 
extended the power of eminent domain from being limited solely to government-built 
housing to private real estate developers. Under Title I of the law, government agencies, like 
New York’s new Slum Clearance Committee, could now sell sharply discounted city land to 
private developers as long as they agreed to provide a significant amount of housing on the 
development site. However, even though the law dictated that Title I projects be limited to 
“slums and blighted areas” that were “predominantly residential,” the language was “not 
specific enough to guarantee that rundown areas would be rebuilt with housing alone, much 
less low-income housing,”30 thereby allowing New York and other cities to use the law to 
underwrite the building of complexes for universities, libraries, cultural centers, and the like.  
Another change to urban renewal law came with the passage of the 1954 Housing 
Act, which removed housing as a required component of slum clearance and redevelopment 
projects. The 1954 act changed the calculous of urban renewal by changing housing from the 
raison d’être for renewal projects and making it instead a tool for the strengthening of urban 
centers. In other words, the 1954 act, signed into law by President Eisenhower, privileged 
private enterprise and commercial redevelopment as the driving force behind urban renewal. 
More importantly, while the 1949 Housing Act had effectively stretched the limits of what 
constituted a “public purpose” that could justify exercising eminent domain, the 1954 act 
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stretched that meaning even further by essentially defining any threat to the economic well-
being of a city neighborhood as a threat to the general welfare.  
These changes to housing and urban renewal policy were particularly important in the 
context of the Cold War, when clearing cities of blighted areas and slums took on an 
importance as symbolic as it was practical. Just as residential communities in central cities 
began clearing out after the war years, so too did many cities see a significant decline in 
industrial production within the urban core. In the eyes of many city leaders, the survival of 
the central city meant remaking the urban landscape so that it could better accommodate the 
ascendant service-and-knowledge-based economy, which was quickly supplanting industrial 
production. As city leaders worked to shore up the economic and physical infrastructure of 
the city center, “the operative term for city housing, street layouts, and land use,” argue 
urbanists Bernard J. Frieden and Lynne B. Sagalyn, “was obsolete.”31 From a practical 
standpoint, remaking the “obsolete” and cluttered city along modern lines would mean 
tearing down what already existed with little attention paid to preserving the traditional 
character of existing neighborhoods. Factories and warehouses would have to give way to 
banks, government agencies, and cultural centers while the superblocks and megastructures 
created under the auspices of urban renewal would, it was believed, bring a sense of order to 
the urban landscape, clearing away signs of decay and poverty and strengthening not just the 
economic health but also providing a powerful visual representation of American prosperity.  
Providing such a visual display was particularly important as the United States 
became more entrenched in the Cold War. The presence of slums and any appearance of 
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blight not only had economic consequences but also reflected poorly on the country in the 
eyes of the rest of the world, jeopardizing the image of the United States as a nation 
prospering under capitalism.  As Zipp argues, “Urban renewal would represent . . . an effort 
to contain the infelicities of American life for Cold War onlookers abroad. By alleviating 
inequalities, urban renewal would promote the idea that cities were entering a new era of 
abundance and rational modernity for all.”32  
Much like the nation’s foreign policy toward the Soviet Union and other communist 
regimes, urban renewal could not promise to eliminate poverty and other “infelicities” of 
American life any more than the United States could promise to eliminate communism, but 
could promise only to contain them. Indeed, so closely aligned to Cold War containment 
logic was urban renewal policy in the eyes of some that one historian has referred to the 1949 
Housing Act as “a kind of Marshall Plan for cities.”33 In practice, containment through urban 
renewal meant tearing down entire neighborhoods and relocating the residents—who were 
almost always low-income people of color—to housing projects far removed from their 
condemned homes in the only neighborhoods many of them had ever known. Moreover, 
urban renewal represented a vision of the city that saw little value in the day-to-day 
interactions on sidewalks, stoops, and in the shops and bodegas that characterized life in the 
neighborhoods bulldozed in the name of progress. Under the vision espoused by urban 
renewal proponents, the city streets were to be remade to express a monolithic identity 
anchored by rational order, a vision that failed to recognize the importance of what journalist, 
activist, and urban renewal opponent Jane Jacobs called “the mix and jumble of older 
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neighborhoods.”34  A staunch opponent of urban renewal, Jacobs argued against the 
uniformity and deadness that urban renewal projects left in their wake, advocating instead for 
the preservation of the mix of residential and commercial buildings and the concomitant 
social activity and networking among residents and proprietors that characterized city streets.  
Jacobs argued that because city streets had to be equipped to handle a constant flow 
of strangers, they organically developed their own identity based on the interactions among 
neighbors and passersby. Successful neighborhoods made the presence of strangers a “safety 
asset,” rather than a liability, but doing so required the existence of spaces that were socially 
functional. To that end, according to Jacobs, streets of the successful city neighborhood must 
have three main qualities: (1) “[T]here must be a clear demarcation between what is public 
space and what is private space;” (2) “[T]here must be eyes upon the street, eyes belonging to 
those we might call the natural proprietors of the street. The buildings on a street equipped to 
handle strangers and to insure the safety of both residents and strangers, must be oriented to 
the street;” and (3) The sidewalk needs “users on it fairly continuously, both to add to the 
number of effective eyes on the street and to induce the people in buildings along the street to 
watch the sidewalks in sufficient numbers.”35 Urban renewal, by erasing the small blocks that 
fostered community, cooperation, and vitality, according to Jacobs, led to isolation and 
deadness on the city street. The housing projects that replaced the tenement neighborhoods 
deemed slums by the proponents of urban renewal ultimately became “worse centers of 
delinquency, vandalism and general social hopelessness than the slums they were supposed 
to replace,” while the housing projects’ physical structure were “truly marvels of dullness 
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and regimentation, sealed against any buoyancy or vitality of city life.”36 But the same 
activity that Jacobs saw as key to maintaining order and safety on city streets and so 
desperately lacking in the new modern city landscape, others saw as chaos that needed to be 
tamed and contained in order to ensure that abundance was kept on full display.  
As important as such visible displays of abundance were in demonstrating the 
supremacy of capitalism, however, the emphasis on material wealth was a double-edged 
sword that could potentially undermine the United States’ efforts to prove its supremacy. 
While Americans were being encouraged to spend and consume more than ever before, many 
contemporary intellectuals were, by the end of the 1950s and heading into the 1960s, 
sounding the alarm that the country had been lulled into a sense of complacency and 
conformity, and there was growing concern that the United States was coming to be viewed 
abroad as an increasingly consumerist society focused on little other than accumulating 
wealth and living in luxury with little desire for cultural or spiritual enrichment.  
This perception was not simply disheartening. In the context of the Cold War, it was 
dangerous, and it was on this basis that a preoccupation with a demonstrable affinity for high 
art came to be viewed as an important weapon in the ideological struggle with the Soviet 
Union. Although the founding of the National Endowments for the Arts and the Humanities 
would not happen until 1965 under the Johnson administration, which was finishing the work 
started under Kennedy, the groundwork for the founding of the two endowments could be 
said to have begun nearly two decades before their establishment, and they would almost 
certainly never have received the necessary Congressional support were it not for a growing 
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consensus that the arts were an important weapon to be wielded in the fighting of the Cold 
War.  
As early as 1946, the United States government responded to the Cold War threat 
with what historian Michael Kammen has called “an unprecedented yet uncoordinated array 
of initiatives by the federal government to export American culture as exemplary illustrations 
of what the free world had to offer Europe as well as developing nations.”37 In 1948, the 
Educational Exchange Act, for example, established three offices within the State 
Department devoted to cultural exchange and to educating nations abroad about American 
culture: the Office of Educational Exchange, the Office of International Education, and the 
United States Information Service.38 The United States Information Agency, created in 1953, 
built on the earlier educational exchange programs and relied heavily on the performing arts 
as a diplomatic tool, and in the words of Kammen it soon “had jazz bands such as Dizzy 
Gillespie’s making international tours. Such exports achieved undeniable popularity 
wherever they went, and they were perceived as the music of individualism, freedom, 
pluralism, and dissent—fundamental qualities obliterated by Communism.”39 The USIA and 
other cultural exchange initiatives were clearly more concerned with rebutting communist 
propaganda that argued that Americans were “propagators of a money-mad civilization, atom 
bomb barbarians who have forfeited the right to use the word ‘culture’”40 than they were with 
establishing a clear cultural policy on the domestic front. However, by enlisting the arts in 
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the Cold War even for the most pragmatic of reasons, these initiatives opened the door for 
increased support for the arts in the United States.   
As theater historian Margaret Knapp notes, “the economics of the arts received its 
most widespread and thorough scrutiny in the 1960s, a decade when the Kennedy 
administration made high culture fashionable” and when economic prosperity led to interest 
in supporting the arts.41  Joseph Zeigler echoes Knapp’s nod to Kennedy as an important 
influencer in winning widespread support for the notion of arts subsidy. “The advent of the 
Kennedy administration in 1961,” Zeigler writes, “introduced a new tone to American 
cultural life. After the apple-pie nonintellectualism  of the Eisenhower years, there was at last 
a new young awareness in Washington.”42  Zeigler is right to point to the Kennedy 
administration as an important turning point in the cultural life of the United States; even 
before he took office, Kennedy repeatedly revealed on the campaign trail “his desire to 
improve the quality of life in the United States through increased intellectual and cultural 
achievement, which he believed a federal arts policy could encourage.”43 Although it would 
ultimately be Lyndon Johnson who signed into law the bill creating the NEA and NEH in 
September 1965, it was Kennedy who initiated the effort. The Cold War rhetoric of 
demonstrating the cultural maturity of the United States remained central to making the case 
for government support for the arts, but he also argued emphatically for the importance of the 
arts in providing uplift for citizens at home. While Kennedy certainly recognized the problem 
of the world’s view of America’s cultural immaturity as a significant problem with far-
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reaching consequences in foreign policy, he also understood that effectively deploying the 
arts as diplomatic tools required nurturing them at home; international recognition could only 
be achieved if America “raise[d] its own level of sophistication.”44 The arts could indeed act 
as a powerful psychological weapon in the Cold War, as evidenced in the practices of the 
USIA and the other tactics used by the previous administration, but Kennedy believed in and 
argued repeatedly for the intrinsic value of the arts. In a 1963 speech in honor of poet Robert 
Frost at Amherst College, Kennedy proclaimed the importance of raising the stature of art 
and culture in the United States: 
Our national strength matters, but the spirit which informs and controls our strength 
matters just as much. . . . I look forward to an America which will reward 
achievement in the arts as we reward achievement in business or statecraft. I look 
forward to an America which will steadily raise the standards of artistic 
accomplishment and which will steadily enlarge cultural opportunities for all of our 
citizens. And I look forward to an America which commands respect throughout the 
world not only for its strength but for its civilization as well.45 
Kennedy was assassinated less than a month after giving this speech, but the administration 
of Lyndon B. Johnson picked up the mantle and gave form to the initiative by establishing 
the National Endowment for the Arts. Despite Kennedy’s repeated assertions of the intrinsic 
value of the arts, proponents of the NEA focused their arguments on the importance of 
bolstering America’s image abroad. Nonetheless, when the 1960s dawned, there was a 
growing sense in the country that the United States was undergoing a major cultural 
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explosion, and the rise of the regional theater movement seemed to provide further evidence 
of that boom. 
Looking Beyond Broadway: The Resident Theatre Movement 
The resident theater movement grew out a long-standing desire among theater artists 
to find alternatives to the dominance of the commercial theater epitomized by Broadway. 
That desire was certainly nothing new in the postwar United States. The first two decades of 
the twentieth century, for example, saw the proliferation of “little theaters” across the United 
States and even in New York that sought to foster the work of new playwrights 
experimenting with forms more adventurous than the standard fare offered on Broadway. 
The Washington Square Players and the Provincetown Playhouse, founded in 1914 and 1916, 
respectively, were the two most prominent examples, but dozens of cities took part in this 
movement. However, it was not until the years following World War II that the resident 
theater movement created a seismic shift in the theatrical landscape.  
Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, dozens of theaters opened in cities throughout the 
country, and by1966 there were more actors working in resident theaters than in New York 
City.46 Although it was the desire to create alternatives to the Broadway producing model 
that drove the resident theater revolution, the very concept of the resident theater depended 
on what Joseph Zeigler, one of the few historians to document the movement, called “the 
concept of the theater as an institution,” with each theater “structured as an entity unto itself, 
with an identity and standing of its own, like a business corporation.”47 The earliest resident 
theaters revolved, according to Zeigler, around “the essential need in each situation for a 
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single, messianic leader to give it character, spirit, direction, and inspiration,”48 starting out 
either as an amateur organization or on a very modest professional scale and founded only to 
provide their leaders with forums for their own work, and these early theaters had “few ties 
to the community at large and none to the nation as a whole. . . . There were no theories of 
institutionalism or decentralization, let alone dreams of a national theatre.”49  Some of these 
early theaters, like the Alley in Houston, founded in 1947 by Nina Vance, expanded and 
forged close ties with their communities over time while others collapsed once their founders 
departed. However, what they all had in common was that for their founders, as critic Martin 
Gottfried said, “the theater was hardly more than a dream held together by a shoestring.”50 
However, two major events changed the nature of resident theater and played a significant 
role in moving the resident theater companies toward institutionalism: the advent of major 
foundation support, most notably from the Ford Foundation, and the founding of the Guthrie 
Theatre in Minneapolis.  
Both Poggi and Zeigler point to 1957 as the turning point in the regional theater 
movement. It was in this year that W. McNeil Lowry, who headed the arts and humanities 
program at the Ford Foundation, became interested in the burgeoning regional theaters. 
Throughout 1957 and 1958, Lowry traveled through the country, visiting several regional, 
community, and university theaters, seeing their work and meeting with their leaders. In 1959 
the Ford Foundation awarded three-year support to the Alley Theatre, the Actor’s Workshop, 
and Arena Stage. These grants, which would be the first of many, were for the express 
                                                
48 Ibid., 3. 
49 Ibid., 24-25. 
50 Martin Gottfried. A Theater Divided: The Postwar American Stage (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 
1967), 95. 
 39 
purpose of building a permanent acting company. The grants required that the funds be used 
solely for payments to actors hired on a seasonal basis and allocated $100 per week for ten 
actors while the theater would be required to pay each actor an additional $100 per week out 
of their own funds.51 The involvement of the Ford Foundation was a major turning point for a 
few reasons. Obviously, the influx of cash provided much-needed financial support. But such 
a significant support from a major foundation provided, in the words of Joseph Zeigler, “the 
first hint of legitimacy and the primary building blocks of institutionalism.”52  The 
Foundation was also instrumental in creating a sense of shared purpose among the leaders of 
the theaters that were cropping up from coast to coast. Shortly after the grants were 
announced, the Ford Foundation convened a conference among two dozen leaders of 
community, university, and professional theaters. This meeting, according to Zeigler, helped 
to break down the isolation of the theaters operating in disparate locations and “helped to 
turn the early regional theatre strivings into a movement in America.”53 
Also important to the evolution of the regional theater movement was the growing 
belief that a cultural boom was sweeping the country. Many contemporary observers pointed 
to higher than ever ticket sales to performances and a sharp increase in the sale of books as 
evidence of what was widely called a “cultural explosion,” thought to demonstrate an 
extraordinary and unprecedented interest in the performing arts. Although William J. Baumol 
and William G. Bowen’s The Performing Arts—the Economic Dilemma would, when it was 
published in 1966, debunk the myth of the cultural explosion by demonstrating that the 
statistics, when adjusted for postwar population growth, actually indicated that the 
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percentages of those attending cultural events had remained flat, the rhetoric of the cultural 
explosion loomed large throughout the mid-1950s and into the 1960s, and there was an 
undeniable obsession with culture in public discourse that only grew once the Kennedys 
came onto the scene. Lowry of the Ford Foundation dated the cultural fixation to the mid-
1950s “when community leaders argued that the arts were good for society by promoting a 
strong national image, showcasing American artistry to the world. . . . More importantly, 
perhaps, art ensconced in physical institutions . . . gave communities a source of civic 
pride.”54 Although he doesn’t mention the Cold War rhetoric, his observation demonstrates 
that the concern with the nation’s image as it related to the arts was very much present in the 
public imagination.  
The legitimation of the regional theater movement took another significant step 
forward in 1963 when the Guthrie Theatre opened in Minneapolis.  Planning for the Guthrie 
had begun in 1959 when Tyrone Guthrie, Broadway producer Oliver Rea, and Broadway 
stage manager Peter Zeisler met to discuss the idea of creating “a classic repertory company 
with the highest professional standards, in a city removed from the commercial pressures of 
New York.”55 Unlike the other regional theaters that had emerged organically over the 
preceding years and built up slowly, the Guthrie took an entirely different approach. Shortly 
after the meeting of Guthrie, Rea, and Zeisler, Brooks Atkinson ran a column in the New 
York Times inviting cities across the country to apply for the honor of being home to—and 
raising the funds to build a theater for—the fledgling company to be led by one of the leading 
directors in contemporary theater. After visiting seven cities, the trio settled on Minneapolis 
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which “had the right combination of civic-minded young businessmen and their wives who 
were anxious to make their marks in the public sector and could raise funds quickly to build 
the theater structure, its company, and its audience.”56 In addition to a successful statewide 
fundraising campaign in Minnesota, the company received a grant in excess of $300,000 
from the Ford Foundation to guarantee against loss for the first three seasons.57 When the 
company opened in May 1963, it boasted an acting company of forty, led by Hume Cronyn, 
Jessica Tandy, and George Grizzard, the starriest cast yet assembled for a regional theater 
company.  
The Guthrie was inarguably a “game changer” in the regional theater landscape for 
several reasons. First, the sheer scale and success of the enterprise—and the national 
attention it received in large part because of the stature of Guthrie and the leading players he 
assembled—lent further legitimacy to the regional theater movement. Secondly, it increased 
pressure on communities throughout the country to “keep up with the Joneses” by creating 
the feeling among many cities that “they really ought to have a theatre.”58 Third, and most 
importantly, argues Zeigler, the Guthrie stoked the notion that “from the regional theatre 
might come a National Theatre for America. Before the Guthrie, there had been scant 
justification for such an idea. The Guthrie was the first regional theatre that looked as if it 
could conceivably develop into the realization of this long-cherished dream.”59 Although the 
Guthrie Theatre would not ultimately attain or even aspire to such a designation, Zeigler’s 
assertion that it revived hope for the creation of a national theater seems to rest primarily on 
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the notion that the Guthrie raised the bar in terms of quality, scale, and community support 
and launched what he calls “the struggle for national supremacy” among the regional 
theaters.60 If nothing else, the Guthrie raised the bar on the level of professionalism that 
could be expected from a non-profit theater outside New York and it showed that such a 
theater could receive national attention and assume a prominent position, not to mention that 
it showed how having such a theater could benefit a city. In the years following the Guthrie’s 
successful opening, a number of large-scale theaters, spurred into being by their cities’ power 
structures, emerged in cities across the country with varying degrees of success. That same 
year saw the opening of the Seattle Repertory Theatre, and then in 1966 the Repertory 
Theatre of New Orleans was created through an NEA grant designed to “produce classics for 
high school students in prescribed areas.”61 That theater lasted just a few seasons until, 
unable to find an audience to sustain it, it closed in 1972. Despite the varying degrees of 
success and failure of the regional theaters that sprouted up across the country, the change 
brought to bear by the Guthrie was an important one in that it demonstrated the national 
prominence such an institution could bestow on a city as far removed from New York as 
Minneapolis and would help add grist to the mill for city leaders who sought to bolster their 
image through the use of the arts. However, as would become clear in many cases, 
particularly at Lincoln Center, the institutionalism of theater was not without peril. Success 
could no longer be determined simply on the artistic merits of the work produced by an 
organization. As institutional prestige became more important in establishing a theater’s 
legitimacy, control of the shaping of a theater’ identity would rest not just in the hands of its 
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artistic leadership but rather would be influenced by countless factors both internal and 
external.  
The following chapters work to identify some of those factors and to explicate the 
ways in which they shaped the emergent identities of two nascent institutions, but it is my 
hope that these stories will demonstrate the value of narrative historiography, particularly in 
examining the role institutions play in shaping the cultural landscape and defining civic and 
national identity. As will be seen in the chapters ahead, a multitude of forces shaped each of 
these institutions on levels ranging from the relationships among individual personalities to 
the overwhelming political force of the Red Scare. By looking closely at the concrete forces 
shaping these institutions and the landscapes of the cities in which they emerged, the sources 
of power in the shaping of an entity’s identity begin to become visible. In addition to 
chronicling the histories of historically important sites of performance, institutional analysis 
of cultural organizations provides a valuable means of making visible the forces that shape 
the spaces where cultural works are legitimated and vividly demonstrates how intersecting 
personal, municipal, institutional, and national imperatives conspire to shape cultural 
production.  
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CHAPTER 1 
“A Mighty Influence for Peace:” Lincoln Center, Urban Renewal, and Cold War 
Mobilization 
 
Ground-Breaking 
On May 14, 1959, twelve thousand people looked on as President Dwight D. 
Eisenhower turned the first shovel of earth at the site of the Lincoln Center for the 
Performing Arts. The president praised Lincoln Center, calling it a “cooperative venture in 
which Federal and local governments, artistic groups, large foundations and private citizens 
are joining forces.”  The Center, according to Eisenhower, symbolized “an increasing interest 
in America in cultural matters as well as a stimulating approach to one of the nation’s 
pressing problems—urban blight” and it would be a place from which would develop “a 
mighty influence for peace and understanding throughout the world.”62  As Eisenhower dug 
into the ground with the chrome shovel, the Philharmonic Orchestra “swung into the 
Hallelujah chorus from Handel’s Messiah, and a few moments later Anthony Capasso, a 44-
year old power-shovel operator, dug the bucket of his giant machine into the ground to begin 
construction of Lincoln Center for the Performing Arts.”63 For Robert Moses, chairman of 
the city’s Slum Clearance Committee, the comingling of Handel’s score with the sounds of 
Capasso’s power-shovel was surely music to his ears. 
 From the podium, Moses, the de facto master builder of New York City during the 
first half of the twentieth century, echoed Eisenhower’s touting of the symbolic importance 
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of Lincoln Center, declaring in his own remarks that with Lincoln Center the city was 
“stak[ing] its claim that New York will become the Center of the performing arts as it has 
already become the world political capital.” But in his very next breath, Moses abruptly 
changed his tone. “You cannot rebuild a city without moving people any more than you can 
make an omelet without breaking eggs,” he bluntly stated. Responding to criticism that urban 
renewal projects like the one out of which Lincoln Center was born favored wealthy real 
estate developers while displacing thousands of low-income residents, he reminded the 
crowd that someone— “the speculative builder who charges higher rentals and pays full 
taxes”—had to foot the bill.  “It is easy for demagogues to insinuate that only the small-
income man should be considered in such projects, to sneer about windfalls and handouts for 
private builders and play up and exaggerate individual tenant hardship,”64 he said. That 
hardship, played up or not, was simply the cost, Moses repeatedly argued, of progress. As far 
as Moses was concerned, progress meant eradicating a city grid characterized by congestion 
and chaos and imposing order on the urban landscape. 
The groundbreaking marked the beginning of physical construction, but plans for the 
Center had been underway since 1953 when Moses first approached the Metropolitan Opera 
and offered them the opportunity to sponsor a portion of the urban renewal project. A few 
months after the groundbreaking, John D. Rockefeller 3rd, the president of Lincoln Center for 
the Performing Arts, Inc., issued a progress report on the development of the Center. In the 
progress report, Rockefeller wrote, “The story of Lincoln Center is the story of gradual 
development of an idea, of complex relationships between old and proud institutions, of 
pioneering in the development of new organizations, of cooperation between private and 
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governmental agencies. It is a story in the American tradition of voluntary private initiative 
and of what it means in service to the public.” According to Rockefeller, the Center would 
also serve to “meet a paramount need of our time: the need for modern man for creative 
fulfillment—his striving for self-expression and the emotional and aesthetic satisfactions that 
set him above the animal.”65 Rockefeller promised the Center would endow the city with a 
valuable cultural asset while bolstering the image of the city and nation as cultural capitals on 
the global stage.  
At the height of the Cold War and at the apex of the era of urban renewal in New 
York City, the Center seemed poised to respond to several needs. It would provide new 
homes for “old and proud institutions” like the Metropolitan Opera and the New York 
Philharmonic. It would serve as the Centerpiece for an urban renewal project that would 
drastically alter the landscape of Manhattan’s Upper West Side. And it would demonstrate to 
the world the cultural maturity of the United States, which was experiencing unprecedented 
growth in economic and global political power in the aftermath of the Second World War. 
Throughout its development, the Center’s leadership and the press framed the project as an 
enterprise designed to ennoble the citizenry of New York and the United States while 
enshrining America’s commitment to something other than materialism and the bottom line. 
But despite the symbolic importance placed upon the Center and reflected in the 
aforementioned words of Eisenhower, Moses, and Rockefeller, “even the loftiest dreams of 
culture were rooted in pragmatism.” 66  
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The impetus for the Center’s creation grew from the practical needs of three 
institutions: the Metropolitan Opera, the New York Philharmonic Society, and New York 
City’s Slum Clearance Committee. The backers of the Lincoln Center project portrayed the 
coming together of these organizations as a serendipitous phenomenon that made the 
Center’s birth virtually inevitable, spinning a tale of “three coincidences” that led to the 
creation of Lincoln Center. As luck would have it, so the story went, Robert Moses had 
selected the Lincoln Square neighborhood for slum clearance while at the same time the 
Metropolitan Opera was in the midst of an ongoing search for a new home. Meanwhile, the 
New York Philharmonic faced eviction from Carnegie Hall, which had just been sold to a 
private developer who planned to tear it down to make way for commercial development. In 
short order, the Met and the Philharmonic would team up to sponsor the redevelopment of a 
portion of Moses’s project site, naturally resulting in a world class cultural institution that 
would in turn serve to clear a deteriorating neighborhood and bring the order of modernity to 
yet another swath of Manhattan.   
 It obviously took more than happenstance to bring this cultural center into being, 
despite the inevitability of the “three coincidences” narrative. The long road from concept to 
institution intersected at many points with New York’s own journey out of its industrial past 
and into the new vision of modernity brought about in the aftermath of World War II and 
with the onset of the Cold War. The changes occurring within New York and the United 
States in the two decades following the war set the stage for the creation of Lincoln Center 
and provided a basis for the rhetoric that would be deployed to garner support for the project 
and shape the institution’s public-facing identity as an institution authorized to represent the 
cultural maturity of the United States on the international stage. Although the United States 
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President had declared Lincoln Center to be “a mighty influence for peace and understanding 
throughout the world,” the Center did not derive its legitimacy through any official national 
or even municipal designation. Rather, it was through its imbrication in a struggle for control 
of the expression of urban identity in the postwar era that Lincoln Center emerged as a 
monument to civic and national progress even before anyone ever took to its stages. 
Out the Most Barren Wasteland 
The Lincoln Square Urban Renewal Project was by far the biggest Title I project 
undertaken in New York City. As originally conceived, the project site spanned 53 acres, 
more than four times larger than the average 12.5 acre size of Title I sites up until that 
point.67 Robert Moses and the project’s sponsors viewed the scale as a laudable element of an 
ambitious vision, but that same scale also ensured massive displacement of residents and 
business owners. At an October 1956 luncheon, reporters asked Moses to respond to 
criticism of the anticipated evictions in Lincoln Square. His response was as brief as it was 
vivid. “The scythe of progress must move north,”68 he declared, evoking an image of 
building after building being violently whacked from its foundation by the scythe’s blade on 
a relentless march up the island of Manhattan. Not only did the image conjured by his 
metaphor suggest a willful disregard for the existing cityscape, but it also chillingly reflected 
the virtual defenselessness of those in the path of the scythe-wielding representative of 
progress who exercised near absolute control over the built environment of New York City.  
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By the time the Lincoln Square project was officially announced in 1955, Moses was 
four decades into a career in which he had transformed the landscape of the outer boroughs 
of New York with a vast array of public works projects including a sprawling network of 
roadways, bridges, and tunnels leading to his network of parks and recreational facilities. 
After World War II, he oversaw two projects in Manhattan, the Stuyvesant Town housing 
project and the United Nations headquarters, each of which was privately sponsored and 
established the practices that would become the signature of the “New York approach” to 
urban renewal. Despite the success of these projects and although he had amassed 
extraordinary power by the end of the war, control over Manhattan’s landscape—at least to 
the degree that Moses desired—remained elusive.      
That changed swiftly and decisively in December 1948 when Moses convinced 
Mayor William O’Dwyer to appoint him as chairman of the Slum Clearance Committee, 
which would oversee implantation of urban renewal projects under Title I of the 1949 
Housing Act.  The appointment received scant attention in the press, which had yet to 
understand the impact that Title I clearance would have on the city. However, “on the 
landscape of New York’s history,” writes Moses’s biographer Robert Caro, “that 
appointment stands out like a mountain.”69  Title I not only made unprecedented amounts of 
money available for purposes of slum clearance, but it also “extended the power of eminent 
domain, traditionally used in America only for government-built projects, so drastically that 
governments could now condemn land and turn it over to [private] individuals.”70 Between 
the passage of the 1949 Housing Act and the Lincoln Square project, Moses used these newly 
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expanded powers of eminent domain to bulldoze entire neighborhoods to make way for 
superblocks on which he built apartment complexes, hospitals, university buildings, and of 
course, cultural centers. When Lincoln Center was first conceived in 1953, Moses’s urban 
renewal projects had encountered some political resistance from those who argued that slum 
clearance and urban renewal projects led not to the improvement of living conditions for 
those inhabiting what Moses and the Slum Clearance Committee described as derelict and 
obsolete buildings but rather to the tearing apart of tightly knit communities forced to endure 
relocation to housing projects far removed from the neighborhoods that had evolved over 
decades. However, before the Lincoln Square Urban Renewal Project, such arguments had 
never gained much political traction, largely because of Moses’s masterful depiction of 
substandard living conditions and his insistence that remaking the physical landscape of the 
city was a necessary means to the end of an orderly city worthy of its increasingly prominent 
place on the world political stage.  
Nothing symbolized that newfound prominence as vividly as the United Nations 
Headquarters, which marked an important moment in the shaping of New York’s postwar 
identity. “I felt that this was the one great thing,” Mayor O’Dwyer later recalled of the city’s 
efforts to lure the UN to New York, “that would make New York the center of the world.”71 
The United Nations represented New York’s centrality on the global political stage and 
served as a shining example of the order that modernist architecture, embodied in the sleek 
glass tower of the Secretariat Building, could impose on the unruly city streets, embodied by 
the conglomeration of slaughter houses in the largely industrial neighborhood, known as 
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Turtle Bay, upon which the UN headquarters arose. More importantly for purposes of the 
story of Lincoln Center, there was virtually no controversy over the clearing of the Turtle 
Bay neighborhood because of its predominantly industrial character and the political 
significance and prestige of the UN project. This combination made the project, to use 
common parlance, a no brainer. “In truth,” writes Samuel Zipp, “no justification was needed, 
only a story that laid out a clear and meaningful progression from one kind of a 
neighborhood to another.” The Turtle Bay neighborhood, essentially a slaughterhouse 
district, was viewed as “unsightly distasteful, and noxious” in comparison to its more refined 
bordering neighborhoods. More important, however, was that the significance of the United 
Nations headquarters meant that the existing neighborhood was seen as “ultimately 
unimportant in light of the world historic splendors planned to replace it.”72 Turtle Bay, 
therefore, had to go not only to eradicate the “unsightly, distasteful, and noxious” 
environment of the slaughterhouse district but also to establish in the public imagination the 
need for New York to self-consciously craft its image as a world class city by making room 
on the city grid for important institutions like the United Nations and eventually Lincoln 
Center.   
 Moses’s total control over the selection of urban renewal sites, unfettered by 
effective resistance, was typical of most major cities in the period spanning the late 1940s 
until 1965, according to urban historians Norman and Susan Fainstein. They argue that 
during this period, which they term the “directive period” of urban politics in the United 
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States,73 control over the landscape of the city rested in the hands of a tightly controlled 
sphere of influence and power.  “Development politics in the city was pluralistic,” they write, 
“only in that it had many powerful players, certainly not in the sense that ordinary 
communities or working class and minority groups influenced the process.”74 The prevailing 
wisdom of the day dictated that in the neighborhoods targeted for renewal and slum clearance 
the deterioration was so severe that only a clean slate could bring about rehabilitation and 
that clean slate could only be brought to bear by the swift unilateral action of city 
government. The core tenet of urban renewal—a belief in the idea of benevolent intervention 
in the shaping of the cityscape for the greater good—helped to stave off those who would 
object to slum clearance projects by depicting targeted areas in such a way as to make it 
virtually impossible for an outside observer to view such sites—and they were almost 
referred to as sites or areas, not neighborhoods—as having any intrinsic value.  
Moses was a masterful spin-doctor when it came to making the case for deeming a 
neighborhood a slum in need of clearance. A major factor of his effectiveness was the matter-
of-fact way in which he presented the case for any given urban renewal project. For every 
project, Moses prepared a highly detailed brochure in which he laid out the redevelopment 
plans and demonstrated the prevalence of slum conditions.  The brochures emphasized 
empirical data and “demonstrated Moses’s commitment to professional expertise” and the 
nuts and bolts of the redevelopment plan were “cast in terms of square-foot and dollar 
calculations rather than social vision.” To demonstrate blight, Moses relied on both concrete 
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facts and figures and photos that depicted the area as being run down. And although the 
brochures included information to demonstrate that steps had been taken to assist with tenant 
relocation, they rendered the existing residents virtually invisible. 75 
In the case of Lincoln Center, the New York Times consistently carried Moses’s blight 
removal banner, lauding the eradication of “the barren urban waste” of the Lincoln Square 
neighborhood, “full of filth and vermin.” Surely the public couldn’t be expected to mourn the 
loss of such a neighborhood, especially when it would give way to “a cultural fairyland.”76 
As work got underway to bring Lincoln Center into being, it seemed that Moses’s vision of 
the city had won. However, by the time the Lincoln Center project was announced, about six 
years after the passage of the 1949 Housing Act, it had become increasingly difficult to mask 
the social costs of urban renewal projects as it was becoming clear that there was inadequate 
housing to absorb the refugees from Moses’s Title I projects.    
When plans for Lincoln Center were announced in 1955, protests arose immediately. 
Harris Present, who had been approached by two committees—one representing residents 
and one representing business owners—became the leading voice in resistance to Lincoln 
Square and ultimately to urban renewal itself. Although the resistance to the project focused 
primarily on the displacement of the neighborhood’s inhabitants, Present and his allies 
realized that they were fighting not just for the homes and businesses of those already in the 
neighborhood but for the legitimacy of “an alternative urbanism based in the informal 
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connections of neighborhood culture.”77 Although they failed to stop the project, their 
opposition “revealed the fault lines at the heart of urban renewal,”78 bringing the growing 
discontent with Moses’s brand of “all-or-nothing bulldozer clearance” to a wider audience 
than ever before. “Perhaps the most important achievement” of the resistance was that it 
“revealed a vision of urban culture that was diametrically opposed to that on offer at Lincoln 
Center; instead of a new modern cityscape for a world city delivered from on high, the 
residents and businesspeople of Lincoln Square defended the complex social world of their 
old neighborhood.”79 Although Lincoln Center’s backers successfully warded off the 
protesters to ensure the project could succeed, the protests had effectively called into 
question the wisdom of a “top down” approach to urban development. The “alternative 
urbanism” advocated by the protesters finally found its voice when Jane Jacobs published 
The Death and Life of Great American Cities in 1962, a landmark publication that led to a 
major shift in urban renewal practices. By the mid-1960s, developers found that simply 
bulldozing over existing neighborhoods was no longer a politically tenable approach to urban 
redevelopment and by the 1970s “for the first time in New York’s history, many preservation 
and renewal programs were aimed at preventing the complete disappearance of buildings 
associated with the city’s identity.”80 Such a major change represented an ideological if not 
practical victory for those who had protested so fiercely against the Lincoln Square Urban 
Renewal Project and also highlights Lincoln Center’s unique position as a sort of linchpin in 
the trajectory of urban planning politics in postwar New York City. It also helps to explain 
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why the Center’s backers would double down on the notion of weaponizing high culture in 
the fight for supremacy during the Cold War. In the face of such fierce resistance, such a 
narrative was crucial in making the argument that Lincoln Center served an important public 
purpose.  
From the Golden Horseshoe to Lincoln Square 
For the cultural institutions to be housed there, Lincoln Center’s scale and its status as 
the anchor of a city-sponsored urban renewal program proffered the hope of liberation from 
the whims of the speculative real estate market, to which most performing arts venues, 
particularly theaters, had been relegated up until that point. While Moses looked to the 
Metropolitan Opera and the New York Philharmonic for the stamp of cultural legitimation 
necessary to lend the necessary aura of a higher purpose to the project, the Met and 
Philharmonic, each facing their own real estate challenges, eventually embraced the 
opportunity offered by the Lincoln Square project to resolve those challenges.  Partnering 
with Moses on the project would not only solve practical problems, however. It would but 
also help to affirm their civic importance in a highly visible way by claiming an enormous 
swath of public land on the city grid.   
For the Metropolitan Opera, the journey from their original home to Lincoln Center 
was particularly tumultuous. When it accepted Robert Moses’s invitation to sponsor a portion 
of the Lincoln Square Urban Renewal Project in October of 1955, the Metropolitan Opera set 
in motion the creation of the Lincoln Center for the Performing Arts and ended an ongoing 
search for a new venue that dated as far back as 1908 when Otto Kahn, the new president of 
the Metropolitan Opera Company, first floated the idea of abandoning the opera house 
located at Broadway and 39th Street.  When prospective general manager Giulio Gatti-
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Casazza suggested the many shortcomings of the existing auditorium might dissuade him 
from accepting the position, Kahn assured him that he need not be concerned. “Don’t worry 
about it and have patience,” Kahn told him. “In two or three years a new Metropolitan Opera 
House will be built.”81 However, as Kahn was soon to learn, convincing the opera’s 
boxholders to abandon their beloved “golden horseshoe” would be a virtually impossible feat 
no matter how severe the theater’s practical shortcomings. The journey to a new home lasted 
not the two or three years Kahn promised but instead nearly six decades as competing 
factions within the company fought over a series of proposals to abandon the Met’s home at 
39th Street and Broadway, a conflict driven by the tension between Otto Khan’s desire to 
democratize the Opera and the old guard’s desire to maintain the opera house as an important 
expression of their social status.   
In late 1925, Kahn proposed building a new opera house on a plot of land he had 
acquired, bounded by 56th and 57th Streets and Eighth and Ninth Avenues. Kahn argued a 
new venue was needed to address two pressing concerns. First, there was the practical matter 
of the condition of the auditorium, which lacked adequate backstage storage and whose 
mechanical equipment could be generously described as outmoded. Secondly, in the years 
following World War I, the Opera began to attract an audience outside the ranks of high 
society and Kahn felt passionately that the Opera should be working to broaden its reach to 
this “substantial group of well-educated music lovers who cared nothing about social 
standing.” 82 To achieve this, Kahn proposed that the new opera house have an additional one 
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thousand moderately priced seats and that the number of parterre boxes be reduced from 
thirty-five to thirty. Further, while the current boxholders would continue to be shareholders 
in the opera house, the boxes themselves would no longer be owned but would be distributed 
under a leasing system.  
It is important to note that from the time of its inception until 1940, the Metropolitan 
Opera actually consisted of two distinct corporate entities. The Metropolitan Opera 
Company, which was the producing unit, bore responsibility for artistic direction and 
production. The Metropolitan Opera and Real Estate Company, on the other hand, was the 
real estate holding company that owned the building itself with the boxholders sharing the 
ownership among themselves. Any plans for relocation would require the approval of the 
boards of both the producing company and the Real Estate Company. While the producing 
company unanimously accepted Kahn’s proposal, the Real Estate Company’s board was 
sharply divided, with some of the older directors expressing opposition to Kahn’s idea. 
Nonetheless, Kahn knew that some members of the board favored the idea, and said so in a 
letter to R. Fulton Cutting, chairman of the Real Estate Company’s board.83 Cutting 
countered that although some members of the Real Estate Company’s board had expressed 
support for the proposal, there was certainly no consensus among them that replacing the 
existing building was desirable. However, he stipulated that if Khan could demonstrate 
adequate public support for the proposal, the Real Estate Company would not stand in the 
way.84  
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Khan took to the press to make his case, and flatly accused the Real Estate 
Company’s board of rampant classism, which he argued was the real motive behind the 
resistance to doing away with the beloved “golden horseshoe.” “A considerable number of 
the lower priced seats are so bad,” he said, “that it is really an act of unfairness to take money 
for them especially from people of small means.”85 That so many of the more affordable 
seats had obstructed views was a direct result of the theater’s design, which had been selected 
based on “the single fact of [architect Josiah Cleveland Cady] having provided more boxes 
than any of the other entries [in the competition for the opera house commission].”86  
Khan’s publicity campaign garnered enough public support to pressure the board to 
approve the plan to replace the old opera house, which they did in a unanimous vote in 
February 1927. But despite the board’s acquiescence to the public pressure, Khan, in 
launching his public campaign against the opera house and the exclusivity it represented, had 
“unintentionally awakened the sleeping giant of [the Real Estate Company],” setting off a 
power struggle in which he “faced an effort to discredit and defeat him at every turn.”87 Even 
as architects Joseph Urban and Benjamin Morris began to develop the plans for the new 
house, a faction of the Real Estate Company’s board worked to undermine Kahn’s proposal. 
When it was discovered that the actual costs of building on Kahn’s site far exceeded the 
allotted budget for the new house, a faction of the old guard, led by Mrs. Cornelius 
Vanderbilt and her nephew seized the projected overrun as an opportunity to put the kibosh 
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on using Kahn’s site and succeeded in reversing the board’s decision.88  Kahn, realizing he 
had been defeated, put his parcel on the market.  
Khan’s failed attempt to replace the grand auditorium with a less ostentatious venue 
demonstrated just how invested the Real Estate Company was in protecting the venue, which 
had become such an important expression of their social standing. Although some on the 
board might have conceded that the time had come to make the Met’s performances more 
accessible, the opera house continued to be an important locus for New York’s elite.  As the 
Times noted, the Metropolitan Opera House was “recognized as the only centralizing factor 
in New York society, which has been broken up into small groups and scattered by many 
influences in the last generation or two. . . . The Golden Horseshoe represents New York 
society’s last stand as a unit.”89  By the time the proposal was defeated, the Real Estate 
Company, despite the fierce opposition Kahn’s proposal had evoked, had in fact reached 
consensus that a new and better-equipped opera house was desirable, and in 1928 turned their 
attention to a new site and a new patron. 
The site was several blocks in midtown Manhattan owned by Columbia University: a 
three-block area bounded by 48th and 51st Streets and Fifth and Sixth Avenues that would 
eventually become Rockefeller Center. Benjamin Morris, who had designed a modest opera 
house for Khan’s site, adapted his design for the new location, which he conceived as a 
“monumental arcade” that would “open onto a large square fronting the opera house. The 
arcade would make the opera house visible from—and give it an address on—Fifth Avenue.” 
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Commercial office towers would line the square on which the opera house was to sit, 
generating a steady stream of revenue.90 Whereas Kahn’s plan for the new opera house 
rejected ostentation, Morris’s vision promised to provide the monumental setting that Kahn 
eschewed, and the promise of such a setting would prove to be essential in winning to the 
approval of the Real Estate Company’s board of directors. 
Cutting, who had shown so little enthusiasm for the 57th Street site, embraced 
Morris’s proposal and began working to find a way to finance the project and to garner 
support among his fellow board members, and in the spring of 1928 he succeeded in 
convincing John D. Rockefeller, Jr. to underwrite the cost of the land. The cost of building 
the opera house, however, was to the responsibility of the Metropolitan Opera Real Estate 
Company. The Rockefeller Center project seemed likely to finally put to rest the conflict-
laden search for a new venue for the Met by offering both the adequate facilities the old 
house so desperately lacked and a setting that would demonstrate the organization’s artistic 
and social supremacy, while at the same time providing the city with a grand civic plaza.  
The center’s layout would counter the increasing dominance of the skyscraper and 
rampant overbuilding that had, according to the New York Times, “allowed New York to 
choke itself to death.”91 The design of Rockefeller Center “made provision for public space 
on a scale which had no precedent in New York,” allowing for “the maximum amount of 
light into the entrance [of the plaza], and ensur[ed] there was no sense of an out-of-scale 
canyon effect.”92 Moreover, the plan “[offered] to put in a distinguished position an 
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institution which, in spite of its eminent artistic and social standing, has seemed condemned 
to be relegated to the side lines to which our theatres for the most part have already retired.”93 
Situated in the majestic setting of Rockefeller Center, the Met would be rescued from the 
crass commercial character of it once-fashionable present location, which had come to be 
enveloped by the garment district to the south and the theater district to the north, and the 
affiliation with the Rockefeller name could only enhance the prestige of the organization. 
But despite the seemingly perfect marriage between the Met and the Rockefeller 
Center project, the Metropolitan Opera was forced out of the project by the bottom line 
Realizing just how much the building project would cost—a cost exacerbated by the fact that 
the Met would have to remain dark for a year during the transition94—the Met began to 
hesitate, and Rockefeller and his associates sensed that they might be deliberately stalling. 
After months of obvious delaying tactics, Rockefeller and his team pressed the Met’s board 
to make a firm commitment to building the opera house on the site, but the board argued that 
the only way they could move forward with the project would be if Rockefeller agreed to pay 
half the cost of the new building. Rockefeller, affronted by what he considered “genteel 
blackmail,” dropped the opera from the project.95 By now, twenty years had already passed 
since Otto Kahn’s 1908 promise to Giulio Gatti-Casazza that the Metropolitan would find a 
new home. As the Depression took hold, construction all but stopped in cities across the 
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country and the Metropolitan Opera entered into a period during which its very survival was 
threatened by a major financial crisis. It would be nearly twenty years more until another 
opportunity arose.  
That opportunity came from Robert Moses. On May 9, 1951, the New York Times 
announced that Moses had invited the Metropolitan Opera and the New York Philharmonic 
to construct “a modern music Center” in Columbus Circle, which was next up on Moses’s 
roster of Title I projects. Moses offered the Met and Philharmonic 80,000 square feet on 
which to build the Center. The Metropolitan would be required to pay approximately one 
million dollars, which represented a considerable savings, for the land. However, Moses 
“warned that ‘if the Metropolitan Opera enters the picture, with or without the Philharmonic’ 
it would be on its own in financing construction of the music Center.”96  
The Opera expressed interest in the proposal and successfully solicited a $500,000 
pledge from John D. Rockefeller, Jr. Then, on July 24, 1951, George Sloan and Lowell 
Wadmond—chairman and president, respectively, of the board of directors—formally agreed 
to bid on the land according to Moses’s terms. As the opera understood the matter, recalled 
general manager Rudolf Bing, this letter should have reserved the land on the project site for 
the Met. But eight months later, “without warning,” Moses “dumped the opera house project 
in a letter sent simultaneously to Wadmond and to the press.”97 As Bing tells the story, the 
Met’s board of directors was enthusiastically pursuing the Columbus Circle opportunity only 
to be completely blindsided by Moses who unceremoniously pulled the rug out from under 
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them at the last minute. However, a close look at the words of George Sloan and the words of 
Moses himself suggests otherwise. 
While it is true that Moses’s withdrawal of the offer to the Met was abrupt, it seems 
clear that it was caused, much like the Rockefeller Center project, by internal conflict within 
the Met and a continued sentimental attachment to the old house. Less than a year after 
Moses’s initial announcement, the Met had raised $900,000 toward the $1.2 million required 
to purchase the land, and it appeared that the prospects for raising the remaining $300,000 
were good. 98  But Moses dropped the Met two months later citing both financial concerns 
and housing requirements imposed by Title I as reasons.  These were valid concerns, but 
there is little doubt that Moses’s impatience with the machinations of the Met’s deliberations 
played a significant role in his decision. At one point, Moses candidly stated that the Opera 
remained “divided in its own counsels and some of its officials prefer to rebuild on the 
present site,”99 an observation that appears to have been well founded. 
Lowell Wadmond, president of the Metropolitan Opera Association, told the Times, 
“We are unhappy because this site was the finest in New York for a new opera house” and 
added that the “news will be a disappointment to the people who pledged money toward the 
purchase of the site.”100 Sloan, on the other hand, had consistently been lukewarm in his 
comments about the Met’s inclusion in the Coliseum project. In May 1951, when news first 
broke of Moses’s invitation, Sloan stated that the Met’s directors were “deeply appreciative” 
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of the offer and that “while there had been discussions with Mr. Moses, the announcement of 
a possible land subsidy was a new and welcome development, but there was a long way to go 
before the association could make a firm commitment.”101 Several months later, when the 
Times announced that fifty percent of the necessary funds had been raised by the opera to 
purchase the land at Columbus Circle, Sloan again equivocated, insisting, “while the opera 
group was deeply grateful to Mr. Moses and appreciated his cooperation, plans for relocating 
the opera house were in little more than the ‘dream stage.’”102 Every time things seemed to 
be moving forward, Sloan was quick to lower expectations and plant seeds of doubt.  
Sloan publicly explained his tepid endorsement of the project by focusing on the 
financial aspects of the relocation, but it seems more likely that he was opposed to the move 
because of a sentimental attachment to the prestige and glamour of the old house and a 
discomfort with the notion of the Metropolitan’s association with a public urban 
redevelopment project. The Columbus Circle project, although supported by most of Sloan’s 
colleagues, presented a difficult conundrum. On the one hand, the project offered the Opera a 
site that, while perhaps not quite as glamorous as Rockefeller Center, would ensure “an 
opportunity to create [an] imposing civic [monument]. . . . But at the same time Moses’s 
invitation raised questions about the Metropolitan Opera’s willingness to modify its 
traditional stance as a quasi-aristocratic group that was too ‘white glove’ to cooperate 
directly with municipal government.”103 While neither Sloan nor any other Met director ever 
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made any such statement publicly, it is a reasonable conclusion. As Howard Taubman wrote 
in the Times, Sloan “made no secret of his fondness for the old opera house, built in 1883 and 
reminiscent of a gracious era.”104 And what could be less gracious than being associated with 
a slum clearance and public housing project? Sloan’s colleagues recognized that among 
many reasons that Moses sought to include the Metropolitan Opera in one of his Title I 
project was his realization of the “inability of the Metropolitan Opera and the Philharmonic 
Symphony Orchestra to cope with the real estate challenges of New York City.”105 If the Met 
were ever to escape the clutches of the garment district and take its rightful place on an 
appropriate pedestal, it would require a patron. It was one thing when that patron was to be 
John D. Rockefeller, Jr., but the idea of the city as patron was too much to bear for Sloan. 
While it was widely understood within the organization that a major change was needed in 
regards to the Metropolitan’s home, the organization seemed, in 1952, to be at an impasse. 
As long as the makeup of the board of directors and executive management remained the 
same, little was likely to change.  
Meanwhile, the New York Philharmonic, which Moses had also reportedly invited 
into the Columbus Circle project, was soon to face its own real estate troubles, which would 
provide an important impetus in the development of the Lincoln Center project. As noted 
above, the original announcement of Moses’s Columbus Circle project stated that both the 
Metropolitan Opera and the New York Philharmonic had been invited to participate in the 
project.  But the ensuing press coverage scarcely mentioned the Philharmonic, focusing 
instead almost entirely on the Met.  Five days after Moses’s announcement of his proposed 
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music Center at Columbus Circle, Floyd Blair, president of the Philharmonic Symphony 
Society, told the New York Times that while he thought the idea of a music Center in 
collaboration with the opera would be a “splendid thing for the city,” he had written Moses to 
say that he was “at a loss as to how to discuss the orchestra’s role.” According to Blair and 
the Times, no one had approached him and the first he heard about the project was when he 
read about it in the papers.106  
A few weeks later, Blair reported to the board of directors about the proposed music 
center in Columbus Circle, “and after discussion the Board unanimously agreed that the 
President and the Management should do their utmost for the best interests of the Society 
which is interested in any development for a permanent concert hall.”107 For the next eight 
months, the board remained silent on the matter until a February 1952 meeting when they 
affirmed their interest in joining the Metropolitan Opera at Columbus Circle “if the plan 
could readily be expanded into a larger project.” However, the following month, Moses 
pulled the plug on the Columbus Circle music center project and the matter was laid to rest 
for the time being.108  
Three years later, some significant changes rekindled discussions of a joint venture 
between the Met and Philharmonic. Robert Moses began eyeing the area northwest of 
Columbus Circle for slum clearance and redevelopment in 1953. The project he envisioned 
“would provide for housing, a hotel or hotels, and other improvements, including perhaps, 
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such quasi-public institutions as the Engineering Societies, Metropolitan Opera, 
Philharmonic, etc.” However, he was unsure whether the Metropolitan and Philharmonic 
could be counted on to “come to an agreement among themselves.”109 In March 1954 he 
wrote to Col. Joseph M. Harfield, an executive committee member at the Met, to gauge the 
interest of the organization in joining the project, asking Harfield to tell him “briefly and 
categorically whether the Metropolitan Opera would have enough money to buy, let us say, 
three acres at a written-down cost and enough funds left to be sure of completing a building 
within a period of about four years?”110  
Having dealt with the Met’s lack of resolve in the past, he made plain in asking for a 
“brief and categorical” response that he was unwilling to be waylaid again the way he had 
with Columbus Circle and the way that Rockefeller had been similarly waylaid twenty years 
before. Harfield replied promptly that the Metropolitan Opera was indeed interested, but 
again he faced stiff opposition from Sloan. After five months passed without a commitment 
from the Met, Moses informed members of the Slum Clearance Committee that he was 
dropping the Met from the project because of Sloan’s opposition.111 Harfield pleaded with 
Moses for more time to get the Metropolitan to commit and although Moses hoped there 
might still be a path by which to bring the opera on board, he looked elsewhere for sponsors 
for the redevelopment project.  
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 A few months later, Sloan, the last significant hurdle to relocating the Met, resigned 
as the chairman of the Metropolitan Opera’s board of directors. 112 With Sloan removed as 
chairman, fellow director Charles Spofford, who had long advocated finding a new 
auditorium for the opera company “took charge of the Opera Association and seized the 
opportunity” to get the Board to affirmatively state its intention to secure a site within the 
Lincoln Square Urban Renewal Project.113 The Metropolitan Board wasted no time in doing 
so. On April 15, 1955, they resolved unanimously to advise Moses of the Met’s “continued 
interest” in the project and to develop a plan to finance the purchase of the land on the project 
site and the construction of the opera house.114 Having officially resolved to move forward 
with the plan, four representatives from the New House Committee sat down with Moses 
about a week later. At the meeting, Moses presented his official offer: 120,000 square feet 
was available to the Met at a cost of $8 per square foot. The offer was contingent on 
acceptance by the Met no later than July 1, 1955.115 During this same meeting, the idea of a 
joint venture with the Philharmonic was floated but Moses rejected the idea, saying that the 
Met “should not attempt to associate with any other group, or try to build a temple of music 
in which other organizations could participate, or any other joint venture.” Three days later, 
however, Moses, for reasons that do not appear ever to have been explained, changed his 
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mind and agreed to make land available within the site for the Philharmonic as well should 
they be interested.116 
 While the Metropolitan’s New House Committee was negotiating with Moses in the 
spring of 1955, the New York Philharmonic was dealing with its own real estate troubles. In 
May 1955, Floyd Blair told the Philharmonic’s board that he had received notice from 
Carnegie Hall’s management that they intended to cancel the Philharmonic’s lease because of 
their plans to sell the building. Blair reported that a representative of Carnegie Hall had 
indicated that he “was desirous of preserving the Hall” rather than seeing it demolished to 
make way for more profitable land use “and would sell it to the Philharmonic at possibly less 
than the offer” the owners of the hall had received.117  
 The Philharmonic had been housed at Carnegie Hall since the hall was built in 1891 
and although they had expressed interest in the previous Columbus Circle proposal, there was 
little real enthusiasm for the move. Carnegie Hall had been an ideal home. Now, faced with 
the possibility of losing that home, the leadership began weighing its options, which included 
accepting the offer to purchase Carnegie Hall or “the building of a new hall, either in 
cooperation with the opera or alone.”118 It is not clear exactly when the Philharmonic was 
first approached by representatives from the Metropolitan Opera, but such an approach likely 
happened prior to the May 11th meeting at which Blair announced the impending sale of 
Carnegie Hall to the board and the executive management committee. The aforementioned 
meeting among Moses and the Met’s New House Committee had taken place on April 26, 
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and the idea of a joint venture was floated during that meeting and the news of the sale of 
Carnegie Hall was delivered to the Philharmonic early in April.  
In stark contrast to the Met, the Philharmonic approached the issue of its permanent 
home with remarkable pragmatism. The committee tasked with exploring housing options 
ultimately identified four options. Among them were the purchase of Carnegie Hall, the 
purchase of an existing hall (other than Carnegie), the construction of a new hall, or a joint 
venture with another institution. Houghton, the chairman of the committee, intimated the 
desirability of this last option, but also noted that moving forward with such a joint venture 
was for the moment out of the Philharmonic’s control because “[t]he initial action—the 
acquisition of the property—is in the hands of the Opera, and the Society must await its 
decision which is expected by the end of summer.”119 Although the prospect of the joint 
move with the Met offered many advantages, Houghton reminded the board that the 
orchestra was guaranteed three years of tenancy at Carnegie Hall even if the building were to 
be sold. The Philharmonic therefore had “adequate time to explore all of the four outlined 
possibilities,” so he recommended moving forward on all four options without committing to 
any, which would ensure that the Philharmonic could maintain a strong bargaining position 
in negotiations for whichever option they chose.120 However attached the organization was to 
their home at Carnegie Hall, the board easily arrived at a consensus that such an attachment 
needed to be set aside in order to ensure the advancement of the Philharmonic as an 
organization.  
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By the summer of 1955, the Philharmonic had all but decided not to purchase 
Carnegie Hall.  A committee unaffiliated with the Philharmonic had launched a campaign in 
June 1955 to save the hall, 121 but the Philharmonic, although they were grateful for those 
running that campaign, said they were unable to take an active part because they were, as 
they said in their annual report, occupied with the annual fundraising drive to meet their 
annual deficit.”122 Clearly they realized that remaining at Carnegie Hall was becoming a less 
attainable goal, and their distancing themselves from the efforts to save the hall suggests they 
were attempting to detach the Philharmonic from the venue both internally and in the public 
mind. Although the Met was still about a month away from officially committing to the 
Lincoln Square project, it had by this time raised almost all the money necessary to do so. 
With this knowledge in hand, the Philharmonic could—and did—state that it believed “that if 
a civic music Center is to be established, the Orchestra should join with the Metropolitan 
Opera and become part of such a Center.”123 All that was needed was the green light from the 
Met.  
On October 17, 1955, Metropolitan Opera president Lowell Wadmond wrote to 
Moses and officially offered to sponsor development of a 120,000 square foot plot within the 
Lincoln Square area.124 Later that month, the Philharmonic’s board unanimously voted to 
commit the Philharmonic to paying $250,000 for the purchase of one acre on the Lincoln 
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Square Urban Renewal Project site.125 After the Slum Clearance Committee rejected the 
$250,000 bid, the Philharmonic’s board authorized an increased bid of $350,000 in order to 
meet Moses’s demand for no less than $8 per square foot.126 On December 9, 1955, 
Houghton informed Moses of the decision and the bid was accepted.127  
Much work remained to develop the institutional framework within which the 
Philharmonic and the Metropolitan would operate, but both organizations, having been 
marshaled into Moses’s march toward modernity, had secured a permanent home on the 
cityscape that was sure to be defined by grand vistas and monumental structures. With the 
participation of the Metropolitan and the Philharmonic confirmed, work could now begin on 
establishing how these two institutions would relate to each in the context of their new home 
while Moses could begin the work of gaining the necessary approvals to start condemning 
and razing the neighborhood to make way for his next superblock project.  
Enter Rockefeller 
When the Met and Philharmonic’s joint participation in the Lincoln Square project 
was publicly announced in October 1955, it was understood publicly as little more than a real 
estate transaction involving two distinct organizations, and in reality, that is essentially what 
it was. A joint committee comprised of leaders from both organizations had been formed to 
address the question of their interrelationship. John W. Dyre, representing the Met, said that 
he “was pleased by the Philharmonic’s decision [to join the project], but said it was too soon 
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to predict just how the two committees would cooperate,” emphasizing that the two 
organizations would “exist in the new development as two distinct units.”128 However, 
despite Dyre’s insistence on maintaining the autonomy of each organization, many of his 
colleagues on the committee had begun to think of the move to Lincoln Square as an 
opportunity to develop a project that was more than a simple real estate transaction. Although 
it would take a considerable amount of time to firmly establish all the intricacies of what 
would eventually become a mammoth institution, the vision for Lincoln Center as it finally 
emerged was established in relatively short order and, like the decision of the organizations 
to move to Lincoln Square, had its roots grounded firmly in pragmatism. 
Despite the steeply discounted cost of the land upon which they would build their 
new venues, the Metropolitan Opera and the New York Philharmonic Society needed to raise 
many millions of dollars. Raising the funds would be difficult under the best circumstances, 
but the added difficulty stemming from the inevitable competition that would arise from 
simultaneous appeals to many of the same prospective donors required the committee to 
think beyond brick and mortar.  “There was tentative talk of some kind of a joint campaign,” 
recalled Edgar Young, “and agreement that in whatever way their plans might evolve they 
needed the judgment, interest, and support of civic leaders outside their immediate 
groups.”129 The group, according to Young, hoped to bring a Rockefeller on board to assist 
with the fundraising and in developing the organizational structure of a joint venture. Nelson 
Rockefeller, located in Washington at the time (he was yet to be elected Governor of New 
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York), was clearly not a possibility, so architect Wallace Harrison suggested John D. 
Rockefeller 3rd, a suggestion echoed by Dean Rusk, president of the Rockefeller 
Foundation.130  
In early September 1955, Charles Spofford attended a meeting of the Council on 
Foreign Relations, a panel on which he served alongside John D. Rockefeller 3rd. During a 
break from the meeting, Spofford told the Rockefeller the story of the “three coincidences” 
and shared that the committee members had begun to think about an expansive cultural 
center. Rockefeller later recalled that after hearing Spofford spin the three coincidences story, 
“new horizons began to open” for him. “Since the war,” he said, “my work had been 
concentrated in the international area and I had begun to think more seriously of my 
responsibilities as a citizen of New York.”131 Although Rockefeller had no previous 
experience in music, theater, or dance, Lincoln Center was not his first flirtation with the 
performing arts. Just two years before, three leaders from the City Center for Music and 
Drama—president Newbold Morris, treasurer Morton Baum, and managing director Lincoln 
Kirstein—reached out to Rockefeller with an invitation to join their board to head a new 
fundraising effort. Rockefeller’s involvement with City Center ultimately did not pan out, as 
Rockefeller came to realize after many months of negotiation that the City Center leadership 
wanted him “for the prestige of his name and his ability as a fund-raiser, not to yield any 
power or allow him to have any real say in the governing policies of the Center.”132 
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Uninterested in a position offering no meaningful policy role to play, Rockefeller dropped 
negotiations with City Center in early 1955. Although Rockefeller walked away from City 
Center, the negotiations had led him to the determination that “any new activity [for me in 
New York City] should be in the field of culture.”133 It was a logical determination, largely 
because it would allow Rockefeller to stake out his own philanthropic “territory” among the 
Rockefeller family, as the Rockefeller Foundation had not showered the arts and humanities 
with its beneficence to anywhere near the degree it had endowed medicine, education, and 
science, an aversion dating back to its 1913 founding. With John D. Rockefeller, Sr. and 
Standard Oil still embroiled in an antitrust lawsuit brought by the federal government, the 
Foundation was viewed with great suspicion, and many assumed that it was vehicle for 
money laundering and other such improprieties. As a result, “the Rockefeller Foundation 
refrained from anything that smacked of controversy” and for a long time “shunned the 
humanities, social sciences, and the arts as areas too subjective or fraught with political 
peril.”134 The Foundation heavily favored, as a matter of political survival, science and 
medicine, which shielded it and Rockefeller Senior from charges of favoritism. Obviously, 
by the time Senior’s grandson was approached about joining the Lincoln Center effort, the 
Standard Oil chapter had long been closed and Lincoln Center would offer a highly visible 
entrée into culture for the Rockefeller Foundation. After consulting with several people, 
including Foundation president Dean Rusk, Wallace Harrison, Edgar Young, and Lincoln 
                                                
133 Ibid., 126. 
134 Ron Chernow, Titan: The Life of John D. Rockefeller, Sr. (New York: Vintage Books, 1998), 568. 
 76 
Kirstein, head of the New York City Ballet, Rockefeller committed to attending a meeting of 
the committee, the first of which took place on October 25, 1955.135  
At this first meeting, the group turned their attention to the primary question at hand: 
was it feasible or desirable to build anything other than an opera house and concert hall 
within the Lincoln Square project? Edgar Young recalled they considered many questions to 
determine the feasibility of expanding the vision: “What might foster the arts of serious 
music? What might bring those arts to a wider public? Are facilities needed for other arts? 
What would be constructive and important in the life of New York City and of the 
nation?”136 Naturally the committee did not arrive at any immediate answers to these 
questions, but they were clearly beginning to think along the lines of national stature and 
prestige. Two weeks later, Rockefeller officially assumed the chairmanship of the committee, 
which officially named itself “The Exploratory Committee for a Musical Arts center” in 
December 1955. The committee established a preliminary budget of $50,000 to cover their 
costs over the next five months and applied to the Rockefeller Foundation for a grant in that 
amount. Writing the formal request on behalf of the committee, Spofford articulated the 
mission of the group: 
[T]o determine the feasibility of a musical arts Center in the City not only for the 
opera and symphony but also for such activities as chamber music, ballet, light opera, 
and spoken drama, and possible educational programs related thereto. Other questions 
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to be considered by the Committee, should it reach an affirmative decision regarding 
the Center, will touch upon the proper organizational relationships of the various 
participating groups, the facilities that would be required, and the best methods of 
financing such a project.137 
 The first key question the committee had to address was what arts other than opera 
and symphonic music would be included. They swiftly decided that the Center would be 
devoted exclusively to the performing arts and would therefore exclude visual arts because 
they “were well accommodated in New York, and we were concerned with how much a 
single Center could wisely include.”138  They also quickly reached consensus that in addition 
to the symphony and opera, spoken drama and ballet ought to be considered for inclusion in 
the Center, but no commitments were made nor were any actions yet taken.  
Although the expanding vision had a long way to go before being clearly defined, the 
exploratory committee began to make its existence known to the public in the final weeks of 
1955. On December 1, 1955, the New York Times ran a front-page story announcing 
Rockefeller’s leadership of the committee and revealing that the committee was exploring 
“the feasibility of an artistic set-up that would take in ballet, concerts, light opera and perhaps 
educational programs” as well as opera and symphony already represented by the Met and 
Philharmonic. In addition to exploring an expanded cultural center, The Times reported, the 
committee would also study possible means of financing the project, noting that 
Rockefeller’s familial pedigree coupled with “his long interest in social and cultural matters,” 
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had led to “speculation that funds from the Rockefeller Foundation might be put into the 
proposed Lincoln Square enterprise.”139  
As things stood both among the committee members and in the public imagination, 
the relocation of the Metropolitan Opera and the New York Philharmonic was moving 
forward, the pragmatic answer to a practical problem for each organization, facilitated by 
Moses’s vision for a modern metropolis. No clear sense of identity or “higher purpose” had 
yet been discussed publicly or even privately. But by highlighting Rockefeller in announcing 
the widening scope of the project of a bigger cultural center in Lincoln Square, the Times 
foreshadowed the important role Rockefeller would take in shaping the image of Lincoln 
Center in the months and years that lay ahead.  
Not for the Privileged Few, but for the Many 
A year after his involvement with the Lincoln Center project was announced, 
Rockefeller told the Times, “In the past the Metropolitan Opera has been for the few . . . and 
one wants to think of the Center as for the many.” 140 This one sentence demonstrates the key 
challenge facing Rockefeller and his committee in establishing the Center’s civic and 
national value. There was no escaping the fact that the Metropolitan Opera had been built on 
a foundation of exclusivity and classism and that it was easy to view Lincoln Center as little 
more than a lavish venue—built on the rubble of a working-class neighborhood—for elite 
institutions.  The committee would need to develop a narrative that made plain that 
accessibility for the citizenry was to be a core tenet of the Center’s philosophy, a narrative 
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that would need to be expressed through both rhetoric and the very structure of the 
organization. In terms of rhetoric, the Center’s leadership and the press, particularly the 
Times, consistently focused not on how the Center might reflect the cultural tastes of the 
broader populace of the city, but rather how that broader populace might be uplifted by 
exposure to opera, ballet, and symphonic music. As things stood a year into planning for 
Lincoln Center, more populist forms of entertainment would have to continue to fend for 
themselves on the real estate market, but Lincoln Center would whisk highbrow culture from 
the crass clutches of the city grid and mount their institutions on a dais overlooking the 
Upper West Side. The rhetoric of cultural maturity, discussed later in this chapter, would be 
an important strategic approach to justifying the privileging the highbrow through 
monumentalization, but in the course of planning the logistical setup of the institution, 
Lincoln Center’s leaders would need to strike the balance between maintaining the autonomy 
of the constituent organizations and portraying the overall cultural center as an institution 
meant to serve the many.  
When Lincoln Center for the Performing Arts, Inc. was officially incorporated on 
June 22, 1956, only the Metropolitan Opera and Philharmonic were firmly committed as 
constituents; although the committee had decided to expand the Center to include drama, 
dance, and an educational component, no decisions had been made in terms of what existing 
entities might be brought in. Work in that regard would span the next several years, but in the 
meantime, the committee worked toward articulating the function of the Center as an entity 
in its own right. The guiding principle that shaped the development of what came to be 
known as the “Lincoln Center Concept” was one of a “loose federation” in which each 
constituent organization would maintain “absolute artistic and financial autonomy.” The 
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newly established board of directors decided early on that Lincoln Center would not provide 
financial subsidy to cover the operating needs of the constituent organizations, which would, 
they felt, run counter to the pivotal principle of autonomy and be fiscally unsound.  
Instead, Lincoln Center would function as a beneficent landlord and would “assist but 
not control the development of the performing arts through the constituents.”141 The Center 
articulated its core principles in a document prepared in October 1957 and entitled 
“Standards for Constituents,” which articulated the “emerging principles” resulting from the 
“explorations with potential institutional sponsors in drama and the dance [which had] been 
in process for many months.” According to these principles, Lincoln Center’s role would be 
to “serve as a stimulus to artistic achievement and public service on the part of its 
constituents, and to be helpful in the developing relationships among constituents and their 
respective arts and functions.” Secondly, each constituent member would be assigned 
responsibility “for its own program and its own financial support,” which was “essential not 
only for the benefit of the constituents, but also for the Center itself and for the success of the 
joint effort.” The third principle that emerged was that, although each constituent 
organization was responsible for its own management and financing, inclusion in Lincoln 
Center offered several benefits. Among these were prestige; a home (Lincoln Center would 
“give its constituent performing companies assurance of their respective halls for such 
seasons as they require, together with year-round rehearsal halls, office space, storage rooms, 
and workshops”); operating benefits (Constituents would rent their halls, owned by Lincoln 
Center, on a break-even basis and in turn “Lincoln Center will pass on to its constituents tax 
exemptions, freedom from charges for debt service, and economies based on large-scale, 
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year-round operation”); and policy participation (under the by-laws of Lincoln Center, each 
constituent would have at least one representative on the Board of Directors of Lincoln 
Center).142 
The document went on to spell out the standards expected of any constituent 
organization: (1) ability to provide a needed service in or to the performing arts; (2) 
establishment and maintenance of artistic standards of the highest quality; (3) professional 
leadership capable of gaining and holding the respect of experts and of the public; and (4) 
institutional framework designed to assure continuity and financial stability, a commitment to 
public service, and a dedication to artistic advancement.143 With this general framework and 
these standards in mind, Lincoln Center continued its search for the remaining constituents. 
The New York City Ballet seemed to everyone on the committee to be the obvious 
choice to be brought in as the dance constituent at Lincoln Center. However, the Ballet did 
not have its own institutional existence, as it was a part of City Center, which was also home 
to the City Opera and was a frequent producer of musicals and operettas. The Ballet’s 
director, Lincoln Kirstein, a member of the Exploratory Committee, had recently resigned 
from City Center, leading “everyone to assume that the New York City Ballet could be 
detached to become the third constituent of Lincoln Center. . . . At first [Kirstein] seemed to 
be amenable to the idea and then his institutional loyalty to City Center reemerged.”144 The 
negotiations between Lincoln Center and City Center dragged on for months and ultimately 
resulted in a stalemate. However, a budget crisis in 1959 led to renewed negotiations with 
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City Center and led to a tussle among the directors of Lincoln Center in which the Lincoln 
Center Concept would be put to the test. 
In 1959, Lincoln Center faced a major fiscal crisis when updated budget analyses 
revealed a $37 million gap between original estimates and the actual financial need.145 
Knowing that filling such an enormous gap from gifts from the private sector was unrealistic, 
Rockefeller advocated pursuing direct financial support from the city, leading Lincoln Center 
to consider a new approach to bringing the New York City Ballet on board as a constituent 
organization. By this time, the board had long abandoned pursuing the Ballet as a stand-alone 
entity; if Lincoln Center wanted the New York City Ballet, it would have to bring in City 
Center in its entirety, which is precisely what Rockefeller decided to do It is impossible to 
know if Rockefeller would have moved forward with the idea had he not been faced with 
substantial budget overruns, but bringing in City Center solved two important problems. The 
first was practical; including City Center could help address an enormous budgetary problem. 
The other was symbolic; City Center, which had catered to working class audiences since its 
inception, would help Lincoln Center affirm its commitment to serving a wide audience and 
help better legitimize itself as a civic institution.  
By 1960, Lincoln Center had decided to seek $35.2 million from New York State and 
City government sources to fill the projected budget gap, $17.5 million of which would fund 
construction of the theater meant to accommodate the dance constituent.146 Rockefeller 
hoped to convince the city to underwrite the cost of the dance theater. Bringing in City 
Center, with its connection to the working class and reputation as a high-quality populist 
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venue, could make such a request more politically viable. As Rudolf Bing recalled, “direct 
tax-supported contribution to Lincoln Center was most easily justified by support for a low-
priced, popular house.”147  
City funding of the building turned out to be a complicated legal problem as New 
York’s state constitution prohibited the city or state from funding the construction of 
buildings it did not own. So if the city were to build the dance theater, it would have to retain 
ownership of the building and Lincoln Center would in turn lease the building from the city 
and the constituent housed therein would sub-lease the dance theater from Lincoln Center. 
Further, the city would not be able to provide the entire cost of the building, and so state 
funds would be required as well. But finding a framework for the state to make a substantial 
direct contribution posed a challenge as well.  The 1964 World’s Fair provided the solution. 
John Lockwood, legal counsel for the Rockefeller family, discussed the matter with Robert 
Moses, who was to head the World’s Fair. The two came to an agreement whereby Lincoln 
Center would house the performing arts unit for the fair (thereby saving the cost of erecting a 
venue at the fair’s site in Flushing Meadows, Queens). Under this arrangement, the dance 
theater, which would be named the New York State Theatre, would be the city and state’s 
contribution to the 1964 World’s Fair and not a direct endowment to Lincoln Center. It took 
two years of protracted negotiations and legislative maneuvering to finalize the arrangement, 
but by August 1962, Lincoln Center had secured the funds it needed to build the New York 
State Theatre, with the expectation that City Center would be, as a constituent of Lincoln 
Center, its primary tenant.  
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Even after Lincoln Center secured state and city funding for the State Theatre, 
negotiations with City Center would not be finalized for two more years, with the lease 
arrangement being one of the key sticking points. City Center objected to the notion of 
leasing from Lincoln Center and argued for an arrangement wherein they would lease 
directly from the city. However, Rockefeller and the Lincoln Center board refused to 
consider such a leasing arrangement as it would run counter to the entire Lincoln Center 
Concept, which held that Lincoln Center would act as landlord to all the constituent 
organizations. Further, the Lincoln Center Concept also specified that in order to facilitate 
Lincoln Center’s role as a facilitator of advancement in the performing arts, Lincoln Center 
would assume control of the buildings during the constituents’ off season during which it 
would book programming under the auspices of the Center itself. City Center objected to this 
proviso as well, demanding year-round control of the building. Finally, City Center agreed to 
sublease the State Theater building from Lincoln Center and to yield the venue to Lincoln 
Center for five to ten weeks per year. It was an agreement a long time in the making but one 
that shed light on the nature of the emerging institution. 
The decision to bring in City Center proved to be controversial within Lincoln Center. 
While Rockefeller believed that it was important to have a constituent organization with ties 
to the working class and with a low-price ticket policy to demonstrate that “Lincoln Center 
exist[ed] for the benefit of people at large and not for any limited social or economic 
group,”148 others, particularly the leadership of the Met, feared having such a populist 
organization in the Center would diminish its prestige. While the Met and the Philharmonic 
had historically catered to and to a large degree derived their cultural legitimacy from that 
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affiliation, City Center’s history was one defined by a strong connection to City Hall and the 
working classes of New York. Despite a solid reputation for its artistic achievements, it stood 
apart from the elite organizations that had spawned Lincoln Center  
City Center opened on December 11, 1943, when it produced its first opera, a 
“ragged-but-right” Carmen. The opening date was also significant in that it was scheduled to 
coincide with Mayor Fiorello LaGuardia’s sixty-first birthday. City Center was almost 
entirely an initiative conceived and birthed by LaGuardia himself, who “harbored the 
conviction, then highly unorthodox in the United States (though not in continental Europe or 
Britain), that ‘high art’ was intrinsically a proper concern of government, not only because it 
was a mark of civic achievement but also because it represented a means of happiness and 
fulfillment of which working class people were being unjustly deprived.”149 LaGuardia was 
not as interested in City Center serving as a symbol of any kind, but thought of it instead as a 
place where the working class citizens of New York, excluded from Broadway theaters and 
the Met by prohibitively expensive ticket prices, could enjoy the best in theater, opera, and 
music for an affordable price. Further, his belief in making culture available to the masses 
stemmed not from a desire to cultivate gentility but to provide uplift. “The industrial 
worker,” he declared, “has a monotonous job. He sews on buttons, say, all day long, stitch 
after stitch after stitch after stitch. But when the worker’s day is over, he can find his spirit 
refreshed and uplifted through—yes—through music, through art.”150  
City Center emerged out of the WPA program and “came as a result of a 
demonstrated popular demand.” In 1938, LaGuardia asked City Council president Newbold 
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Morris if he would manage they city operation of the WPA music project. Newbold at first 
resisted, arguing that he was not a musician. “That’s just why I want you to take this on,” 
LaGuardia replied. “You’re ‘box office;’ you know what kind of programs the average music 
lover wants to hear.”151 As he began the work of taking over administration of the city’s 
WPA music program, Newbold discovered that the program already in place was 
surprisingly robust. After attending a concert in a high school auditorium given by what he 
considered to be the best out of three WPA orchestras operating in the city, he arranged for a 
series of concerts to be performed in the auditorium at the new Rockefeller Center. To 
advertise the event, “Morris filled the subway with advertisements that read: ‘Mayor 
LaGuardia presents the New York City Symphony,’ with the identification ‘WPA Project’ in 
small script at the bottom,”152 a significant decision that immediately linked the program to 
LaGuardia himself, which became of the utmost important as City Center evolved.  
The concert series that Morris spearheaded continued until the WPA was terminated 
shortly before the United States entered World War II. However, when the city took 
possession of the Mecca Temple on 56th Street between Sixth and Seventh Avenues after the 
Shriners failed to pay taxes on the building, Morris convinced LaGuardia to convert the 
building into a performance venue, and then the two men “organized a non-profit corporation 
to run the enterprise and enlisted a group of subscribers consisting mostly of labor unions and 
philanthropists to meet the initial costs.” After making repairs to the building and equipping 
it to function as a performance venue, the city leased it to the non-profit corporation “on the 
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condition that the maximum ticket price be set at $2 (about a third the price of an orchestra 
seat at the Metropolitan Opera).”153 
LaGuardia remained closely associated with the Center from the moment of its 
inception and throughout his mayoralty, and he ensured that this close association remained 
highly visible to the public, which went a long way toward ensuring City Center’s survival 
during its early years when it faced low box office receipts. City Center received little 
support in the way of municipal subsidies; although LaGuardia believed in making the arts 
available to the public, he was not a proponent of direct subsidy. But although City Center 
received very little direct financial support from the city, Mayor LaGuardia’s connection to 
the institution endowed it with the legitimacy of a municipal entity in the public mind. The 
perception that City Center was operated by the city was not uncommon, and LaGuardia “did 
not seek to dispel that impression,” writes historian Murielle Vautrin. What made it a public 
institution in the minds of so many New Yorkers, including the Mayor himself, was “the fact 
that it had been organized under the auspices of City Hall, and that it reflected the Mayor’s 
philosophy, according to which the benefits of democracy, including culture should be 
distributed more equally. In other words, the identification of the Center with City Hall and 
the control that the City exercised on its quality standards, not its (rather insignificant) 
municipal subsidies, made the City Center a municipal theater.”154  
LaGuardia’s close association did, however, have its financial benefits. Because the 
Center was so closely associated with the Mayor and enjoyed great prestige deriving from 
that affiliation, LaGuardia and Morris were able to persuade top performers to work for a 
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fraction of the fees they would command in the commercial sector, thereby “effectively 
replacing the federal subsidy of Morris’s WPA concerts with subsidization by the 
performers, who were willing to donate their talent out of enthusiasm for the project.”155 City 
Center was in some ways similar to Lincoln Center in that it housed a variety of art forms, 
was viewed as a public institution, and relied on institutional support from the private sector. 
And, like Lincoln Center, the makeup of the group that moved City Center from a vision to 
reality reflected the demographic with which City Center would come to be associated. 
When Newbold Morris began the work of creating City Center, he “took [his] 
proposal to a cross section of New York’s leading citizens and organizations.” In addition to 
some wealthy opera-loving New Yorkers, he talked to “Sidney Hillman of the Amalgamated 
Clothing Workers, David Dubinsky of the International Ladies’ Garment Workers, Adolf 
Held of the Workmen’s Circle.”156 Herein lies one of the main differences between Lincoln 
Center and City Center. Whereas Lincoln Center turned primarily to bankers and other titans 
of business to serve on its board of directors, Morris’s understanding of “leading citizens and 
organizations” was clearly different from that of Rockefeller, Spofford, et. al. In Morris’s and 
LaGuardia’s minds, the leaders best equipped to assist with City Center were those who 
understood the work of the artists who would perform in the Center and represented the 
audiences for whom the Center was founded.  With City Center, Morris and LaGuardia 
succeeded in creating a quasi-municipal institution that made the culture available to the 
masses, not only at a more affordable cost but also in a “familial atmosphere far different 
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from the stiff formality of traditional high-art ventures.”157 It was to be the embodiment “of 
the working-class that made its existence possible.”158  
The prospect of bringing City Center—specifically its opera constituent, City 
Opera—onboard at Lincoln Center rankled the Metropolitan Opera. Rockefeller and many of 
the others on the committee believed that there would be no real problem presented by 
having two distinct opera companies, playing two distinct schedules, and appealing to 
different audiences coexisting at Lincoln Center. Bing and most of the leaders did not see it 
that way, and “were affronted by the very idea of this plebeian institution with its low-priced 
wares standing next door to the aristocratic Met.”159 A certain degree of elitism is undeniable 
in Bing’s protests over City Center, and specifically City Opera, joining Lincoln Center. 
However, he also voiced legitimate concerns over the primacy of the Met as the opera 
constituent as well as what he viewed as a violation of the Lincoln Center Concept. 
The chief concern was that the New York City Opera, housed within City Center, 
would, if it moved to Lincoln Center be mere steps away from the Metropolitan Opera. Not 
only would this create unfair competition at the box office, but it would also, in Bing’s view, 
threaten to sully the reputation of the Metropolitan Opera. After learning of the proposal to 
bring in City Center—and the New York City Opera—Bing wrote to Metropolitan president 
Anthony Bliss. Bing told Bliss that his immediate reaction to the news was “one of dismay.” 
He had been under the impression, he said, that “Lincoln Center aimed at the highest cultural 
achievements” and that the constituents chosen “had belonged to the highest class in their 
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field.” City Center, he said, had “no place in that group.” Reminding Bliss that “the eyes of 
the world” were now on Lincoln Center, he argued that the “rest of the world and indeed the 
less knowledgeable parts of the United States will find it difficult to distinguish between the 
two opera companies” and that it would be detrimental to the Center “if the unique position 
of the Metropolitan [were] suddenly confused with a very much lesser organization.” 160 Bing 
clearly viewed City Center as a threat, but because of its importance in securing necessary 
city and state financial support, he had no alternative but to compromise, but it would take 
difficult negotiation to bring Bing around. The contention among the Met, City Center, and 
Lincoln Center comes through with resounding clarity in the Memorandum of Understanding 
(MOU) between the Met and Lincoln Center. In addition to recording the basic terms of the 
overall constituency agreement between the Met and Lincoln Center, the MOU included a 
summary of the modus vivendi—an agreement allowing conflicting parties to coexist 
peacefully—between City Center and the Metropolitan Opera. All the constituent 
organizations would, in their agreements with Lincoln Center, undertake an agreement to 
respect the area of primacy of the other constituents. But because of the potential for direct 
conflict represented by City Opera, the primacy agreement was to be “amplified” by the 
modus vivendi (MV). Lincoln Center agreed that, except for City Center, no other 
organization in the field of opera or classical operetta would be permitted to join Lincoln 
Center without the express consent of the Metropolitan. The MV emphasized the primacy of 
each organization, stating that City Center agreed that opera would not be its principal 
function while the Metropolitan agreed the same in regards to ballet. The actual terms of the 
MV do not go much beyond spelling out that simple principal and stipulating that in the 
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event of a dispute, Lincoln Center could act as arbiter. Its longest passage is not even really 
the articulation of a particular policy, but reads rather like a legally memorialized attempt to 
soothe Bing in the face of his fierce opposition to City Opera’s inclusion at Lincoln Center:  
The Metropolitan and City Center have heretofore coexisted in the City of New York 
without undue prejudice to either by reason of differences in artistic objectives, nature 
of productions, artistic personnel, and in the audiences to which they have primary 
appeal, which have resulted in the activities of the Metropolitan and City Center 
being complimentary rather than conflicting in nature. In addition, City Center’s 
operatic performances have been so scheduled as to minimize conflict with the 
Metropolitan’s New York Season. It is anticipated that this presently existing 
complementary relationship of the Metropolitan and City Center with respect to 
artistic objectives, nature of productions, artistic personnel, audiences and scheduling 
will be preserved to the greatest extent practicable.161 
Bing did not feel particularly mollified by this attempt at conciliation. Most troublesome 
to him was the procedure for resolving differences between the Met and City Center in 
regards to their area of primacy. The outlined procedure indicated that in the event of a 
dispute, a committee consisting of “two directors of each of the disputants, and the chairman 
of such committee to be selected by the members thereof.” The majority opinion of this 
committee would be the binding decision should any such dispute arise. Should the 
committee be unable to arrive at a conclusion, the matter would “at the request of either 
party, be referred for recommended resolution to the Board of Directors of Lincoln 
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Center.”162  Bing considered this an intrusion by Lincoln Center and recalled that the 
leadership of City Center felt the same way. Nonetheless, the Met and City Center agreed to 
the terms of the MV. In retrospect, Bing came to find having City Opera as a neighbor to be a 
mutually beneficial arrangement and said that “it now seems clear to me that I was wrong in 
fighting the entry of City Opera to Lincoln Center. There have been no particular difficulties. 
They have helped us and we have helped them by lending singers, and many of our most 
valuable artists . . . have been ‘graduates’ of the City Opera.” He went on to say, 
“Productions there have considerably improved” although he said he hoped he would “be 
allowed my continuing opinion that they are simply not in the same league as Metropolitan 
productions.”163  
The complexity of negotiations surrounding City Center’s journey to Lincoln Center 
could easily fill a chapter or even an entire dissertation. However, the overview provided 
here demonstrates the complexity of the relationships among the constituent organizations, 
the Lincoln Center leadership, and city and state government officials. These relationships 
informed decisions affecting every aspect of the Center from architecture to the selection of 
constituents to programming. Despite the primacy given the Metropolitan and the 
Philharmonic in the early days of the development of Lincoln Center, Rockefeller’s 
persistence in pursuing City Center was just one of the ways he assumed control of shaping 
the identity of Lincoln Center that would emerge over the course of its development. City 
Center was to be an important means by which Lincoln Center could fulfill its mandate to 
make culture available to the masses. Negotiations between City Center and Lincoln Center 
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spanned the course of several years (approximately 1957 through 1965) and that process 
played a significant role in shaping the institution.  
Cultural Maturity 
While all this wrangling was happening behind closed doors, Rockefeller was also 
hard at work acting as the public face of Lincoln Center and developing an effective narrative 
to win support for the project among a broad range of audiences from potential donors to the 
government officials whose approvals would be necessary to bring the Center to fruition. 
What had begun as a project to protect the longevity of two organizations would evolve into 
an important symbol of America’s “cultural maturity.” Using the rhetoric of cultural maturity 
to emphasize its national importance, Rockefeller drafted Lincoln Center, already deployed 
in Robert Moses’s northward march of progress, into the Cold War. Framing the Center as a 
battleground in the Cold War allowed Rockefeller and Lincoln Center’s leadership to 
legitimate the project by suggesting that it was just as essential to the stature and security of 
the city and nation as the United Nations had been.  
Many had thought Rockefeller to be an odd choice to lead the Lincoln Center project, 
but he maintained that his involvement grew naturally from his prior philanthropic work, 
which had focused on international issues in the years following World War II. In addition to 
his work to bring attention to the problems arising from an increase in the global population, 
Rockefeller had become closely involved with the Japan Society, which eventually led to the 
founding of the Asia Society, of which Rockefeller would serve as president. Rockefeller 
frequently pointed to his Far Eastern travels as the source for his concern with what he saw 
as a troubling view of Americans’ relationship to the arts. “In travel abroad,” he recalled, “I 
have often observed the interest of ordinary peoples in artistic and cultural achievement. 
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Even the poorest homes in Japan, for example, always have some artistic feature . . . that 
emphasizes their aspiration to cultural progress.” He went on to say, “They respect nations 
that encourage such progress. The disturbing thing is that many foreigners mistakenly believe 
Americans are concerned only with material achievement.” Rockefeller believed this to be a 
“handicap” in American relations with other peoples and, because of that, he hoped that 
“Lincoln Center may become a symbol before the world of America’s cultural 
development.”164 Such rhetoric eventually became prevalent in the discourse surrounding 
Lincoln Center, but when planning for the Center first began, talk of the Center’s importance 
as weapon in the Cold War took a back seat to the more pragmatic issues of providing 
adequate facilities for the cities’ elite cultural institutions. While some of the early remarks of 
Lincoln Center’s backers and the press pointed to the Cold War ideology that would come to 
underscore the project, such rhetoric became explicit only after the committee had 
established the organizational framework and Lincoln Center had to begin explaining its 
value to the public, especially once a large segment of that public began questioning the 
project.   
 A few days after Robert Moses officially announced plans for the Lincoln Square 
Urban Renewal project, Howard Taubman extolled the promise of the proposed cultural 
Center in a lengthy article in the New York Times. With plans for the cultural Center well 
underway, New York stood “on the threshold of a brave, new era in the performing arts.” If 
successfully brought into being, the Center would “give a tremendous lift to the cultural tone 
of the city. At the same time it will transform physically the area for which it is planned.” 
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Despite having “an abundance of activities in the performing arts,” the city, Taubman argued, 
needed such a Center if it was to be truly deserving of its position as a capital of the 
performing arts. Having spent many column inches on the potential benefits to the city’s 
cultural scene, Taubman concluded his article with a nod to the national importance of the 
Center. In addition to “open[ing] up new intellectual and emotional vistas for the good of the 
city and the country,” it could also demonstrate that “democracy has the determination and 
power to devote itself to the things of the mind and heart as well as to creature comforts.”165 
Taubman quickly emerged as a leading cheerleader for the Lincoln Center project and argued 
incessantly of the Center’s importance to the city’s cultural life and advocated strongly for 
governmental support for the Center. “In any other country such a project could not be 
contemplated without almost complete government financing. . . . But what does New York 
do for a project which will keep it in a position as a leading metropolis?” After 
acknowledging that the city was in fact making the Center possible through its contributions 
toward land acquisition costs, he asserted that the city needed to do more. The city, he 
argued, “should be dealing with [Lincoln Center] as the cultural enterprise it is and not as 
though it were another slum clearance and housing development.”166 In essence, Taubman’s 
argument that the city should throw its support behind the Center for its intrinsic cultural 
value rather than limiting its intervention to the financial participation required under Title I 
called for “official” legitimation of the Center as a civic institution. However, with such 
                                                
165 Howard Taubman. “New Cultural Vista for the City.” New York Times, April 22, 1956. ProQuest Historical 
Newspapers: The New York Times. 
166 Howard Taubman, “Civic Pride: City Officials Should Work for Lincoln Center as a Municipal Necessity,” 
New York Times, June 2, 1957. ProQuest Historical newspapers: The New York Times. 
 96 
official appellation not forthcoming, it fell to Rockefeller and the Center’s backers to develop 
the narrative establishing Lincoln Center as a truly civic and national enterprise.   
 Throughout the summer of 1956, more information about the Center became public. 
In July, New York Times reporter Ross Parmenter wrote a lengthy article in which detailed 
plans for the Lincoln Center for the Performing Arts were delineated for the first time. In 
addition to detailing the general plans in terms of the arts to be represented by constituent 
organizations with the Center, the article touched upon the aims of the Center as well as the 
events that conspired to spur the idea for the Center. “One of the leading aims of the Center 
is that its units should stimulate and cross-fertilize each other,” Parmenter wrote. This 
principle of cross-fertilization, Parmenter suggested, had played a role in the decision to 
include a venue for legitimate theater “even though New York does not have the equivalent 
of London’s Old Vic to run it. One of the hopes of the Center is that its facilities will lead to 
the establishment of a strong dramatic organization,” something New York clearly lacked. 
Parmenter made no mention of how the Center would play in terms of expressing the cultural 
maturity of the United States, but focused instead on the voids in the cultural landscape the 
Center would fill in relatively practical terms. The article also highlighted Rockefeller’s 
conviction in the “importance of culture in the life of any nation. He wanted to ‘do something 
in the New York City picture.’ And he had already given considerable thought to a cultural 
Center here in New York.” After dutifully repeating the story of the three coincidences, 
Parmenter explicated all the details that had been ironed out up until that point and concluded 
the article with a call for public support of the project. “The men behind the project are all 
deeply excited by its potentialities,” he wrote. “They hope the public will catch some of the 
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fire of their enthusiasm so that the Center will receive the necessary support.”167 However, it 
would soon become clear that in the eyes of many New York City residents and government 
officials, accommodating cultural institutions and enriching the cultural life of a local 
municipality did not quite rise to the level of significance necessary to justify the massive 
displacement of residents and businesses that the project would cause.  
With an approval vote scheduled for a September 1956 Board of Estimate meeting, 
protestors stepped up their efforts in the summer months, culminating in a postcard campaign 
in which neighborhood residents and business owners reminded Mayor Wagner, “You will 
need our votes in November.” Harris Present recalled that in the last statewide election, 
Governor Harriman had won by a remarkably small margin and suggested that were the 
election to be close in the fall of 1956, “Mayor Wagner’s action on Lincoln Square may be 
the determining factor as to whether he will or will not be elected.”168 This particular tactic 
was essentially a concrete expression of the overall message that undergirded all of the 
resistance to the Lincoln Square project: David had just as much right to influence the shape 
and identity of the city as Goliath did. Winning the battle, Rockefeller realized, would 
require that Goliath come up with as consistent a message as David. Moreover, it would be 
particularly important that Goliath’s message could claim the moral high ground equal to or 
surpassing that of David. 
While the first laudatory articles began to appear in the press, Rockefeller began to 
develop messaging that went beyond extolling the importance of culture for culture’s sake 
                                                
167 Ross Parmenter. “Lincoln Square Plan Develops Toward World Cultural Center,” New York Times, July 23, 
1956. ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The New York Times.  
168 Charles Grutzner. “Foes Threaten a Political Fight Against Lincoln Square Project,” New York Times, 
September 8, 1956. ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The New York Times. 
 98 
and instead sought to establish the Center’s national importance. Rockefeller turned to 
Harold Seymour, an experienced fund raiser. Seymour advised all his clients that “the case 
should be bigger than the cause” and he urged Rockefeller to focus his rhetoric on “the 
possibilities of bringing into being something truly big, exciting, and of international 
significance, rather than to stop at something that merely satisfies an urgent, minimum, and 
local need.” So while the origin story focusing on the coincidences and the need for new 
homes for the Met and Philharmonic made for a good story, they “should not be major 
themes in a campaign because they were ‘not challenging enough.’”169 Further complicating 
the challenge of creating a compelling message was the fact that Lincoln Center, despite its 
primacy as the Centerpiece of the project, was one of several different elements of a 
redevelopment project that would cover fifty acres sprawling over the Upper West Side of 
Manhattan. Also to be included were apartment buildings, a campus for Fordham University, 
and a row of commercial theaters sponsored by theater impresario Roger Stevens. As 
historian Joel Schwartz has noted, “the jerry-rigged assemblage left individual sponsors 
uncertain about their relationship to the overall plan.” Lincoln Center’s exploratory 
committee “had little contact with Fordham, looked askance at Stevens’s theatrical row and 
ignored [the] housing component, which was needed for the write-down.” Rockefeller’s 
committee tried to find a way to relate the arts Center to the district planning, “but members 
could not disguise the haphazard way the project was sited onto the West Side.”170 In other 
words, the Title I project lacked any cohesive sense of purpose. Yes, Lincoln Center was 
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unquestionably the biggest element of the project, but everyone knew that Lincoln Center 
was not the true impetus for the Title I project. In reality, Moses’s goal was slum clearance. 
As Robert Stern has argued, even if the Metropolitan and Philharmonic had not been 
interested in participating in the project, “Moses still would have cleared the site and rebuilt 
it, with Fordham University as its principal institutional tenant and much of the land given 
over to housing.”171 Moses had in fact never really bothered to articulate any kind of “higher 
purpose” for the project. In his mind, the project was of “vital importance to the city and to 
the entire West Side of Manhattan” because most of the buildings in the area targeted for 
redevelopment “were Old Law tenements in various stages of obsolescence.”172 As far as 
Moses was concerned, the state of the neighborhood—which he considered to be in a state of 
dilapidation beyond repair—was all the justification he needed to flatten it. Throughout the 
project—and indeed throughout his career—Moses assiduously focused his messaging on the 
pragmatic needs associated with urban redevelopment, specifically ridding the city of slums 
and rebuilding along stark modern lines. Even when attempting to wax poetical about the 
city, he was unable to tamp down his pragmatism. 
In May of 1956 Moses, at the request of the editor, penned a piece for the Times 
entitled “Significance: What the City Means.” In the piece, Moses characterized himself as 
one who “has tried to make a few superficial improvements in our town in the effort to keep 
it abreast of the times and has come to realize its unique character, its natural and man-made 
beauty, its fast tempo, its traditions—valid and woozy—and its irritating, stubborn resistance 
to change.” The piece is perhaps one of the most telling Moses ever wrote in terms of 
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shedding light on what he loved and hated about the city and what drove him in his efforts to 
reshape the landscape. Moses’s love of the city comes through with resounding clarity in the 
piece, but at the same time, that love is defined not by an idle admiration of the city as it 
existed but rather for its potential to be remade to reflect physically the excellence of all that 
made New York notable. “Those of us who see New York in all its aspects, who get about, 
who know its light and shade, who are fascinated by its varied peoples, find it the most 
stimulating workshop in the world,” he wrote. For Moses, the city was “a town of 
superlatives” and the Lincoln Square project, the latest in a long line of redevelopment 
efforts, would work to bring New York’s landscape in line with its aspirations of 
excellence.173  
So convinced was Moses that his vision of the city—his “workshop”—was the right 
one, he left it to the individual sponsors of the institutions to be housed on his project sites to 
extol their importance to the city. The challenge for Rockefeller and his colleagues was to 
ensure that Lincoln Center was at the center of the campaign to win approval for the urban 
renewal project and in turn to develop a compelling message that would convince the public 
that the Center was not simply a superfluous ornament for the city, but was rather 
indisputably necessary. To do this, Lincoln Center would need to bring an aura of national 
and global significance to the project. The Cold War provided the basis Rockefeller needed 
to achieve this goal.  
In December 1956, Rockefeller addressed a luncheon meeting of the Women’s City 
Club at their Park Avenue headquarters, where he told the assembled crowd, “So much of 
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America’s prestige abroad is based on accomplishments in industry and sciences, but our 
cultural side is often less well understood than we might wish.” During his speech he focused 
on the Center’s need for financial support as well as his own commitment and that of his 
colleagues to ensuring that those displaced by the project would receive as much assistance 
in the relocation process as possible. He assured his audience that although it was “always 
most unfortunate, when an area undergoes change, that there is a displacement of people,” all 
those associated with the project were “very much aware of our responsibility to find new 
housing for these families and are confident of our ability to do so” and assured the audience 
that a “continuing supply of new housing” would help ease the burden on those forced out of 
the neighborhood by the Center. Having given those assurances, he discussed the high cost of 
the Center, then estimated at $75 million, and insisted that despite some government and 
foundation support, the majority of the funds would have to come from the private sector. 
“While we realize that a substantial proportion of the needed money must come from 
relatively few givers, we must have broad general support. Lincoln Center is for the many 
and it is only sound and right that all should join in its support.” Rockefeller justified this 
tacit demand for financial support from the public by emphasizing the national and 
international significance of Lincoln Center, which would, he said assure the city’s position 
of leadership, a respectable goal in its own right, but more importantly, the Center would 
have international significance, standing as “a symbol of American cultural maturity, 
affirming for people everywhere our faith in the life of the spirit.”174 In this address, 
Rockefeller launched his campaign to portray Lincoln Center as a “response to the great 
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questions of the age.” Doing so meant explaining the project’s “importance of culture for 
national life during a time of affluence, for the country’s international reputation in an era of 
Cold War, and for urban resurgence.”175 
While the centrality of the Metropolitan Opera and New York Philharmonic exposed 
Lincoln Center to charges of elitism, the prevalent mood of the Cold War offered Rockefeller 
a powerful defense against such charges. As Stephen Whitfield has argued, political 
discourse during the Cold War in the United States rejected the articulation of overt political 
ideologies. Whitfield cites a 1953 book by contemporary historian Daniel J. Boorstin entitled 
The Genius of American Politics. Boorstin identifies the titular genius as “antimetaphysical, a 
blank state that was devoid of susceptibility to the ‘philosophies’ of Nazism, Fascism, and 
Communism. American politicians were supposed to arrange deals, not articulate ideals.”176 
Instead of working to articulate a uniquely American identity, the Cold War was best fought 
by defining national identity through contrast with the threatening “other.”  In addition to the 
specter of the ever-looming atomic attack, falling behind the Soviet Union in terms of 
progress threatened the primacy of the United States. Rockefeller and his colleagues in 
Lincoln Center capitalized on this attitude to advance their cause.  
There was certainly no denying that Lincoln Center, however benevolent its 
intentions, would appeal most strongly to the well-heeled. And although Rockefeller sought 
to broaden Lincoln Center’s appeal by including City Center, the climate of the Cold War 
relieved him of the burden of developing a truly populist institution. “Faith was strengthened 
in the institutions of authority as the best preservatives of national values,” argues Whitfield. 
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Lincoln Center was repeatedly framed as an antidote to the perception that America was a 
crass culture driven by little more than the bottom line. For example, a fundraising appeal 
letter asserted that Lincoln Center could respond to the charge that “Americans are only 
interested in making money” and “could stand as a symbol of the nation’s coming of age, of 
its readiness to stand with Europe at the head of civilization.”177 But the cultural means by 
which Americans would do so was clearly to be bestowed from above, as Zipp persuasively 
argues: 
Of course, the Center’s sponsors found American mass culture to be distasteful. Their 
efforts to democratize the arts amounted to a kind of controlled release, an attempt to 
guide, supervise, and guarantee its munificent effects from on high, not an attempt to 
inject high culture into the mass marketplace. Lincoln Center’s great gift to a newly 
affluent American society was to be a curious and novel blend of elitism and 
democratization, far more open to the public than earlier models of cultural hierarchy 
rooted in nineteenth century class antagonism, but still controlled from above.178 
Although Lincoln Center was to be more open to the public than “earlier models of 
cultural hierarchy rooted in nineteenth century class antagonism,” the concerns Lincoln 
Center was said to address were strikingly similar to those expressed in the 19th century. 
Lincoln Center’s public statements made repeated reference to the importance of cultural 
institutions as antidotes to the increased amounts of leisure time available to working class 
Americans in the age of affluence. One of Rockefeller’s colleagues warned, “We will have to 
learn how to fill the time we have literally manufactured in our factories.” Failing to do so 
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could result in psychological and societal crises.”179 Although he didn’t say so explicitly, he 
clearly implied that the average worker, when left with unstructured time, posed a potential 
danger to the social order.  
This was hardly a new line of argument. In 1886, trustees of the Metropolitan 
Museum of Art were embroiled in heated debates over whether to open the museum on 
Sundays. Ultimately the trustees decided to do so, apparently having been convinced that 
visiting the museum to be edified would provide an alternative to frequenting immoral 
places. One concerned citizen challenged opponents of Sunday museum hours by asking, 
“Will you refuse with such noble powers in your hands to be the ally of this community in 
the struggles against gigantic vices?”180 Such direct rhetoric, rooted in class antagonism, 
would naturally not fly in the public statements of Lincoln Center, and it is not my intent to 
suggest that class prejudice lay at the root of the emphasis on filling leisure time. However, 
the Cold War culture valorized homogeneity, and the provision of culture through an 
institution endowed with a certain degree of authority could be seen as a way of facilitating 
such homogeneity. 
By the time Lincoln Center faced its last hurdle for city approval, the rhetoric of 
cultural maturity and containment had been well rehearsed and played a central role in the 
statement of John D. Rockefeller 3rd at the City Planning Commission’s heated public 
hearings. The statement reiterated all the virtues of the Center as a performing arts venue in 
its own right but also emphasized the international importance and the value it would bring to 
the spiritual edification of New York’s people. Rockefeller declared, “To New York, Lincoln 
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Center will add another capital as important to the performing arts as the United Nations is to 
world affairs, Wall Street to finance and Fifth Avenue to fashion. . . . To the world, [it] will 
announce America’s cultural maturity. Lincoln Center will prove that the arts in America 
have come of age.” He also argued emphatically that the Center reflected “the growing 
recognition that enjoyment of the arts is important if not essential to the human spirit.”181  
Rockefeller and the leaders of Lincoln Center would continue to double down on this 
rhetoric throughout the development of Lincoln Center, but by framing the project as one of 
national importance, they had succeeded in establishing Lincoln Center as a bulwark in the 
Cold War against the Soviet Union. By seizing upon the Zeitgeist and aligning their rhetoric 
accordingly, they ensured that that the buildings would rise. Budget crises and conflicts 
among the constituent organizations would abound, but the project was underway and the 
institutional framework of the Center was, by 1957, taking shape.  
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CHAPTER 2 
Travertine and Turmoil: Contestation and Identity in the Repertory Theatre of Lincoln 
Center 
 
Introduction: The Happiest Play 
On October 24, 1963, the acting ensemble of the Repertory Theater of Lincoln Center 
gathered in a Second Avenue studio for the first rehearsal of Arthur Miller’s After the Fall. 
The play, Miller’s first in nearly a decade and the inaugural production of the Repertory 
Theater, was, Miller told the assembled actors, “a happy play, the happiest work I’ve ever 
written.” As Christopher Bigsby has observed, that must certainly have seemed like an odd 
statement for a play “in which the cruelties of the House Un-American Activities Committee 
led to the suicide of one of its victims and in which friends prove false and marriages 
collapse.” Any sense of happiness in the play must surely have come, Bigsby argued, “from 
the reconciliation with private and public history towards which [the play] moves.”182 The 
reconciliation of which Bigsby writes relates to the play’s protagonist, Quentin, and his 
attempt to reconcile his own conception of his identity with the reality of the life he has lived. 
As the opening production of the Repertory Theater, the play was a particularly appropriate 
choice. Not only was it the first play in nine years from one of the country’s most prominent 
playwrights, but the action of the play also reflected the turmoil that would unfold within the 
Repertory Theater over the course of its existence. Just as Quentin found himself locked in a 
confrontation with his own sense of identity, the Repertory Theater of Lincoln Center was 
forced into a moment of reckoning in which the ideals and practices of its artistic leadership 
collided with the institutional apparatus of Lincoln Center.   
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Having laid claim to its stake on Manhattan’s landscape, Lincoln Center now offered 
director Elia Kazan and producer Robert Whitehead the opportunity to stake their claim on 
the landscape of American theater history. Both men had firmly established themselves as 
leaders in the commercial theater world, Kazan as the most influential theatrical director of 
his time, and Whitehead as a producer with a track record of successful productions of 
“quality plays” on Broadway. The Repertory Theater could bestow upon Kazan and 
Whitehead the ideal capstones to already illustrious careers, for it was not intended to be just 
another New York theater, but was in the words of one of its harshest critics, Martin 
Gottfried, “designed to be the American National Theater from the moment it opened its 
doors.”183  
By the time the acting company assembled for their first rehearsal in October 1963, 
Lincoln Center had firmly established itself as a necessary demonstration of American 
cultural maturity, a designation that had been used to justify the erasure of a vibrant 
neighborhood for the sake of progress. Now the leaders of the Center, having elevated the 
Met and Philharmonic to monumental status, offered the city and the nation the promise of a 
theatrical institution that would, as part of Lincoln Center, represent the United States on the 
global stage during the Cold War. Unlike the other institutions housed at Lincoln Center, 
however, the Repertory Theatre had no institutional existence prior to its conception as part 
of the Center. Instead, Rockefeller and the founders of the Center hoped to create a theatrical 
institution as venerable as the other constituents from the ground up, but as everyone would 
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soon learn, the pressures of creating a “national” repertory theater out of thin air complicated 
a development process already fraught with difficulties.  
Chief among these difficulties was establishing the identity of an organization 
conceived in a boardroom with no clear artistic mandate but rather with the mandate to 
establish a theater worthy of the prestige that Lincoln Center banked on to establish its 
preeminence. From the earliest stages of its development, The Repertory Theater of Lincoln 
Center suffered from the collision between a vague mission and a board of directors 
unnerved by public criticism and the fiscal realities of running a permanent repertory theater. 
Further complicating matters was Kazan’s ambivalence about the project and his uncertainty 
about both his willingness and ability to meet its demands. In the years between the 
incorporation of the theater and the opening of After The Fall, Kazan struggled to define the 
meaning of the theater for the public, but in so doing he was forced into a confrontation with 
his own beliefs about his talent, taste, and convictions about the theater, and Whitehead 
discovered that his extensive career in the Broadway theater had not prepared him to confront 
the political machinations of the corporate board room. From the earliest stages of its 
development, the Repertory Theater was plagued by conflict over how to best reflect 
American theatrical ideals within an institutional structure. Every aspect of the theater’s 
artistic work from the acting to play selection to the physical plant was hotly contested both 
within the organization and publicly in the press. At the root of the conflict lay a failure to 
establish a clear sense of identity that could withstand the onslaught of criticism foisted on 
the theater from the press and its own board of directors. Rather than collaborating to develop 
the theater’s identity, the artistic leaders sought to protect and enshrine their artistic legacies, 
while the Board of Directors resisted them at every turn.   
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The Vivacious Philanthropist 
The first salvo in the fight to define the Repertory Theater in the public mind was 
fired on May 5, 1958, when the New York Times announced that department store heiress and 
“vivacious philanthropist” Vivian Beaumont Allen had pledged three million dollars toward 
the construction of the building that would eventually become home to the Repertory 
Theater.184 In its press releases, Lincoln Center had consistently mentioned its plans to 
include a repertory theater, but “Until Mrs. Allen’s munificent gift,” wrote Lewis Funke in 
the New York Times, “no one had more than a right to hope that the Center’s aims would be 
fulfilled. Her gift not only makes possible the construction of the physical theatre,” Funke 
said, “but it also opens up horizons hitherto only dreams in the minds of many dedicated 
theatre-lovers.”185 Policy statements regarding the future work of the theater would remain 
vague for some time, but the public announcement of Allen’s three million dollar gift, 
followed in quick succession by the announcement of Broadway producer Robert 
Whitehead’s appointment as the chief consultant, cemented from the beginning the theater’s 
affiliation with the wealthy elite and the Broadway establishment in the public imagination.  
Rockefeller, who had engaged in closed-door meetings with consultants for over two 
years, used the occasion of Allen’s gift to launch the development of the theater’s 
organizational structure in a more public forum. Securing the gift had taken over a year, and 
it had significant importance, both materially and symbolically. Materially, the three-million 
contribution represented the first donation of that size from a private individual, and would, 
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Rockefeller hoped, go a long way toward attracting similarly large contributions. 
Symbolically, major gifts like this one tethered the Center—and specifically the theater—to 
the aspirations of the citizenry. The importance of Allen’s gift lay not just in its facilitation of 
the laying of brick and mortar, but also—and more importantly—it attested to the what the 
Times called the thoughts and hopes of the individual citizen. Of course, Allen represented a 
particular demographic of New York’s citizenry and Lincoln Center’s leadership surely 
expected that most of their financial support would come from that same demographic, which 
meant that Rockefeller and Lincoln Center’s backers would need to establish that the theater 
would not take a back seat to the other constituent organizations at Lincoln Center, a concern 
that Allen herself had raised with Rockefeller and which Rockefeller worked to assuage 
when courting Allen’s multi-million dollar contribution, assuring her that   “the drama theater 
should not have to take a secondary place in the center concept, in building or location, or in 
timing of construction” and that “‘her theater’ would be as important as the one for dance.”186 
Considering the absence of an already-established organization that could match the stature 
of the other organizations, her concerns were well founded, and Rockefeller did his best to 
reassure her in that regard.  
Writing to Allen in January 1958, Rockefeller asserted the importance of the theater 
within the Center, promising that “the repertory theater is an important and integral part of 
the overall development” of Lincoln Center. He assured her that plans were in place to 
develop a sound organization for the theater, and that he had retained Robert Whitehead as a 
consultant “with the expectation, as plans develop and become more concrete, that he would 
become the permanent leader of the whole (drama) undertaking.” Whitehead’s credentials 
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undoubtedly helped reassure Allen of the potential prestige of the theater at Lincoln Center. 
Since his 1947 debut as a Broadway producer with a production of Medea, Whitehead had 
enjoyed a career defined by box office successes and had become known for what many 
contemporary writers called “quality plays.” Among the works he had produced were Bus 
Stop, Major Barbara, Orpheus Descending, and A Touch of the Poet. The works, although 
not the most unconventional, lent Whitehead’s record an air of gravitas, while his box office 
successes afforded Rockefeller the further legitimation he needed in the absence of the long-
standing institutional framework of an organization like the Metropolitan Opera. Four 
months after Rockefeller’s letter, on April 26, 1958, Allen made the pledge.187 
By the time Allen confirmed her pledge in April 1958, Rockefeller had officially 
appointed Whitehead as the primary consultant for the repertory theater and charged him 
with leading an advisory council and with heading the development of the theater’s 
programming. In the letter documenting Whitehead’s appointment, dated February 6, 1958, 
Rockefeller memorialized the shared belief among himself, Whitehead, and Lincoln Center’s 
Vice President George Stoddard in the “desirability and importance of developing a repertory 
drama performing group here in New York City,” adding that having the group be a part of 
the Lincoln Center for the Performing Arts would “not only contribute materially to the 
group’s effectiveness but also would give it an added prestige and stability.”188 It is important 
to note Rockefeller’s phrasing here. Although this letter essentially served to engage 
Whitehead to act as a consultant to the Lincoln Center for the Performing Arts, Rockefeller 
speaks of the establishment of a repertory theater in New York City as being desirable in its 
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own right, noting that such an organization, once formed, would benefit by joining Lincoln 
Center as a constituent organization. In other words, the creation of the theater company was 
to be, technically, an event discrete from, and preceding, the theater’s becoming a constituent 
of Lincoln Center. In so phrasing the understanding between Whitehead and Lincoln Center, 
Rockefeller simultaneously commissioned the creation of a new theater company from 
scratch and adhered to the Lincoln Center concept, which stipulated that all constituent 
organizations were to be autonomous and responsible for their own financing, management, 
and programming.  
In tasking Whitehead with leading the formation of the new theater, Rockefeller made 
an important decision in shaping the direction the repertory theater would take. For starters, 
Whitehead, although highly regarded as a producer of “quality” plays on the more refined 
end of the Broadway spectrum, was still part of the Broadway “establishment.” Secondly, the 
Actors Studio had been vigorously campaigning to be named Lincoln Center’s theater 
constituent, and Whitehead’s official appointment marked the end of its candidacy. Although 
it is unclear exactly when Rockefeller began talks with Whitehead, there can be no doubt that 
those talks coincided with Rockefeller’s talks with the Actors Studio. And there is little doubt 
that Whitehead, given his deeply held belief that Strasberg’s teaching of the Method had 
been a destructive force in the American theater, influenced Rockefeller in his decision to 
reject the Studio as the theater constituent. “We didn’t want Strasberg,” Whitehead stated 
plainly in 1963. “Through Strasberg the psycho-sexual interpretation of the subtext has 
become a major force now. At Lincoln Center we will be anti-psychoanalytic.” In rejecting 
the Studio, the Repertory Theater had made a clear choice. “We want to establish,” 
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Whitehead said, “a new character for our performers, as well as the theatre.”189 By shunning 
the Actors Studio, the theater-to-be distanced itself from the Method and rejected the idea of 
Strasberg as a defining force at the Repertory Theater, despite his influence as an acting 
teacher.  
The day after formally engaging Whitehead as the primary drama consultant for 
Lincoln Center, Rockefeller broke the news to Elia Kazan, who had been on the advisory 
council and who had led the campaign for the Actors Studio’s selection as the theater 
constituent. Rockefeller assured Kazan that Whitehead “hopes as strongly as I do that you 
will continue to work with us in the development of these plans which we all feel are so 
important not only to the Center but for the development of the art of the theatre in 
America,”190 but clearly the doors of Lincoln Center had been slammed shut in the face of 
the Actors Studio, which had been in talks with Rockefeller and his colleagues for at least 
two years. The conciliatory tone in Rockefeller’s letter, in which he informed Kazan, “Mr. 
Whitehead knows of our previous conferences with you and your associates,” suggests that 
Rockefeller likely concealed his negotiations with Whitehead from Kazan, waiting until he 
had a firm commitment from Whitehead before cutting the Actors Studio loose, a rejection 
that clearly left Kazan feeling stung and humiliated. 
The rejection of the Actors Studio left Kazan feeling conflicted. Looking back on the 
experience, he insisted that he didn’t work as hard as he might have to secure the 
constituency of the Actors Studio, with himself, Cheryl Crawford, and Lee Strasberg as co-
managers and directors, because he “didn’t believe in him [Lee Strasberg] as an equal partner 
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or as a producer, or want him as a standby advisor or as an overlord, however benign.” 191 
But at the time, in his correspondence with Rockefeller and, later, with Whitehead, Kazan 
adamantly insisted that the Actors Studio was the ideal organization to represent the spoken 
drama at Lincoln Center, and his advocacy for the Actors Studio suggests a belief in the 
Studio—and its leadership, including Strasberg—as the standard-bearers of cutting-edge 
theater in the United States.  
In proposing the Actors Studio as the theater constituent for Lincoln Center, Kazan 
attempted to capitalize on the Studio’s reputation as a breeding ground for the most 
compelling actors in American film and theater and asserted the importance of the Method as 
an arbiter of American theatrical identity. In June1956, Kazan informed Rockefeller that the 
Actors Studio was prepared to take over a six-month season at Lincoln Center and that “the 
effort of the Actors Studio there would be administered by Cheryl Crawford, Lee Strasberg, 
and myself.” The “fundamental intention,” according to Kazan, would be to “make our 
people aware and proud of the work and importance of the American Theatre—its plays, its 
craftsmen, their techniques and their talents,” and the organization would maintain a training 
program alongside its theater-producing arm.192 In this brief letter, Kazan made only passing 
reference to repertoire, focusing instead on the importance of showcasing the craftsmanship 
of the American theater. And perhaps nowhere was the craftsmanship of American theater 
better displayed, in Kazan’s view, than in the work of the actors connected to the Actors 
Studio.  
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Six months after this initial letter to Rockefeller, Kazan sent a more detailed proposal 
laying out in detail the reasons that the Actors Studio was, in his view, best equipped to 
operate the theater at Lincoln Center. Kazan proclaimed the importance of the theater at 
Lincoln Center as an “American” enterprise, insisting that, contrary to the conventional 
wisdom, there existed an extensive repertoire of American drama classics, but that the 
absence of a repertory system wherein those classics could be kept in rotation and in the 
public consciousness had resulted in the disappearance of those plays once their initial runs 
had ended. As Kazan saw it, the lack of permanent companies had led to the perception that 
the United States lacked a strong theatrical tradition, but what it lacked in a dramatic “canon” 
it made up for in the quality of the acting that had emerged out of the Studio.  
Rockefeller, however, found Kazan’s argument insufficiently persuasive, looking 
instead toward more trustworthy indicators—box office receipts and critics’ notices—as the 
legitimation he knew would be necessary to win the support of prospective donors. Perhaps it 
is cynical to suggest that the decision to enlist Whitehead rather than the Actors Studio 
regime was directly influenced by Rockefeller’s efforts to secure the funding for the 
construction of the theater, but it is clear that Whitehead’s involvement in the project was a 
significant selling point in Rockefeller’s pitch to Vivian Beaumont Allen. Fundraising, 
however, was not the only consideration that played into Rockefeller’s choice to go with 
Whitehead instead of the Actors Studio.  
Kazan had arranged a meeting among Strasberg, Rockefeller, and some other leaders 
from Lincoln center, a meeting Kazan learned did not go well. Kazan recalled that  reports of 
the meeting indicated that “Lee was in the glory of his pride, instructing Rockefeller that if 
he hoped to have a theatre in his Center, the first person he should have consulted was Lee 
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Strasberg, because Lee and no one else grasped the artistic problems and their solutions.”193  
Although Rockefeller was too polite to say so in the meeting, Kazan knew that after this 
encounter there was little hope of Strasberg being brought aboard the project in any 
meaningful capacity. Kazan, who did not attend the meeting, suspected that Strasberg’s 
authoritarian tendencies alienated Rockefeller, and that there might be other motives at work 
in the decision to reject the Actors Studio’s candidacy.   
After learning of the rejection, Kazan complained bitterly to Clifford Odets, 
suggesting that the decision of “Rockefeller and his committee of Presbyterians” to choose 
Whitehead as the principal advisor, despite the considerable effort put forth by Kazan on 
behalf of the Actors Studio, was pre-ordained. “I had already done a lot of advising,” he told 
Odets, “attending many meetings with him and his group and writing several prospecti. But 
in the end consanguinity told.”194 It is unclear exactly what Kazan was suggesting by his 
choice of the word consanguinity, but it is reasonable to infer that he suspected ethnic or 
political prejudice to be at the heart of the decision. It is impossible to know whether that is 
true, but Rockefeller must certainly have found Strasberg’s authoritarian tendencies not only 
viscerally off-putting but also concerning as an indication that Strasberg lacked the 
malleability necessary to ensure successful cooperation with the institutional apparatus of 
Lincoln Center, while Whitehead was just as comfortable in a boardroom as he was in a 
theater.  
Whatever Rockefeller’s reasoning, the announcement of Whitehead’s appointment, 
which coincided with the securing of Allen’s gift, marked the first milestone in the 
                                                
193 Kazan, A Life, 608. 
194 Kazan, Selected Letters, 366. 
 117 
development of the public identity of the Repertory Theater of Lincoln Center years before 
an actor ever set foot on its stage. In the decision to cast aside Strasberg and the Actors 
Studio in favor of Robert Whitehead, Rockefeller rejected the legacy of the Group Theater in 
favor of a successful Broadway track record.  Now, with the funds for the building assured 
and Whitehead’s leadership established, Rockefeller began to publicly unveil the results of 
his work up until this point. 
Going Public 
In May 1958, Rockefeller revealed that Lincoln Center had established an advisory 
council on drama and had appointed Whitehead as the primary consultant for the developing 
repertory theater. Serving alongside Whitehead on the advisory council were Vivian 
Beaumont Allen, Cheryl Crawford, producer Robert Dowling, critic Walter Kerr, actress Eva 
Le Gallienne, Sanford Meisner, Jo Mielziner, Rogers Stevens, George D. Stoddard of NYU, 
and Juilliard president William Schuman. Kazan was also on the council where he would, for 
the time being, serve in an advisory capacity. Notably missing from the list was Lee 
Strasberg. The advisory council was tasked with  “assur[ing] for drama at Lincoln Center the 
highest in artistic standards, continuity, and financial stability” by establishing general policy 
and eventually forming a nonprofit organization.195 Whitehead had little to say about the 
specifics of the theater’s programming , stating only that the new theater “should devote 
itself to producing the best of American plays, old and new, and should be prepared to 
present the best in the world, including Shakespeare and other classics” and that he 
“envisioned an organization consisting of a managing director and two production directors 
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entrusted with the training and development of the acting company,” which would have 
“twenty top actors. . . . There would also be a studio where selected young players would 
receive free training.”196  
Lewis Funke, in the Times, heralded the beginning of the Repertory Theatre’s 
development as “undoubtedly the most exciting news to develop in a long time for the 
American theatre.”197 The creation of a permanent company, in Funke’s view, marked a 
tremendous step forward for raising the stature of the American theater both at home and 
abroad. “Little imagination . . . is required,” he wrote, “to realize that were we in possession 
of such a theatre, and its essential concomitant, a permanent acting company, we would not 
have floundered as we have in quest of a representative group to send to the Brussels World’s 
Fair—or to any of the international drama festivals now in existence.” A repertory theater 
could also function, Funke suggested, as a “library of plays—a fountainhead for the 
preservation of a nation’s dramatic classics, a constant source of stimulation and 
reinvigoration for the nation’s playwrights.” Funke emphasized the importance of the theater 
as a public institution that could represent the United States on the world stage. He expressed 
his confidence that “auguries are good for the birth and durability” of a permanent company, 
assuring readers, “It is a credible assumption that like the Metropolitan and the Philharmonic, 
the repertory theatre will be in the hands of civic and culturally minded citizens of substance 
who will see to it that the theatre has an uninterrupted life.”  Funke articulated the repertory 
theater’s potential to fulfill a great need in the American theater. With the regional theater 
movement still in its infancy and so many previous attempts at the establishment of a 
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permanent repertory company having failed, the promise of a sound institutional framework 
capable of supporting such an undertaking was tantalizing. Adding urgency to the need for a 
nationally recognized institutional theater was the ever-mounting pressure for the United 
States to demonstrate its cultural superiority to the Soviet Union.   
While even the American theatrical press was highly critical of the commercial nature 
of Broadway, the Great White Way came under increasing criticism in the late 1940s and 
into the 1950s from behind the Iron Curtain. In June 1949, Soviet critic I. Kulikova published 
an article in which she declared Broadway dead. In many ways, her critique of Broadway 
echoed American critics, who felt that Broadway’s reliance on the box office as the sole 
barometer of success had stifled artistic innovation, and she identified many of the same 
causes, including the star system and the fact that despite there being nearly forty Broadway 
theaters in the theater district, “not a genuine theatre company (truppa) was to be found, nor 
a single theatre collective with a constant repertoire—merely tenant companies specifically 
chosen for a particular production.”198 Kulikova’s critique differed from American critics in 
that she framed the creative vacuity of Broadway not merely as the result of producers’ greed 
but rather as a result of the crushing force of capitalism itself, arguing that “the character of 
Broadway productions was not determined by public taste, but ‘in accord with tasks set by 
Wall Street.”199 The “stale atmosphere” of Broadway, wrote Kulikova (as reported in the 
Times), was created by “Broadway imperialists,” and it “stifl[ed] all creative initiative of 
theatrical groups and turn[ed] actors and producers into robots, obedient to the will of Wall 
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Street bosses.”200 By casting the Wall Street bosses as oppressive heavies manipulating 
Broadway producers and artists, Kulikova implied that America’s capitalistic system robbed 
the people of their voice in the theater, preventing the theater from occupying a meaningful 
place in their lives. Another Soviet critic, M. Morozov, had argued, prior to Kulikova’s 
article, that Americans envied the Soviets because the United States lacked a theater that 
spoke directly to them. According to Morozov, Americans, “with a pained longing . . . read 
about Soviet theatre, which not only talks about the people, and serves the people, but 
belongs to the people.”201 Soviet theater was, Morozov argued, an integral part of Soviet life 
to a degree that Americans could only dream about.  
Although Morozov and Kulikova penned these articles ten years before the founding 
of the Repertory Theatre at Lincoln Center, Funke’s article announcing the establishment of 
the advisory board—with its assertion that a permanent company could have prevented the 
embarrassment of “floundering” at the Brussels World Fair—clearly demonstrates that the 
nerve struck by the Soviet critics remained raw. The establishment of the advisory board and 
the assurance of the theater’s construction offered hope not only that an institutional 
framework to support a national theater could at last be developed, but also that the 
Repertory Theater, situated within the fortress-like campus of Lincoln Center, would serve as 
a visual display of American theatrical might to counter criticisms like those leveled by 
Soviet critics. It now fell to Whitehead and Kazan to make the case for how their new theater 
would fill the cultural void left by the absence of a national theater. 
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One of Whitehead’s first undertakings was a tour of European repertory theaters 
during which he visited several repertory companies. Upon his return in June 1959, he said 
he had been impressed by what he saw during his travels, which had “changed [his] entire 
thinking about repertory theatre here.” He had been most impressed by the German repertory 
theaters he visited, particularly the Berliner Ensemble. “They have achieved amazing range 
and style and they have standards of production we would do well to emulate,” he reported, 
noting that it was amazing what could be accomplished by “talented actors and directors 
working together over a period of time.”202 Shortly after his return from Europe, Whitehead 
announced that he had accepted an invitation from Soviet officials to spend several weeks 
touring Russian theaters. According to the Times, the officials wanted Whitehead’s 
“suggestions on which of their native productions to export to the United States and they 
have extended the unusual invitation through this country’s State Department.” Whitehead 
accepted the invitation and felt it would serve a “double purpose, in that it not only would 
further the cause of good cultural relations between the two countries but also would give 
him an opportunity to report to the Lincoln Center people on Russian repertory 
techniques.”203  It also allowed him to tie the work of the Repertory Theater to the Cold War 
mobilization narrative so important to the development of Lincoln Center. 
When he returned in December 1959, Whitehead reported that his visit to the Soviet 
Union affirmed his main takeaway from his tour of European theaters: the importance of a 
well-trained company and permanent repertory. “You cannot achieve great theatre after three 
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weeks in rehearsal and an opening in New Haven,” he told the Times. He argued, 
“Playwrights must exist within an organization—they must live with the day-by-day turmoil, 
with the whole mess.” He was also quick to point out, however, that Americans should be 
careful not to fetishize the Soviet theater too much. “There are no third-act problems in the 
new Soviet plays—the solution is Marxist doctrine . . . You cannot put on plays by 
committee, here or elsewhere. They can be done by dedicated individuals and groups thriving 
in a free theatre atmosphere and society.”204 In other words, Whitehead suggested that while 
the Soviets might have a stable institutional structure for their theater, they did not enjoy the 
same freedom of expression in the theater or in society at large. The theater at Lincoln Center 
could learn much from the Soviets about the value of permanent ensembles and repertoire, 
but it would also benefit from the free and open discourse absent in the Soviet Union.  
Like Rockefeller, Whitehead managed to invoke the Cold War ethos, defined by the 
supremacy of American democracy, while avoiding any hint of fanaticism. Instead, he 
worked to emphasize what he believed was a cultural shift in the United States that made the 
theater possible and necessary. Whitehead faithfully towed the party line throughout his 
association with the theater, repeatedly asserting that although Rockefeller and his fellow 
“enlightened business leaders” played an important role in making the theater possible, “it 
could not have come about without the atmosphere that currently exists in the nation. We 
have reached a point in our history—possibly it is a maturity; certainly it is a psychology, a 
need that exists.”205 The theater reflected, according to Whitehead, not just a mobilization 
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against the Soviet Union in the fight for supremacy, but also the culmination of a process of 
evolution that had been underway for some time. Refrains of cultural maturity had echoed 
throughout Lincoln Center’s development and would continue to be sung as the theater 
evolved from concept to producing organization. But, as Whitehead and Kazan would soon 
learn, those refrains would not be enough to define the theater’s identity or to convince critics 
of the theater’s worth. 
Incorporation 
Sometime in the summer of 1959, Whitehead proposed to Kazan a fifty-fifty 
partnership in the artistic leadership of the Repertory Theater. Kazan accepted the position on 
September 2, 1959, but his acceptance came with a caveat. He told Whitehead that he would 
be willing to compromise on any number of things to be dealt with as they came up, but that 
there was “only one piece of understanding that I have to have with you before I start. . . . So 
now I’ll spell out the one thing that is of great concern to me. And I’ll do so by making a 
suggestion.”206 He suggested that the Repertory Theater remain unaffiliated with the drama 
department of the Juilliard School, which was to be led by Michel St. Denis, and that the 
Actors Studio be “attached” to the Repertory Theater as the official actor-training arm of the 
company. Under this proposed arrangement, Strasberg would run the training studio but 
would have no leadership or executive role within the Repertory Theater.  
Allowing Strasberg to head the Studio under the auspices of the Repertory Theater 
would mitigate the risk that St. Denis would exert undue influence on the acting company of 
the Repertory Theater, a concern that had nearly ended Kazan’s relationship with the 
                                                
206 Kazan, Selected Letters, 410. 
 
 124 
Repertory Theater five months earlier, when he had resigned his position on the advisory 
board after learning of St. Denis’s likely appointment as the head of the drama department at 
Juilliard. Kazan believed that St. Michel’s approach to acting, which placed tremendous 
emphasis on external style, was anathema to the idea of an American repertory theater and 
feared that his leadership of the Juilliard School would taint the acting company of the 
Repertory Theater.  
If the Repertory Theater was to be a distinctly American theater, Kazan insisted, it 
must resist the temptation to turn over the training of its actors to a European teacher, a 
decision that seemed to him “not only deplorable but even tragic.”207 The Method, according 
to Kazan, defined American theater and “[sprang] from our national temperament—the 
nature of our people.”208 As far as Kazan was concerned, the Repertory Theater, if he was to 
lead it, should be free of the influence of St. Denis, who would, he feared, drain the company 
of a distinctly American character.  Whitehead did not appear to support Kazan’s proposal to 
attach the Actors Studio to the Repertory Theater, but Kazan, despite his misgivings about St. 
Denis’s leadership of drama at Juilliard, accepted the offer to join Whitehead as the co-
director of the theater, which was officially incorporated in February 1960. 
When Lincoln Center announced the incorporation of the Repertory Theatre 
Association in February 1960, the New York Times proclaimed its confidence that this new 
theater company, despite the obstacles that surely lay ahead, would ultimately find success. 
“With the same patience and dedication as has been manifested by the other constituents in 
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Lincoln Center,” the Times predicted, “success seems bound to be its reward.”209 The 
announcement in the Times only vaguely alluded to the theater’s programming plans, 
mentioning only Whitehead’s assertion that “the life of the theatre is in its new work. We 
must do new plays along with American revivals and classical works.”210 A great deal of 
work lay ahead in the establishment of a clear artistic policy and organizational structure for 
the theater, but the most senior leadership of the company had now been installed. Serving as 
president of the corporation would be George Woods, a banking executive and chairman of 
the First Boston Corporation. Whitehead, as had been expected, assumed leadership as the 
producer and Elia Kazan joined him as co-producer and artistic director.   
Shortly after the announcement of its incorporation, the theater’s public relations 
director, Barry Hyams, wrote to Robert Whitehead to “express the importance of press 
representation for the Repertory Theatre from this time forward,” urging Whitehead to take 
control of the narrative of the theater’s evolution.  “The need arises,” he wrote, “to shape this 
identity in the public mind and to create a positive and sustained attitude toward the 
Repertory Theatre.”211 Hyams understood that the theater’s association with Lincoln Center 
exposed it to greater scrutiny than a stand-alone repertory theater would ever receive. More 
importantly, he understood that if Whitehead and Kazan did not make a concerted effort to 
establish the theater’s identity in the public imagination, there were plenty of other people 
who would do it for them. Perhaps Hyams had recalled that two years earlier Vivian 
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Beaumont Allen had expressed her “cherished hope that our country might one day have a 
national theatre comparable in distinction and achievement to the Comedie Francaise."212 
From a public relations standpoint, such comparisons risked shaping a particular identity in 
the public mind before the theater’s leadership could establish its direction themselves. Now 
was the time for the theater’s leaders to begin to give the public an idea of what they had in 
mind.  
 Whitehead and Kazan, heeding the advice of their public relations director, made 
their first extensive public remarks about their vision for the theater on April 17, 1960 in an 
interview with Maurice Zolotow of the New York Times. Zolotow called their decision to 
leave the commercial theater behind for Lincoln Center “the first seismic tremor in what may 
prove to be a great earthquake in the American theatre, comparable to the effect of the 
Theater Guild during the Nineteen Twenties or the Group Theatre during the Nineteen 
Thirties.”213 Kazan and Whitehead, although careful never to explicitly evoke these other 
companies, described their own organization as an endeavor sharing similar aims. In terms of 
repertoire, each season would, according to Whitehead, include two new American plays, 
two classical European revivals, and one “revival of an American classic, or an O’Neill play 
or Thornton Wilder, perhaps.”214 Kazan emphasized that the theater, despite its intent to 
mount productions of classics, would do so only for works that seemed relevant in 
contemporary terms and that such productions would be mounted in an “exciting way.” 
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Liberation of the artist from the frenetic pace of the Broadway production process would, 
Kazan and Whitehead proclaimed, facilitate the lofty programming goals of the new theater 
company.  Rehearsal periods would last not two and a half weeks but, insisted Kazan, “as 
long as a play needs it—three months, six, months, yes, even eight months,” much like the 
Group Theater had done with its famously long periods of exploration and rehearsal. 
 In articulating the theater’s strategy, Whitehead adopted a cool, even-keeled tone, 
limiting his commentary primarily to questions of repertoire and the physical theater space, 
so it fell to Kazan to articulate the theater’s purpose. Kazan spoke emphatically about the 
vitality he hoped the new theater would bring about, “excitedly describ[ing] a theatre of color 
and spectacle, of mobility in the use of stage dynamics, of a utilization of the arts of the 
painter, the singer, the choreographer, the pantomimist.”215 The Repertory Theater, Kazan 
implied, would not only present works unlikely to receive production on Broadway, but 
would push the very boundaries of production techniques.  Kazan intended, he said, to “make 
a theatre that is interesting, exciting, vital to us in contemporary terms. . . . There is a dearth 
of ideas about life, about morality and there is a dearth of theatricality, of emotionalism, if 
you like. We want to be more theatrical—not less—than the commercial theatre.”216 Exactly 
how it would be more theatrical than the commercial theater remained to be clearly 
explained. Kazan somehow managed to be simultaneously evocative and vague in his 
descriptions, evoking a theater unlike anything ever seen before on the one hand, but on the 
other failing to offer any specific details about how he would accomplish this. This tension 
between impassioned rhetoric and meagre substance characterized many of his public and 
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private statements during the early part of his tenure at Lincoln Center, and the impression 
that emerges is of a man trying to convince himself as much as anyone else, an impression 
confirmed by the events of the coming years and Kazan’s own reflections on those events.  
 Meanwhile, the policy announcement swiftly drew fire from critics who felt that the 
appointment of a management team who had built their careers in the commercial theater was 
an outright betrayal of the very idea of a repertory theater, which was meant to be an 
alternative to the hit-flop commercial producing model. Robert Brustein was particularly 
hostile toward the Kazan and Whitehead administration and scoffed at the statements they 
made in the Times. “One may wonder—when it is commercialism that is debasing our 
theatre—why the Lincoln Center project was handed over to two men who up till now have 
shown no great interest in any other system.”217 Kazan and Whitehead’s proposed emphasis 
on new plays from leading American writers was, in Brustein’s view, a mistake in terms of 
emphasis. He argued that the “repertory fever” sweeping the country grew out of the 
realization that “America will never develop a satisfactory dramatic tradition until it can 
develop a unified company with plenty of rehearsal time and a vigorous, intelligent, and 
continuous artistic policy.”218 Kazan’s longstanding association with the Actors Studio 
suggested to Brustein that one of the main problems facing the American theater, the lack of 
“histrionic range” of American Method-trained actors, would only be exacerbated under the 
leadership of Kazan who would likely draw his actors from the ranks of the Actors Studio.  
 Tyrone Guthrie also argued that a national repertory theater “should not indulge in the 
highly speculative business of producing new work.” He argued that instead the commercial 
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theater “could still reward success in this field so richly that the responsibility can still be left 
to private enterprise. Moreover, private enterprise affords to new authors a more catholic 
taste and more competitive terms than does an institution,” which should instead work to 
keep “a selection of Great Masterpieces constantly in view.”219 Although Guthrie had made 
these remarks two years earlier when the news of the repertory theater first broke, his and 
Brustein’s arguments represent the views of many contemporary proponents of repertory. 
While there might be room in a repertory theater for the new works by “leading playwrights,” 
critics seemed to fall into one of two camps. In one camp were the intellectual theatrical 
press who believed that a repertory theater should take advantage of its subsidy not only to 
present works unsuitable for Broadway, but that those works should adventurously explore 
the limits of theatrical practice. Brustein even went so far as to suggest that an organization 
like the Living Theater would be a more appropriate choice to assume the theater 
constituency at Lincoln Center.220 Others, like Guthrie, saw a repertory theater not as an 
outlet for experimentation but as a repository of sorts for great works. Whichever camp 
critics fell into, one thing was relatively clear. Kazan did not align with either of these 
visions, and he knew it. 
 Looking back years later, Kazan admitted that he had misgivings about taking the 
position in the first place.  “Although I’d often proclaimed that repertory was the only kind of 
theatre I believed in,” he wrote, “I doubt very much if I was enthusiastic about fathering the 
day-to-day life of a company of actors. The job would require a total devotion, near 
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fanaticism. I didn’t have that.”221 Feeling honor-bound to stay with the project, he determined 
that he would do his best to make it work, but he felt trepidation every step of the way.  In 
September 1960, he wrote a lengthy letter to Whitehead laying out many of his convictions 
about the direction in which he felt the theater should move. On the surface, the letter seems 
like an impassioned rallying cry shared with a collaborator. However, a close look at the 
letter in the context of the surrounding circumstances suggests a certain amount of duplicity 
at work and that the letter was motivated less by conviction than by hesitation.  
After listing all the reasons why a repertory theater was likely doomed to failure in 
New York, Kazan wrote, “There’s no reason to do this whole bloody thing. Is there? . . . 
Unless,” he wrote, “. . . it’s exhilarating! Unless it’s an adventure, unless it fills us with the 
sense that we’re making the impossible come to be . . . and unless the result, in a word, is 
Art.”222 In addition to insisting that it must be an ART THEATRE—a phrase that appears in 
all capital letters twice in close succession—Kazan argued for a socially relevant theatre: 
I think we should be a social Theatre. I don’t mean this in the narrow sense of the 
Thirties (although I’d prefer that to our own theatre). To put it another way, it should 
be a thematic Theatre. It should be a Theatre of Themes. Each play, each production 
should say something. I want us to do comedies, musicals, fantasies, pantomimes, 
childrens [sic] plays, as well as tragedies and dramas—but I don’t want to do 
anything unless something in the core of the play or the production-to-be is 
STIRRING to me. I want to become the centre [sic] of a Group of Contemporary 
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American Artists: playwrights, directors, designers, actors technicians all of whom 
think of the Theatre as a cause.223 
This same fervent tone runs through most of this letter and one cannot help but feel that the 
passion is somewhat forced; at times the letter feels more as though it is meant for 
publication than as a communiqué between colleagues.  
 Kazan also reopened the subject of the Actors Studio, making another pitch to 
formally attach the Studio to the Repertory Theater. He proposed putting Strasberg in charge 
of the Repertory Theater’s actor-training program issued an ultimatum to Whitehead:  If 
Whitehead would not agree to attach the Actors Studio to the Repertory Theater and if the 
two organizations were to remain separate, Kazan would stay on at the Actors Studio—rather 
than accepting Whitehead’s offer to lead the Repertory Theater—and only direct the 
occasional play at Lincoln Center. Closing the letter, Kazan said, “I think we must see if we 
do agree on these concrete, specific fundamental points of departure.”  If they discovered that 
they were not in accord, he said, Kazan would “resign as co-whatever-I am and I will be 
open to invitations to direct a show for you your first season.”224 
By the time he wrote this letter in 1960, Kazan had already admitted to himself that 
he wished that he had never agreed to join the Lincoln Center project, but he realized he had 
to see it through, recalling later, “if I could have found an honorable way out, I would have 
taken it.”225 Kazan’s ultimatum was almost certainly an attempt to create such an 
“honorable” escape from the project. Considering that Kazan knew of Whitehead’s hostility 
toward Strasberg and the Actors Studio, he seems to be inviting Whitehead to ask for his 
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resignation. No such request was forthcoming, however, and it does not appear that 
Whitehead ever responded, at least in writing, to Kazan’s ultimatum.   
Honestly, Baby, Isn’t It Time? 
 Now locked into the Lincoln Center project with no escape in sight, Kazan worked at 
lining up playwrights to contribute work to the theater. In June 1961, he wrote an 
impassioned letter to Tennessee Williams, urging him to give Lincoln Center a play. Kazan 
conceded that writing for the Repertory Theater would not offer Williams anywhere near the 
remuneration he could expect from a Broadway hit, but the Repertory Theater could “make 
of you a living playwright in the sense that Brecht is a living playwright in East Berlin.”226 
He urged Williams to turn his back on the commercial theater and write for an institution 
where he could be more daring. “Honestly, baby, isn’t it time,” he chided Williams. “Most 
everyone experiments when they’re young, but the real good ones, Picasso, Michelangelo, 
Chaplin and Goya experiment when they have their full gift.”227 Kazan tried to seduce 
Williams with the promise of that the Lincoln Center theater would avoid the traps of 
previous repertory groups that had died from “asphyxiation in the dust of worthiness” and 
that the theater’s physical plant would be equipped to realize Williams’ wildest imagery.  He 
implored Williams to give the theater “a difficult [play], an impossible one, a truthful one, a 
painful, honest, uncompromising one, all personal statement, all inconvenience, all 
untraditional, all uncommercial. We can put wonder back in the corpse of our Theatre.”228 If 
Kazan was to be believed, he was presenting Williams with a theater that he could call his 
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own where his plays “will be kept alive and revered.”229 Although Williams expressed some 
initial interest, he ultimately turned down the offer from Kazan.  
 Despite his assertion that he planned to push the boundaries of theatrical production 
at Lincoln Center, Kazan trod familiar territory in his search for contributing playwrights, 
approaching former collaborators like Clifford Odets and William Inge. The first play he 
secured for the theater’s inaugural season was a play by Broadway veteran S.N. Behrman, 
But for Whom Charlie, which had originally been optioned for a Broadway production by 
Whitehead, who had asked Kazan to direct it. According to Behrman, the Broadway 
production of the play had been sidelined by Kazan’s film commitments, but once planning 
for Lincoln Center was underway, Kazan suggested to Behrman that the play might be 
appropriate for the Repertory Theater. Behrman, although impressed by Whitehead’s 
ambitious plans for the Repertory Theater, hesitated to commit to a non-commercial 
production, but Kazan persisted, finally cornering Behrman at a state dinner at the White 
House on May 11, 1962.230 “I don’t know whether it was the general excitement of the 
evening, the anticipation of presently meeting the President and First Lady, or Mr. Kazan’s 
ignescent personality that made me suddenly feel that this was the only destiny for me and 
my play,” Behrman recalled. “I said ‘yes.’ It was probably the first theatrical deal ever 
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consummated in the White House.”231 Within a few weeks, Behrman and the Repertory 
Theater finalized the deal, which the Times reported on May 29, 1962.232  
The press seems to have had little to say about Behrman’s selection at the time, 
although many critics would come down hard on the play once it premiered, lambasting it as 
frivolous and more suited to Broadway than a prestigious repertory theater. Behrman himself 
made no bones about the fact that he was not a “proletarian writer” but rather he “[wrote] 
plays about people who are fairly intelligent” and was “interested in what problems afflict 
mature and intelligent people. I think they have problems, too. I think they suffer, too.”233 No 
doubt Vivian Beaumont Allen, the vivacious philanthropist herself, would have been first on 
line to buy a ticket had she lived to see its opening.  
While Kazan worked to woo Behrman, Whitehead was dispatched to meet with 
Arthur Miller in his room at the Chelsea Hotel, where he asked Miller if he would write a 
play to open the Repertory Theater. Whitehead naturally had concerns about whether Miller 
would be able to work with Kazan after their public break over the HUAC proceedings. 
Miller had not changed his opinion that Kazan’s testimony “had disserved both himself and 
the cause of freedom,” but the moral question confronting Miller was “whether his political 
stance and even moral defection, if one liked, should permanently bar him from working in 
the theatre, especially this particular kind of publicly supported theatre.”234 Miller believed 
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that refusing to work with Kazan would put him on the same moral footing as those who had 
promulgated the blacklisting and persecution during the McCarthy era. From a professional 
and artistic point of view, “to reject [Kazan],” Miller recalled, “was to reject the hope for a 
national theatre in this time.”235 Miller agreed to give the play on which he was working—
After the Fall—to the theater and he began to accelerate the pace so that he could finish it in 
time for opening about a year hence. It is unclear exactly when Whitehead approached 
Miller, but the initial meeting most likely happened sometime in the late summer or early fall 
of 1962. The Times reported Miller’s commitment on October 26, 1962. Whitehead 
expressed his and Kazan’s “immense enthusiasm” and said, “Arthur Miller has taken an 
important step in helping establish the purpose of the Lincoln repertory company.”236 Having 
secured a new play from a leading American playwright, the Repertory Theater had taken an 
important step in establishing its prestige. Meanwhile, Kazan and Whitehead had begun the 
work of building the acting company. 
A King or a Brooklyn Cab Driver   
In September 1962, almost exactly a year after Kazan’s “final offer” to Strasberg, 
thirty-five actors—twenty-one men and fourteen women—all under the age of twenty-five, 
convened for the first time in the Carnegie Hall studio that would house the Repertory 
Theater’s training program.237 According to a press release from the Repertory Theater, the 
training program aimed “to establish and teach an approach to style for the American actor 
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faced with the varied requirements of a repertory consisting of classics, revivals and 
contemporary plays.” Whitehead called the gathering the “first step toward actual 
performance.” The actors would undergo an intensive eight-month training program, after 
which fifteen of the twenty-five trainees would be invited to join the repertory company 
alongside more senior and established actors. As the Repertory Theater began to occupy 
more and more column inches in the press, the selection of the more senior actors came 
under scrutiny, and many critics suggested that Kazan’s history with the Actors Studio would 
likely result in a company drawn from its ranks, thereby severely limiting the range of the 
company. Although the inner turmoil surrounding the involvement of the Actors Studio had 
been settled, Kazan and Whitehead would continue to be on the defensive as they rolled out 
their plans regarding the acting company.  
In the months leading up to the start of actor training, Whitehead kept mum about the 
actors who might fill the ranks of the repertory company at Lincoln Center. Lewis Funke 
ribbed Whitehead in the Times for the apparent laryngitis that seemed to kick in when 
Whitehead was asked to confirm meetings with notable actors under consideration. Funke 
reported in January 1962, “it has been clear to patrols and intelligence agents that intense 
activity has been in progress looking toward the formation of the company for the Vivian 
Beaumont Theatre to be erected in the Lincoln Center for the Performing Arts.”238 Among 
the actors sighted entering and leaving Whitehead’s West Forty-Sixth Street offices were 
Christopher Plummer, Geraldine Page, Anne Bancroft, Mildred Dunnock, Pat Hinkle, Jason 
Robards, Eli Wallach, Karl Malden, Hume Cronyn, among others. Many of the actors with 
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whom Whitehead reportedly met were affiliated with the Actors Studio, alarming many 
critics.  
Whitney Bolton of the New York Morning Telegraph, for example, wrote that the 
revelation that so many Studio actors were under consideration diminished what limited hope 
he might have had for the repertory theater’s ability to live up to its promise. Like Brustein, 
who had argued two years earlier that the Method was “the worst possible training grounds 
for a repertory actor,” 239 Bolton believed that relying on Studio actors would impede the 
range of works that could be adequately presented by the company, and went so far as to 
argue that Kazan seemed “so narrow a director that he [felt] secure only with Studio people.” 
Bolton, who characterized himself as “one critic who often enough has been dismayed by 
Studio techniques,” saw something even more pernicious than Kazan’s potential artistic 
limitations at play, and suggested that Whitehead and Kazan were “deliberately creating a 
closed corporation cozily assembled around their mostly Studio favorites.” Bolton, clearly 
not a devotee of the Studio, would likely have scoffed at Kazan’s assertions to Rockefeller 
and Whitehead that the Method was a defining characteristic of what made American theater 
unique, as he believed that limiting the roster to Studio alumni would essentially 
disenfranchise the vast majority of American actors while preventing the Repertory Theater 
from achieving the artistic stature worthy of a national theater. As he saw it, the Studio and 
the Method represented a narcissistic sect of the American theater more concerned with self-
indulgence than with serving the needs and desires of American audiences. “Make way for 
the mumblers, the actors with small regard for traditional obligation to audiences,” he wrote. 
“Make way for a cult that already has done much damage to the American theatre. At 
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Lincoln Center, apparently, the cult has found its temple and the professional theatre has 
found a locked door.”240 Bolton was one of many critics who expressed concern that the 
influence of the Method could work against the aspirations of a repertory theater, and so the 
Repertory Theater would have to work to ensure that not only were they working to train 
their actors to meet the demands of repertory but also that they communicated those efforts 
clearly to the public.  
At Kazan’s urging, Whitehead had agreed to engage Robert Lewis, a Group Theater 
alumnus, to lead the training program. Knowing that Whitehead viewed the Method 
skeptically and admired Michel St. Denis’s approach to teaching style, Kazan and Lewis 
worked to convince Whitehead that Lewis could deliver the training that the young actors 
needed. In late 1960, Lewis wrote to Whitehead and attempted to assuage Whitehead’s 
misgivings. Lewis echoed Kazan’s objections to Michel St. Denis’s emphasis on the “outside 
in” approach to acting. However, he was careful to assure Whitehead that he understood the 
necessity of technical training in conjunction with the emotional truth that the Method’s 
training techniques fostered. “Certainly, it is to be hoped,” he argued to Whitehead, “that this 
time more than lip service will be paid to the desperate need for daily intensive study in all 
the means of the actors’ expressivity. . . . However, the training and development of the 
actors’ true inner feelings to fill up this sense of form with life is fundamental.”241 Lewis 
promised Whitehead that he would develop a training program to equip actors with the 
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technical capabilities necessary to tackle the demands of rotating repertory while ensuring 
that the vitality and truth derived from the Method would not be sacrificed.  
Kazan and Lewis, in the public rolling out of the training program, carefully 
downplayed the influence of the Method and emphasized the intensive technical training the 
actors would undergo.  Addressing the actors in the training program on that first day, Lewis 
told the assembled students, “We believe in true feeling, but if we are to have a genuine 
repertory company we must extend the range of the actors.”242  Whitehead, Kazan, and Lewis 
worked carefully to conjure in the public mind the image of an actor defined by poise, flair, 
and technique as opposed to the image of the stereotypical Method actor too self-involved to 
worry himself about something so trivial as being heard or understood by an audience. Lewis 
insisted to the assembled actors—and to the public via the press release recounting this first 
day—that his training program would  “provide the actor with the best of both schools—the  
‘all inside,’ and the ‘all outside’ –so that he will be able to play a king, as well as a Brooklyn 
cab driver.’”243  In other words, the emotional truth of the Method would occupy a central 
position, but the repertory trainees would be well prepared to tackle the elevated works 
expected of a national repertory theater.  
 Kazan used the training program’s kick off as the occasion to publish his first 
extensive public statements about his vision for the theater since the April 1960 joint 
interview with Whitehead. In an article entitled “Theater: New Stages, New Plays, New 
Actors,” Kazan emphasized the importance of the actors to the theater’s vision, writing, “It is 
perfectly obvious that the program of a repertory theater is something that is not sympathetic 
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to all actors nor even to most actors. It is equally obvious that most actors are not technically 
prepared and trained to play repertory.”  He went on to say, “It is shocking and dismaying 
how untrained many of our stage stars are, how narrow their vocal range, how provincial 
their speech, how inept their bodies.” The training at Lincoln Center would address these 
deficiencies and would work to move beyond the kind of work generated at the Actors 
Studio. Kazan explicitly mentioned the Studio in the article, noting that his “greatest 
disappointment” with the Studio’s work was that it never transcended the “preoccupation 
with the purely psychological side of acting.”244 Despite his acknowledgement of the 
importance of the Studio’s contributions to the theater, Kazan clearly made an intentional and 
explicit public break with the Studio with the publication of this article in the Times. Not 
only did he have to hit back against criticisms that his Studio and Method background was 
antithetical to repertory, but he also had to make it clear in the public mind that he was no 
longer affiliated with the Actors Studio.245  
 After eight months of training, Kazan and Whitehead invited fourteen of the thirty 
actors in the program to join the repertory company. Kazan met with members of the training 
program on April 29, 1963 either to offer them a position in the company or to send them on 
their way. Kazan offered most of the chosen actors two-and-a-half year contracts, and told 
most that they were not guaranteed roles. In many cases, he also made a point of compelling 
the actors to declare their commitment to stay with the company and not abandon ship should 
commercial theater or movie offers come in.  In his notes, he recounted his meeting with 
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Faye Dunaway, in which he told her that she would almost certainly be getting movie offers 
and “we weren’t interested in having her unless she wanted nothing but this.” Dunaway 
replied that a position in the repertory company was “all in the world she wanted.”246 Of 
those actors not chosen for the company—including a young Frank Langella, whose rejection 
was “the hardest one” for Kazan—most seemed, according to Kazan, to take the news 
relatively well despite some tears from a few.  
However, one cannot help but notice a hint of sexism running through Kazan’s 
commentary. Kazan described many of the rejected men as taking it hard or being 
disappointed, but he described the women’s reactions in stark emotional terms. Of actress 
Gail Fisher, he wrote, “Came in hostile. Said that it was a corrupt world and, therefore, our 
class was corrupt. . . . I had no respect for her reaction.”  A young actress named Gretchen 
Walther complained that Robert Lewis expressed hostility because he “[didn’t] like girl girls 
and, therefore, she had great difficulty working in this atmosphere of antagonism and scorn 
or whatever. Then she burst into tears. . . . The meeting confirmed the impression that I had 
that she has a very slight talent if any.”247 It is impossible to know whether Kazan’s 
assessment regarding the “slight talent” of Walther or the hostility of Fisher were valid, but it 
seems worth noting that he recounted his meetings with women in a much more visceral way 
than the meetings with the men of the company. While this could be chalked up to a clear 
trend of misogyny that characterized much of Kazan’s personal life, it also seems likely that 
the harshness visited upon these women in the notes on his meeting at least subconsciously 
served to bolster his attempts to appear objective when recounting the meeting with the 
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actress whom he claimed to have criticized most harshly—Barbara Loden, who was accepted 
into the company and would become the breakout star after playing the leading role in After 
the Fall. 
By the time of these meetings in April 1963, Kazan and Loden had been romantically 
involved for five years, and she had given birth to Kazan’s son Leo. Recounting his meeting 
with Loden, Kazan reported that he had been “very rough with her on her voice.  Told her 
she hadn’t made nearly enough progress. Whitehead and Kazan agreed to talk to her each 
separately about this again. Kazan feels Whitehead especially would have influence over her 
in this regard.”248 His account of this meeting with Loden was the only one in which he 
spoke of himself in the third person, and the only one in which he leveled such a specific and 
harsh criticism at an actor. One can almost imagine him winking at Loden while berating her 
in front of Whitehead and Lewis. But what is particularly interesting about his attempt to 
demonstrate impartiality toward Loden—despite the fact that by now their romantic 
entanglement was all but common knowledge—is that she had already surfaced as the 
leading contender for the role of Maggie in After the Fall. In late December 1961, ten months 
before the training program even began, Loden, days away from giving birth to Leo, met 
with Miller and read for the role of Maggie, and it was clear to both men that they had found 
their leading lady. Nonetheless, Loden went through the training program like everyone else 
and was given a two year contract at a weekly salary of $350, making her one of the most 
highly compensated among the company.249  
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The month before the announcement of the selection of the ensemble, the Times 
announced that Jason Robards had joined the company. Robards agreed to appear in four 
plays over the course of two years. Among his assignments were the leading roles in After 
the Fall and But for Whom, Charlie. A bona fide Broadway star, Robards would help lend 
the Repertory Theater star power, while reinforcing the importance of the venture to the 
health of American theater. “I feel I have to do it,” he said; “it’s not for the money I assure 
you.”250 Just like Miller, Behrman, Kazan, and Whitehead, Robards could earn substantially 
more money on the commercial stage, but by joining the repertory company, he sent a clear 
signal that the Repertory Theater would help counter the “disintegrating state of the 
theater.”251 And so now, three years after its incorporation, the Repertory Theater of Lincoln 
Center had secured two original plays, put together an ensemble and landed a prominent 
leading man to head up the repertory company. When rehearsals began in October 1963, 
there was, it seemed, much to be excited about. 
The Great American Company 
 Expectations were naturally high as rehearsals began. A permanent company 
comprised of veteran performers and promising newcomers was to be directed by the most 
influential contemporary director in a new play by Arthur Miller. Miller was optimistic that 
the freedom from the financial pressures of Broadway would allow the company to “work a 
change in the theater; it’s the spirit of the play again instead of the motive for personal 
success,” he said. “I feel we can build a permanent voice with the repertory company. The 
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only value involved will be the play itself and the expansion of the actors’ techniques.”252 
Everyone from Kazan to the unknown young ensemble actors echoed Miller’s refrain of 
freedom from the commercial excesses of Broadway, and embraced the opportunity to enjoy 
the stability and continuity of working in a permanent company.  
 By all accounts, the atmosphere in those early days of rehearsal was one of 
exuberance and anticipation. William Goyen, a writer-in-residence on a Ford Foundation 
grant, spent several months observing rehearsals and published his reflections in Show 
magazine. He recalled that in those early days, actors spoke “with the tone of relief and 
reinvigoration of people who have been saved from something. . . . Here it was at last, they 
were saying, the Great American Company. Now they would live together and work together 
and make a community.”253 Many of the actors expressed their gratitude and excitement over 
being able to devote themselves to their work without worry about what would happen if the 
production folded due to poor ticket sales. Ensemble member James Greene told a reporter, 
“Here for the first time, an actor gives his complete attention to what he is doing. He’s not 
thinking about TV or about anything else. Each actor feels, ‘Now I have two years to apply 
myself.’”254 But the euphoria in which so many of the actors reveled was to be short-lived.  
 As Goyen tells it, the mood in the rehearsal shifted rather quickly as tensions 
mounted within the company. Goyen suggested that the weight of the plays, After the Fall 
and O’Neill’s Marco Millions, which was to be the second play in the repertory lineup, 
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overtook the cast. Miller’s play, said Goyen, seemed to be a “portrait of self-pity, maudlin 
self-concern, immense self-aggrandizement. But the people caught in the deepening 
relationships and realities of the characters in this world of Miller’s were shadowed by it. 
Barbara Loden was three times trying to leave the play.”255 To make matters worse, Robards 
disappeared for a days-long bender in November, buckling under the pressure of the 
enormous role of Quentin and likely reacting negatively to the realization that he was likely 
to be overshadowed by Loden’s performance.256 When Robards returned, nobody said a word 
about his disappearance, according to Goyen. Any relief the company felt over his return was 
quickly overshadowed, for Robards had returned to rehearsals on November 22, 1963. 
Rehearsals broke for the day upon receiving word of President Kennedy’s assassination, but 
the company was back at work at the next day. Kazan recalled the company being utterly 
devastated by the news. Their grief was only compounded when, three weeks later, Kazan’s 
wife Molly suffered an aneurism and died. Rehearsals were suspended for a few days until 
Kazan returned to the rehearsal studio, obviously weakened by the experience. The company 
pulled together and continued to work toward the January opening of After the Fall, which as 
we will see received a relatively favorable critical response. But the time the play opened, a 
cloud seemed to hang over the company. Adding to the sense of gloom was the danger that 
Whitehead and Kazan had begun to sense lurked in the boardroom.  
Oaths of Vengence 
 By the time rehearsals began in October 1963, Kazan and Whitehead had already lost 
the faith of some members of the theater’s board of directors, who believed Kazan and 
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Whitehead had demonstrated questionable artistic and administrative judgment. Whitehead in 
particular had raised the ire of some of the board members—and that of George Woods, the 
president of the Repertory Theater—through his solution to a major logistical challenge 
facing the company. Although his downfall was still a year off, it was this decision that can 
fairly be viewed as his tragic mistake. In early 1962, Whitehead and Kazan learned that the 
Vivian Beaumont Theater, because of construction delays, would not be ready until late 
1964, a full year later than the originally scheduled opening. Waiting for the Beaumont’s 
completion could cause the company to lose the plays they had commissioned from Behrman 
and Miller.257 In addition, the Beaumont’s delayed opening date would coincide with the 
1964 World’s Fair, and Whitehead felt it important that the Repertory’s opening not be 
overshadowed by such a high-profile event.258  It seemed clear to Whitehead that the 
company would need to find an alternative venue to present their first season. Whitehead 
presented this idea for the first time in May 1962, when “after a week of intensive 
discussions with the center’s executive board, the repertory theatre’s producing directors—
Robert Whitehead and Elia Kazan—were given the approval and necessary financial support 
to take the step.”259 Whitehead claimed that the plan for an alternative venue “had been 
endorsed enthusiastically by George D. Woods,”260 but even if Woods did support the plan 
initially, which seems unlikely, he clearly changed his mind soon enough.  
                                                
257 Louis Calta, “Lincoln Troupe to Get Its Tent: Company and ANTA Settle Rent for Temporary Home.” New 
York Times, April 23, 1963. ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The New York Times. 
258 Arthur Gelb. “Repertory Group to Perform in ’63: Lincoln Center Unit Seeks a Stage While Awaiting 
Beaumont Theatre.” New York Times, May 29, 1962. ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The New York Times. 
259 Ibid. 
260 Ibid.  
 147 
At first, Whitehead intended to rent an existing theater that could be adapted to give 
the stage some of the characteristics of the Beaumont’s thrust stage, but he and Kazan could 
not find a venue suitable to their needs. They instead devised a plan to construct a temporary 
structure, essentially a steel-framed tent, which would replicate the stage and seating 
arrangement of the Beaumont.  Whitehead and Kazan had hoped initially that such a 
structure might be erected on the grounds of Lincoln Center on the site of the Juilliard 
School—construction of that building had not yet begun—but that proposal was rejected by 
Lincoln Center for largely aesthetic reasons, so the Repertory Theater would need to find 
another site. Woods bristled at the idea of erecting a new structure, saying he “found these 
ambitious plans financially disturbing and reported his concern to the Lincoln Center 
Executive Committee on January 30, 1963. Lincoln Center took a firm position that it could 
not help in financing such a building; the Repertory Theater would have to take full 
responsibility.”261 Woods so vociferously opposed the plan that he went so far as to tell the 
Lincoln Center Executive Committee in February 1963 that he had lost confidence in 
Whitehead.262  
Things only got worse when Whitehead maneuvered around Lincoln Center’s refusal 
to finance the theater’s construction by successfully negotiating an arrangement with ANTA, 
which offered to invest $400,000 to build the temporary theater. George Stoddard, chancellor 
of New York University and a board member of Lincoln Center and the Repertory Theater, 
offered Whitehead a site on Washington Square.263 Having secured the funding from an 
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outside investor, Whitehead convinced the board to approve construction of the theater. He 
had clearly—and publicly—defied Woods. “There was a gleam of triumph in Bob 
Whitehead’s eye” recalled Kazan, “and George saw it. People don’t take oaths of vengeance 
anymore, but if they did, George would have.”264    
Although no action was taken against Whitehead for the time being and although the 
Repertory Theater moved forward with its plans to erect the temporary theater downtown, the 
situation brought to the surface the tensions between the artistic direction and the 
administration. In Kazan’s view, the acrimony grew directly from the issue of authority 
within the organization: “From the incident of the ANTA Washington Square Theatre, the 
issue became Who’s boss? Who has the authority, the men with the money or the men with 
the theatre savvy to do the job?”265 And so even before the curtain rose on the first 
production, it was clear that the artistic leadership was not likely to enjoy the unfettered 
freedom promised by the repertory ideal. 
  While Woods was incensed over Whitehead’s administrative decisions, board 
member Eugene Black worried about the artistic direction the theater was taking. In an 
August 1963 letter, he voiced some of his concerns over the management of the theater to 
George Woods. Black was particularly concerned with play selection as well as the question 
of what limits should be placed on their artistic freedom. He questioned the wisdom of 
emphasizing new plays rather than more established works. While he supported the idea of 
Lincoln Center “eventually” fostering new writing, it was “not clear in [his] mind whether 
Lincoln Center should, at the beginning, emphasize new plays as opposed to a broad range of 
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good classical plays—classical in the sense of good modern writers as well.” He also 
objected to the inclusion of Marco Millions, which he considered “O’Neill at his worst. . . . I, 
personally, would like to have seen them do one new play (the Miller play), one semi-
modern (say, a Strindberg), and one old play (say, Elizabethan or Restoration).” Finally, he 
expressed his concern that both Kazan and Whitehead “might be stretching their right of 
‘artistic management’ a little too far.”266 Black’s letter to Woods did not convey any sense of 
hostility. Instead, he seems to have been making a genuine effort to arrive at an 
understanding of what the relationship between the artistic leadership and the board of 
directors should be. His biggest concern—and one that he would raise repeatedly—was the 
emphasis on new works. Far more important to him, and to many of his fellow board 
members, than artistic innovation was establishing the Repertory Theatre on equal footing in 
terms of prestige with the other organizations in Lincoln Center. He clearly had little 
tolerance for experimentation and uncertainty, valuing instead work that the theater could 
hold up as beacons of excellence. Whether Kazan and Whitehead’s efforts would yield such 
work would become apparent once the Repertory Theater’s season opened in January 1964.  
Rejoice That a New Company Has Been Born  
    “Which to celebrate first?” asked Howard Taubman upon the opening of After the 
Fall on January 23, 1964. “The return of Arthur Miller to the theater with a new play after 
too long an absence? Or the arrival of the new Repertory Theater of Lincoln Center with its 
high promise for a consecration to drama of aspiration and significance?”267 Taubman, ever 
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the faithful cheerleader of the fledgling company, lauded what he saw as the promise of the 
acting ensemble, which seemed poised to grow into a true ensemble. The play was an artistic 
success in and of itself, according to Taubman, and it marked the birth of the Repertory 
Theater, also a cause for celebration. “Rejoice,” he told his readers, “that Arthur Miller is 
back with a play worthy of his mettle. Rejoice also that a new company has been born 
committed to theater of consequence, not only the new but the old that New York so 
scandalously neglects.”268 John Chapman of the Chicago Tribune felt that the play got the 
Repertory Theater “off to an impressive start,” and he hailed the performances of leading 
actors Jason Robards and Barbara Loden as “monumental.” 269 The Wall Street Journal was 
not as enthusiastic, writing that the play was “an ambitious work, occasionally flashing with 
the talent we have come to expect of Mr. Miller. But its impact is far less than that of Mr. 
Miller at his best.”270 The overall reaction from the daily theatrical press was mixed but 
generally positive. 
The more intellectual critics writing for the weeklies, however, savagely attacked the 
play. Richard Gilman saw in the play “everything inadequate, pretentious and self-serving in 
the life of our theatre.” He went on to write, “A play, heralded with trumpets, which is not 
even the simulacrum of a drama, a troupe of professionals whose work would shame even the 
rawest of amateur spirits, an audience mesmerized and confirmed in its devotion to the 
lowest mystique of ‘the theatre’ to raw material in place of art and to personality instead of 
imaginative creation—such is Arthur Miller’s After the Fall and its production by the 
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company that was to effect the redemption of our stage.”271 Robert Brustein called the play 
“a shameless piece of tabloid gossip, an act of exhibitionism which makes us all voyeurs.”272 
Brustein found the play to be both in poor taste as well as poorly constructed, and he 
ridiculed the Repertory Theater for “institutionaliz[ing] the bankrupt Broadway vision in the 
fashionable culture emporium of Lincoln Center.”273 Even with mixed reviews, the play was 
successful at the box office, but the critical response was not what the board had hoped for.  
The remainder of the season brought a generally lackluster critical response. A month 
after After the Fall’s opening, Eugene O’Neill’s Marco Millions opened. Directed by Jose 
Quintero, the Repertory Theater’s production marked the first revival of the play since a 
1930 revival produced by the Theatre Guild. Although the critics were not especially harsh 
on the production, little enthusiasm could be detected in their response. Most critics made a 
respectful nod to the choice to revive a neglected play by the country’s most revered 
playwright, but most also pointed out that the play was hardly one of O’Neill’s best. The 
Wall Street Journal suggested a certain pretentiousness in the selection of the play, saying 
that it “emerge[d] as a sort of ‘cultural event’ rather than as a drama to stimulate or 
arouse.”274 Taubman praised the selection of the play and said that Quintero had “presided 
over a production full of theatrical flair.”275  The Chicago Tribune’s John Chapman saw not 
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flair but rather  “quite desperately stylized” direction, saying that Hal Holbrook “play[ed] 
Marco as if he were Douglas Fairbanks the Elder doing ‘Robin Hood.’”276 Variety also 
suggested that the play, in addition to being “overlong and progressively tiresome,” exposed 
some weaknesses in the theater’s acting troupe. The casting was “uneven” and some of the 
individual performances were “uncontrollable in several instances. The merits and faults of 
repertory casting are becoming more evident with added shows.”277 While the cast of After 
the Fall had been widely praised for their performances, it soon became clear that Kazan had 
made the mistake of selecting the company almost solely on its suitability for After the Fall, 
a problem that became even more apparent in the next production. 
The third and final production to enter the first season’s rotating repertory, Behrman’s 
But for Whom, Charlie, opened on March 12, 1964 to a critical response that, although not 
hostile, was certainly not rapturous. Most reviewers offered some praise for Behrman’s 
characteristically witty dialogue, but the play was perceived by most to be inconsequential at 
best. Taubman opened his review by praising the “good talk, amusing and rueful,” as well as 
“some moments of glinting character.” However, according to Taubman, “the spine of the 
play [was] soft. It [was] almost as if S.N. Behrman has spent all his energy and wisdom on 
certain thoughts pressing on his mind and has neglected not only the skeleton of his play but 
also a good deal of its flesh and blood.” Critics were harsher on the production than on the 
play, many echoing Taubman’s observation that the play, a conventional drawing room 
comedy, seemed much more suited to an intimate proscenium stage than the sprawling thrust 
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of the ANTA Theater. Variety had kind words for the play itself but argued that it “suffer[ed] 
from the inadequacies of presentation. The trouble appears basic—the Lincoln Center group 
seems to lack the feeling for the play and the personnel to cast, stage or perform it to 
maximum effect.” Although Kazan’s “dynamic staging” had been crucial to the impact of 
After the Fall, his direction of the Behrman play ‘[gave] the impression of not having the 
proper deftness of touch for Behrman’s suave and incisive writing. And since he is the 
artistic head of the organization, with authority in not only casting, but the selection of the 
company itself, he must take the major rap.”278 Kazan did not disagree, recalling later that he 
considered Charlie to be the first “fatal” mistake he made, as it “revealed [his] limitations as 
a director, who was clearly working outside of his range, and as the artistic leader of a 
theater.”279  With each of the plays having opened within weeks of each other, the 
increasingly negative reviews must have begun to feel like a pile-on. The Board of Directors, 
spooked by the press, summoned Whitehead and Kazan to a board meeting held on March 
13, 1964, the day after the opening of Charlie.  
 Although the board expressed “complete confidence . . . in Messrs. Whitehead and 
Kazan’s management of the affairs, both artistic and business of the Company,” they sent a 
clear message that they were tightening the leash on both of them. Whitehead and Kazan 
agreed in the meeting that they would “review the past activities of the company, consider 
the areas in which mistakes were made and those in which successes were achieved, prepare 
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plans for the future, and reduce their thoughts to writing for the benefit of the Board.”280 
Clearly one place where mistakes had been made was in the programming. It seemed obvious 
that the intellectual press, which had been so critical of the first season’s programming, 
heavily influenced the board’s evaluation of the company’s work.  
A few weeks later, Kazan and Whitehead presented the written survey of their plans. 
They proposed a four-play line-up for the 1964-65 season, rather than three, as they felt they 
could more evenly distribute the talent of the company among four productions. Most of the 
plays they were considering would be “classics or contemporary European plays with classic 
qualities. All of them are costume pieces and the casting requirements are large. Thus it will 
probably be necessary for us to bring new members into the company, creating higher 
overhead on company costs.” This approach to the programming marked an enormous 
departure from the first season and was almost certainly not the approach the two would have 
taken if left to their own devices. In reading the memo, one cannot help but detect a certain 
amount of passive aggression. “Okay, we’ll present programming that might appease the 
critics,” they seemed to be saying, “but you have to understand that it’s going to cost more 
money.” In the memo’s summation, Kazan and Whitehead stressed their commitment to 
being mindful of the financial burdens of running the theater, but they reminded the board 
that no other repertory theater in the world had ever been self-supporting. Although most of 
the proposal had the tone of the genteel businessman that so characterized Whitehead, the 
last sentence, which calls for everyone to put their cards on the table, smacks of Kazan. “We 
have high hopes,” they said. “We feel we have just made a start. We would like your ideas on 
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all the above points. We are in the act now of planning our next two seasons. So this is the 
time for all of you, together or separately, officially or personally to say to us what you have 
to say.”281 The defiance of this last sentence seems to reflect the defensive posture in which 
Kazan and Whitehead found themselves in relation to the board.  
 By this time, Kazan doubted whether he could continue in his administrative role, and 
he had already begun to explore the possibility of stepping aside as co-producer and instead 
focusing solely on directing plays. No matter how noble a venture the Repertory Theater may 
have been, Kazan simply was not built to answer to executives and struggled to learn how to 
navigate those relationships. The week before he and Whitehead shared their proposal with 
the board, Kazan had a lunch meeting with Lincoln Center President Bill Schuman to discuss 
the problems facing the Repertory Theater. As Schuman saw the situation, a significant 
problem facing the company was the relationship of the artistic management of the Repertory 
Theater to its own board, a relationship Kazan and Whitehead needed to improve. “To my 
mind, many of the present problems that you have with the Repertory Theater in regard to 
management will be resolved if you will truly take advantage of the willingness of your 
Board of Directors to help you.” Schuman felt that some of the problems facing the company 
stemmed from a lack of communication between management and directors. “Here I firmly 
believe,” he said, “it is the responsibility of management to lead the organization in terms of 
the broad policies adopted by the Board. . . . I can think of no other form of checks and 
balances which could be devised to better this system.”282 The letter from Schuman to Kazan 
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summarizing their meeting does not capture anything Kazan might have said during the 
meeting, but it clearly indicates that Kazan was struggling with managing the institutional 
apparatus of Lincoln Center.  
 Already on the defensive internally, Kazan and Whitehead now had to turn their 
attention to defending the theater to the public. Although Taubman had shown quite a bit of 
forbearance in his reviews of the company’s productions, he published a column the week 
after Charlie opened in which he said the theater must take a moment to reflect and think 
about what it wanted to accomplish. “The first season, despite its accomplishments, has left 
doubts,” he wrote, “and the future is full of questions.”283 Taubman praised the theater for the 
simple fact that they had launched a repertory season in the face of challenging 
circumstances. However, he said that it was now necessary for the company to declare its 
mission and develop a clear policy. Clearly, Whitehead and Kazan needed to develop a 
strategy to address the criticisms being leveled at the theater.  Barry Hyams shared Kazan 
and Whitehead’s frustration over the barrage of criticisms being leveled against the 
Repertory Theater. “We have made no promises before we opened except that we would 
strive to establish a beachhead,” he said to them in his proposed public relations plan. “We 
are being clobbered for not winning the war. Nevertheless, we exist. That is our achievement, 
and our victory.” Hyams advocated a public relations approach that would emphasize the 
achievement of having established the Repertory Theater and remind the public that 
developing such an institution was an ongoing process. Therefore, “at the risk of sounding 
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fatuous,” he told Kazan, “dedication is our keynote.” 284 He laid out an extensive public 
relations and publicity plan and admonished Kazan and Whitehead that it was imperative that 
they participate in interviews and publish by-line articles to defend the theater.  
 Kazan picked up the process mantle, and in an August editorial in the New York 
Times entitled “On Process,” wrote the following:  
We know we’re not there yet. We even know we’ll never get ‘there’ because there is 
no ‘there.’ Success for us is not the broad public and critical acceptance of a single 
production. It is the creation of an institution and of its continuous program. We 
started as a process and our goal is a process. The ups and downs, the ‘successes’ and 
the ‘failures’ are equally part of it.285 
Kazan acknowledged that the theater had made several missteps along the way, but he also 
alluded to the hypocrisy of those who criticized the Theater’s apparent alignment with 
Broadway ideals by suggesting that his critics’ condemnation was premature and more in line 
with the hit-flop mentality of Broadway than with the organic growth of a repertory theater, 
which must be allowed to grow over time. “But in the arts,” he wrote, “we think in terms of 
the overnight sensation and the sudden genius.” Rather than giving the theater time to find its 
identity, a process requiring experimentation and inevitable failure from time to time, Kazan 
felt that his critics were demanding perfection right out of the gate. It was a valid point. 
Moreover, those critics Kazan rebuked had greatly influenced the men in the boardroom, 
who by the autumn of 1964 had lost patience with the Kazan/Whitehead administration and 
had all but made up their minds that the two had to go.  
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 In September 1964, Robert Houget became president of the Repertory Theater of 
Lincoln Center when George Woods stepped down after taking an executive position with 
the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, which required that he reside in 
Washington, D.C.286 Woods agreed to continue to serve as a member of the Lincoln Center 
board and to serve as chairman of the Repertory Theater’s board of directors. Houget, 
executive vice president of the First National City Bank of New York, faced several 
challenges as he assumed his position as president. For starters, there were the material 
realities of the deficit and falling attendance. As the New York Times reported in October 
1964, the first season had ended with a deficit of $500,000 and attendance had dropped to 
55% of capacity, a significant drop from the previous season’s 81%.287 Secondly, Houget 
was faced with a tenuous political environment as tensions mounted within the organization. 
A general sense of upheaval pervaded the organization as Kazan and Whitehead found 
themselves facing renewed pressure.  
 Eugene Black, who had previously expressed concerns about Kazan and Whitehead’s 
choices, had, by October 1964, lost all patience with the two. Particularly galling to Black 
was the fact that even at this late stage, with the season set to open in a matter of weeks, 
Kazan and Whitehead had still not announced the fourth production of the season to follow 
the previously announced productions of The Changeling, Miller’s new play Incident at 
Vichy, and Tartuffe. He found their “hesitancy” to be a “little over-refined to [his] taste.” 
Black was also disappointed once again with their play selection, calling their choice of plays 
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“exquisite,” and saying that it seemed they were “trying to be somewhat over-arty and 
progressive.” Black believed Kazan and Whitehead had failed in just about every way 
conceivable, and he finally conceded that he had come around to Woods’ long-held opinion 
“that if we had to do this again I’m not sure I would have chosen the Kazan-Whitehead 
combination, and I am not even sure I would have chosen either one individually.”288 Black, 
who would continue to advocate for a more conservative approach to managing the 
Repertory Theater, was undoubtedly not alone in his views, but much of the animosity 
directed toward Whitehead and Kazan was voiced behind closed doors rather than openly 
and directly to their faces. Still, Kazan, surely aware that he was a target, decided to do what 
he could to get out of the line of fire. 
 Although Kazan had no written contract with Lincoln Center, he had made a verbal 
agreement to stay with the Repertory Theater at least until the opening of the Beaumont 
Theater in 1965. On October 23, 1964, Kazan wrote to Charles Spofford and Bill Schuman 
and informed them that he planned to resign his co-producing position immediately upon 
reaching that milestone. Kazan’s agreement also stipulated that while he would confine his 
theater activities to Lincoln Center, there would be no such constraints on his film projects, 
and he invoked this point in his letter to Shuman and Spofford. “It is obvious now,” he wrote, 
“that if I continue in the Repertory Theater in my present capacity . . . I would have to give 
up my motion picture work. I am not in the least prepared to do this.”289 Kazan also argued 
that despite having worked in harmony with Whitehead, “a two man equal-power leadership 
arrangement is NOT a correct one for the Repertory Theatre.” Finally, he concluded the letter 
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by stating that although he wished to be free of his administrative responsibilities after the 
opening of the Beaumont, he would be amenable to staying connected to the theater in an 
informal capacity, but “recognize[d] that it is possible that you may want to make entirely 
different plans.”290 Members of the board, it turned out, did have other plans.  
Kazan’s letter to Spofford and Schuman was dated six days prior to the opening of 
the 1964-65 season. The opening production of The Changeling was, by all accounts, an 
unmitigated disaster. Howard Taubman, who had been supportive of the Repertory Theater 
up to this point, opened his review by acknowledging the appropriateness of the selection of 
the play. “It is a play that deserves to be done,” he wrote, “and a permanent repertory theater 
that means to serve the drama as an art with a proud history is the place to do it. On this point 
there can be no doubt however great one’s reservations may be about the production itself.” 
Taubman went on to harshly criticize Kazan’s direction, noting the “glaring deficiencies” in 
the direction and the inability of the acting company to meet its demands.”291 Martin 
Gottfried echoed Taubman’s sentiments, but was more blunt in his assessment. “Ironically, 
the play was the most properly chosen of all,” he said. “Almost never performed, although 
academically respected, it had become a dead classic. If it had not already been dead, this 
production would have done the trick.”292 Most of the reviews zeroed in on the production’s 
poor acting, once again exposing Kazan’s limitations as a director and verifying concerns 
among critics that the Method-influenced company, while perfectly suited to a play like 
Miller’s After the Fall, was ill-equipped for period drama; this disparity was perhaps best 
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illustrated by Barbara Loden, who drew as much critical damnation for The Changeling as 
she had drawn adulation for her “monumental” performance in After the Fall. John Chapman 
of the Chicago Tribune, who found the acting “almost invariably awful,” expressed his 
disappointment with Loden, “who was so exciting last season” in After the Fall, but who now 
was “remarkably unexciting as the leading lady of ‘The Changeling.’”293 While the reviews 
for the previous productions had been somewhat mixed, condemnation of The Changeling 
was universal and brutal.  
 A week after the opening of The Changeling, Eugene Black urged Robert Houget, 
despite his initial feeling that no immediate action should be taken, to take up Kazan on his 
offer to step down as co-director. Both Black and fellow board member Samuel Rosenman 
felt that it was a step that should be taken immediately, rather than waiting, although they 
also argued that the decision would have to be kept out of the press at least until after the 
opening of the second season. Black enumerated his reasons for urging acceptance of Kazan's 
offer: the “joint” decisions made by Kazan and Whitehead had been universally wrong; joint 
management was not a viable managerial model; Black believed that Kazan was responsible 
for some of the more “wild eyed” ideas pursued. Black also said that Kazan was not 
temperamentally suited for the job, nor did he possess the skill or experience necessary to 
work on classical works, a fact that had just indisputably been demonstrated.  
However, he also recognized the risks involved in taking immediate action against 
Kazan. “The arguments against doing something now are obvious, and include, of course, 
Kazan's reputation in the theater and the possibility he may get out and eventually take 
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Arthur Miller with him. Also, I am not, frankly, quite crazy about Bob Whitehead—but I 
don't think we have had a chance to really judge this gentleman because his joint work with 
Kazan is not illustrative.”294 Houget clearly had his work cut out for him. Even if he himself 
had no immediate wish to dispose of Kazan or Whitehead or both, it must have been obvious 
that the board would likely be unable to continue to coexist with the two. New to Lincoln 
Center, he sought out advice from insiders, and the result was the public airing of the 
theater’s backstage drama and the occasion for the fall of both Whitehead and Kazan.   
 On December 5, 1964, news broke of a crisis at Lincoln Center of such proportions 
that Rudolf Bing, general manager of the Metropolitan Opera, declared Lincoln Center to be 
“deteriorating to a free-for-all jungle where constituents can raid each other at will.”295 The 
raid of which Bing spoke involved the Metropolitan’s assistant manager Herman Krawitz, 
Lincoln Center president William Schuman, and newly appointed Repertory Theater 
president Robert Houget. A few weeks prior to the breaking of the story in the New York 
Times, Houget had spoken to Schuman about the troubles facing the Repertory Theater and 
the board’s growing loss of confidence in Whitehead's management. Schuman recommended 
Krawitz as a possible replacement, and Houget, followed up on that suggestion, approaching 
Krawitz and floating the possibility of his becoming the Repertory Theatre’s managing 
director. Upon hearing of Houget and Schumann’s overtures to Krawitz, Bing was incensed, 
calling the attempted poaching an affront to the very concept of Lincoln Center, which 
stipulated that the constituent organizations, while autonomous in their operations, should 
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“work toward a cooperative and friendly working relationship.”296 Bing threatened to resign 
from the Lincoln Center Council, a body tasked with discussing and resolving joint problems 
of Lincoln Center constituents, over the incident, stating he had “no confidence in this setup 
if this is allowed to happen.”297  
Despite Bing’s public condemnation of Houget’s attempt to poach an employee of a 
sister organization, Houget refused to back down, declaring that he still planned to pursue 
Krawitz.298 Anthony Bliss, president of the Metropolitan Opera, responded by declaring that 
he would work to ensure that Krawitz not be released from his contract, adding that Krawitz 
had not asked for such a release.299 Perhaps, as Variety suggested, Krawitz “was just 
indulging a human nature interest in knowing how much somebody else considered his 
services worth.”300 Whatever his reasons for entertaining the overtures of Houget, Krawitz 
stayed put in his post at the Met.  
The leadership of the Metropolitan Opera quickly put the matter to rest.  At a board 
meeting held the following week, “there was no discussion of the Krawitz affair except that 
Mr. Bliss announced the issue was closed and everyone was trying to treat any wounds that 
had been opened.” G.S. Moore, a board member of the Metropolitan Opera told Houget, “It 
is everyone's desire to be helpful to you in filling your staff problem. The suggestion was 
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made that Roger Stevens who is on the Opera board knows the entertainment world very well 
and should be able to help.”301 In the grand scheme of things, the affair was little more than a 
black eye on the public face of the Met and Lincoln Center. But the impact was much more 
deeply felt at the Repertory Theatre where, for the Whitehead/Kazan administration, it was a 
fatal blow. 
 The Krawitz affair brought the troubles that had been simmering for over a year at the 
Repertory Theater to a head, and within days the Repertory Theater was left devoid of artistic 
leadership. It was no secret that Whitehead and Kazan had been facing opposition from a 
board of directors concerned about financial deficits and stung by the persistent negative 
critical response to the first several productions. But the public revelation that Krawitz had 
been offered “undisputed control of the repertory theater”302 was the first that Whitehead or 
Kazan had heard that their positions might be in jeopardy. As far as Whitehead was 
concerned, the act of clandestinely approaching someone to replace him amounted to “a 
wrongful discharge” and Whitehead “accept[ed] it as such, effective immediately.”303   
The day after Whitehead declared his immediate resignation, Houget announced that 
the Repertory Theater planned “further discussions” with Whitehead and that the Repertory 
Theater was no longer pursuing Krawitz to replace Whitehead.304 Over the course of the next 
week, Repertory Theater board member Michael Burke led negotiations between Whitehead 
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and the theater in an attempt to work out a solution. “I can’t imagine what they talked about 
for a week,” Kazan later said, “because the proposal Mike conveyed from Schuman was 
simple—and insulting. . . . They were asking Bob to continue for the rest of the season, 
knowing that he’d then be replaced.”305 Finally, on December 15, Whitehead announced that 
talks had not been successful and that he would not continue. Houget issued a statement on 
behalf of the Repertory Theatre’s board expressing their regret that they had “been unable to 
deter Mr. Robert Whitehead from leaving the company immediately.” Although Burke had 
attempted to “persuade Mr. Whitehead to continue to guide the company for the present 
season,” Whitehead refused. On hearing of Whitehead’s decision, Elia Kazan, having 
declared, “If he’s not there, I’m not there,” made good on his promise to resign if Whitehead 
departed, and Arthur Miller said he would cease to write for the theater.306 
 Whitehead’s departure set off a major crisis inside the Repertory Theater, and in the 
weeks following, it seemed questionable whether it would be able to continue its operations. 
In addition to Kazan and Miller, the Repertory Theater suffered two other losses. On 
December 14, Joseph Verner Reed, the executive producer of the American Shakespeare 
Festival and a member of the Repertory Theater’s board of directors, resigned his position on 
the board, calling his resignation “a protest against the shocking, disgraceful treatment that 
Lincoln Center has accorded to Robert Whitehead.”307  The company suffered another, 
potentially bigger, problem when Maureen Stapleton, who had been cast to play the lead in 
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the upcoming production of Madwoman of Chaillot, resigned upon the announcement of 
Whitehead’s ousting, even though Whitehead urged her to stay with the production, which 
was to start rehearsal the following week with a February 18 opening. “Mr. Whitehead told 
me not to do it,” Stapleton told the Times, “but I told him that since he no longer was my 
boss he could not stop me. It’s a shame they did that to Mr. Whitehead.”308 Stapleton was not 
the only member of the acting company dismayed over the ousting of Whitehead. Several 
other members of the acting company voiced their ire over the situation, demanding in a 
telegram to Houget that he inform them about plans to move forward: 
Inasmuch as communications to you from the acting company of the Repertory 
Theatre of Lincoln Center have not been acknowledged and in view of the fact that 
many of us hold long term contracts with you until 1966 for the purpose of building 
an American repertory company may we inquire into your plans for our future? If we 
are to be deprived of the leaders who attracted us to this organization does it follow 
that this city may be deprived of the repertory program which also brought us into 
this company and for which many of us abandoned substantial professional activities? 
Signed Frederic de Wilde, Robert Downing, Hal Holbrook, Michael Strong, David J. 
Stewart, David Wayne, Joseph Wiseman.309 
Houget replied to the actors a few days later. In his telegram, he acknowledged that the 
theater faced daunting problems but assured the actors he believed the problems could be 
solved. “We think the repertory theater idea is a sound one and that it has a place in the 
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theater in New York. We have many advantages. We will soon have our fine playhouse to 
work in, we have a loyal subscription list, our performing company is in being and gains 
experience and stature every day.” He regretted that the board could not prevent Whitehead’s 
departure, he said, but urged the company to rally. “Now the business management, the 
artistic direction, and most important of all the performing company should turn their 
attention to their jobs,” he wrote.  “We must all stand solidly together and work with Mr. 
Stanley Gilkey as acting administrator.”310 But despite Houget’s assurances to the company 
that all would be well, the survival of the theater was already in question.  
 Although the Repertory Theater announced on December 19 that a search for a new 
director was underway, led by board member Judge Samuel Rosenman, Houget was unsure 
the theater could survive considering the events following Whitehead’s departure. The 
resignation of Maureen Stapleton led to cancellation of Madwoman of Chaillot because a 
suitable replacement for her could not be found. Arthur Miller announced on December 31 
that when the season concluded in June 1965 he would withdraw both After the Fall and 
Incident at Vichy in protest of Whitehead’s dismissal. The cancellation of Madwoman of 
Chaillot required the refunding of $118,000 to subscribers, compounding the financial blow 
the company took when The Changeling was withdrawn from the repertory, resulting in an 
$18,000 refund.311  
On January 6, Houget met with board member Michael Burke and acting 
administrator Stanley Gilkey. At the meeting, the group discussed the potential financial 
consequences of closing the theater and entering receivership. They determined that if the 
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theater were to close immediately, they would have to refund an additional $118,000 for 
Tartuffe subscriptions. Additionally, the ANTA Theater presented a significant financial 
burden. Because the Beaumont was not scheduled to open until late 1965, the lease on the 
ANTA Theater ran until January 1966. Were the company to fold, it would still be obligated 
to pay $2,000 per week “dark rent” at the ANTA Theater for an entire year in addition to 
about $50,000 in payables Gilkey reported. In short, closing the theater would result in a total 
cost of nearly four hundred thousand dollars. Houget, Burke, and Gilkey concluded that 
folding at that moment could potentially be more costly than continuing operations. If 
Tartuffe performed well at the box office, there was a good chance that the company could 
break even.312 It is unclear how seriously the management of the Repertory Theater 
contemplated the possibility of shutting the theater down or if the discussion even moved 
beyond this exploratory meeting, but the board decided to keep the theater running. 
 While everyone offstage at Lincoln Center was still reeling from the upheaval caused 
by the fracas, preparations for the next production continued and on January 15, Tartuffe 
opened to some of the more enthusiastic reviews the company had received to date. Chapman 
of the Daily News declared that with Tartuffe “Everything look[ed] much brighter” for the 
Repertory Theater of Lincoln Center, calling the production “the happiest event yet in the 
two-season history of the company.”313 Although many critics had some reservations about 
the production, there was clear consensus that the production was the strongest yet presented 
by the Repertory Theatre. The New York Post, for example, said that the production revealed 
                                                
312 Untitled memo signed by Robert Houget and dated January 6, 1965. Actor’s Workshop and Repertory 
Theatre of Lincoln Center Records, 269, Folder 1. 
313 John Chapman. “’Tartuffe’ a Rollicking Big Romp; Best yet for Lincoln Center Co.” Daily News, January 
15, 1965. Actor’s Workshop and Repertory Theatre of Lincoln Center Records, Clippings File. 
 169 
“what is by far the highest degree of imagination, style and taste it has yet displayed.”314 And 
Howard Taubman of The New York Times, although expressing some reservations about the 
tendency of director William Ball toward exaggeration and the resulting unevenness in the 
production, argued that the production, the last arranged under the leadership of Whitehead 
and Kazan, “capture[d] enough of the spirit of the play to do honor not only to Mr. 
Whitehead but also to Moliere.”315 In addition to their commentary on the quality of the 
production, most critics also made mention of the play’s prologue in which Hal Holbrook 
reminded the audience of the strict no-smoking policy in the theater and then announced that 
the evening’s performance was dedicated to Robert Whitehead, prompting the audience to 
respond “with a loud but useless vote of confidence for Whitehead.”316 And while Tartuffe 
settled into the repertory of the company, the search for a new director for the company was 
underway. 
The duration of the search was remarkably short—successors were named by the end 
of January—but throughout those few weeks, the board was forced to do some serious soul 
searching about the direction the theater should take. The ouster of Whitehead and Kazan 
posed an existential threat to the Repertory Theater. Organizations like the Metropolitan 
Opera or the New York Philharmonic could easily survive a sudden change of management. 
With a long history and established practices and policies, their sound institutional 
frameworks allowed for continuity that could transcend the loss of an individual leader. No 
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such continuity had yet been established in the Repertory Theater. Whitehead’s and Kazan’s 
departures nullified any sense of identity that had begun to emerge. Survival of the Repertory 
Theater would therefore hinge on finding not only the right “fit” for the Center but also an 
individual or team that could establish a theater on a solid institutional basis.  
Eugene Black urged other board members to think carefully about how to proceed in 
choosing new directors, advocating a staunchly conservative approach focused on “proven 
plays” with new plays presented only “one every one or two seasons, and then only after 
careful review of the author and play by a number of competent people.” He suggested that 
experimentation and the development of new works be limited strictly to the smaller Forum 
Theater and emphasized the importance of the company not getting ahead of its own 
capabilities, limiting classical repertoire to foreign—but English language—plays that were 
“not dramatically difficult to put on.”317 Black’s approach, he believed, aligned well with the 
profile of Tyrone Guthrie’s theater in Minneapolis, which had defined itself in large part by 
its devotion to classic repertoire.  Black’s comments reflected the battle scars of the 
Kazan/Whitehead administration. Clearly, Black was working to ensure that the Repertory 
Theater would have as little exposure to harsh criticism as possible; limiting the repertoire to 
“proven” plays was one line of defense, and ensuring that every new play went through a 
thorough vetting by “a number of competent people” was another, ensuring that the wild-
eyed whims of any future directors might be contained. Perhaps more than anything, Black 
and his colleagues were determined to ward off the vicious attacks of the Brusteins and 
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Gilmans of the world, and what better way to do that than to turn to those very critics for 
advice? 
Richard Gilman recalled that in December of 1964, he was invited to lunch by an 
executive of Lincoln Center “who first wanted plaintively to know why my published 
comments on the Repertory Theater had been so harsh and then, moving from a condition of 
injured feeling to one of abject inquiry, whom I might recommend to take over its troubled 
destiny.”318 After a moment’s hesitation, Gilman mentioned Herbert Blau and Jules Irving, 
co-directors of the Actor’s Workshop, widely regarded as one of the best and most 
adventurous resident theaters in the country. Gilman admitted that he accepted this valuation 
primarily on faith, having seen only one of their productions. “But Blau’s and Irving’s ideas 
had impressed me, and so had the fact that their repertoire over the years had been built 
around the truest notions of what was best in contemporary drama.”319 To what degree 
Gilman’s recommendation influenced the Lincoln Center executive (whom Gilman does not 
name) and his colleagues is anyone’s guess. But the following month the Repertory Theater 
announced the appointment of Irving and Blau as the new co-directors of the theater, 
effective March 1, 1965.  
Four months after it was announced that Irving and Blau would assume leadership of 
the Repertory Theater of Lincoln Center, Theodore Hoffman predicted in Show magazine 
that Irving and Blau, whose theater (the Actor’s Workshop) “wasn’t exactly the toast of San 
Francisco” would “flutter the dovecotes all right, attract plenty of partisans, make lots of 
provocative copy for the Sunday drama sections and probably drive the board of directors to 
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as many secret discussions as the last regime.”320 Hoffman turned out to be right on all 
counts. The Blau/Irving regime would represent an almost entirely different institution and 
one that would prove just as controversial as the Kazan/Whitehead regime.  
Conclusion  
After five years of planning, the Repertory Theater of Lincoln Center as conceived by 
Robert Whitehead and Elia Kazan unraveled just weeks into its second season. Several 
factors conspired to ensure its failure, perhaps none as easily identifiable as the failure to 
establish a clear vision for the theater. Looking back on the company’s failure, Kazan named 
the lack of a clear sense of identity as a root cause of the demise of his and Whitehead’s 
administration. “We had no face,” he recalled. “We hadn’t made up our minds who we were 
going to be, rather tried to be everything for everybody. Nor did our production program 
grow out of our personalities. The result was that we wobbled from side to side, and nobody 
knew who we were.”321 For Kazan and Whitehead, leading a national repertory theater 
offered them an opportunity to create a lasting institution that would not only transcend the 
commercial demands of Broadway but would also offer an alternative vision of American 
theatrical identity from that being presented on the Great White Way. The institutional 
structure of a repertory theater, subsidized by foundation grants and private donations 
secured by a dedicated board of directors, should have endowed the artistic leadership with 
the freedom to experiment and create a solid institutional foundation upon which to build an 
artistically progressive program. However, the economic, artistic, and political complexities 
of the non-profit model, which vex virtually every cultural institution, were amplified by the 
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unique culture of the Lincoln Center for the Performing Arts, brought into being by titans of 
culture and politics and populated by some of the biggest egos in the performing arts.  
Rockefeller had selected Kazan and Whitehead on the basis of their Broadway 
successes, a decision made largely because, despite the burgeoning regional theater 
movement, the board members “were not about to hand their multimillion-dollar building, 
and its vague but ambitious hopes, over to academics or to provincials untried in New 
York.”322 To put it in its simplest terms, Kazan and Whitehead, with their successful record 
on the commercial stage, represented the closest Lincoln Center could come to a 
management team as accomplished in the field of theater as the Metropolitan was in the field 
of opera. In exchange for the legitimation they could bestow on Lincoln Center’s Repertory 
Theater, Kazan and Whitehead would reign over an institution that would ostensibly allow 
them to pursue the kind of work Broadway would not abide. However, when critics attacked 
the theater’s artistic work, the board refused to stand by Kazan and Whitehead, 
demonstrating the reality that not-for-profit theater is not as free from commercial pressure as 
one would like to think. Despite the fact that a subsidized repertory theater operates on a non-
profit basis, it still relies on box office and critical successes to underwrite the failures.  
Kazan and Whitehead were clearly not blameless in the failure of the theater. Their 
egos, particularly in the case of Kazan, contributed to the collapse of their administration. 
While it is true that Marco Millions might not have been likely to be revived on Broadway, 
the programming they chose never transcended a middle of the road Broadway ethos, nor did 
they seem to be attempting to reach an audience beyond the typical upper middle class, 
middlebrow audiences that populated Broadway theaters. Instead, they seemed to view 
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Lincoln Center as a place where they could secure their legacies as dominant figures in the 
American theater, but in so doing, they failed to adapt to the administrative structure of the 
Repertory Theater and to respond to shifting currents in the theatrical landscape. 
 The criticisms of Brustein, Gilman, and the like stemmed from a resentment that an 
opportunity to push the boundaries of American theater beyond the psychological realism 
that had come to dominate Broadway and the American canon had been squandered on an 
administration led by Broadway professionals whose moment had passed. This was not an 
unfounded criticism. For all his misgivings about taking on the Lincoln Center project, 
Kazan clearly felt it important to defend the primacy of the Method despite his vow to push 
the acting company beyond realism, which he was never able to do successfully, and he 
certainly did not have a modest view of his importance in the development of American 
theatrical identity. For all his and Whitehead’s talk of producing new works, they seemed to 
be uninterested in new playwrights, soliciting works almost exclusively from those who had 
proven track records on Broadway, and they showed no interest in engaging with artists 
emerging from the avant-garde movement. Instead, the Repertory Theater seemed more 
invested in creating a fortress in which the works of the few anointed “greats” like Miller and 
O’Neill could be enshrined.  
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CHAPTER 3 
Modern Marvel: The Los Angeles Music Center and the Narrative of Civic Progress 
 
Introduction: Ushering in a New Era 
On December 4, 1964, 3,250 people filled the auditorium of the Dorothy Chandler 
Pavilion at the Los Angeles Music Center. After conducting the Los Angeles Philharmonic in 
Richard Strauss’s “Fanfare,” conductor Zubin Mehta declared to the audience, “This is the 
most unique city in the 20th Century. I do not think it is too late, now, in mid-century, to 
begin a new cultural life. This evening we are going to usher in a new era.”323 With the 
opening of the Pavilion, the first of three buildings to open at the Music Center, Los Angeles 
staked its “claim to cultural supremacy in the west.”324 Perched atop Bunker Hill, the Music 
Center anchored the revitalization of that storied neighborhood, which had been cleared to 
make way for the corporate skyscrapers that would begin to rise by the end of the decade 
while just a few miles away, Dodger Stadium would soon celebrate its second anniversary. 
Meanwhile, on the west side of Los Angeles, the Los Angeles County Museum of Art would 
soon open its doors on Wilshire Boulevard while UCLA was undergoing a massive campus 
expansion. Los Angeles seemed to be experiencing a massive facelift and what Time 
magazine called a cultural explosion, and the Music Center was ground zero. 
 After declaring the dawn of a “new era” for Los Angeles, Mehta asked the audience 
to join him in paying homage to Dorothy Chandler, “the one person who most of all is 
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responsible for the creation of this edifice. . . . She it is who gathered together the volunteers 
and the phone numbers of the millionaires.”325 Married to Times publisher Norman Chandler, 
Dorothy Chandler led the campaign to build the Los Angeles Music Center, raising the 
majority of funds through private contributions. The opening of the Music Center marked the 
culmination of more than a decade of work on the part of Chandler, who had risen to 
prominence after she led the effort to save the Hollywood Bowl after its sudden closure in 
1951. Chandler used her experience as a fundraiser to move the Music Center project 
forward, becoming the driving force and the public face of the Los Angeles Music Center.  
But the Music Center was more than the pet project of a socialite. Rather, it was an 
important symbol of Los Angeles’s new modern urban image in the postwar period, and it 
played a key role in shaping the physical landscape of Downtown and in forming powerful 
coalitions of individuals from government and the private sector. To an even greater degree 
than New York’s Lincoln Center, the Los Angeles Music Center was an important arbiter of 
power in Los Angeles as the old guard business elites, led by the Times and the Chamber of 
Commerce, fought to maintain power and “new money” elites from the West Side and 
Hollywood jockeyed for social status.  
For nearly two decades after the onset of the Depression, the downtown business elite 
fought an uphill battle to regain their power as New Deal liberalism reigned in state and local 
government. The fight culminated in a fierce battle over public housing in which the liberal-
left popular front that had gained so much political power during the late thirties and forties 
was roundly defeated in the early 1950s when the business elite, led by the Times, launched a 
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vitriolic redbaiting campaign that brought a swift end to public housing in Los Angeles, 
ousted the sitting mayor, and installed an elite-friendly administration (handpicked by the 
Times and the business elite) in City Hall. It was in this historical moment, when a 
progressive vision of what historian Don Parson called “community modernism,” espoused 
by the left-liberal popular front and that viewed public housing as the foundation for the 
modern city, was cast aside for what Parson calls corporate modernism, “the monumental 
glorification of the commercial urban economy,” that the vision of downtown Los Angeles as 
it exists today began to emerge.326 The resounding defeat of the liberal-left coalition laid the 
groundwork for a new pro-growth alliance in which organized labor, entrepreneurs, and 
liberals cooperated to shape a new identity for Los Angeles, an identity that would be 
expressed in large part through the monumentalization of corporate power and cultural 
gravitas.  
Although the Los Angeles Music Center was not explicitly involved in the battle over 
public housing, its long journey to realization was deeply connected to the struggle for 
control over the landscape of Downtown. The earliest iteration of the idea for the Music 
Center dates back to 1945 when a group of “motivated citizens” formed Greater Los Angeles 
Plans, Inc. (GLAPI) to “build a civic auditorium and an ‘opera house.’”327  Made up almost 
entirely of representatives from the Downtown business elite, GLAPI proposed to revitalize 
Downtown Los Angeles with a massive project comprised of an opera house and convention 
center, but for several years was unsuccessful in garnering the necessary voter approval for 
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the project. It was not until the early 1950s that gathering forces brought together leaders 
from government, culture, and the private sector in a concerted effort to monumentalize Los 
Angeles’s economic might and reshape the national image of a city that had long been 
derided as “an uncouth poor relation of San Francisco.”328 The defeat of public housing led to 
the embracing of a new vision of the modern city and opened the door for the business elite 
to reclaim control over the city’s physical, symbolic, and economic landscape. The Music 
Center’s creation was not simply enabled by this reclamation, but rather played an important 
role in facilitating it as well, acting as a kind of nexus around which the developments 
reshaping Los Angeles coalesced to create the modern metropolis that began to emerge with 
the dawning of the 1960s.  
The Creeping Cancer of Socialism 
Upon his election in a 1938 recall vote against Mayor Frank Shaw, Fletcher Bowron 
promised his supporters—and warned Times publisher Harry Chandler—that he would not 
cozy up to the Times or the Downtown business establishment. “Harry will never call me 
Fletch,” he declared. “Just because Chandler has sixty million dollars on the newspaper is no 
sign he can run this town.”329 Having been endorsed by every major newspaper except the 
Times, Bowron rode into City Hall with the support of a reform coalition comprised of an 
“alliance of the Left, including CIO unions and members of the Communist Party, the 
economic and moral-reform oriented Right, and the liberals and moderates convinced of 
massive corruption.”330 Bowron, a self-described “New Deal Republican,” successfully 
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maintained the recall coalition in order to win reelection in 1941, defeating a conservative 
councilman backed by the Times. However, between his 1941 reelection and his next bid in 
1945, Bowron shifted steadily to the right, alienating many of his previous allies and 
strengthening ties with the city’s business interests, and when he ran for reelection again in 
1945, he did so with the backing of the Times. This newfound accommodation between the 
New Deal Republican, the Times, and the old guard business elite did not last long.  
Despite his rightward political drift during the war, Bowron remained committed to 
expanding public housing in Los Angeles even after the Depression had lifted and the war 
ended, putting him at odds with the business establishment and the Times. As the nation and 
the city emerged from the war, the business elite and private real estate interests, who had 
opposed public housing all along, wished to return to normalcy and to put housing 
construction back in the hands of private enterprise with minimal government interference. 
However, by the time the war ended, public housing, in the words of Don Parson, “seemed 
on its way to becoming an entrenched and established welfare-state institution in Los 
Angeles.”331 Between 1939 and 1941, ten public housing projects won the approval of the 
City Council, albeit many of them with slim margins. Public housing would remain a divisive 
issue among the City Council, but a coalition of “organized labor, civic organizations, 
religious groups, and mobilized groups within the city’s racial and ethnic communities”332 
put their full support behind the projects and helped public housing, which owed its popular 
support to the emergency conditions of the Depression, win legitimacy in the public mind. 
Not only did public housing enjoy widespread public acceptance for over a decade, but it was 
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also the driving force for urban development in Los Angeles, reflecting a vision for urban 
growth driven by utopian aspirations. Private real estate interests could do little to stop the 
deepening entrenchment of public housing, and the return to prosperity as the Depression 
lifted and the country entered World War II only made things worse. World War II brought 
to Los Angeles what Mike Davis has called “its real industrial revolution.”333 Los Angeles 
quickly became a major center for defense manufacturing, and over the course of just six 
years its population grew by twenty percent as workers lured by the booming manufacturing 
economy flooded the city. The mass migration created an extraordinary housing crisis in the 
city, leading to an even further entrenchment of public housing, which came to be viewed as 
an integral part of the war effort.334 Despite the return to prosperity ushered in by the war, the 
casting of public housing as a key element of national defense strategy ensured that popular 
support for public housing remained strong, while within the projects communal living 
thrived.  
When Congress passed the 1949 Housing Act, Bowron sprang into action to make the 
case for Los Angeles’s participation in the program, appearing before the City Council in 
August 1949 to request approval to apply for 10,000 units of public housing under the new 
federal program. The City Council unanimously approved the plan, and a month later Bunker 
Hill was named as the first site for redevelopment under the city’s federal contract.335 The 
Times attacked the proposal, arguing that it amounted to nothing more than taxpayer charity, 
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drawing the battle lines between the liberal left and the city’s business interests for control 
over the defining vision of the city.336   
By the end of 1950, plans for executing the federal redevelopment contract were well 
underway, while opposition to public housing began to mount among the electorate after the 
Times embarked on a campaign to discredit public housing by painting it as socialistic and 
arguing that the politicians pushing these projects through the legislative process were 
ignoring the will of the people. In November 1950, the City Council voted 12-1 to approve 
the project sites selected by the CHA despite complaints from businesses and homeowners 
facing eviction under eminent domain. The Times attacked the Council vote, arguing that the 
City Council had, with their near unanimous vote, “brushed aside” pleas from citizens facing 
eviction,337 an assertion not without merit. By this time, public support for the housing 
program had clearly begun to wane. Just two weeks before the Council’s vote, an anti-
housing proposition had won at the polls with the backing of several pro-business 
organizations including, of course, the Times. Proposition 10 required that all future public 
housing proposals in California be approved by public referendum in the city and county 
affected.338 The vote demonstrated a growing antagonism to public housing in Los Angeles, 
aided no doubt by the Times’ vitriolic campaign against the program.  
Emboldened by the results of Proposition 10, the Times intensified its repudiation of 
the public housing program, and opinions among the Council, who were starting to feel the 
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pressure, began to shift. The November 1950 vote approving the public housing project sites 
had passed by an overwhelming 12-1 majority, but over the course of the next year, several 
councilmen withdrew their support. In December 1951, Councilman Harold Harby 
announced his defection, saying that upon further reflection, he had come to see that the 
public housing program represented little more than Socialism.339 Harby’s defection flipped 
the majority in the City Council from support to opposition of public housing and three 
weeks later, on December 26, 1951, the City Council voted to nullify the federal housing 
contract.  
The Housing Authority responded by filing a writ of mandate with the California 
Supreme Court to force the Council to honor the contract. Meanwhile, Bowron argued that 
the Council did not have the authority to cancel the contract with the federal government. He 
offered to renegotiate the contract and reduce the number of housing units, but refused to 
cancel the contract outright. The Council reacted with the “immediate approval of a 
municipal referendum on the issue,” which would be held on June 3, the date of the state 
primary election.340 Proposition B, if passed by voters, would uphold the 1949 contract, 
while its defeat would ostensibly kill the project.  
A coalition of business leaders drawn mainly from the Chamber of Commerce and 
the Merchants and Manufacturers Association formed the Committee Against Socialist 
Housing (CASH) to lead the campaign against Proposition B. The campaign unleashed an 
endless torrent of red baiting rhetoric, painting public housing as a Trojan horse concealing a 
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Communist army ready to seize the city.341 In June 1952, voters went to the polls where anti-
housing forces carried the vote, with 379,050 voting not to reinstate the contract and 258,777 
voting to reinstate it.342 However, the vote was legally meaningless. In April, the California 
Supreme Court had ruled that the Council did not have the authority to abrogate a federal 
contract, rendering Proposition B moot. Nonetheless, the outcome of the vote, despite having 
no legal value, had tremendous political value, having clearly demonstrated a major loss of 
public support for the housing program. Housing opponents seized on this opposition and 
intensified their assaults on the Housing Authority, launching an investigation into the 
agency that would have made Joseph McCarthy proud.  
 On August 27, 1952, Frank Wilkinson began testifying at a routine eminent domain 
hearing related to the Chavez Ravine housing project. Two days into his testimony, on 
August 29, 1952, the hearing took an ominous turn when in the middle of his testimony the 
opposing attorney stopped his cross examination to ask, “Now Mr. Wilkinson, what 
organizations, political or otherwise, have you belonged to since 1929?”343 Wilkinson 
refused to answer the question, the hearing was halted, and Wilkinson was promptly 
suspended by Housing Authority executive director Howard Holtzendorff. Wilkinson’s 
refusal to testify marked an important turning point in the public housing fight and sealed not 
only his own fate, but also that of the public housing program and the mayoralty of Fletcher 
Bowron.  
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Although the Times and anti-housing forces had long ago started branding the 
program as “socialistic,” Wilkinson, by invoking the Fifth Amendment, put a face on the 
Communistic threat, allowing the opposition the opportunity to argue that public housing was 
not just ideologically incompatible with private enterprise-led growth, but an outright threat 
to the nation’s security. That same day, the City Council, upon learning of the events that 
transpired at the eminent domain hearing, unanimously adopted a motion to ask HUAC to 
investigate Wilkinson and the Housing Authority. In making the motion, Councilman Ed 
Davenport called Wilkinson’s testimony earlier in the day “a very significant occurrence” 
that was inevitable. The issue, he said, “overrides public housing and has to do with the 
safety of this country.”344 Suddenly, public housing was no longer the focus of an abstract 
ideological difference over how to shape the built environment of the city. It was now a clear 
and present danger to American democracy and anyone who remained aligned with the 
program should be viewed as an enemy of the people.  
HUAC hearings focusing on the CHA were held on September 26 and October 28, 
1952. The committee identified five alleged Communists, including Wilkinson, all of whom 
were purged from the Housing Authority after refusing to answer questions about their 
political affiliations. Although none of the accused affirmed membership in the Communist 
party, the Times reported that the hearings had “revealed startling evidence of Communist 
plots to infiltrate the City Housing Authority and other governmental and school teacher 
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organizations.”345 Bowron refused to back down from his support of public housing, making 
it clear to the entrepreneurial elite that the only way to bring a definitive end to the public 
housing program in Los Angeles was to unseat him and replace him with a more business-
friendly candidate.  
In December 1952, Times publisher Norman Chandler convened a meeting in his 
office at the Times. Present at the meeting was an assemblage of Los Angeles power brokers 
including Chandler, Pacific Mutual Insurance president Asa Call, business leaders Neill 
Petree and Carey Hill, among others. The sole item on the agenda was the selection of a 
candidate to “carry out their mission at City Hall.” They discussed a rumored thirty-four 
candidates, finally settling on “bland but dependable” Congressman Norris Poulson, who had 
a “long history of service to the regional business establishment,” having “compiled a 
consistently anti-labor record, while opposing rent controls and public housing.”346 On 
December 26, 1952, Chandler wrote Poulson to inform him that he and his allies wanted 
Poulson to run for mayor with their backing.347 Poulson accepted the offer and began a 
campaign, whose committee was organized by Times reporter Carlton Williams and managed 
by Councilman George Cronk, with substantial financial backing from real estate developer 
Fritz Burns.348  
Public housing remained in the forefront throughout the mayoral campaign. By 
refusing the yield on the issue even in light of the HUAC hearings, Bowron had given 
                                                
345 Carlton E. Williams, “City Officials Aroused by Senate Hearing.” Los Angeles Times, October 30, 1952. 
ProQuest Historical Newspapers: Los Angeles Times.  
346 Tom Sitton, Los Angeles Transformed, 178. 
347 Gottlieb and Wolt, Thinking Big, 262-3. 
348 Tom Sitton, Los Angeles Transformed, 178. 
 186 
Poulson and his backers all the ammunition they needed. The Times relentlessly dogged 
Bowron and painted him if not as an outright Communist then at the very least as a 
Communist sympathizer, while Bowron argued that the election was an attempt “by a small, 
immensely wealthy, incredibly powerful group” to elect a man that would do their bidding 
and not the bidding of the people.349 It was a weak argument given how easy it was for 
Poulson and the Times to turn it around on Bowron, who was clearly, they would argue, 
defying the will of the people by pursuing a program that voters had twice rejected at the 
polls. Bowron’s characterization of Poulson as a puppet of the business elite was no match 
for the elites’ characterization of Bowron as being sympathetic to the Communist party. In an 
editorial two days before the election, the Times took one last punch at Bowron when they 
reminded readers that “[t]he public housing program brought him to bed with some 
characters who were dubious indeed. And he did not detach himself from them even when he 
was given the evidence of Red connections. If there was Communist infiltration in the 
Housing Authority, he apparently didn’t care much, for he didn’t do anything effective to 
stop it.”350 Despite a hard-fought campaign, Bowron was defeated by Pouslon on May 26, 
1952. Upon taking office in July, Poulson would faithfully carry out the bidding of the 
business elite and pursue an aggressive agenda to remake the city’s landscape. With public 
housing and its ethos of “community modernism” having been resoundingly rejected, the city 
would now begin the work of transforming its built environment to reflect the order of 
corporate modernism. The “demise of the Left in the 1950s and the delegation of its 
corresponding vision of community modernism to the dustbin of history,” says Don Parson, 
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gave way to a singular and definitive modern Los Angeles.351 Just as small tightly-knit 
neighborhoods were bulldozed in New York to make way for Robert Moses’s urban renewal 
projects, so too would the entrepreneurial elite exert their city-making will on the landscape 
of Los Angeles. The new vision of the city, forged by the defeat of public housing, paved the 
way for the Music Center, and the Music Center itself would play a major role in expressing 
the new vision of modern Los Angeles. 
From Hick Town to Modern Marvel 
Over the next decade, Los Angeles would receive an extraordinary makeover both 
physically and culturally.  The Music Center was just one of many projects that would 
reshape power and the expression of urban identity in Downtown Los Angeles. By 1960, 
Bunker Hill was being cleared for one of the biggest urban renewal projects in United States 
history that would transform Bunker Hill into “the premier office district” of Southern 
California352 and plans were well underway to construct Dodger Stadium on Chavez Ravine. 
Meanwhile, on the West Side of Los Angeles, plans were moving forward to create the Los 
Angeles County Art Museum, which would break ground in 1962, the same year that 
construction on the Music Center would begin.  
Both the Bunker Hill urban renewal project and the construction of Dodger Stadium 
in Chavez Ravine grew directly out of the defeat of public housing, which had rendered the 
Left “voiceless” and unable to muster the political power to resist the corporate modernist 
vision espoused by Poulson and the downtown business establishment.353 Having turned 
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popular opinion against public housing as the driving force behind the development of the 
built environment, the rhetoric of “civic progress” emerged as the defining principle that 
would shape modern Los Angeles. This emerging vision was both facilitated and legitimated 
to a large degree by the 1954 Housing Act, which, as discussed in the introduction to this 
dissertation, opened the door for massive redevelopment projects not contingent on housing. 
Most importantly for Los Angeles, the 1954 Housing Act “transcended the acrimonious 
divide between liberals and conservatives, forging a new consensus that emphasized 
commercial redevelopment instead of public housing as the answer to central-city 
decline.”354  
Freed from the public housing imperative, the business elite, in cooperation with 
Poulson and the Community Redevelopment Agency, could finally pursue a downtown 
redevelopment vision based on commerce and culture, a goal they had pursued 
unsuccessfully since the mid-1940s, when GLAPI had begun its efforts to reclaim downtown. 
By making federal subsidies available for the underwriting of private urban development, the 
1954 Housing Act helped to shift the standard for defining the notion of “public purpose” in 
such a way that protecting the general economic health of a city neighborhood could now be 
said to be in the interest of the general welfare. Los Angeles, led by Poulson and the 
downtown business elite, seized on this notion in advancing the redevelopment of 
Downtown, insisting that corporate-and-culture-driven urban renewal was a necessary tool to 
ensure Los Angeles’s growth and protect the city’s economic health.  
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Bunker Hill had long been a target for redevelopment. Once comprised of 
“prosperous residential streets”355 and characterized by ornate mansions “that did not follow 
any particular style but rather conformed to with their owners’ imagination and 
aspiration,”356 Bunker Hill had been one of the most fashionable neighborhoods in Los 
Angeles in the 1880s. Wealthy and upper middle class Angelenos had settled on the hill, 
which afforded a respite from the bustle of the developing downtown. However, the 
neighborhood quickly fell into disrepute when those same wealthy residents, in the 1920s and 
1930s, fled the neighborhood for more fashionable areas as Los Angeles expanded westward. 
The mansions stayed but were converted in rooming houses, while the once-fashionable 
hotels started catering to low-income residents, and tenement housing was built in the 1920s 
and 30s.357 Bunker Hill quickly came to be seen as a hotbed of every conceivable social ill 
from drug use to petty theft to murder, a vision most aptly described—and largely 
promulgated by—noir novelist Raymond Chandler, whose description of the neighborhood 
as “old town, lost town, shabby town, crook town” can be found on the pages of virtually any 
book or article touching on Bunker Hill’s history.  
Indeed, the literary and cinematic representations of Bunker Hill as a sinister 
landscape populated by marginalized and nefarious deviants played an important role in 
shaping the public’s perception of a deteriorating downtown core and provided a firm 
foundation for those who would argue that the city needed to be “reclaimed.” As Eric Avila 
has argued, "Hollywood's rendition of the postwar urban crisis implicated distinct social 
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actors, each of whom attained greater recognition in urban public life during the 1930s and 
1940s. Blacks, women, homosexuals, and Communists ran rampant in the noir city.” These 
same groups, Avila argues, “secured some accommodations in the political culture of New 
Deal liberalism, but their figurative doubles in film noir and the urban science fiction film 
dramatized their threat to the dawning social order of Cold War America.”358 The 
representation of the urban landscape in noir helped put a specific face—derelict, poor, 
subversive, and non-white—on the threat that lurked on the city streets in Bunker Hill and 
lent credence to the argument that intervention was needed to wrest control of the city from 
these dangerous others.  
 The CRA announced its intention to redevelop Bunker Hill in 1949 and issued a 
proposal in 1951. The centerpiece of the proposal was thirty-seven thirteen-story apartment 
buildings, which would help make Bunker Hill “a colony of worker bees—a hive for 
downtown office employees” while the existing low-income tenants would be accommodated 
by the public housing units to be built under the city’s Title I contract with the federal 
government.359 Proposition C on the April 1951 ballot asked voters to approve the issuance 
of five million dollars to go toward the costs of acquiring the land on Bunker Hill and then 
turning it over to private developers. The Times and the downtown business establishment 
supported the proposal, which would help clear the city of what was widely viewed as a slum 
while ensuring that the redevelopment was driven by private enterprise. The proposition 
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received a majority vote, but fell short of the required two-thirds and so the housing-based 
proposal was shelved.360  
Debates over the future of Bunker Hill lasted for several years after the defeat of 
Proposition C. Much like Lincoln Square, the residents of Bunker Hill fought to save their 
neighborhood, arguing that despite the number of dwellings in poor repair, the Hill 
comprised a tight-knit community. Property owners submitted an alternative redevelopment 
plan that would not eradicate the neighborhood but rather would rehabilitate existing 
structures and preserve the neighborhood’s general character. The City Council briefly 
considered the alternative plan, ultimately rejecting it on the basis that rehabilitation of the 
existing buildings would not adequately address the blight that plagued the neighborhood.  
The final redevelopment plan was approved in March 1959. No longer anchored by 
housing, the proposed design for Bunker Hill would include “a total of approximately 3,750 
dwelling units, 3,000 hotel units, 12 million square feet of office and over one-half million 
square feet of retail space.”361 Although it would take well over ten years from the start of 
demolition in 1960 for the new Bunker Hill to begin to take physical shape, the plan’s 
promise to give Los Angeles the skyline it had been sorely lacking secured the ascendancy of 
corporate modernism as the defining ethos of the downtown landscape.  
Not far from Bunker Hill, Chavez Ravine was about to undergo a transformation of 
its own. Upon taking office, one of Mayor Poulson’s first acts was to renegotiate the housing 
contract with the federal government. Although he was not able to cancel the contract 
entirely, he significantly reduced it and eliminated several of the individual housing projects, 
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including the largest, which was to be built in Chavez Ravine. The cancellation agreement 
stipulated that any of the already-condemned land must be put to public use. Because of that 
stipulation, the City Housing Authority was now sitting on hundreds of acres that had been 
condemned but that could not be developed. Meanwhile, Brooklyn Dodgers owner Walter 
O’Malley was looking to leave New York after failing to convince Robert Moses to provide 
an adequate site to build a much-needed replacement for Ebbets Field. Poulson, aware that 
O’Malley had expressed in interest in moving the Dodgers west, pursued an agreement to 
bring the team to Los Angeles. Like Bunker Hill, the redevelopment of Chavez Ravine 
represented, as Eric Avila said, “another episode in the history of the postwar American city, 
in which the destruction of familiar urban spaces begot a new cultural order.”362 The 
transformation of Chavez Ravine into Dodger Stadium was the result of a fierce political 
struggle that pitted the Times and its allies against the politically weakened left. The fight 
over Chavez Ravine centered to a large degree on what constituted a “public purpose” in 
modern Los Angeles, and shows how important the symbolic demonstration of civic progress 
had become in reshaping the landscape and image of Los Angeles.  
Named for Julian Chavez, one of the first Los Angeles Councilmen, Chavez Ravine 
was situated just north of Downtown and comprised of three neighborhoods: Palo Verde, La 
Loma, and Bishop. Although located close to Downtown, the neighborhoods were “semi-
rural villages with poultry, live-stock, and subsistence gardening” and populated by “an 
extremely close-knit but impoverished community lacking basic urban services.”363   
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Because of its extreme poverty and substandard housing conditions, Chavez Ravine was an 
obvious target for redevelopment and had been designated a project site under the city’s 
contract under the 1949 Housing Act. Declared the worst slum area in the city by the 
Department of Health in 1948, hundreds of the dwellings—which ranged in type from houses 
to chicken coops—lacked toilets, baths, and running water.364 When it was designated as a 
redevelopment site in 1949, the City Planning Commission saw Chavez Ravine “as the 
cornerstone for a human and democratic citywide redevelopment program.”365 Residents in 
Chavez Ravine received eviction notices in July 1950 and the Housing Authority began 
purchasing the property that December.366 Homeowners and residents of Chavez Ravine 
were promised first choice of units in the new housing project that would rise on the land 
once, but as noted earlier, that project never rose thanks the termination of the public housing 
project. 
 In October 1957, the City Council approved an agreement between the City of Los 
Angeles and the Brooklyn Dodgers. Under the agreement, the city offered to give O’Malley 
the original Chavez Ravine site and an additional 115 acres of land, two million dollars for 
land clearance, and $2.7 million for access roads. In exchange, O’Malley would give the city 
Wrigley Field, which the Dodgers owned and where the Angels played) as well as a 
community recreation center on the stadium site at Chavez Ravine, the latter of which was 
never built.367 The deal was attacked by many who believed that it amounted to a giveaway. 
But Poulson, who “underestimated the strength of his own [bargaining] position,” was 
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convinced that “O’Malley needed us much less than we needed him, [so] he obviously held 
the trump cards,”368 and so O’Malley had gotten what many believed could only be described 
as a sweetheart deal.  
 But it wasn’t just that Poulson was thought to be giving away the store that angered 
so many in the city. Homeowners and residents of Chavez Ravine had been evicted to make 
way for a public housing project. While many of them still bore anger over being evicted for 
that purpose, the fact that the land would now be used for a baseball stadium rather than 
returned to its owners infuriated those who had been cleared from the neighborhood. The 
anger spread nationwide when, in May 1959, six months after voters narrowly approved the 
city’s contract with the Dodgers, the Arechiga family, who had refused to sell their home for 
the price the Housing Authority offered, were forcefully evicted. Television cameras 
captured the moments when “Mrs. Avrana Arechiga, the sixty-eight-year old matriarch, 
threw rocks at [deputies enforcing their eviction], while her daughter, Mrs. Aurora Vargas, a 
war widow, was carried kicking and screaming from the premises”369 and the moment, as 
soon as the house was vacant, when bulldozers knocked the house down while the family 
looked on. The event received national television coverage and created an enormous public 
backlash against Poulson and the Dodgers. Poulson stood his ground, arguing that the 
Arechigas, who had pitched a tent on the site of their demolished home and refused to leave, 
were simply hamming it up for the cameras in effort to get a better financial offer on their 
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home. Sleeping in tents was just one more sensationalistic tactic according to Poulson and his 
supporters. “No doubt,” said Poulson, “they enjoyed every indignant minute of it.”370 
 The forcible eviction of the Arechigas put in sharp relief the conflict over Chavez 
Ravine as it related to the modern vision of the city versus the community-driven vision that 
the Left had espoused before being squashed by the redbaiting campaign. Supporters of 
public housing had determined that Chavez Ravine, in their view the worst slum in the city, 
required intervention to provide more adequate housing, with adequate being defined along 
modern urban lines. This was despite being “a happy community where everyone knew and 
helped one another.” It was, according to one visitor, reminiscent “of a village in Mexico, 
nonetheless this was old Los Angeles with a charm all its own, a Los Angeles we will never 
see again.”371  Even had the public housing program not been defeated, it was clear that as 
modernism ascended in Los Angeles there was no longer a place for Chavez Ravine as it 
existed before the city’s intervention. Remembered by many as enchanted and “an idyllic 
situation, in spite of its squalor,”372 Chavez Ravine was for public housing proponents a site 
for rehabilitation through community modernism and for Poulson and Dodger proponents, it 
was little more than an obstacle standing in the way of progress. Poulson recalled that he had 
spent nearly three years trying to interest public groups in developing the land but to no avail. 
“Meanwhile,” he said, “the place was inhabited by squatters and by a handful of small home 
owners whose goats, cows, and chickens roamed about.”373 One supporter of the Dodger 
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agreement declared in a letter to Councilman Edward Roybal, who had voted against the 
deal, “Anyone who is against the Dodger agreement belongs to some hick town and not this 
modern marvel, Los Angeles.”374  
Poulson, the Times, and other Dodger supporters worked to convince the public of the 
importance of Dodger Stadium not just as a source of revenue for the city, but as the city’s 
entrée in the major leagues of American cities. Poulson went so far as to describe Dodger 
Stadium as another great public “work” and the Times eagerly picked up that banner, 
declaring that the Dodgers would “restore to the city the sense of common enterprise it once 
had when all the citizens would join up to tap a water supply far away in the mountains.”375 
Making this comparison, the Times was situating Dodger Stadium among the major 
milestones in the infrastructural development of Los Angeles. While the aqueduct and 
railroads had each built the physical foundation upon which the city could rise, cultural and 
popular attractions like Dodger Stadium represented a new kind of infrastructure, more 
symbolic but no less crucial to the city’s growth.  
 The stories of public housing, Bunker Hill, and Chavez Ravine demonstrate the way 
in which the elite finally reclaimed control over the vision of the city by taking advantage of 
the Red Scare and changes in urban redevelopment law. Although the Music Center was not 
directly implicated in any of these, it is difficult to imagine the project gaining traction had it 
not been for these events. Indeed, the Downtown business establishment had tried for nearly 
a decade to create a major civic cultural center. Even before the public housing war got fully 
underway in the 1950s, GLAPI was fighting to strengthen the elite’s hold on Downtown, but 
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met with defeat at every turn. Although they failed to win the necessary support, the history 
of GLAPI is an important chapter in the story of the Music Center and of Los Angeles. 
An Urgent Need 
Greater Los Angeles Plans, Inc. (GLAPI) was incorporated in 1945 for the express 
purpose of addressing “the urgent need for civic auditorium and music center facilities 
consistent with the size and importance of this metropolitan area.”376 Following GLAPI’s 
January 1945 incorporation, the executive committee of the Downtown Businessmen’s 
Association gave their unanimous endorsement of the project. Neil Petree, president of the 
Association—and a founding member of GLAPI—told the Times—whose publisher Norman 
Chandler sat on GLAPI’s board—that the group hoped that “this much-needed facility may 
become a completed reality, making possible cultural and recreational events beyond 
anything Los Angeles has heretofore enjoyed, attracting thousands of tourists and bringing 
greater prosperity and prestige to all of us.”377 Upon its incorporation, GLAPI had not 
committed to a particular “location, plan or any other detail,” said its president Albert B. 
Ruddock, who added, “We are, however, committed wholeheartedly to fostering these 
improvements for the city.”378 In other words, GLAPI had no clear mandate in terms of 
programming or cultural production, but rather saw the idea of a civic auditorium as a means 
to help strengthen the downtown business district, the prominence of which declined during 
World War II as Los Angeles, like so many other American cities experienced “an 
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accelerated pattern of residential and industrial decentralization.”379 GLAPI’s ostensible 
commitment to “fostering these improvements for the city” would also help to protect the 
downtown real estate and business investments of its membership. GLAPI’s leadership 
envisioned Downtown growth through the development of a cultural infrastructure that had 
failed to materialize because of their own fanatical focus on real estate development which 
only exacerbated the suburbanization that led to downtown’s decline. Although GLAPI’s 
initial plans are rightly recognized as an important moment in the development of the Music 
Center, their rhetoric failed to motivate the people of Los Angeles and to win the broad-based 
support needed to bolster such a massive undertaking.  
GLAPI’s leadership was comprised of a cross section of individuals heavily invested 
in downtown real estate. Among them were Pacific Mutual Insurance president Asa Call, 
Neill Petree, Norman Chanlder, and P.J. Winant of Bullock’s Department Store to name a 
few; many of the same individuals would later sit on the “committee of twenty-five” that 
handpicked Norris Poulson to run for mayor in the 1953 election. In the first few months of 
its existence, GLAPI employed two strategies to garner public support for their plans to 
redevelop downtown. A few months after its incorporation, GLAPI attempted to capitalize on 
postwar patriotism by declaring their proposed civic auditorium to be a “war memorial.” In 
May 1945, GLAPI announced that two veterans’ groups had endorsed their proposal for a 
“War Memorial center program.”380 Having already announced the unanimous endorsement 
of the business interests, the endorsements of the veterans’ organizations would, GLAPI 
hoped, imbue the project with a greater sense of civic legitimacy.  
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To establish the cultural legitimacy of the project, they turned to New York’s 
Metropolitan Opera, announcing that in April 1948, the Met would hold annual seasons in 
Los Angeles. The performances would first be given in the Shrine Auditorium “pending the 
construction of War Memorial Opera House and a War Memorial Auditorium.”381 The 
partnership between GLAPI and the Met was “hailed as the cultural milestone of the 
century.”382 Although the San Francisco Opera had been performing in the Shrine 
Auditorium for years, the establishment of a permanent arrangement with the Metropolitan 
Opera was heralded as a reflection of the cultural aspirations of Los Angeles’s citizenry. 
Responding to the announcement of the GLAPI-Met partnership, County Supervisor W.A. 
Smith said, “The advent of Metropolitan Opera in Los Angeles will mean that the area has 
attained a cultural growth commensurate with the terrific advances in population and in 
economic and industrial development.”383 Ultimately, the relationship with the Met fizzled 
after a year. In 1949, it was announced that the Met would not return for another season, and 
it was suggested in the press that the San Francisco Opera had exerted pressure on city 
leaders out of fear that the Met’s presence in the city would create undue competition. 
Whatever the reason for the end of the GLAPI-Met relationship, the organization pressed 
forward with its plans.  
By the end of the 1940s, GLAPI had purchased two parcels of land in Downtown Los 
Angeles: a square at Lafayette Park for the opera house and a site bounded by Figueroa, 
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Fremont, Third, and Fifth Streets for the civic auditorium.384 The purchases had been made 
“in anticipation of favorable action by the City of Los Angeles to finance the project through 
the issuance of general obligation bonds,”385 the first of which went to the polls in April 1951 
as Propositions A and B, which sought a combined thirty-five million dollars for the 
construction of two separate facilities.  Proposition A proposed a public auditorium with 
“19,000 seats for conventions or championship fights, or 15,000 seats for events requiring 
floor space” as well as a large exhibition center. Proposition B, meanwhile, proposed a 
“public music and dramatic center with two principal auditoriums seating 3500 and 1500” as 
well as rehearsal halls, practice rooms, and office and studio space.386  
The Times vigorously promoted the proposal. In the months leading up to the primary 
election in which voters would decide the fate of the propositions, it ran numerous articles 
declaring the need for such facilities to bring not only economic growth to the city but also 
the prestige the city lacked when compared to others of comparable size. GLAPI’s leadership 
took up countless column inches in the paper, extolling the benefits the project would bestow 
on the city’s national and international reputation. Leland Atherton Irish, speaking on behalf 
of GLAPI’s board of directors, promised voters that the auditorium and music center would 
“not only add prestige to Los Angeles as the cultural center of the world, but will contribute a 
wealth of advantages to each and every citizen in every walk of life.”387 Meanwhile, other 
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representatives of GLAPI worked to assure the public that the project would also deliver 
great material benefits to the city.  
Despite the full throttle support of GLAPI’s leadership and the Times, the proposals 
failed to win voter approval. Returning to the drawing board, GLAPI sold the Lafayette Park 
site, focused their attention solely on the property in Bunker Hill, and then put forward 
another ballot initiative in the 1953 election. This new iteration of the project combined the 
civic auditorium, convention center, and opera house onto one site. The Times once again 
threw its weight behind the project, arguing in a February 1953 editorial that the city had 
“long suffered because it does not have an adequate auditorium, where conventions exhibits, 
sporting events and other affairs can be held.” Building the auditorium and opera house was 
“a matter of civic pride,” as many cities smaller and “less important” than Los Angeles 
already had such facilities.388 When voters went to the polls in May 1953, the proposition 
again failed to win the necessary two-thirds majority approval, although it did fare better than 
the first attempt.389 GLAPI made one final attempt the following year when they created a 
revised proposal and partnered with a newly formed organization, Forward Los Angeles, a 
loosely formed “civic organization of 800 leading citizens.”390 The new proposal, Proposition 
F, eliminated the opera house and called for “a 15,000-seat auditorium, doubling as a sports 
arena, an exhibition hall for trade shows and a smaller hall for music.”391 In their public 
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statements, Forward Los Angeles emphasized that their membership comprised not just elite 
businessmen from downtown, but also representatives from “every walk of life and every 
section of Los Angeles.”392 When the voters went to the polls in June 1954, Proposition F 
garnered greater support than its two predecessors, with 65.6% of voters casting affirmative 
votes, but just shy of the required two-thirds majority.393  
Although the vote reflected growing support for the idea, it had become clear that 
winning popular support for the convention hall and Music Center from the city’s electorate 
would be more challenging than GLAPI had anticipated. Several factors could be attributed 
to the electorate’s hesitation. For one thing, no matter how much GLAPI and its supporters 
lauded the benefits the downtown project would bring to everyone in the city, there was no 
escaping the fact that voters were being asked to fund a project that was clearly intended to 
benefit the downtown business establishment. While that same establishment had, with 
growing success, portrayed public housing as a Socialist scheme in which the taxpayer was 
being asked to “pay someone else’s rent,” they were now asking voters to foot the bill for a 
project meant to shore up the value of their own investment in downtown real estate. GLAPI 
and the Times had worked hard to convince the public that the opera house and convention 
center would benefit everyone in the city, but it was difficult to convey any sense of public 
ownership in the project in a meaningful way.  
The geographical nature of the city further exacerbated this problem. It is important to 
remember that city elections reflected the votes not just of citizens of downtown Los 
Angeles, but also in many outlying communities where residents were not enthusiastic about 
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supporting a project from which they did not see themselves benefiting. This became 
particularly obvious during the campaign for Proposition F, when several City Council 
members attempted to add to the proposal three “community auditoriums” in outlying areas 
of the city, substantially increasing the dollar figure of the proposition.394 When the issue 
went before the City Council, Harry Volk, chairman of Forward Los Angeles, warned that if 
the “branch auditoriums” were added to the proposition, the organization would withdraw its 
support. Despite its desire to bring “millions of dollars in convention revenue, uphold our 
employment and prosperity, and bring us untold cultural and recreational opportunities,” 
Volk said, Forward Los Angeles could not endorse a bond issue that added to the scope of 
the project. Of course, the added cost of the additional auditoriums was not the only 
consideration; the “branch auditoriums” proposal directly undermined GLAPI’s raison 
d’être: recentralizing the downtown business district. So with the defeat of the third proposal 
in 1954, it was now clear to GLAPI and its allies that they would likely never gain the 
endorsement from city voters and that they would need to look to build a broader base of 
support.  
Enter Dorothy Chandler and the Board of Supervisors 
Conspicuously missing from GLAPI’s original proposal was any clear affiliation with 
a specific cultural institution, except for the short-lived partnership with the Metropolitan 
Opera. As a result, there was no sense among the public that the construction of the civic 
auditorium represented anything more than an investment in real estate. Meanwhile, a 
number of cultural organizations were working to bolster their profile, and establish their 
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companies on a more sound institutional and permanent basis, among them the Hollywood 
Bowl and the Southern California Symphony Association (SCSA), both of which had grown 
out of attempts in the early twentieth century by Los Angeles “to develop its own regional 
version of American high culture—symphony, opera, oratorio, as well as noncommercial 
theater and the fine arts—transplanted to, created for, and participated in by a broad-based 
local arts community with a widespread audience.”395 Much like the city’s geography, the 
cultural landscape of Los Angeles remained diffuse even while GLAPI was working on 
developing its proposals for a centralized music center and civic auditorium.  
One of the most curious aspects of GLAPI’s history and its relationship to the cultural 
landscape of Los Angeles is the fact that many of the leaders of GLAPI, the Southern 
California Symphony Association (SCSA), and the Hollywood Bowl belonged to the same 
organizations but did not align their respective objectives of economic power and cultural 
legitimacy. For about four years, between 1950 and 1954, the three organizations orbited 
separately around a similar desire to institutionalize and monumentalize culture on the city’s 
landscape. Although nobody realized it in the moment, each was in its own way laying a 
piece of the foundation for what would become the Los Angeles Music Center. A confluence 
of events starting with the near closure of the Hollywood Bowl in 1951 brought the 
individual players together with the County Board of Supervisors who helped to reposition 
the project as a county rather than municipal project.  
Most retellings of the history of the Music Center point to 1951 as the key moment in 
the beginning of the journey that led to its 1964 opening. It was in that year that the 
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Hollywood Bowl suddenly shut down and the city and county were forced to confront the 
very real possibility of losing one of the most important—and one of the only—cultural 
landmarks in Los Angeles. As the 1951 summer season got underway at the Hollywood 
Bowl, all seemed to be moving along as usual. A “comfortable informality” had marked the 
opening of the annual “Symphonies Under the Stars” series on July 11 when “real music 
lovers,” including “dowagers and shopgirls, music students and music connoisseurs, civic 
leaders, and financial tycoons” gathered to hear the Los Angeles Philharmonic play.396 The 
night before, the Bowl had opened its season with a performance of the Strauss opera Die 
Fledermaus. In his review of the production, critic Albert Goldberg complained that 
Strauss’s light opera had been heavily burdened by a production that “suggest[ed] grand 
rather than light opera.”397 While the production was handsome, he said, the performance 
was marred by the weightiness of its scale. But the impact on the artistic interpretation was 
nothing compared to the financial impact Die Fledermaus had on the Bowl. Despite having 
cash on hand of just over twelve thousand dollars and disappointing advance sales, the Bowl, 
with Die Fledermaus, racked up production expenses exceeding $121,000.398 The massive 
financial loss made the closing of the Bowl inevitable, and on July 15, 1951, all remaining 
performances for the season were cancelled. Jean Hersholt, the president of the Bowl, 
assured the public that the closure was only a temporary measure and that performances 
would resume shortly and appointed an emergency committee to develop a strategy to 
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reorganize the Bowl and secure its future sustainability. Heading the committee was Dorothy 
Chandler. An executive vice president of the SCSA, Chandler had been appointed to the 
Bowl’s board of directors just over a week before its closure.399 The coincidence of Dorothy 
Chandler’s appointment to the Hollywood Bowl Association’s board of directors and the near 
collapse of the Bowl turned out to be a critically important moment in Los Angeles’s cultural 
history, as it “started her extraordinary career in the world of cultural politics.”400  
Born Dorothy Buffum and known among her friends and close associates as Buff, she 
met Norman Chandler, son of Times publisher Harry Chandler, while the two were enrolled 
at Stanford University. They were married in August 1922. Buff “possessed the spirit, 
energy, and ambition of a self-confident, savvy power player”401 and in the early years of her 
marriage to Norman Chandler, she struggled to reconcile that ambition with the expectations 
Norman’s conservative family.  
Chandler’s drive far exceeded that of her husband Norman. As Mike Davis has 
argued, by the time Norman Chandler took over the reins of the Times, “‘tired blood’ or 
‘spoiled rich boy’ syndrome, which seemingly affects all dynasties after the second 
generation” had set in, making the male heirs to the throne “dependent upon their fathers’ 
henchmen or their wives.”402 Norman Chandler was “a third-generation aristocrat,” argue 
Gottlieb and Wolt, “and his few ambitions reflected that fact.”403 His wife more than made 
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up for that lack of drive. By the 1940s she had become “a power at the Times and was taking 
an active interest in the cultural affairs of the city, as well as keeping on top of internal 
corporate matters.”404 She had also taken on responsibility for managing the corporate image 
of the Times, and was deeply concerned with bolstering the national reputation of Los 
Angeles. 
Chandler worked tirelessly to bolster the city’s image by demonstrating the 
legitimacy of Los Angeles’s cultural institutions. She was elected to the board of directors of 
the Southern California Symphony Association in 1943,405 so by the time the Hollywood 
Bowl imploded in July 1951, she had been a long-time presence on the cultural scene in Los 
Angeles. But it was the Bowl crisis and her role in saving the institution that brought her 
greater attention and gave her an outlet that could fulfill her drive. More importantly, it 
would lead to the creation of a “new cultural order”406 headed by Chandler herself and made 
up of a coalition bridging traditional social divides while bringing the need for an enhanced 
cultural infrastructure to the fore of the public consciousness.  
Throughout the Hollywood Bowl campaign and the later drive to build the Music 
Center, Chandler carefully balanced her public persona as a society matriarch with the more 
private reality, in which she was a shrewd political operative and cunning power broker in 
her own right.  After taking center stage during the Hollywood Bowl drive, and later, the 
Music Center project, Chandler would come to be known by insiders as the “Iron Lady”407 
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and was accused by many of being “dictatorial.”408 When asked about these labels, Chandler 
replied, “Talk like that makes me cry. Inside of me I am very loving and warm, but the 
position in which I’ve been placed, the responsibilities I have, make it necessary for me to be 
very strong and firm. Often I’ve had to be the catalyst simply because nobody else would 
make a decision.”409  
Surely, there is some truth in Chandler’s claim that the charges of being “dictatorial” 
were painful to her, but when considered in light of the political skill she demonstrated 
throughout the Bowl campaign and would further refine during the drive to build the Music 
Center, it seems clear that she also understood the danger—in the late 1950s and early 
1960s—of pushing back too hard against these charges that almost certainly would never 
have been leveled at a man occupying her position. Even though it was well known that 
“Dorothy, rather than Norman, had become the most important power at the Times,” 
Chandler was careful not to publicly embrace feminism. “I’ve earned my achievements by 
what I as a woman have done,” she said. “But to say I’m a women’s libber and I want equal 
this and equal that is wrong. Sure I’ve had to work hard at being accepted, but to talk about 
this competition with males all the time—I can’t understand it.”410 Whatever her personally 
held beliefs about being a “women’s libber,” Chandler was astute enough to recognize that it 
was dangerous territory for someone seeking contributions from wealthy elites and the 
general public. Chandler instead chose to capitalize publicly on her role as a society 
matriarch to bring an aura of elegance and glitz to the fundraising drive, while behind the 
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scenes she wielded her Chandlerian muscle when necessary, both of which would prove 
tremendously valuable in her effort to save the Hollywood Bowl and as her vision for the 
Music Center came into sharper focus in the mid-1950s.  
One of Chandler’s first acts upon the start of the Hollywood Bowl crisis was to 
appoint an operations committee to quickly put together a program for a series of emergency 
fundraising concerts at the Bowl. She appointed Edwin Lester, the director of the Los 
Angeles Civic Light Opera, as chairman and he was joined on the committee by Los Angeles 
Philharmonic Music Director Alfred Wallenstein and Los Angeles Public Schools 
Superintendent of Music Education William Hartshorn.411 Over the course of two weeks, this 
newly formed committee put together a lineup of noted conductors and musicians to headline 
a series of fundraising concerts at the Bowl. Meanwhile, Chandler turned to Neill Petree to 
head the fundraising committee. After drafting Petree into the Bowl campaign, she instructed 
him to contact his friend, noted film actress Irene Dunn, and enlist her support. “She’s lovely 
and charming,” she told Petree, “and I think the motion picture connection will be very 
helpful.”412 Chandler also recruited Neil Smith, executive vice president of GLAPI to take 
over the managerial responsibilities of the Bowl after managing director Karl Wecker 
resigned.413 Chandler understood that success in rescuing the Bowl would require both the 
support of the public and the cooperation of city and county officials. Petree and Smith 
ensured a solid connection to the traditional sources of financial and political support offered 
by the downtown business elites, and the “motion picture” connection offered access not only 
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to the deep pockets of Hollywood celebrities but also to the star power that could help ensure 
public interest in the Bowl.  
While the financial support of individual heavy hitters would be critical to the success 
of the Bowl and ultimately to the Music Center as well, Chandler worked relentlessly to 
convince the public of the Bowl’s importance to the community and to encourage broad 
participation in the fundraising campaign. To do this, she employed two strategies. First, she 
continually reminded the public that the closure of the Hollywood Bowl had attracted 
nationwide news coverage, all of which reflected poorly on Southern California. She 
frequently warned the public that the closure of the Bowl threatened the “cultural integrity 
and eminence of Southern California,” and said that what Southern Californians wanted was 
“cultural stability, unity, and quality on a high plane.”414 She lamented the perception that 
Los Angeles was thought to be culturally inferior to cities like New York because Angelenos 
lacked the “civic pride” of East Coast residents and she “wish[ed] this feeling were more 
dominant in the West Coast. We must ‘sell’ what we have here—the people and our assets,” 
she declared. “We must let everyone know that we have a great Hollywood Bowl. It is not 
necessary to go to faraway shores for great music. Among the best is right here.”415 The 
Times echoed Chandler’s argument in an editorial, pointing out that this “great cultural asset” 
helped give the city prestige. “It is a case where must pay attention ‘to what the neighbors 
say,’” the editorial argued. “The property is here, the physical installations, the tradition, the 
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genius, the talent, the management ability. Solely lacking is community drive.”416 Chandler 
and the Times worked in concert to convince the public that because the Bowl was owned by 
the county, all Southern Californians “should consider the Bowl a civic responsibility for 
financial reasons if for no other.”417 And what better way for the public to fulfill its 
responsibility than with their financial support?  
Chandler’s second strategy to engage the public as active participants was in the 
fundraising campaign chaired by Petree and movie star Irene Dunne. Petree and Dunne were 
tasked with assembling a committee of one hundred members who would work toward 
raising $100,000. Speaking at a meeting of the fund-raising committee at the California Club, 
Petree explained to the assembled crowd that the fundraising plan they were developing was 
aimed at “affording the public an opportunity to back to the Bowl financially and 
artistically.” Although he acknowledged that the Bowl would need to attract large donations, 
“it would be far better for the Bowl if 100,000 people contributed $1 than if 1000 people 
contributed $100.”418 The Times aided in the effort “to enlist financial support of the 
community to maintain and insure the future of fine music in the Southland” by accepting 
contributions to the fund and including a remittance coupon in the paper as well as 
“begin[ning] the fund with a contribution of $500.”419 The publicity surrounding the Bowl 
campaign consistently focused on the importance of the public’s participation. County 
Supervisor John Anson Ford, in a letter published in the Times, lauded the modest 
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contributions of the citizenry as “eloquent testimony” to the great “regard for this community 
enterprise.” He was particularly impressed, he said, by “the teacher and wife whose family 
obligations are large and whose pay is modest, who sent in two $1 bills. For them it meant 
more than $100 checks from many.”420 By October 1951, the financial situation of the Bowl 
had been reversed. From “box office receipts of only $38,069.81 and an operating loss of 
$80,096.26 during the disastrous week of ‘Fledermaus,’ the remainder of the season showed 
paid admissions of 149,339 totaling $171,320.39, with ‘other income’ in the amount of 
$15,355.06,” reducing the operating loss to $33,645.82.421 By October 1951, the goal of 
$100,000 had been surpassed.  
With the Bowl now on firmer financial footing, Chandler turned her attention to 
ensuring its long-term stability and began by orchestrating a reorganization of the Hollywood 
Bowl Association. In January 1952, Petree was named president of the Hollywood Bowl 
Association and Chandler was elected executive vice president. In addition, several 
longstanding board members were pushed aside and replaced by a mix of individuals from 
business, entertainment, and municipal and county government. In reorganizing the board she 
had created a new alliance made up of powerhouses from the downtown establishment as 
well as from Hollywood, new money elites, and higher education. Chandler clearly 
understood that the continued success of the Bowl rested on the ability of its leadership to 
wield influence in a variety of sectors ranging from government to culture. Having raised the 
profile of the Bowl through her fundraising campaign, she now worked to establish its 
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legitimacy not only as a musical venue but also as a vital public asset. Ensuring the longevity 
of the Bowl and increasing its legitimacy would require subsidy from the city and county. 
Having established the importance of the Bowl to the city and county of Los Angeles, 
Chandler and Petree led the effort to renegotiate the Bowl’s lease with the county to finance 
improvements to the Bowl. In a letter to the Chief Administrative Officer of Los Angeles 
County, Petree said it appeared “conclusively that there is no way to successfully continue 
the Hollywood Bowl operation unless improvements (as outlined by the architects and 
engineers) can be accomplished in the shortest possible time.” He proposed, on behalf of the 
board of directors, that “the present ninety-nine year lease be cancelled and a new lease made 
with the County of Los Angeles, providing for a period not to exceed twenty-five years.” The 
Bowl Association “would be relinquishing forty-five years of a lease on a very valuable piece 
of property in consideration of the County making the improvements that are so vitally 
necessary.”422 Chandler’s success in the fundraising campaign, which relied so heavily on 
drawing the public’s attention to the reputational harm the Bowl’s collapse had brought to 
Los Angeles, made it difficult for the Board of Supervisors to decline the request.  
The supervisors agreed to renegotiate the lease and assumed the financial burden of 
making much-needed improvements to the facility to the tune of $569,000 in the first two 
years alone.423 The planned improvements for the first year included a new electrical system, 
new light and sound towers, new sound equipment, remodeling of the box areas and the 
construction of new dressing rooms. The second year’s construction program would include 
new parking areas, ramp lighting, seating capacity expansion, and several cosmetic 
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improvements to the Bowl.424 Millions more were spent on the physical infrastructure of the 
Bowl over the next few years as Chandler and the board of directors worked to ensure that 
the physical plant reflected the Bowl’s permanence as part of the cultural and civic landscape 
of Los Angeles.  
 The Bowl’s near closure, Chandler later recalled, brought about “the whole change in 
the cultural picture of Los Angeles. . . . That was a real shock to Los Angeles.”425 As dark as 
that moment may have been, Chandler recognized the opportunity not only to rally public 
support to save this venue and organization, but also to capitalize on the national 
embarrassment brought upon the city by the near loss of one of its only prominent cultural 
institutions. Chandler had effectively used her influence—most notably her relationship with 
the Times—to ensure that the reputational damage caused by the Bowl crisis remained front 
and center in the public’s mind, thereby providing valuable leverage when attempting to 
persuade the County Supervisors to lend financial support to the Bowl. When confronted 
with her proposal that the county assume significant financial responsibility for the Bowl and 
its needed capital improvements, the Board of Supervisors was hardly in a position to say no. 
As one observer later recalled, Chandler had “buttonholed county supervisors and city 
councilmen into subsidizing culture.”426 But more important than cornering the Supervisors 
into lending increased financial support, Chandler had begun the process of bringing 
powerful players together to work toward a singular goal of revitalizing Los Angeles. When 
the third bond proposal put forth by GLAPI failed to win public support—falling short of the 
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required two-thirds majority by less than one percent—in 1954, Chandler was “really 
relieved” and said that although she had been supportive of all of the GLAPI proposals, she 
“could never see the convention center and the opera house together. The time seemed ripe to 
try a new tack, to see if we couldn’t raise the money ourselves.”427  
Both a Challenge and an Opportunity of Major Importance 
 Once again, Chandler deployed Hollywood glitz to attract money and public interest. 
On March 17, 1955, more than six hundred guests gathered at the Ambassador Hotel for the 
Eldorado Party, a “golden kaleidoscope of beautiful gowns, fragrant flowers, entertainment, 
and music” that “made the event a memorable one in the social annals” of Los Angeles.428 
Chandler enlisted MGM Studios executive John Green to produce the event, which he titled 
“An Evening of Improbabilities.” The evening featured a high-end fashion show and 
entertainment from such luminaries as Jack Benny, Dinah Shore, Danny Kaye, and David 
Rose. Further adding to the opulence of the event, the entire Los Angeles Philharmonic 
Orchestra performed. The main event of the evening was the raffling of an Eldorado Cadillac 
donated by General Motors; hence, the fundraiser’s name, “The Eldorado Party.” The party 
netted $400,000 toward building a reserve fund for the Southern California Symphony 
Association and would “eventually go to provide a permanent home for fine music in our 
City of the Angels.”429 The Times lavished countless column inches on the fundraiser, which 
was the subject of over a dozen features in the paper over the course of just a few days. In 
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addition to raising an impressive sum, the party had provided evidence, Chandler later said, 
“that Southern Californians wanted a music center badly enough to build it themselves.”430  
While Chandler had been at work putting together plans to raise the funds to provide 
a permanent home for the Los Angeles Philharmonic, the Board of Supervisors had become 
interested in taking over the GLAPI proposal for a public auditorium as a county, rather than 
city, project. After losing their bid to host the 1956 Republican Convention to San Francisco 
because of a lack of adequate facilities, the Supervisors ordered a study of the legal 
framework necessary to allow the county to purchase land for and to construct venues for the 
purposes of presenting music and other kinds of performance.431 In 1954 and 1955, GLAPI 
and the Board of Supervisors collaborated on developing such legislation, which ultimately 
passed in May 1955. Because GLAPI’s support had been instrumental in successfully 
passing the enabling legislation, their leadership expected that they would retain control of 
the project. However, The Board of Supervisors had already moved in a different direction, 
causing much resentment among some of GLAPI’s leaders.432 
A few weeks after the Eldorado Party, the Board of Supervisors announced the 
formation of a Citizen’s Advisory Committee (CAC) to be headed by Dorothy Chandler. 
This committee would be tasked with “work[ing] out details of locating and financing 
without cost to taxpayers a downtown music center and convention hall.”433  The CAC would 
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be comprised of about forty members. Each of the five supervisors would appoint three 
committee members from their respective districts and twenty-five “at large” members would 
be appointed by the Supervisors as a body. Chandler worked with the Supervisors to ensure a 
broad representation of business, culture, and civic interests. The committee members, 
appointed to the CAC in June 1955, included representatives from labor, education, 
publishing, aviation, and motion pictures (notably represented by Cecil B. De Mille).434 The 
following month, Chandler appointed her executive committee, made up of “topflight civic 
leaders selected for key roles.” Chandler assured the Board of Supervisors that this group 
was “without political or other bias in its dedication to the aim of the auditorium’s 
completion.”435 At the close of the Supervisors meeting, Charles S. Jones, the newly 
appointed chairman of the CAC, called a meeting for the following day as the first “work 
session” of the newly formed executive committee of the CAC, and Chandler closed her 
remarks to the supervisors by declaring the project to be “both a challenge and an 
opportunity of major importance not only to Los Angeles County but to the whole of 
Southern California.”436 
 The first significant step taken by the CAC was to commission a study by the 
consulting firm Arthur D. Little, Inc., to make specific recommendations for the project. 
Engaged by the CAC in September 1955, Little worked to determine the potential markets 
for a civic auditorium and music center as well as the appropriate locations and 
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organizational and financial structures for the venues. Little recommended that the county 
build two separate buildings: “a convention and exposition building and a music center.”437 
In its discussion of the potential market for a music center, the Little report evaluated the 
need for facilities to accommodate two distinct types of events: those requiring seating for 
fewer than 2000 audience members (such as small recitals, choral groups, modern dance, and 
minor ballet companies) and those requiring seating for audiences of 2000 or more (such as 
light opera, symphony, grand opera, major solo artists, etc.). After conducting “many detailed 
personal interviews with people well informed in the music field in both Los Angeles and the 
rest of the country” and who “were connected with almost all kinds of musical entertainment 
and represented virtually every aspect of the production of major musical events,” Little 
concluded that the major deficiency facing Los Angeles was in venues able to accommodate 
audiences of 2000 or more. After considering several solutions to solve the lack of adequate 
venues for audiences of more than 2000 members, Little recommended the construction of a 
music center with a “flexible-capacity hall of 4000 seats.”438  
In addition to highlighting the failure of the existing musical venues to meet the needs 
of particular organizations like the Los Angeles Philharmonic and the San Francisco Opera, 
which was in residence in the Shrine Auditorium during the summers, the report validated 
the Supervisors’ concerns that the lack of adequate civic facilities was damaging not only to 
the county’s bottom line but also to its reputation. Many of the report’s recommendations 
were based on interviews with the managers of civic auditoriums and cultural centers in other 
major cities, plainly demonstrating that Los Angeles was falling behind most major 
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metropolises in terms of cultural growth, particularly New York, where plans for Lincoln 
Center were beginning to take shape.  
On June 18, 1956, the CAC appeared before the Board of Supervisors to make their 
recommendations based on the Little report. They recommended two buildings—a 
convention center and music center—be built on the site bordered by Eighth Street, Hill 
Street, Olympic Boulevard, and Flower Street. The music center would hold a flexible 
capacity auditorium with maximum seating for 4000, reducible to 2100, while the convention 
center would have 315,000 square feet of exhibition space. “Such a building,” said the CAC, 
“should be able to handle all major conventions, including national political conventions and 
vast trade shows, such as the National Automobile Show.”439 Also included in the mammoth 
project site would be garage facilities capable of accommodating 5500 cars. Financing the 
project would be accomplished through “the creation of a nonprofit corporation” managed by 
“public-spirited citizens.”440 Under this arrangement, the corporation would buy the land and 
issue bonds to finance construction of the buildings; the county would lease the properties 
from the corporation, and those proceeds would be used to retire the bonds. The projected 
cost of the land and buildings was approximately fifty-one million dollars, and the annual 
leasing cost to the county was estimated to be $500,000.441 After hearing the CAC’s 
recounting of the recommendations, the Supervisors voted unanimously in favor of moving 
forward with the project. Later that month, The Civic Auditorium and Music Center 
                                                
439 “Text of Project Recommendation.” Los Angeles Times, June 20, 1956. ProQuest Historical Newspapers: 
Los Angeles Times. 
440 Little Report, 2. 
441 “Text of Project Recommendation.” Los Angeles Times, June 20, 1956. ProQuest Historical Newspapers: 
Los Angeles Times. 
 220 
Association of Los Angeles County (CAMCALA) filed articles of incorporation, with 
Dorothy Chandler as chairman of the board of directors and Charles Jones as president. All 
of the CAC members were retained as part of CAMCALA.  This corporation would be 
responsible for land acquisition and the construction of the facilities.442  
Naturally, the Times lauded the decision to move forward with the project, which 
represented “at once a fulfillment and a challenge.”443 In an editorial the day before the 
Supervisors cast their unanimous vote in support of the project, the Times reiterated the “fact 
that “Los Angeles County in its role as the fastest-growing and most forward-looking of all 
metropolitan areas in the United States must keep reminding itself continually that it is 
woefully behind the times in some respects.”444 However, despite the unanimous approval of 
the Board of Supervisors and the praise heaped on the project by the Times, the project was 
not immune to criticism.  
CAMCALA’s insistence that “the benefits of these facilities will extend far beyond 
the boundaries of any one city; in fact, throughout the entire County”445 did not persuade 
officials and journalists in some outlying municipalities, particularly Long Beach and 
Pasadena, who objected to a project they felt privileged downtown at the expense of their 
localities.  The publisher of the Long Beach Independent Press-Democrat, F. Herman 
Ridder, who wanted to build a concert hall in Long Beach, denounced the project, arguing 
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that the Little Report overstated the potential of the proposed auditorium to be self-
supporting.446 Others argued that the Supervisors’ support of the project amounted to the 
circumvention of the voters will by pushing ahead without seeking approval at the ballot 
box.447  
Pressure continued to mount over the course of the next year, during which the 
project ran into increased resistance as well as legal and fiscal challenges related to land 
acquisition. Even the most ardent supporters of the project conceded that the growing cost of 
land acquisition, a result of the 1957 recession and rising interest rates, represented a 
significant problem, adding to the project’s financial risk. Additionally, a June 1957 Board of 
Supervisors meeting at which Supervisor Burton Chace proposed subjecting the project to 
voter approval, clearly signaled to Chandler and the rest of CAMCA that the project could be 
in jeopardy.448  
By the end of July 1957, CAMCA was faced with a difficult decision. On July 29, 
Chandler and CAMCA president Charles Jones called a meeting of the organization at the 
Biltmore Hotel, where Chandler and Jones presented their plan to postpone the project. 
Chandler emphasized that they were not abandoning the plan, but rather “putting it on the 
shelf,” adding, “we didn’t want another failure.”449 A July meeting of the Board of 
Supervisors had revealed faltering support for the project, and Chandler understood that an 
additional failure—this would be the fourth—could sink the project once and for all.  
Chandler affirmed her belief in the project to the CACMA membership, assuring them, “This 
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action today represents only a period of waiting. These facilities will be built with the kind of 
unity and dedication we have in the people of this county.”450  The next day, the Board of 
Supervisors accepted CACMA’s request to postpone the project.  
Supervisor John Anson Ford, who had been a strong proponent of the project and a 
leading advocate for county support of cultural institutions like the Hollywood Bowl 
expressed his “deep personal regret” over having to postpone “one of the most important 
improvements the county has sought in many years.” He added, “It doesn’t lessen the great 
need for this civicly operated facility wanted by the great majority of our citizens.”451 A few 
weeks later, Ford also privately expressed to Chandler his belief in the project, praising her 
“pioneering effort” and noting that although the project must be postponed, CACMA, under 
Chandler’s leadership had “clearly demonstrated” the “need and the material benefits of such 
a civic improvement. It is inconceivable that this need will not be filled in the foreseeable 
future.”452  
Although the project would languish on the shelf for well over a year, Chandler 
learned the lessons of failure well. Despite the initial support of the Board of Supervisors for 
the project, its size and location had produced a price tag too exorbitant for even the most 
civic-minded citizens. After accepting CACMA’s request to postpone the project, the Board 
of Supervisors had requested that the committee “stay alive and active” and suggested that in 
the future, the civic auditorium could be separated from the music center “to produce a less 
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costly over-all approach.”453 This was the approach Chandler preferred all along, as it would 
ensure her greater control over the project, and after being elected president of the Southern 
California Symphony Association in January 1958, Chandler resolved to use that position to 
aggressively pursue the music center project independently of the civic auditorium.   
Upon assuming the office of SCSA President, Chandler made two commitments to 
the Association: to find a permanent director and to build a permanent home for the 
orchestra, both of which she viewed as essential to achieving her goal of bolstering the 
orchestra’s stature and that of Los Angeles itself. Getting the music center project underway 
consumed her attention during the first year of her presidency. After the most recent failure 
to launch the music center project, Chandler realized that she would need to demonstrate that 
enough private money could be raised to ensure that the financial burden to the county would 
be minimized as much as possible. The $400,000 from the Eldorado Party was still sitting in 
the SCSA’s reserve fund, and Chandler believed that if she could get to $500,000 she might 
be able to convince the Supervisors to cooperate. She made her first major move in 
December 1958, when “following a hunch . . . she decided to take a Sunday drive to Orange 
County to talk to Myford Irvine.”454 Chandler recalled that her decision to visit Irvine, who 
she did not know personally, was “impulsive,” but it turned out to be successful. After 
hearing her vision of the music center, Irvine signed a pledge for $100,000, and a month later 
she secured another $100,000 contribution from the Michael J. Connell Charities, a 
foundation that had “always given generously to the Symphony.”455 With $600,000 now in 
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reserve, Chandler felt confident she could convince the Supervisors to support another 
attempt to finally build the music center.  
In March 1959, Chandler’s proposal was presented to the County Board of 
Supervisors by Pacific Mutual Insurance Executive and establishment power broker Asa 
Call, chairman of a small committee that had been working to develop a new strategy for 
erecting a cultural center in downtown Los Angeles.456 It was this proposal that finally put 
the Los Angeles Music Center on the path to fruition. The proposal had two key elements: 
First, Chandler and Call’s committee agreed to raise four million dollars toward the ten-
million-dollar construction costs through private subscriptions, and asked that the county pay 
the remaining six million dollars and to appoint and pay the fee of the Welton Becket 
Architectural firm. In addition to these monetary contributions, the County would set aside a 
piece of county-owned land near the Civic Center.457  
The Board of Supervisors voted unanimously in favor of the proposal and expressed 
their astonishment over the novel approach Chandler and her committee had developed. 
Supervisor Frank G. Bonelli declared after Call’s presentation, “In my 15 years in public 
office, this offer of donations of private funds to build public buildings is the most unusual I 
ever heard,” a sentiment echoed by others on the Board of Supervisors.458 Supervisor 
Kenneth Hahn said that the proposal was “more than” unusual, adding, “It was unheard of up 
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to now.” Supervisor Warren Dorn “lauded the ‘faith and public spirit’ of ‘these private 
individuals who would contribute to such a facility.’”459 Over the ensuing months and years, 
the significance of private contributions would become an important factor in the 
development of the Music Center’s identity. Also important, however, was its new location, 
which not only solved financial and political problems, but also placed the Music Center in 
the middle of a rapidly transforming landscape. Located adjacent to the Civic Center, atop 
the Bunker Hill Urban Renewal Project, and within an easy drive of Chavez Ravine, where 
Dodger Stadium would soon rise, the Music Center would provide “a much-needed 
centerpiece to the city—and a bold modern identity.”460  
Somewhere Near the Center of the Greatest City in the County  
The selection of the new site, bounded by Grand Avenue, Hope Street, Temple Street, 
and First Street, was particularly important for several reasons. From a practical standpoint, 
the county’s ownership of the land would allow the project’s supporters to avoid the 
financially and politically costly process of acquiring land through eminent domain 
proceedings which had contributed to the shelving of the project in 1957. As Toland notes in 
the official history of the Music Center, the idea to locate the Music Center in the Civic 
Center had been supported by John Anson Ford.461 Ford had first suggested the Civic Center 
site in a June 1957 meeting of the Board of Supervisors just before the previous proposal was 
shelved. During that meeting, Ford affirmed his belief that “a great metropolitan area like 
ours deserves and needs a center for . . . cultural activities, such as music and opera” and that 
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the “logical” place for such facilities was “somewhere near the center of the greatest city in 
the County in the metropolitan area.” Although he believed that spending public money on a 
cultural center was entirely justified, he recognized that the residents in the outlying areas 
“bitterly opposed” the project because they were “being called upon to help pay for a deficit 
on a downtown project.” Of course, there was no question that a cultural center, if built, 
would be built in the downtown area, so garnering adequate support for the project rested on 
the ability to reduce the projected cost. By lowering the cost of the initial real estate 
investment, he argued, they could demonstrate that the deficits could be substantially 
reduced, thereby giving the supervisors the political cover to vote in favor of the project.462 
Also important was the fact that the use of land already owned by the county ensured that the 
project was protected from becoming bogged down in the political quagmire of eminent 
domain proceedings, thereby reducing the likelihood of the significant political resistance 
that had plagued Lincoln Center. This is not to say that urban renewal in Los Angeles was 
any less contentious than in New York City. The redevelopment of Bunker Hill and Chavez 
Ravine each faced significant opposition from residents and business owners who faced 
displacement because of the projects.  However, by the time the Board of Supervisors voted 
to move forward with the Music Center project in 1959, both the Bunker Hill and Chavez 
Ravine urban renewal projects had been approved by the City Council and upheld by the 
courts, thereby allowing the Music Center’s proponents to avoid explicit association with 
evictions, displacement, and erasure, while simultaneously capitalizing on the new vision of 
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the city that was emerging under Mayor Poulson and the newly emboldened business elite 
who had finally been able to seize control of the downtown landscape.  
Several Million Dollars and Lots of Civic Pride 
With the future of the project finally secure, Chandler set about the work of raising 
the funds to build the Center. The fundraising campaign was important in creating the same 
sense of public investment in the project that had saved the Hollywood Bowl almost ten 
years before, and it reinforced the narrative of the Music Center as a demonstration of “co-
operation between free enterprise and free government without parallel in history”463 and of 
the public’s will to build the Music Center themselves. Phrases like “motivated citizens,” 
“public-spirited,” and “civic minded” peppered almost all of Chandler’s public comments 
about the Center and its supporters, and Chandler consistently portrayed monetary 
contributions as an explicit act of civic participation. A fundraising brochure inviting 
individuals to become “founders” the Music Center with a contribution of $25,000 or greater 
told prospective donors, “In a free society, giving is a privilege and an honor. It can also be a 
joyous and thrilling experience when it provides the chance to share in a project of urgent 
need and shining promise, to participate directly in countless other lives that will be in some 
way enhanced by one’s gift.”464 Such rhetoric allowed potential donors to feel as though they 
were participating in a project that would benefit the community at large by bequeathing 
much needed cultural facilities, but the implicit paternalism also reassured prospective 
patrons that the Music Center would stand not only as a monument to the cultural maturity of 
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Los Angeles but would also forever attest to the social and financial power of those who 
were able to facilitate its construction.  
Chandler sought financial support from virtually every imaginable source, most 
notably looking beyond the traditional downtown funding sources and turning instead to 
Hollywood and the “new money” of the predominantly Jewish Westside. As Chandler later 
recalled, “The city was fragmented. . . . There was Hollywood, and there was downtown, and 
they didn’t know who the others were.” She eschewed the traditional big meetings in elite 
social clubs—most of which, at least in downtown Los Angeles, were off limits to Jews—
and instead favored fundraising “on an individual basis . . . in my house or somebody else’s 
house, or in little private dining rooms, everyone accepted on the same basis.”465 Chandler’s 
inclusion of the new money Jewish elite rankled some members of the old guard elite who 
felt that Chandler would compromise the prestige of the elite by opening the door to anyone 
with the price of admission. Columnist Hedda Hopper criticized Chandler, saying “Los 
Angeles society is much like the frog that wanted to inflate himself bigger than the bull. 
Outside our city’s limit, its ‘society’ doesn’t mean much primarily because our standard isn’t 
‘Who are you? but ‘How much have you got?’”466 Nonetheless, Chandler, having long since 
come to terms with the scorn from the old guard who resented her clout within the Times and 
in political and cultural affairs, pressed forward with her campaign.  
Perhaps no anecdote better illustrates Chandler’s shrewdness as a fundraiser than that 
of a chance encounter that led to on-the-spot contributions from two men totaling $250,000. 
Chandler had scheduled a meeting with the Music Center’s Building Fund Committee and 
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hoped to be able to announce at the meeting that they had reached their goal. Instead, it 
looked as though she would have to inform the committee that they were still $250,000 short. 
As she walked into the upscale Perino’s Restaurant, she spotted Edward Pauley with whom 
she served on the University of California Board of Regents. When Chandler told Pauley of 
the shortfall, he offered to contribute half of the needed amount if Chandler could match it. 
When Sam Mosher, Chairman of Signal Oil, walked into the bar, Chandler “excused herself 
and went to speak to Mosher, glancing occasionally at Pauley.”467 Mosher wrote Chandler a 
check on the spot for the $125,000. Chandler knew the two men to be rivals and, when she 
found herself in the same room with the both, she seized upon the opportunity to use that 
rivalry as leverage. She would use a similar tactic the following year when she set her sights 
on savings and loan magnates Mark Taper and Howard Ahmanson.  
By December 1961, the plan for the Music Center had expanded to include not just 
the pavilion, but also two additional theaters. The first of the new buildings would be called 
the “Forum” and would be “a small building of approximately 800 seats that will be for 
musical purposes, for dramatic purposes, for civic education, for educational forums for 
getting groups to come from all over the country.” The second building, would be the 
“Center Theater” and would have approximately 1,825 seats and “would house anything 
within the area of the performing arts which needs a theater of that size.”468 To meet the 
additional cost of the two new buildings, the fund-raising committee had raised its goal to 
twelve million dollars. Around Christmas of 1961, Chandler approached S. Mark Taper, who 
had, by the late 1950s, made a fortune financing suburban housing.  
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Taper had moved to Long Beach from England in 1960 “with every intention of 
retiring in the sun on a modest income.” Taper did not stay in retirement for long. Instead, he 
invested heavily in real estate and built thirty-five thousand homes in Northern and Southern 
California, “acquired a handful of savings and loan associations and formed the First Charter 
Financial Corporation.”469 Like many of his “new money” counterparts, Taper wished to 
carve out a place for himself in Los Angeles society, a desire that Chandler tapped into 
during their negotiations for Taper’s gift, which took place over the course of about one year. 
Under the terms reached, Taper agreed to contribute one million dollars to build the forum if 
three provisions were met. First, the building would be named in his honor. Second, he 
would have a permanent box seat adjacent to the Chandlers’ box. Third, he would have veto 
power over the naming of the other two buildings in the Music Center. 470 Taper’s 
contribution was a major boon to the Music Center fundraising drive, moving it past ninety 
percent of its twelve-million-dollar goal, but it also served as an important sign of Chandler’s 
commitment to reaching her goals by opening the doors of Los Angeles society to those who 
had been unable to gain entrée into the elite social circles of the old guard. In exchange for a 
few million dollars, Chandler offered previously marginalized individuals legitimation in a 
literally concrete way.  
After securing Taper’s gift, Chandler set her sights on Howard J. Ahmanson, another 
savings and loan magnate and “new rich upstart.”471 Ahmanson had moved to California 
when he was about twenty years old and began working for his family’s fire and casualty 
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insurance company. In 1947, he bought Home Savings and Loan and “grew the thrift side of 
the business into an empire that made him one of the richest people in the United States.”472 
In addition to his success in finance, Ahmanson was an active philanthropist, having donated 
two million dollars toward construction of the Los Angeles County Museum of Art in 1961 
followed by a one million dollar gift to the University of Southern California the following 
year.473 Ahmanson and Taper were by all accounts fierce rivals in the savings and loan 
industry, and Chandler capitalized on their mutual competitiveness to secure a gift from 
Ahmanson.  “You’ve got to play one against the other,” she said. “You’ve got to know when 
to push and when to shove. It took a lot of talking, a lot of understanding, a lot of listening to 
their personal lives. One wanted to give as much as the other.” Although it took nearly two 
years to secure the gift, Ahmanson, “not wanting to be outdone” by Taper, donated over a 
million dollars toward the construction of the Center Theater in 1965, and Chandler agreed to 
his stipulation that the building be named after him. Finally, on December 28, 1965, the 
Board of Supervisors unanimously approved the official naming of the Dorothy Chandler 
Pavilion, the Mark Taper Forum, and Ahmanson Theater. As the Board of Supervisors 
prepared to vote on the naming of the buildings, Supervisor Ken Hahn declared it “proper to 
give tribute to whom tribute is due and it is certainly the consensus of the opinion of the 
citizens of the great County, through their elected Board of Supervisors of the County of Los 
Angeles, to give this public honor to the donors of these, of the benefactors of good things 
for the people.”474  
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As important as these major gifts were to the funding of the Music Center, these 
remarks by Supervisor Hahn reflected a challenge facing Chandler. The fundraising 
campaign was not just a means to generate revenue to build the Center. Rather, it was also 
important to developing its public image. Indeed, no aspect of the Music Center’s creation 
was more loudly touted than the significance of private contributions. Over and over again 
the public was reminded that the Music Center, while enjoying some financial support from 
the county, was being funded not through the levying of taxes or expensive municipal bonds, 
but rather through the kind of voluntary giving encouraged by the free enterprise system. 
However, too much emphasis on the major donations like those of Irvine, Taper, and 
Ahmanson could not only alienate prospective small donors but could also undermine public 
good will toward the project if it appeared to be solely paternalistic enterprise.  
Appearing before the Board of Supervisors in January 1962, Chandler boasted that 
her fund-raising team had raised millions of dollars at a cost of only $48,000, noting that 
there was “no record in the United States” of such a sum being raised with so little expense. 
Chandler attributed the low fundraising costs to the volunteer nature of the endeavor; the 
only paid person on staff, Chandler said, was a part-time secretary. Also important to the 
fundraising effort was the policy “to spread the base of giving because we felt that then 
everyone would feel that it was their Center, no matter whether they gave a dollar or a 
hundred thousand dollars, it was their Center from then on.” Out of 1,342 gifts, nearly half 
were in the $1 to $1,000 range, while only two percent of the gifts exceeded fifty thousand 
dollars.475  
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Nonetheless, because major gifts attracted the most news coverage and were in fact so 
large that they comprised a disproportionate percentage of the bottom line, Chandler had 
difficulty downplaying the degree to which the Center was financed by the city’s elite. A few 
weeks after Taper’s gift was announced to the public, Chandler received a letter from a Los 
Angeles resident named Lillian Madsen. After thanking Chandler for her work in creating the 
Music Center, Madsen suggested that “a beautiful fountain or container of some sort be built 
where coins could be put in a slot.” Such an approach, Madsen suggested, would allow 
“those who are not blessed with lots of money feel that they too can have a part in the culture 
of the city.” Expensive fundraising dinners and galas were “fine,” Madsen said, but they 
made many in the city feel shut out both “financially and psychologically.” Soliciting 
contributions as small as a few pennies could, Madsen suggested, yield “several million 
[dollars] and lots of civic pride.”476  
Chandler had effectively courted wealthy donors on the premise of civic participation 
through giving—and by offering many of them entrée into the upper echelons of Los Angeles 
society—but she had not been nearly as effective in soliciting support from the general 
public, many of whom clearly felt alienated from the project, as Madsen’s letter poignantly 
demonstrates. Chandler was surely aware of this disconnect, but finding an effective way to 
generate wider participation in the fundraising for the Music Center remained elusive until 
September 1964 when she spoke at the dedication of the Pavilion.  
After thanking all who had given of their time and money, Chandler, acknowledging 
her reputation as a tenacious fundraiser, said to the assembled 3,500 onlookers and countless 
others listening over radio and television, “So as not to disappoint anyone, let me make one 
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little pitch—We need more money! The Center Theater is not yet funded. We need 
approximately $1 million. If one million people would put $1 in an envelope . . . The Music 
Center would be complete!”477 After her remarks, Chandler was besieged by people 
crowding around her to place dollar bills in her hands. Many of these individuals echoed 
Lillian Madsen’s belief that their small donations were not needed or desired. One woman 
told Chandler, “Until you said that, I’d have been a little ashamed to offer so small a 
contribution. But now I’m not. Thank you.” Another woman and her husband each 
contributed a dollar and told Chandler, “Now it’s our Music Center too.”478  
The response to her “little pitch” demonstrated to Chandler that a small gifts 
campaign would not only tap a potentially vast revenue stream but would also help to better 
establish the Center as a civic enterprise. Chandler turned once again to Hollywood and 
enlisted Walt Disney to help raise one million dollars from one-dollar donations. On 
November 1, 1964, they launched the “Buck Bag” campaign in which fifty thousand blue 
bags designed by Disney were “placed in the hands of a host of volunteer collectors 
representing the entire spectrum of Southern Californians.” Chandler said of the campaign, 
“We want people everywhere to have an opportunity to participate personally in The Music 
Center. When [the Buck Bag drive] is complete, I hope a million Southern Californians will 
be able to say with pride, ‘I helped build it.’”479 By the time the month-long campaign was 
over, more than two million dollars had been raised, including $500,000 in matching funds 
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from Mark Taper, and when the Dorothy Chandler Pavilion opened on December 6, 1964 all 
the buildings were fully funded.480  
When all was said and done, it cost approximately $34.5 million to build the Music 
Center, $19 million of which was raised by Chandler and her committee. The remaining 
balance was paid by about one million dollars from county funds and a nongovernmental 
bond issue of $14.5 million.  The buildings, legally owned by non-profit “lease companies,” 
were rented to the County, and the County’s rental payments went toward retiring the 
bonds.481 The Buck Bag drive helped to add another strain to the narrative of civic 
engagement that had defined the fundraising campaign, which in turn had served as the 
primary means through which the public became familiar with the Music Center. By 
harnessing financial resources from every conceivable source, Chandler “transform[ed] her 
city’s image and the relations of power by redefining the nature of the establishment.”482 By 
offering men like Taper and Ahmanson entrée into the downtown scene, Chandler 
demonstrated a clear understanding that maintaining Chandlerian power in Downtown Los 
Angeles could no longer be viewed as a zero-sum game if Los Angeles was to achieve 
prominence on the national and international stage. Perhaps more than any of the other 
Chandlers, Dorothy Chandler’s desire to remake downtown Los Angeles transcended the 
purely financial concerns of those in the establishment who had made the first attempt under 
the auspices of GLAPI. For Dorothy Chandler, bolstering the political and financial status of 
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Los Angeles was inextricable from establishing its cultural legitimacy. Just as she had 
worked to assemble the funds to build the Music Center, she would keep her hands in every 
pot to ensure that the Center maintained high standards, always with an eye beyond the 
borders of the city.  
Like a Meeting with Mr. Khrushchev 
 By the time Chandler was elected president of the Southern California Symphony 
Association in January 1958, her political power in Los Angeles had grown considerably 
since the campaign to save the Hollywood Bowl. The Bowl campaign had established her as 
a major force on the cultural scene of Los Angeles, resulting in increased influence within the 
SCSA and catapulting her into the public limelight. In 1954, she had been appointed by the 
governor to the University of California Board of Regents, where she oversaw the physical 
expansion of the campus. The presidency of the SCSA gave her the added political clout she 
needed to take control of the Music Center project and to better establish the cultural 
legitimacy of the Los Angeles Philharmonic Orchestra. Although the orchestra had engaged a 
succession of notable conductors, it “was without [permanent] leadership and was losing 
quality,” said Chandler.483 Finding a permanent conductor was just as important to Chandler 
as building a new home for the orchestra, and she spent the better part of 1959 conducting a 
search for a musical director who would bring not only stable leadership but also musical 
excellence and star power to secure the Orchestra’s place among the nation’s best. In the end, 
the Orchestra found and signed a conductor with exactly the musical prowess, star power, 
and the unexpected bonus of sex appeal, but only after a contractual crisis brought the 
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orchestra unwanted national attention, launched a war between the Times and the Hearst 
papers, and put Chandler on the defensive against accusations of totalitarianism.  
 In 1960, the Southern California Symphony Association announced that it had signed 
Hungarian conductor Gorg Solti as Los Angeles Philharmonic Music Director. Solti seemed 
to have all the qualities that Chandler wanted in a musical director. He was well known as a 
topflight conductor in Europe and had also achieved celebrity in the United States in 1958 
when his recording of Wagner’s Das Rheingold reached the top 40.484 “The appointment of 
Mr. Solti as music director of the Los Angeles Philharmonic Orchestra,” said SCSA 
Chairman Henry O. Duque, “marks another step forward for this outstanding orchestra.” 
Having a conductor of Solti’s stature, said Duque, meant that the orchestra would “continue 
to contribute immeasurably to the cultural life of Southern California. In his recent period of 
conducting, he has won a deep regard from the music-going public.”485 According to Solti’s 
agreement with the Los Angeles Philharmonic, he would be a guest conductor until 1962, 
when he would become music director. A slate of additional guest conductors was assembled 
to cover the 1961-62 season.  
Among these was Zubin Mehta, a young conductor from Bombay.486 At just twenty-
five years old, Mehta had already established himself on the international music scene as a 
prodigy with extraordinary potential. Responding to a recent performance, one Los Angeles 
critic wrote, “The disturbingly talented young conductor from Bombay performed feats of 
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musicianly virtuosity.” In addition to his musical gifts, Mehta also brought with him an 
unusual asset for a potential Philharmonic leader: sex appeal. According to Time magazine, 
“his tousled sable locks, his honey-colored aquiline features and voracious energy gave him 
the appeal of a matinee idol” and made him “a kind of culture hero.”487 While Solti ensured 
gravitas, Mehta promised to bring to the Philharmonic the kind of charisma and star power 
that would attract national attention and set it apart from its counterparts. After a series of 
successful concerts with the Los Angeles Philharmonic, Mehta was offered the position of 
“conductor in association” with Solti. Under his agreement, he would be in residence for at 
least eight weeks each year for a term of three years to “give [the contract] and him a sense 
of permanency.”488 Mehta’s engagement was announced to the public in February 1961 and 
Soti, who was out of town until April, was notified via telegram.  
Solti had not been consulted about the offer to Mehta and his title of associate 
conductor, and he did not receive the news well. When Chandler returned from the weekend 
on the Monday following the Mehta announcement, she found an angry telegram from Solti 
waiting for her. Solti was furious that such an important decision had been made without his 
explicit consent. In a meeting with Chandler, Solti’s manager and legal counsel issued an 
ultimatum: cancel the Mehta contract or Solti would not show up for his next scheduled 
appearance in April. Chandler found this tactic to be “startling” and refused to act favorably 
in response to an overt threat. She asked instead that Solti “hold the ‘status quo’” until April 
when they could meet in person to hash out the matter.489 Ultimately, Solti was unyielding in 
                                                
487 “Conductors: Gypsy Boy.” Time.  
488 Chandler Statement to SCSA Board of Directors. Dorothy Chandler Papers. This document is undated, but 
was likely prepared sometime in April 1961. 
489 Ibid. 
 239 
demanding that Chandler cancel Mehta’s contract as Associate Conductor, and Chandler was 
equally unyielding in her refusal to do so. As far as Solti was concerned, Chandler’s decision 
to elevate Mehta to near equal status without even consulting him represented a usurpation of 
his artistic authority over the orchestra. Solti resigned in March 1961, citing the 
Philharmonic’s “decisions contrary to my rights which constitute a serious breach of 
contract,” which left him “no alternative but to withdraw from my engagement.”490  
 Even the most restrained journalist could hardly have resisted covering the power 
struggle between maestro and matriarch, and the story received significant local and national 
coverage in the press. After years of favorable coverage, Chandler suddenly found herself 
facing relentless sniping from a variety of sources, particularly the Hearst papers, which 
gleefully leveled accusations of despotism at her. An April 3, 1961 headline in the Los 
Angeles Examiner—one of the Times’s fiercest rivals—declared, “Dictatorship Shocks 
Public.”  Time magazine reported that many of Chandler’s colleagues resented her forceful 
style of leadership. One of her fellow board members (although the article does not make it 
clear on which board this source served) said, “A meeting with Mrs. Chandler is like a 
meeting with Mr. Khrushchev; you sit around a table and she makes the decisions.”491 The 
article in Time also quoted Los Angeles Examiner critic Patterson Greene, who lamented, 
“Once more Los Angeles has been tumbled from possible artistic eminence to obvious 
artistic disgrace.”492 Greene repeatedly insinuated that Chandler’s management—
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characterized by her usurpation of her own musical director’s authority—made a mockery of 
the maturity and gravitas to which the Music Center ostensibly aspired.   
 At the height of the Solti crisis, Times editor Nick Williams came to Chandler’s 
defense, arguing in an April 1961 editorial that the attacks emanating from the Examiner had 
little to do with the management of the Los Angeles Philharmonic, but rather represented an 
opportunity “to vent the frustrations of a losing corporate battle upon thousands of dedicated 
workers in the public’s service.”493 In the editorial, Williams ridiculed the Examiner’s 
declining circulation rates and painted their attacks on the Philharmonic and Chandler in 
particular as a desperate attempt to increase their own circulation by “wildly defam[ing] one 
person connected with The Times.” However, apart from this one allusion to Chandler, 
Williams downplayed her centrality in the story. Instead, to further vilify Greene and the 
Examiner, Williams painted their attacks as being directed not at the single most powerful 
woman in Los Angeles, but rather at the “thousands upon thousands of volunteer women, 
working from Santa Barbara to San Diego and in all the cities of our Southern California” to 
support the Los Angeles Philharmonic and create the Music Center.  
Chandler herself seems to have maintained a relatively low public profile during the 
episode, but behind the scenes of the SCSA, she worked to balance justifying her actions to 
the board with asserting her executive authority. Although the Solti episode led to some 
unfortunate publicity, Chandler believed that accepting his resignation and terminating the 
contract were in the best interest of the long-term stability of the Philharmonic. The situation 
had, Chandler argued to the board, created a sense of unrest, which had negatively impacted 
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everything from ticket sales to the “sense of volunteer and Board harmony.” Additionally, it 
created the public perception that there was “a lack of confidence” in Chandler’s presidency 
of the SCSA.494  Furthermore, despite the fallout, Chandler insisted that the Orchestra had 
acted well within the bounds of its authority in hiring Mehta, which was done, Chandler 
reminded the board, to more firmly establish the institutional soundness and permanence of 
the orchestra. At the time of Mehta’s hiring, Solti was only available for thirteen weeks of a 
twenty-three-week season, so having an associate conductor would, Chandler believed, 
ensure stability and continuity within the organization, which was particularly important as 
the opening of the Music Center approached.495  
  Although the Solti affair was all-consuming for much of the spring of 1961, the 
matter soon passed into memory as plans for the Music Center progressed. The board of 
directors stood by Chandler, reelecting her to the presidency in May 1961. She had come 
“out of the affair injured but not mortally wounded.”496 With the Solti affair settled, Chandler 
“called for a committee of five to seek out a new conductor,” and soon thereafter, that 
committee recommended that Mehta be appointed conductor of the Los Angeles 
Philharmonic.497 Mehta would serve as the conductor of the orchestra for over a decade and 
brought just the kind of star power that Chandler had hoped he would. Although the 
preceding controversy had given the Orchestra and the Music Center a bit of a black eye, 
Chandler had succeeded in establishing the continuity and legitimacy that would be 
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necessary to establish the Philharmonic as an organization on the cutting edge of orchestral 
music in the United States.  
From Glittering Architectural Monument to Living Gallery of Fine Arts 
 Although it was her promise to find a new home for the Philharmonic that finally set 
the Music Center on the path to realization, Chandler knew from the beginning that the 
Philharmonic alone, with a season of only twenty-three weeks, would be unable to sustain the 
Center artistically or financially on a year-round basis. The original germ for the Music 
Center idea dating back to GLAPI in 1945 had been driven by a desire to monumentalize 
culture on the cityscape with little thought given to what would inhabit whatever monument 
might rise. Now that plans were moving forward, Chandler would need to work to “turn the 
Music Center from a glittering architectural monument into a living gallery of the fine 
arts.”498 To fill the remainder of weeks at the Pavilion, Chandler approached the Los Angeles 
Civic Light Opera Association (LACLOA), which would play an important role in shaping 
the Music Center. Founded in 1938 by former concert pianist-turned-talent-agent Edwin 
Lester, the LACLOA began as a producer of operettas and light opera, but by the 1950s had 
become the premiere presenter and producer of musical comedy on the West Coast, 
presenting the West Coast premieres of Broadway musicals and producing new productions 
that transferred to Broadway, the most successful of which was Peter Pan starring Mary 
Martin in 1954. With a solid national reputation and a healthy bottom line, the Civic Light 
Opera Association offered a valuable counterpart to the Philharmonic. 
 In addition to its success as a producer and presenter locally, the LACLOA had 
effectively raised the profile of Los Angeles as a fertile market for operetta and musical 
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theater. “When the Civic Light Opera Association was being formed here,” said Lester, “the 
theatrical world usually referred to Los Angeles as ‘the worst show town in America.’”499 
While many Broadway tours stopped in San Francisco, almost all of them bypassed Los 
Angeles. When the first season of the LACLOA—which Lester, then working as a talent 
agent, formed primarily for the purpose of putting his clients to work—was announced, there 
was “colossal disinterest” in the idea of an annual light opera season. But Lester managed to 
sign opera star John Charles Thomas for their first production, Blossom Time, which 
generated significant interest, not to mention revenue. That first season closed out with 
Roberta, starring an up and coming comedian named Bob Hope. The production was an 
enormous success, grossing over $41,000 in a single week, contrasting starkly with a touring 
production of Blossom Time mounted a few weeks earlier that earned a weekly gross of only 
$6,000.500 
By the time Chandler approached Lester about joining the Music Center, the 
LACLOA had developed into a hugely successful operation with a track record of successful 
local productions and Broadway transfers. The company also enjoyed the kind of fiscal 
security most non-profit producing organizations would envy. The consistently growing 
national reputation of the organization had attracted a substantial number of patrons to the 
point that Lester declared, “being a guarantor had become a sought-after obligation.”501 
Lester had also built “one of the most sophisticated and successful subscription lists in the 
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history of American theater. Ninety-five percent of all Civic Light Opera seats were sold in 
advance to subscribers.”502  
Chandler approached Lester in 1959 to see whether he might be interested in making 
the LACLOA a resident of the Music Center. The company had been performing in the 
Philharmonic Auditorium and when Chandler approached Lester, he was in the middle of 
negotiations to purchase the Pantages Theater. In July 1959, the Light Opera’s board of 
directors, recognizing the “urgent need for the Music Center,” resolved to “give its 
wholehearted support in bringing it into being,” and to make the Music Center its home.503 In 
addition to agreeing to become a resident company, the Light Opera contributed $250,000 to 
the Music Center building fund.504 When it moved into the Music Center, the company 
brought with it over a thousand guarantors, ninety-six percent of whom had renewed their 
pledges from previous seasons. This base of support was “believed to be the largest theatrical 
support crowd in the world and those guarantors helped solidify the Music Center’s base as it 
opened and then began to expand.”505  
Although the Philharmonic was the impetus for the Music Center, the Civic Light 
Opera would become the dominant economic force at the Music Center. Lester prided 
himself on his ability “to operate and not go out begging for money”506 and noted that in the 
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beginning, the Music Center depended upon the LACLOA for its survival, pointing out that 
in the first two years, “our rental really kept them alive. We often advanced our six months’ 
rental to help them out of various spots,”507 and the Light Opera never hesitated to use its 
financial clout as a negotiating tool. For example, when faced with a lease modification that 
would increase their rental rate, they requested several concessions in exchange for the 
increase in rent, including an increase in the lease’s duration and in the number of weeks 
during which the Pavilion would be available for their use. “In any consideration of rental 
adjustment,” wrote their legal counsel to County Administrative Officer L.S. Hollinger, “we 
would assume that serious consideration will be given to the fact that LACLOA is the major 
source of income for the Pavilion.”508 As “the only Los Angeles group that could guarantee 
to fill a hall many weeks,”509 the LACLOA worked not only to exploit their economic clout, 
but also to use that clout to ensure their autonomy and primacy among the constituents within 
the Music Center. 
Like the New York Met’s Rudolf Bing, Lester jealously guarded the Civic Light 
Opera’s status as the premier producer of light opera and musical theater. When he learned 
that the D’Oyly Cart Opera Company, a renowned touring operetta company dedicated to the 
works of Gilbert and Sullivan, which Lester dismissively called “a trouping repertoire 
company,”510 he voiced his objections to Music Center General Manager William Severns. 
Particularly troubling to Lester was the fact that the February 1965 booking would precede 
the Light Opera’s first production in the Pavilion, which would open in December 1964. 
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Lester argued that it was imperative for the first presentation of Light Opera in the Pavilion 
to be of the highest caliber possible and that D’Oyly Carte “[did] not present a quality of 
production nor a standard of performance that is any way representative of the best in the 
light opera and musical comedy theater of today.”511 The booking, argued Lester, violated the 
LACLOA’s agreement with the Music Center Operating Company stipulating that the 
presentation of light opera would be the function of the LACLOA. More important to him, 
however, was protecting the Light Opera and the Music Center from being associated in the 
public mind with what he viewed was a mediocre company. “The first presentation of light 
opera or musical comedy in the Music Center should,” he argued, “be the essence of glamor. 
. . . At least the first presentations in each of the fields which the Music Center will serve, 
should be as near as possible to the ideal.” In making his argument, Lester once again 
invoked the stature of the LACLOA. “Just as the symphony can leave no stone unturned to 
attain the highest degree of perfection in its first presentations at the Music Center,” he told 
Severns, “the Civic Light Opera has an even greater responsibility because of the number of 
performances for which we are obligated and the larger public which we have to serve.”512  
Severns pushed back on this point, arguing that the while the LACLOA’s “large 
public” eagerly anticipated the organization’s first season in the Music Center, “there is a 
smaller public who should also be served if the Music Center is to keep faith with the total 
ticket-buying pubic of the area. The dedicated Savoyard deserves the opportunity to see and 
hear his favorites under the most advantageous circumstances offered by the Music 
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Center.”513 Severns assured Lester that the public was unlikely to associate in any way 
D’Oyly Carte with the LACLOA. More importantly, however, Severns refused to back down 
from asserting the Music Center’s right to present outside attractions, so long as they met 
certain standards of performance,514 when the resident companies were not occupying the 
Music Center’s building. Moreover, the Music Center was obligated, under the terms of its 
sublease with the County, “to furnish the maximum educational and cultural benefits to the 
community without tax burden to the County,”515 and booking outside attractions was an 
important means of doing so. Refusing to honor the booking with D’Oyly Carte would lead, 
Severns argued, to the rightful accusation that the Music Center was “refusing an appealing 
attraction and the rental income from such an engagement.” It was also important to Severns, 
as the General Manager of the Music Center Operating Company, to assert the authority of 
the Center and keep the Light Opera in check. Chandler herself, despite recognizing the 
importance of the Light Opera to the success of the Music Center, worked to ensure that the 
SCSA would not be overshadowed by the Light Opera. She undoubtedly resented Lester’s 
repeated reminders of the Light Opera’s financial might and had taken steps in setting up the 
management of contributions to the Center to ensure that the SCSA would remain on even 
footing with the LACLOA within the Center.  
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An Unsettled Situation 
 Although the D’Oyly Carte conflict quickly faded from memory after the troupe 
made its appearance as scheduled in 1965, the episode was one of the earliest tests of the 
organizational structure of the Music Center. When the Center opened in 1964, its 
constituents consisted only of the Philharmonic and the Civic Light Opera.516 Like Lincoln 
Center, the Music Center acted as landlord to its resident companies while also sponsoring 
performances by outside organizations during the resident companies’ off seasons. In 1961, 
the Music Center Operating Company (MCOC) was formed to manage the operations of the 
Music Center. A nonprofit organization headed by “nine volunteer civic leaders and 
businessmen,”517 the MCOC’s primary responsibility was the administrative management of 
the Music Center, which included dealing with the county, contracting with performing arts 
companies, and establishing procedures for the operation of the complex,518 which turned out 
to be more complicated than expected.  
A 1965 study by management consulting firm McKinsey & Company determined that 
the Music Center was suffering from an organization that “reflect[ed] an unsettled 
situation”519 stemming from the fact that rather than establishing a clearly defined central 
management system, the Music Center Operating Company had been “superimposed” on the 
existing organizational practices of the Southern California Symphony Association and the 
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Hollywood Bowl Association (HBA).520 McKinsey said the employees of the Symphony and 
HBA were operating under what they called a “business-as-usual under the old organization 
attitude,” carrying on “as one large informal organization.”521 While the informal structure 
was working well enough for the time being, it was clear that it would not be sustainable in 
the long term, especially as the Music Center brought aboard new resident companies. 
McKinsey recommended that routine administrative functions be  centralized under the 
direction of the MCOC and that functions critical to the success of, or entirely unique to, 
specific companies be handled directly by those companies.522 Seven specific functions were 
to be centralized under the new organizational structure: national publicity, local advertising, 
direct mail, office services, ticket sales, and personnel administration.523 The MCOC would 
bear responsibility for overseeing these functions, which would be paid for by the constituent 
organizations, with the exception of the Civic Light Opera, which had opted not to participate 
in the sharing of centralized services so as not to disrupt their well-established business 
practices.  
What the McKinsey report could not address, however, was the artistic decision-
making authority of the resident organizations and the MCOC. The MCOC’s function was 
strictly administrative and operational; it had no authority to exercise artistic control. 
Chandler had long been considering the “idea of a group that would provide not only 
direction for the artistic development of the Music Center but also educational and 
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professional development.”524 In August 1965, she announced the creation of the Performing 
Arts Council, the concept for which had first been announced in December 1964 upon the 
opening of the Dorothy Chandler Pavilion.525 The Performing Arts Council would 
“coordinate the activities of the resident companies of the Music Center, establish long-range 
policies, and raise funds as necessary.”526 The Council would also bear the responsibility of 
selecting additional resident companies to complement the Philharmonic and Civic Light 
Opera. Announcing the creation of the Performing Arts Council, which would consist of two 
representatives from each of the resident groups and ten “at large” members, Chandler 
expressed her excitement over this important challenge, “to help forge the resident 
companies that will infuse these majestic structures with vitality and meaning, and to 
encourage the development of important new talent, to make Southern California truly a 
crucible of the performing arts.”527 The Performing Arts Council would “not only direct the 
producing activities of the center but would also solicit funds for these projects and dispense 
monies to the field with the most urgent need.”528 According to Chandler, the creation of the 
Performing Arts Council marked the transition of the Music Center from a labor of love 
among civic volunteers to a cultural institution governed by “highly professional 
representatives of the theater, the ballet, the opera, the symphony, the musical theater.”529 
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Chandler hoped the Council would help to define a distinct identity for the Music 
Center that would transcend its function as landlord and further enhance the legitimacy of the 
institution, but it was also intended to help mitigate any one constituent—particularly the 
Civic Light Opera—from gaining too much power. As noted above, one of the functions of 
the Council was to solicit funds for its programming and determine how those funds were 
disbursed.  The use of the Council as conduit grew out of what Chandler saw as “the 
jockeying for cultural/political domination of the Music Center project that had peaked by 
the early 1960s.” The Light Opera’s dominance at the Music Center grew not only out of its 
box office success and sizable subscription base, but it was also a bastion of the “old guard” 
elite, many of whom were guarantors of the organization. “Other Chandler-led cultural 
organizations, such as the Southern California Symphony,” say Wolt and Gottlieb, “were 
poor cousins when it came to financial backing.” The Performing Arts Council was created 
“to challenge the preeminence of the old Light Opera group.”530 The tensions that surfaced 
between the LACLOA and the Music Center Operating Company and Chandler’s efforts to 
maintain a balance of power within the Music Center reflect the way in which cultural 
institutions in Los Angeles became a space wherein competing factions of the city’s elite 
fought for control of Downtown. Keeping the Civic Light Opera in check was not just a 
matter of maintaining operational order. Rather, it was an important part of asserting the 
power of the new money elites who had finally gained entrée into Los Angeles society 
through the Music Center and other cultural institutions like the LACMA.  
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Conclusion 
To an even greater degree than Lincoln Center, the Los Angeles Music Center was a 
powerful weapon used to acquire and wield political power in postwar Los Angeles. For the 
business elite, the Music Center was key to attracting real estate development to Bunker Hill 
and shoring up the value of their investment in Downtown. For the Board of Supervisors and 
the city government, the Music Center provided a powerful symbol of Los Angeles’s 
newfound identity as a modern metropolis that could finally take a leading role on the 
national and international stage. It provided new money elites like Ahmanson and Taper the 
social legitimation they desired and allowed them to put their stamp on Downtown Los 
Angeles. The history of Los Angeles in the postwar period is ultimately a story of competing 
visions for the future of Los Angeles. The triumph of what Parson calls corporate modernism 
obliterated the vision of community embraced by the Left and in so doing erased several 
vibrant communities for the sake of progress. In the absence of a Robert Moses who wielded 
virtually unchecked power, the Downtown Business elites instead worked together to form a 
coalition to ensure their success in shaping the Downtown landscape as a means of securing 
their power. The Music Center played a critical role in bringing this coalition together, while 
providing the cultural institutions housed within with a highly visible stamp of legitimation.  
When the Center opened in 1964, Bunker Hill was a virtual tabula rasa, with most of 
the boarding houses and motels having been demolished and with the land on which they 
once stood awaiting development. Today, Bunker Hill is a fully realized corporate district 
lined with skyscrapers and all the trappings of a modern city. Even now, the Music Center, 
proudly perched above Bunker Hill, dominates its surroundings, looking down on the 
progress it played such a role in ushering in.  But one cannot help but think that hovering 
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over the Center is Benjamin’s Angel of Progress, watching as the organic neighborhoods that 
once stood in Downtown Los Angeles were erased by the vision of progress that enabled the 
forces that gathered in postwar Los Angeles to finally create the Modern Acropolis crowned 
with the “Twentieth Century Parthenon.”  
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CHAPTER 4 
“The True Theatre Audience:” Center Theatre Group and Cultural Maturity in Los 
Angeles 
 
 
With the opening of the Music Center’s Dorothy Chandler Pavilion, Los Angeles 
declared to the world that it was taking its rightful place as a modern metropolis that could 
compete with cities like New York, Chicago, and San Francisco. In addition to providing 
lavish surroundings for symphony and opera, the Music Center would function as an 
important nexus of political and financial power in the city of Los Angeles. Having built a 
coalition of business elites that transcended traditional social barriers, Dorothy Chandler and 
the Music Center played a critical role in reshaping the physical, social, and political 
landscape of Los Angeles. The organizations housed within the Center, such as the Los 
Angeles Philharmonic and the Civic Light Opera Company, would continue to enjoy artistic 
success in their new surroundings, but as Lew Wasserman, president of the Center Theatre 
Group Board of Directors, would proclaim ten years after its opening, “Center Theatre Group 
has been the most successful and the most deeply influential of the new ventures at the Music 
Center.”531  
From its inception, Center Theatre Group enjoyed consistent critical and popular 
success as well as broad support from the community and its board of directors, and as early 
as its first season it established itself as an organization known for producing high caliber 
productions ranging from classics to world premieres.  Many of its premiere productions, like 
Angels in America, Zoot Suit, and Children of a Lesser God, have gone on to become staples 
in the American canon. As the Los Angeles Times wrote upon hearing of the impending 
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retirement of the Mark Taper Forum’s founding artistic director, Gordon Davidson, Davidson 
“won the West Coast a seat at the New York tables where serious theatrical conversations are 
held.”532 When Center Theatre Group raised its curtain for the first time in April 1967, the 
resident theater movement was well underway, but many in Los Angeles felt that the city 
might forever be relegated to being little more than a stop for touring productions of 
established Broadway hits. Even one of the most successful theaters in town, the Huntington-
Hartford, survived only by booking national tours, and the little theaters that produced their 
own shows offered up a steady diet of conventional commercial fare.533  
With the national profile of Los Angeles rising as it transformed its image into a 
modern metropolis, the city’s dearth of a serious theater (i.e., theater that did more than 
function like “a delayed echo of the New York seasons”534) had become a focus of major 
concern among theatrical professionals in the city. In October 1966, the Hollywood Press 
Club hosted a panel discussion entitled “How Legit is L.A.?” The panel consisted of leaders 
from the Pasadena Playhouse, the Huntington-Hartford, the Carousel Theatre-in-the-Round, 
all of which were suffering from major financial crises. According to Los Angeles Times 
reporter Charles Champlin, the views of the panelists “tended to run from sharp concern all 
the way to dark pessimism.”535 While organizations like the Civic Light Opera continued to 
thrive, most on the panel felt that the city had failed to develop an audience conditioned to go 
to the theater. “Theatregoing is in part habit,” wrote Champlin. “It ought to be an option any 
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night. In recent Los Angeles history, theater hasn’t been.”536 However, Champlin expressed 
hope that with the opening of the two theaters—the Ahmanson and the Mark Taper Forum—
at the Music Center and the fact that they would benefit from at least a partial subsidy, things 
might start to look up for the city.  
Los Angeles Times theater critic Cecil Smith did not share the pessimism of Champlin 
and the panelists. Smith argued that the city was in the midst of a theatrical boom. Despite 
Doolittle’s cries of poverty at the Huntington-Hartford, their productions had been well 
attended, Smith said. The Civic Light Opera had generated a $3.8 million gross, and the APA 
Repertory Theatre, in residence for the summer in Los Angeles, had yielded “the best weeks 
the APA Repertory has known.”537 Los Angeles had proven, Smith said, that it had an 
audience hungry for good theater even if it was in relatively short supply. Smith argued that 
the regional theater movement was “the most hopeful, dynamic and explosive area of the 
arts” and “nowhere [was the movement] happening with more force and purpose and promise 
than in Los Angeles.”538  
Nowhere was that force and purpose more clear, Smith argued, than in the 
establishment of Center Theatre Group, which would help to flip the script and turn Los 
Angeles into a major theatrical center and not simply a road town. Although it would face 
challenges as its operations got underway, Center Theatre Group would in fact achieve its 
goal of attaining local support and national legitimacy within its first year. While in some 
ways its situation within the Music Center mirrored that of the Repertory Theatre of Lincoln 
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Center’s relationship to its own parent organization, Center Theatre Group enjoyed many 
advantages that the Repertory Theatre did not. First, it grew to a certain degree out of an 
existing enterprise, which had established its own legitimacy through an affiliation with 
UCLA. Secondly, the lack of serious theater in Los Angeles meant that the company would 
fill a widely recognized void in the cultural landscape and provide a means to rally audiences 
and supporters around the narrative of a city on the cultural rise. Third, the company received 
support from the same two arenas that had so undermined the Repertory Theatre of Lincoln 
Center—the press and its board of directors, each of which was deeply invested in bolstering 
Los Angeles’s image as a major metropolitan center, seeing Center Theatre Group as a vital 
part of that objective. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the Mark Taper Forum, which 
would become the artistic heart of the company, was led by a director who not only was 
deeply committed to generating new work but who was extraordinarily adept at finding the 
balance between aspiration and pragmatism and recognizing the importance of building a 
sense of community between theater, audience, city, and nation.  
A Troupe of Actors in Search of a Theater 
Although Center Theatre Group was not incorporated until 1966, it has its origins in a 
1958 conference at UCLA’s Lake Arrowhead Conference Center where Abbott Kaplan, dean 
of UCLA Extension, and William Melnitz, the dean of the UCLA School of Fine Arts, 
convened a meeting of over eighty theatrical professionals from across the country. Among 
the attendees were Lee Strasberg, Paul Newman, Anthony Quinn, Eva Marie Saint, Shelly 
Winters, Joanne Woodward, and Robert Ryan. The purpose of the meeting was to develop a 
plan “to fill the void in serious theater [in Los Angeles] with professional productions on the 
UCLA campus, not with a resident company but utilizing the enormous pool of talents [sic] 
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working in movies and television here.”539 At the time of the meeting, “the professional 
theater in Los Angeles was a seldom thing, rarely noted and seldom discussed.” Los Angeles 
was, Cecil Smith recalled, rightly “known as the worst theater town in the country.”540 That 
would begin to change less than a year after the 1958 meeting when the Theatre Group 
presented a series of three staged readings on the campus of UCLA in the summer of 1959.541  
Within just a few years, the Theatre Group would firmly establish itself as a major 
theatrical force in Los Angeles and would develop a national reputation as one of “the most 
brilliant permanent professional theaters in the country.”542  Already heralded by local critics 
and audiences, the Group by its fourth season had begun to attract the attention of critics 
from across the country. Howard Taubman, drama critic for the New York Times, praised the 
Group in June 1962 for having “become an asset to the college community and to Los 
Angeles at large.” The Group had, he said, “found an audience and improved the state of 
theatrical culture in Southern California.”543 Taubman had been impressed by the Group’s 
world premiere production of The Child Buyer that season and said that the production 
clearly demonstrated that Southern California boasted an eager theater audience “willing to 
make up its own mind and ready to respond to plays that [had] not yet won the imprimatur of 
New York.” As for the production itself, Taubman argued that the performance “observ[ed] 
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high theatrical standards” and benefited from a pool of available talent that could not be 
matched by most metropolitan centers.544  
Shortly after Taubman published his article on the Group, the company was awarded 
a $500,000 Ford Foundation grant. The Group was one of nine theaters in the United States 
awarded the grant, which was designed to help companies that had demonstrated enough 
success and developed enough community support to ensure that the grants would aid them 
in “reach[ing] significant  new levels in their development.”545 Standing on the UCLA 
campus shortly after the announcement of the Ford Foundation grant, John Houseman 
declared, “Here is the future of the theater.”546 Although the Theatre Group was “in certain 
respects,” according to Houseman, a “typical example of the new theatrical wave that is 
sweeping away the crumbling remains of the centralized commercial theatre in America,”547 
he also observed that there were three specific characteristics that set the Theatre Group aside 
from the other regional theaters: the “alliance of professional theatre people and university 
personnel that is unique in this country;” its location within “a community with an exploding 
population and passionate concern with establishing its own cultural identity;” and “the fact 
that it was situated “in the center of a great conglomeration of performing and producing 
talent.”548 The Theatre Group depended on each of these factors in establishing its cultural 
legitimacy. The affiliation with the university lent the Group an air of gravitas and 
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institutional legitimacy from its beginning, while also allowing UCLA Extension to broaden 
its reach into the community by aligning itself with notable theater and film personalities. 
More importantly, however, the legitimacy bestowed on the Theatre Group by its affiliation 
with UCLA allowed Houseman to attract the intellectual upper middle class audience he 
desired. In his view, the “true theatre audience [had] virtually disappeared.” By partnering 
with UCLA, Theatre Group could “now reach the middle-class intelligentsia that has simply 
ceased going to the theatre because it is too much of a nuisance or because it is too 
expensive.”549 Despite his assertion that aligning with the university would “offer the theatre 
the broad base it needs,”550 that base consisted almost entirely of well-educated and well-to-
do Angelenos. While a distinct undercurrent of elitism is clearly evident in his naming of the 
middle-class intelligentsia as the “true” theatergoing audience, Houseman’s assessment of 
Los Angeles as a city passionately concerned with establishing its own distinct cultural 
identity shows a he had a keen understanding of the changes that were sweeping the city. By 
the time the Group opened its doors in 1959, the business elite had long since won control 
over the city’s landscape and the construction of its new modern identity was well underway. 
It was in this new cultural landscape that Houseman’s “true” audience looked to the Group to 
affirm their aspirations of cultural gravitas and maturity, which had become such an 
important thread in the ascendant narrative of Los Angeles’s metropolitanism. 
The first of the three readings presented in the summer of 1959, Under Milkwood by 
Dylan Thomas, “came off the bookshelf onto the stage of Schoenberg Hall” on August 6, 
1959. LA Times critic Philip Scheuer called the play a “literary-dramatic curiosity,” praised 
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the professionalism of the actors, but admitted that he had difficulty understanding the work. 
“I caught what I could; it was not much,” he said, but added that the actors, who “seemed not 
only to understand it, but to love it,” gave the dialogue “an absolutely superlative enunciation 
as well as emotional expression.” Closing out the review, he wrote, “Well done, pros. But 
‘Under Milkwood’ is strictly for the longhairs—and only certain longhairs at that.”551 
Scheuer’s assertion that the play was only for “longhairs” may have been an overstatement, 
but his difficultly in grasping the work as a critic suggests just how unfamiliar 
unconventional European work was to Los Angeles audiences. The Group had clearly 
announced with this opening production that it aimed to produce work that was both 
unfamiliar and intellectually challenging.  The reading of Under Milkwood was followed by 
staged readings of Mother Courage and Nikos Kazantzakis’s Sodom and Gomorrah. As 
unfamiliar to local audiences as such works might be, however, the readings were 
tremendously successful at the box office, attracting nearly nine thousand people and playing 
to 94% capacity.552 
 John Houseman joined the Group as artistic director the following January. With this 
first season, Houseman established the principles that would guide his work during his tenure 
at the Group. He followed his first full-scale production, T.S. Eliot’s Murder in the 
Cathedral, with Chekhov’s The Three Sisters, which he recalled could still be announced as a 
west coast premiere “in view of Southern California’s benighted theatrical record.”553 
Determined to brighten that “benighted” theatrical record, he would look not to Broadway 
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but to Europe, classics, and the avant-garde for the Group’s repertoire. He rounded out his 
first season with The Prodigal by Jack Richardson and an evening of four plays entitled 
“Comedies of Despair,” featuring Albee’s The Sandbox, Tennessee Williams’s This Property 
Is Condemned, Ionesco’s The Lesson, and Beckett’s Act Without Words. Each performance 
of this evening of “mostly absurdist plays”554 was followed by “a debate in which our actors 
matched their bewilderment with that of panels of local intelligentsia that included Charles 
Brockett, Steve Allen, Christopher Isherwood, and Clifford Odets.”555 New York Times 
theater critic Murray Schumach wrote that these debates stimulated the “fraternization 
between the worlds of Hollywood and the universities,” and he noted how the affiliations of 
each of the panelists influenced the ways in which they responded to the work. The debates 
served not only as a forum to grapple with the merits of the works presented, but to foster a 
sense of cross-fertilization among disciplines from the more “highbrow” academic 
departments to Hollywood and to further valorize the intellectual curiosity of the Group’s 
audiences. By the end of its first season, the Group had, according to the New York Times, 
challenged not only the “theatre taboo” that Los Angeles residents could “not be drawn into a 
legitimate theatre that features serious drama unless a swimming pool and barbeque pit are 
included in the price of admission,” but that “the legitimate theatre and a university are about 
as compatible as Greek drama and popcorn.”556  
As important as the Group’s affiliation with UCLA was in establishing its cultural 
legitimacy, the alliance also yielded many important practical benefits as well. Chief among 
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these was UCLA Extension’s commitment to covering the Group’s overhead administrative 
costs and to providing them access to performance facilities at no cost. It was estimated that 
if the Theatre Group were charged for the administrative services provided by UCLA 
Extension staff at the same rate as other organizations using those same services, it would 
incur overhead charges of approximately $26,000.557 The financial and institutional support 
the Group received from UCLA was indispensable in setting up the company, but that 
support began to founder as early as 1961 when tensions between the Group and UCLA 
Extension began to surface.  
In October 1961, Dean Kaplan announced to the Theatre Group’s board that because 
of cutbacks to their budget, UCLA Extension would need to reconsider whether they could 
continue to cover Theatre Group’s overhead costs. Kaplan revealed that he was under 
increasing scrutiny from colleagues and staff members who “question[ed] the wisdom of 
continuing support of Theater Group, at this time when Extension [was] having serious 
difficulties.” Houseman bristled at Kaplan’s suggestion that the Group be charged 
retroactively for their overhead costs that fiscal year, but he recognized the validity of 
Kaplan’s position and reluctantly agreed that it would be reasonable to charge the Group for 
its own overhead costs moving forward.558 
Although the Group would remain on campus for several more seasons, it was clear 
as early as this 1961 meeting that no matter how highly audiences and critics esteemed the 
company and believed it to be an asset to the campus, it was not without its detractors. In a 
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Los Angeles Times retrospective, Cecil Smith recalled, “The enthusiasm of the audience did 
not necessarily extend to campus” and he noted that there was “considerable resentment in 
the academic community at the invasion of these professional workers in such mundane 
fields as movies and TV.”559 Critic Jules Novick characterized the Group as “somewhat of a 
stepchild at UCLA,”560 an assessment vividly illustrated by the Group’s continued challenges 
in securing a dedicated performance space on campus. Despite its artistic preeminence, the 
Theatre Group remained throughout its existence “what it was at the very start: a troupe of 
actors in search of a theater.”561 No matter how much prestige the Group had won for itself 
and had brought to the UCLA campus, it was necessarily relegated to second-class status 
when it came to the use of performance facilities, priority for which was given to university 
programming. The Theatre Group’s quest for a theater facility of its own became a top 
priority for Houseman and the board and the efforts to reach that goal began sometime late in 
1961. The quest would drag on for several years and force the Group into a moment of 
reckoning with its identity as it related to UCLA and the city of Los Angeles.  
In February 1962, Kaplan told the board he had met with McNeil Lowry at the Ford 
Foundation and inquired about the possibility of obtaining a grant for the construction of a 
theater. Lowry seemed reluctant to give the company money earmarked for theater 
construction and instead offered a grant to be used for hiring actors and directors,562 an offer 
                                                
559 Cecil Smith. “At the UCLA Theater Group, the Ordinary Was a Rarity.” Los Angeles Times, May 14, 1981. 
ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The Los Angeles Times. 
560 Jules Novick, Beyond Broadway: The Quest for Permanent Theatres (New York: Hill and Wang, 1968), 99. 
561 Anton Calleia. “UCLA Theatre Group Successful, but Still Searching for a Home.” Los Angeles Times, 
November 24, 1963. ProQuest Historical Newspapers: Los Angeles Times. 
562 Although the Foundation had been providing project-specific support to individual theater artists affiliated 
with resident theaters since 1957, it did not begin giving bulk grants to theaters themselves until 1959, and those 
were intended primarily to help with the building of companies, specifically to hire professional actors and 
directors; it was not until the 1962 round of grants that the Foundation began loosening the parameters of their 
 265 
Kaplan rejected because “Theatre Group is able to get these people, due to its location in Los 
Angeles.”563 Without support from the Ford Foundation, Kaplan thought it ill-advised to 
launch a fund-raising campaign at that juncture, as it was unclear whether the Group would 
be able to rally the necessary support. The board agreed that before they moved forward with 
planning a fundraising drive, they would need to work toward securing verbal commitments 
from at least a few potential donors to demonstrate support for a building project before 
approaching the Regents, whose approval was required before any actual fundraising could 
begin.564   
Over the next few months, Kaplan began pursuing approval from the Regents to 
begin raising funds. Everything seemed to be moving along smoothly, and in July 1962, 
Kaplan announced that the Board of Regents had designated a site for the construction of a 
theater on the UCLA campus.565 Two months later, in October, came the announcement of 
the aforementioned Ford Foundation grant. As exciting as news of the site selection and the 
grant was, Houseman became disturbed as he noticed in the ensuing months “a strange 
silence” starting to “surround the Theatre Group’s future.”566 Returning from abroad in the 
late fall, Houseman met with Kaplan and some of the Group’s board members, who, 
Houseman recalled, “proved incapable of giving me any definite information about the 
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construction or even preliminary designs for our theatre.”567 Houseman suspected that the 
project might have run into resistance “in an upstairs boardroom.”568  
His fears were confirmed at the February 1962 board meeting, when Kaplan informed 
the board that the Regents had withdrawn their support for the fundraising drive for a new 
theater. Houseman learned from Kaplan that Dorothy Chandler, a UCLA Regent, had 
“declared that she would countenance no university theatre plans until her own major 
downtown fund-raising drive was completed. And she virtually ordered Chancellor Murphy 
to abandon the idea of a theatre on campus until further notice.”569 Houseman was incensed 
not only by Chandler’s scuttling of the project but also by Kaplan’s acquiescence and refusal 
to fight the decision. He accused Kaplan and Murphy of selling out to Chandler and voiced 
his sense of betrayal after having devoted so much time and energy to creating “a permanent 
organization with its own artistic identity and its own base on campus,” a hope that was now 
“shattered.”570  
The next month, Houseman resigned as artistic director. Informing the board of 
Houseman’s resignation, Kaplan said that Theatre Group, “as an activity of University 
Extension,” had benefited from the use of many university facilities and services, but the 
Group had, “because of the complexities of the university and the absence of its own staff . . . 
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encountered difficulties. Many of these problems will be mitigated when the Theater Group 
is in its own theater,” but it would be, he said, at least three years before a new theater would 
become a reality. Houseman had decided, Kaplan told the board, that it was impossible for 
him to continue as artistic director under those circumstances.571 Although he was present at 
the meeting, the minutes do not record Houseman making any remarks of his own to the 
board. However, in his memoir, Houseman affirms Kaplan’s statement regarding the reasons 
for his departure, but in more explicit terms.  
The halting of the building project had pushed Houseman over the edge after months 
of increasing frustration, and Houseman realized that there was little chance that the status-
quo would change any time soon, a reality he could no longer abide: “If the best we could 
hope for was to continue to function indefinitely as ‘migrant mummers,’ dependent for acting 
space on the whims of the Music and Humanities Departments, then I for one, was no longer 
interested!”572 Houseman’s frustration in his final months as artistic director contrasted 
sharply with his initial hope for the Group’s future. The alliance with the university, which 
had at first seemed the key to establishing a serious professional theater in Los Angeles, 
turned out, in Houseman’s view, to be an insurmountable hindrance to institutional progress. 
Even with the reduction of the overhead subsidy after the first season, the Group had enjoyed 
considerable administrative support from UCLA Extension and was therefore able to operate 
with little more than a skeletal staff, but the building project crisis revealed just how 
problematic that limited structure was in terms of achieving autonomy.  
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When the board first began to pursue the Regents’ approval for a fundraising 
campaign a year earlier, Kaplan pointed out that a challenge the Group faced was a lack of 
administrative “machinery” to manage a major fundraising campaign and suggested that the 
Group would need to develop a more robust and clearly defined organizational structure. 
However, doing so was easier said than done. Because the Group was technically an 
“activity” of University Extension and Extension was the “responsible agent,” many of the 
administrative and financial responsibilities could not be separated from Extension. As a 
result, even if the Group had developed a fully-fledged organization chart complete with 
administrative officers, “the officers’ functions would be less than in another type of 
organization.”573 In other words, because of the Group’s relationship to Extension, its own 
executive officers, if such positions were created, would remain subordinate to Extension. 
The Group now found itself in what seemed like a conundrum. On the one hand, UCLA 
Extension’s support was steadily dwindling and the Group faced increasing difficulty in 
securing performance venues on the campus. On the other hand, they now found that their 
reliance on the university had held them back from venturing out on their own.  
After Houseman’s resignation, the company continued to thrive artistically. 
Houseman even returned as a guest director a year after his resignation for a production of 
King Lear starring Morris Carnovsky.574 The production was a massive hit, sold out before 
performances began,575 and received stellar reviews. The production turned out to be an 
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important moment for the Group thanks to Houseman’s decision to bring along an assistant 
director named Gordon Davidson, who had worked as Houseman’s assistant at the American 
Shakespeare Festival in Connecticut in 1958 and had worked extensively as a stage manager 
in New York.576 Davidson had not planned to stay in Los Angeles after his engagement with 
Lear, but when Lyle Dye, who had been acting as the Group’s executive coordinator, was 
tapped to lead the Performing Arts Council at the Music Center, Davidson was offered Dye’s 
position.577 Davidson would continue the tradition of presenting intellectually challenging 
works, as Houseman had done, but would also work to move the company in a more 
adventurous direction, seeking out material that was artistically exciting, decidedly 
contemporary, and controversial. The most notable of these was Rolf Hochhuth’s The 
Deputy, a massive verse drama in which Hochhuth excoriates the Catholic Church for its 
refusal to intervene in the Nazi’s extermination of the Jews during World War II.  
Despite the promise of continued artistic success under Davidson’s leadership, a 
“sense of disenchantment” had set in within the Group. It seemed, according to Cecil Smith, 
to have remained “a theater of promise rather than actuality,” still operating “at UCLA’s 
sufferance in halls available when not used for classrooms; it still has no facility in which to 
work between productions, no center to operate in, no shop of its own.”578 Indeed, by 1965, 
the Theatre Group found its existence threatened when UCLA announced that its academic 
calendar would transition from the semester system to the quarter system, and opened its 
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1965-66 season, in the words of New York Times reporter Peter Bart, “amid woes.” With the 
transition to the quarter system, there would be far fewer weeks and nights when the facilities 
used by the Group were not needed to support academic programming, so the Group 
expected to be pushed off campus and grew frustrated with Extension for taking no steps to 
help find them a home.579 Increasingly, those associated with Group began to argue that the 
time had come for them to sever ties with UCLA. Actor, director, and board member Lamont 
Johnson told the New York Times that he believed that the Group had gone as far as they 
could go under the existing setup.580 Breaking with UCLA Extension increasingly seemed to 
be the most likely resolution to the challenges posed by the impending loss of performance 
space on campus, but that reality was more problematic than promising, and it forced the 
Group toward a moment of reckoning about how it would manage to sustain itself away from 
UCLA.   
The comments made publicly by Lamont Johnson and another unnamed board 
member, who had argued that the affiliation with UCLA had become more of a liability than 
an asset,581 stemmed from an April 1965 meeting at which Kaplan told the board he did not 
see a way for the Group to continue operating unless it could secure its own venue off 
campus and find independent means of funding such facilities. Because Regents’ approval of 
a fundraising campaign remained unlikely, the board agreed that it was time to consider 
whether it made sense for the Group to remain under the auspices of the university or to cut 
ties and “become an independent community project.” Doing so, Gordon Davidson argued, 
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would exponentially increase the Group’s expenses and would require “some form of 
subsidization.”582 Although the Group had a large and supportive audience, he said, it had 
“no active group committed to or affiliated with it.” Obtaining the subsidization necessary to 
sustain the Group as an independent organization would require that it “proceed on several 
levels in order to integrate the community in [the Group’s] activities” in order to develop a 
“sponsoring group.”583 Some of the board members agreed and proposed that were the Group 
to become an independent organization, the board should take on more active roles as 
community liaisons in order to generate the support the Group would need.  Such outreach 
and fundraising were standard functions of most boards of directors, but the Theatre Group’s 
board had largely been relieved of that responsibility because of the Group’s affiliation with 
UCLA, and not everyone on the board agreed that they should expand their responsibilities 
into the realm of community liaising and raising money.  
Actor Jeffrey Hayden, a founding board member of the Group, plainly stated that he 
had no interest in participating in any such activity and threatened to resign from the board. 
He pointedly reminded everyone that the Group had been created not to address any needs of 
the community at large, but rather “out of the need of theatrical people” to develop a place to 
pursue meaningful stage work in a city dominated by film and television. Davidson shot 
back, stating that he “felt that actually there was no real sense of commitment from 
professionals, as witnessed by the many cast crises we have had in the past productions.”584 
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Even if it were true, Davidson suggested, that the Group’s main purpose had been to fulfill 
the needs of artists over those of the community, those same artists showed little regard for 
their art when Hollywood came calling. This argument between Davidson and Hayden 
highlighted the core problem that the Theatre Group now had to face: the administrative 
support provided by UCLA Extension had relieved the Group not only of fiscal responsibility 
but also organizational responsibility as well, allowing them to devote their attention almost 
exclusively to production. Given that reality, one can understand Hayden’s objection to 
expanding the scope of the board’s responsibility to engage the community and fundraise; 
that was clearly not what they had signed up for seven years earlier. But it had become clear 
that once the company was pushed off campus, it would no longer be able to maintain the 
status quo.  
After the debate between Davidson and Hayden subsided, Lyle Dye, who had 
retained his position on the board after resigning as executive coordinator to join the Music 
Center, expressed his belief that “the time had come for a complete re-evaluation of the role 
and duties of the Board” and suggested that “each member should tender his resignation 
voluntarily to allow such an evaluation.” Kaplan echoed Dye’s suggestion, noting that before 
the Group could make any informed choices about what the role of its board should be, it 
would first need to determine “what kind of organization The Theatre Group should 
become.” Hayden moved to dissolve the board, and the motion carried unanimously with the 
board agreeing not to publicize its dissolution.585  
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Two months after this meeting, the Group launched its sixth season, which turned out 
to be the penultimate rather than the final season as the New York Times prophesized it might 
be. Instead, the season was the Group’s most successful to date, with average attendance of 
92%. Davidson’s production of The Deputy alone drew more than 25,000 audience members. 
Even with all this success, the Group seemed certain to fold once its time on the UCLA 
campus ended. Following the dissolution of the board of directors, Davidson continued to 
look for off campus alternatives, and went so far as to draw up plans to convert a Ralph’s 
Supermarket, which the company had used as a rehearsal space, into a theater. But without 
funding, the plan was a nonstarter. 586   
The Group’s success in continuing to draw near-capacity audiences did not go 
unnoticed by the Music Center’s management, who announced in March 1966 that the Group 
had been selected as the Center’s resident theater company.  As Cecil Smith observed, the 
Theatre Group’s affiliation with the Music Center would “not only [fill] a major void in the 
plans for that complex but also [would give] the producing organization its long needed 
permanent home.”587 Chandler and her colleagues among the Music Center’s leadership were 
undoubtedly impressed by the Group’s artistic success, but were likely even more impressed 
by the subscription audience the Group had in place; by the time it launched its final season, 
it had attained a subscription base of over eleven thousand,588 a sizable ready-made audience 
for the Music Center’s new resident company.  
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The invitation to join the Music Center clearly marked a triumph for the Group in that 
it assured its continuation, but it remained unclear at the time of the announcement exactly 
how the Group would need to evolve once it joined the Center. In fact, the announcement did 
not even suggest that Davidson might be brought aboard in an official capacity to lead the 
Group once it moved to the Music Center. Abbott Kaplan had agreed to helm the board once 
the Group moved, but no other staffing decisions were announced. Davidson found the 
omission of his name puzzling. “People had argued,” he recalled, “that the one thing Theatre 
Group could provide was audience continuity and reputation, in which I’d played a part. I 
guess they shopped for some heavier names.”589 Indeed, when the invitation to the Group 
was announced, Kaplan told the press that the company would look for an artistic director of 
“international stature.”590 And although the Theatre Group had been designated as the theater 
constituent of the Music Center, most likely for the very reasons Davidson named, when the 
newly formed board met shortly after the Group’s acceptance into the Music Center, there 
was virtually no mention of the Theatre Group. Rather, the discussion proceeded as though 
the board were creating a theater company from scratch. 
In April 1966, about two weeks after the Music Center announced the Theatre Group 
as its resident theater company, Dorothy Chandler convened a meeting of the newly formed 
Center Theatre Group’s board of directors. Also in attendance at the meeting was actor Hume 
Cronyn, who had been invited to advise the board largely because of his association with the 
Guthrie Theatre in Minneapolis where he and Jessica Tandy led the acting company in its 
inaugural season. The meeting focused on several key practical questions, with an emphasis 
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on whether to operate the theater on a true rotating repertory basis, the problems associated 
with assembling a permanent acting company, and whether the company should sponsor 
engagements by outside organizations. Acutely aware of the importance of the company 
having an initial success, Cronyn warned the board, “If this theater fails or doesn’t do well it 
is going to be a black eye of such dimension to the whole American theater. . . If this one 
should turn out a calamity, we are right back where we started—at the Broadway and road 
company.” Failing to develop a strong company would result in the theater buildings 
becoming little more than road houses.591  
Although Cronyn believed that it would serve the theater well to occasionally bring in 
other prestigious theater companies to limit dark time in the theaters, he held firm in his 
belief that a permanent acting ensemble was the backbone of a theater company, and said, “I 
think with two theaters you will have less risk if you have a company of 45 to 55 actors in the 
first year. Then you could play both theaters. If you cannot do that, then I do not think you 
have a theater,”592 even while acknowledging that keeping actors year-round represented a 
significant challenge. When some board members expressed resistance to launching with 
such a large company, Cronyn suggested the board might consider mitigating risk by 
concentrating on just one of the theaters for the time being, while working toward the 
ultimate goal of concurrent operation of the two theater buildings and a sizable permanent 
company. There would be “no disgrace,” he said, in starting with the Taper, the smaller of 
the two theaters. What was important, he argued, was that Center Theatre Group “start with a 
pinch of public acceptance and a sufficient degree of success.” Opening with the Taper could 
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allow the company to open with an artistic triumph. “With the best productions of 
Chekhov—the best ones I have seen were on a thrust stage, because it brings the theater to 
the people. They seem to be in the room.” He recalled that the two best productions thus far 
at the Guthrie had been The Three Sisters and The Cherry Orchard. “Those productions,” he 
said, “did not rely on extraneous showmanship—there was a real emotional life and 
presence.”593 This suggestion was one of only a few times Cronyn touched upon the potential 
repertoire Center Theatre Group might consider, but he was clearly pushing the board toward 
a theater much more staid than adventurous, starkly different from what the Theatre Group 
had evolved into over the preceding eight years at UCLA.  
Although Cronyn and the board extensively discussed several concrete challenges 
such as budgeting and attracting directors, the meeting ultimately amounted to little more 
than existential hand wringing. Cronyn repeatedly reminded the board that no meaningful 
decisions could be made until the board determined “what sort of theater it wants.” Chandler 
admitted that the board had not had any meaningful discussions about that key question, and 
Lamont Johnson lamented, “We are kidding ourselves as a board until we make more 
decisions of what we are. We are beguiled by the beauty and frightened by the reality.”594  
This outburst by Johnson, a long-time member of the Theatre Group, highlights the 
key challenge that faced the board as it worked to determine how best to chart the course of 
the company. The physical plant and the institutional support the Music Center would finally 
provide were beyond anything the Group had ever thought they could achieve, but those 
same advantages represented frightening realities that meant the Group could hardly expect 
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to simply “relocate” from UCLA to Downtown Los Angeles. As Cecil Smith wrote when 
covering the launch of the Group’s last season at UCLA, the Group was “moving into a 
broader arena than it [had] ever known, subject to a wider audience than it [had] ever 
sought.” When it moved to the Ahmanson and the Taper, it would need to “develop a new 
identity, a new personality, geared to that massive cultural complex.”595 Much of the Group’s 
success had hinged on the niche audience of “middle class intellectuals” cultivated by 
Houseman and later Davidson, an audience eager to be challenged and willing to accept the 
occasional artistic failure for the sake of “a university experiment in professional theater,”596 
but at the Music Center, they would face not only the realities of a broader audience but also 
a physical scale and civic prominence that would significantly raise the stakes.  
 Nobody on the board was more attuned to the scrutiny the company would face in its 
move to the Center than Dorothy Chandler herself. When Chandler kicked off the meeting, 
she told the board that “start[ing] with the right people” would be “the most important thing” 
and that she “hope[d] this theater group [could] come to some decisions quietly and not have 
to go back and re-do,”597 an admonition stemming from a recent experience with the Center’s 
opera constituent, the Los Angeles Opera Company, which had operated as a quasi-
professional company since 1948. One of its board members, attorney Bernard Greenberg, 
recalled that the board had “decided that we should try to elevate the performances, become a 
real professional company. We thought that if we became associated with the Music Center 
                                                
595 Cecil Smith. “Theater Group Era Ends with Anouilh’s ‘Poor Bitos.’” Los Angeles Times, September 4, 
1966. ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The Los Angeles Times.  
596 Ibid. 
597 Center Theater Group Meeting Held April 5, 1966.”Dorothy Chandler Papers. 
 278 
we would be able to do that.”598 The company produced three operas at the Dorothy Chandler 
Pavilion as the resident opera company, but despite fairly positive critical response, Chandler 
felt that the quality of the productions did not rise to the level required by the Music Center 
and the company was forced to reorganize into a sponsoring organization.599 The loose 
organizational structure of the Theatre Group likely gave Chandler and others on the board 
reason to worry that the Group could suffer a fate like that of the Opera, which had sought to 
use the Music Center as a means to attain greater professionalism rather than coming on 
board as a fully established professional producing organization. When the meeting with 
Cronyn concluded, they were no closer to arriving at a clear sense of purpose or direction 
than when they had started. 
Re-enter Robert Whitehead 
 On Tuesday, May 10, 1966, a week after the board’s meeting with Hume Cronyn, a 
train carrying Robert Whitehead pulled into Los Angeles at one o’clock in the morning. A 
few hours later, Whitehead, donning a hardhat, toured the Ahmanson and Taper, both still 
under construction. Project architect John Knight and Lyle Dye, executive director of the 
Council of the Performing Arts, the central oversight body for the Music Center, led 
Whitehead through the construction site as he “moved everywhere, saw everything,” keeping 
up a “steady barrage of questions to Knight, the woods to be used, the fabrics, the colors, 
where and how the trucks could deliver scenery, where it would be stored, what the facilities 
for dressing rooms and rehearsal halls are.”600 With the pragmatic eye of a successful 
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Broadway producer, Whitehead inspected the buildings carefully, assessing the potential 
challenges each posed. A few hours later, he sat with the board to advise them on launching 
the organization’s operations. Whitehead and the board discussed many of the same topics as 
those covered during the Cronyn meeting, but the discussion was more candid and brought to 
the surface many of the board’s major concerns. Moreover, during this meeting the vision for 
the overall structure of Center Theatre Group, particularly the respective purpose and 
function of each of the two theater buildings, began to crystallize, opening the door for 
Davidson to ensure that the Theatre Group could hold on to its artistically adventurous 
identity even after its move to the Music Center.  
 Whitehead echoed Cronyn’s argument that the prominence of the Music Center and 
Los Angeles meant that the theater would face much higher expectations than most others 
and insisted that in such a metropolitan area there could be no compromise.601 Recalling 
Cronyn’s argument that the development of a large acting ensemble was the most important 
element of developing a true theater company, Melnitz asked if the board should consider 
creating an ensemble large enough to operate in both theaters. Whitehead said that while he 
believed it was possible to operate both theaters at the same time, the prospect of launching 
true repertory in the Ahmanson, which seemed to him to be rather big and impersonal, 
worried him. He reminded the board of the importance of aligning their aspirations with the 
financial realities of operating a company on such a large scale, encouraging them to start out 
with a series of individual productions. Starting with a series of individual productions, then 
building toward developing a permanent repertory company, would offer a more manageable 
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alternative to attempting to launch with a full-blown repertory company out of the gate, 
which he argued would “present immediate problems that might take the heart out of 
everyone,” placing an undue burden on the company that could potentially undermine the 
longevity of the operation, a hard-learned lesson from his experience at Lincoln Center two 
years earlier. Whitehead’s point about starting small was well taken by the board. However, 
with the construction of the theaters set to be complete in early 1967, they felt pressured to 
ensure that the theaters not sit dark upon completion, a concern Whitehead understood and 
for which he suggested a solution that sparked intense debate among the board.  
Holding firm to his belief that the company must not rush into launching an operation 
too big to manage, he proposed an alternative arrangement wherein Center Theatre Group 
would engage individual producers, “the best producers in America,” for a series of 
productions in the Ahmanson. Under this arrangement, the productions would be financed 
through Center Theatre Group, which would maintain sixty percent ownership, leaving forty 
percent for the producer, who would then be free to tour the production if it was a success. 
Such an arrangement would be attractive to producers, Whitehead argued, because it would 
give them the opportunity to present productions, such as classics, that they might not be 
willing to risk presenting on Broadway. Furthermore, inviting in a series of independent 
producers might eventually lead, Whitehead suggested, to “find[ing] a producer who might 
take over on a more long-time basis, who would eventually build a repertory.”602 Lyle Dye 
viewed Whitehead’s suggestion as one which, if viewed as part of a long-term strategy, 
would buy the organization time to take the necessary steps toward developing “the finest 
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kind of repertory company.” While most of their thinking had been “going toward opening a 
full-blown repertory company in 1967,” Whitehead had offered a viable alternative.  
Some on the board, however, viewed this proposition as one fraught with danger. 
Board member William Fadiman argued that while he understood that starting out as a 
booking organization could ultimately lead to the development of a repertory company, much 
of the theater’s funding would come from community members, not to mention the fact that 
the Center was built on county land, and that under Whitehead’s proposal, Center Theatre 
Group would be asking the citizenry of Los Angeles to support a road house without roots in 
the community. Rather than supporting a Los Angeles company, the citizens would be 
paying, Fadiman argued, “to see us rent four walls.”603 Fadiman also felt that outside 
producers would only be interested in coming to Los Angeles to reap the benefits of having 
Center Theatre Group financially sponsor their own productions, further distancing the 
theater from any sense of growing out of the community. Henry Dreyfuss seconded 
Fadiman’s concerns, arguing that because Los Angeles was a community “imbued with civic 
pride,” Center Theatre Group must be “a community endeavor otherwise we are all merely 
going to be theatrical angels. We could go to New York and be angels.”604   
Despite Dreyfuss and Fadiman’s resistance to Whitehead’s proposal, there was 
consensus among the board that it was a sound idea so long as it was understood to be an 
interim solution as the organization worked toward building a locally managed company. 
George Seaton, asked Whitehead if he thought it possible that the company might hire an 
artistic director who would “then commission a New York producer-director to come out and 
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do a production so that it would be our production.” Whitehead tried to allay the board’s 
concerns, saying, “I meant to make that clear. There should be an artistic director. He and 
two or three people must plan the season.” This, Seaton argued to the board, would help to 
generate civic interest, and Dreyfuss seemed to find some reassurance in this notion. Lyle 
Dye argued that even if the company launched with the presentation of outside productions, 
Center Theatre Group and Los Angeles itself could reap important reputational benefits, but 
only if it was understood that any productions presented would originate at Center Theatre 
Group as opposed to touring companies using the Ahmanson as a tour stop. “Then, if a 
production has a future beyond here,” he said, “we would participate. These would be 
productions from the Center Theatre Group of Los Angeles,” helping the company begin to 
build a national reputation.605  
Throughout the debate, Whitehead and some on the board repeatedly returned to the 
discussion of the size of the theater, many of them implying or stating explicitly that the 
Ahmanson was simply too large. When Dorothy Chandler objected to the criticisms being 
leveled against the Ahmanson, George Seaton assured her that he did not mean to criticize 
the buildings, but argued, as had Whitehead earlier in the meeting, that “the size of the 
theatre dictates what you are going to do in that theatre.” The Ahmanson dictated, he argued, 
a certain scale of production, echoing Whitehead who believed that the Ahmanson was more 
suited to conventional drama on a large scale while the Taper seemed to him more of a 
“playwrights’ theatre” and one that would lend itself well to experimentation.  
Chandler didn’t reply to Seaton, but instead turned to Gordon Davidson. “Gordon,” 
she said, “so that there is something going on which carries on a tradition from the 
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University, we could take the little theatre and use the challenges there in doing some 
interesting things, maybe with writers.” She prodded him further, “Don’t you think that could 
be done in the kind of way it has been done at the University?”606 Davidson seized on 
Chandler’s prompt. “I think that the small theatre really cries out to be used that way,” he 
said, but cautioned that “creating this umbrella under which you are operating a major 
producing company plus another organism that is somehow stimulating new playwriting as 
well as producing” represented a major undertaking. To set that in motion by 1967 posed 
significant challenges. Melnitz, excited by the prospect of “taking what [had] been done at 
UCLA and moving it into a better suited and better equipped theatre,” assuaged Davidson’s 
concerns, noting that the Taper and the Ahmanson need not necessarily open simultaneously. 
Having an “umbrella” over the Ahmanson and Taper while the Taper was carrying on the 
tradition of what had been done at the Group, Melnitz said, would not only be possible but 
also an advantage. Dreyfuss concurred, proclaiming that some of the best theater that had 
been produced on the West Coast had been at UCLA and that the Taper was perfectly suited 
to carry on that same kind of work. Furthermore, he suggested, if the board could agree to 
carrying on the work of the Theatre Group in the Taper, he could get on board with the idea 
of bringing in outside producers, an idea about which he had expressed deep reservations 
only a short while ago.  
Chandler’s proposal offered solutions to several of the problems, both practical and 
less tangible, that had been identified at the start of the meeting. Opening at the Taper, a 
suggestion first floated by Hume Cronyn two weeks earlier, would buy the company time in 
that it seemed more feasible, Chandler said, to prepare something on a smaller scale in the 
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Taper than it would be in the Ahmanson and suggested that the company could conceivably 
prepare three plays in the Taper in the spring and summer of 1967 while preparing for two 
productions in the Ahmanson in the fall. Whitehead concurred, telling Chandler and the 
board that the small theater “requires more imagination than back-breaking effort.” Chandler 
also suggested that opening on a small scale in the Taper would not only solve financial and 
logistical challenges, but would also help to garner community support. “It seems,” Chandler 
said, “that the support of the community could be carried on through the challenge and 
stimulation if we started with something in the small theatre and got them excited about that. 
Then, by the time the fall comes there is a new staff that is ours that has the little theatre 
under its wing and is the one that makes the arrangements for the other productions.” 
Dreyfus, unable to contain his excitement, leaped in, “Then before the opening of the Taper 
Theatre, an announcement would be made of what would be done in the big theatre. I think 
almost anything done out at the University could be done in the Taper Theatre.” 607   
Although Center Theatre Group would ultimately not operate as a true rotating 
repertory company or even engage a permanent resident acting company, this meeting was a 
watershed moment in the development of the company. By the time the board adjourned, the 
skeleton of the organization had come clearly into view. Center Theatre Group would operate 
the two venues simultaneously. The Taper would focus on experimentation, developing new 
works, and would carry on the Theatre Group’s adventurous work while the Ahmanson 
would be home for large scale productions geared toward a broader audience and would 
actively seek high profile producers and directors to mount new productions with an eye 
toward moving those productions beyond Los Angeles. Through this structure, the company 
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could build on the local support and national profile of the Theatre Group while expanding 
its reach into the national theater scene. 
Assembling the Creative Team 
 Following the May 1966 board meeting, Davidson, although gratified that the 
Group’s work would be carried on in the Forum, remained unsure of his role in the endeavor. 
His attention was focused on finishing out the Theatre Group’s final season on the UCLA 
campus and in the summer of 1966 he began rehearsals for the Los Angeles premiere of 
Leonard Bernstein and Lilian Hellman’s Candide, which would not only be one of the 
Theatre Group’s most successful productions but would also give Chandler the assurance she 
needed that Davidson could handle the job of overseeing the Mark Taper Forum. When 
Candide opened in July 1966, Cecil Smith called it “the most ambitious and elaborate work 
the Theatre Group has attempted in its eight years on the UCLA campus” and considered it 
“one of the most impressive,” hailing it as “an immensely gratifying experience, pulsating 
with life, visually exciting, charged with ribald wit, a swirling ragtag world pinned to the 
stage.”608 Music critic Martin Bernheimer lauded Davidson’s “stress on bitter satire—as 
opposed to shiny ‘show-biz cheer,’” which imbued the music with a “degree of theatrical 
irony it lacked before.”609 Leonard Bernstein himself called the production “staggeringly 
wonderful,” adding, “Gordie has a genius for digging into a play and locating those hidden 
truths that perhaps even the playwright overlooked.”610 By all accounts, the production 
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breathed new life into the piece, “help[ing] to reestablish [its] prestige after an over-blown 
and heavy-handed original Broadway production staged by Tyrone Guthrie,” which folded 
after only a couple of months.611 
 Dorothy Chandler attended one of the eleven performances of Candide, and after the 
performance, she went backstage to ask Davidson if she could come back to his house to talk. 
A few days later, Davidson was asked to meet with Chandler at the Music Center, where he 
was offered the leadership of the Taper.612 The Center Theatre Group archives hold no record 
of any deliberations among Chandler and the board regarding Davidson’s appointment as 
artistic director of the Taper. Historian Margaret Leslie Davis, in her account, based largely 
on an interview with Davidson, suggests that it was seeing Candide that led Chandler to hire 
Davidson. While it seems unlikely that Chandler would have made such a decision based on 
one performance, it is not implausible that Candide was the tipping point that led to 
Davidson being handed the job. Surely, Chandler must have had Davidson in mind when the 
Theatre Group was named the theater constituent of the Center, but she likely had 
reservations about putting someone who lacked the national stature that others on the board 
had argued was necessary for whoever would lead the organization, which had been initially 
conceived as an operation vastly larger than that of the Theatre Group at UCLA. However, 
now that it had become clear that the Taper would operate as its own organism within Center 
Theatre Group and would need its own artistic director, Davidson certainly seemed likely. 
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Furthermore, the scale of Candide likely gave Chandler further assurance she needed that 
Davidson could handle the job of overseeing the Taper.  
 After finally offering Davidson the leadership of the Taper, Chandler approached 
Lew Wasserman, president of MCA, Inc., to see if he might be interested in serving as 
president of Center Theatre Group’s board of directors.  Unsure at first, Wasserman sat with 
Dorothy Chandler in a meeting where he said he spent “two hours saying no” to her. 
Nevertheless, she persisted, telling Wasserman that with the opening of the theaters only 
months away and with an urgent need to raise money, things were getting “chaotic” and she 
needed his influence on the board.613 Wasserman finally agreed, and his engagement was 
announced in September 1966. 
Wasserman, according to the Times, was particularly well equipped for his post. He 
was, wrote Cecil Smith, “a president intimately conversant with the theater world and one 
who has been closely involved with local and national civic projects.”614Although this was 
surely an important part of Chandler and the board’s calculus in selecting Wasserman, his 
connections to Hollywood and Westside money played no small role in his appointment. 
Recalling Wasserman’s appointment, Davidson praised Chandler’s fundraising acumen. 
“Mrs. Chandler knew that if this Music Center complex was to survive,” the money could not 
all come from Pasadena and Orange County. “It had to include the Westside, the Jewish 
community, the movie people. How do you get them? Get their leader.”615 And if anyone 
could be rightfully called the leader of the Hollywood elite, it was Wasserman, who after 
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working as a theater usher and talent agent, “emerged as the most powerful mogul in post-
World War II Hollywood.”616 Upon Wasserman’s death in 2002, Stephen Spielberg called 
Wasserman “the chief justice of the film industry—fair, tough minded, and innovative,” 
adding that many in Hollywood felt that with Wasserman’s passing, they had “lost their 
benevolent godfather.”617 But benevolence was not what drew Chandler to Wasserman.  By 
1966, Wasserman had already built a reputation as “Hollywood’s most skillful executive at 
raising campaign funds and at forging ties to top politicians in Washington, Sacramento, and 
at Los Angeles City Hall,” having “correctly sensed that money and access to stars spoke 
volumes to politicians,”618 knowledge upon which Chandler herself capitalized during the 
Music Center campaign. Wasserman, Chandler knew, could play the same fundraising role 
for Center Theatre Group that she had played for the Music Center. And in addition to his 
fundraising prowess, Wasserman’s national stature as the most powerful figure in Hollywood 
demonstrated that Center Theatre Group aspired to claim a place for itself on the national 
stage, which was further demonstrated by the appointment of Robert Whitehead as general 
advisor, announced simultaneously with the Wasserman announcement.  
  Reporting on Wasserman and Whitehead’s engagement, Cecil Smith proclaimed, 
“The formation of the Center Theatre Group is unquestionably the most significant 
development in the history of drama in Los Angeles—one of the most important in the 
burgeoning growth of the American theater.” Smith outlined the scope of the organization, 
which would do everything from producing “plays of cultural and artistic value” and 
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developing promising playwrights to presenting “visiting theatrical productions of 
“exceptional merit” and sponsoring major independent productions originating in the city. 
Center Theatre Group, would be, he said, “not just another transient voice in the theatrical 
world but a permanent cultural force in Los Angeles.” 619  Smith and Wasserman’s comments 
demonstrate how Center Theatre Group aligned with the imperatives of the Music Center to 
bolster Los Angeles’s national image. By emphasizing Center Theatre Group as a 
“permanent cultural force” in Los Angeles, Smith helped to position the company within the 
paradigm of the transformation of Los Angeles as a modern marvel, embodied in the 
monumentalization of corporate, cultural, and recreational spaces like Dodger Stadium on the 
cityscape. Smith and Wasserman also implied that becoming such a permanent force could 
only be achieved by ensuring that the company’s reach extended beyond the city of Los 
Angeles, which would help to establish Los Angeles as an important center of production. 
Although much of the rhetoric of Center Theatre Group’s leadership in the coming months 
would herald the artistic freedom that could only be offered away from the financial 
constraints of the commercial theater, tethering the company to Broadway and Hollywood 
was an important part of the organization’s strategy in achieving national prominence.   
In his own comments, Wasserman carefully worked to drive home the message that 
Center Theatre Group would position itself as a leader on the national stage while building 
upon what had been generated locally on the UCLA campus. He was careful not to make any 
proclamations about artistic programming, saying he was “too new a voice” to discuss 
specific plans. His basic thinking, he said, was that “at UCLA certain people have done such 
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an incredibly fine job that our best contribution is to provide them all the help we can,” 
stressing his commitment to supporting the work of the Theatre Group, which had “set a 
standard that has influenced the theater throughout this area and is greatly responsible for the 
growing theatrical interest here.”620 He then picked up the cultural maturity mantle, declaring 
that there was no question in his mind “that we are maturing as a nation, that our interest in 
cultural and artistic and intellectual work has grown enormously. . . . Even that monster that 
comes into our home—TV—has done much to whet the appetite for art, literature, theater 
and many worthwhile things.”621 He was confident, he said, that Center Theatre Group could 
“accomplish something quite extraordinary here. . . . We have a strong board and we will 
have a first rate staff. I’m very impressed with Gordon Davidson—I think he’s done a 
fantastic job at UCLA. Our job is to give the creative people the tools to work with—and tell 
them: go!”622 Despite his emphasis on the commitment to continue the work developed 
locally at UCLA, Wasserman’s statements carefully wove the local importance of the locally 
produced work of the Theatre Group with national concerns. Meanwhile, Whitehead 
emphasized that while his association with the theater would be “as a working member—not 
simply a casual adviser,” he would continue his independent work as a producer,” and Smith 
noted that Whitehead had three productions in the works, one of which might be launched at 
Center Theatre Group.623 Chandler further clarified Whitehead’s role, saying that he would 
be a “key figure” within the organization, noting that his primary responsibility would be to 
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guide the productions in the Ahmanson, which she emphasized “would be original 
productions, not merely road companies of Broadway plays.”624  
Just a few weeks later, Center Theatre Group announced it would produce the world 
premiere of a new play by novelist Romulus Linney. The Sorrows of Frederick, based on the 
life of Frederick the Great, would be Linney’s first full-length play and was to be directed by 
Albert Marre. After Marre secured the play, he approached Robert Whitehead to act as 
producer for a Broadway production. Whitehead, interested in producing the play 
commercially, thought it would also “be ideal for launching . . . the Taper Forum.”625 At the 
time of the announcement, negotiations among Center Theatre Group, Marre, and Whitehead 
were still in the early stages, but the early announcement allowed Center Theatre Group to 
demonstrate its commitment to extending its reach beyond Los Angeles, a point emphasized 
by the Los Angeles Times when it reported the story.  The arrangement with Whitehead to 
produce on Broadway a production originating in Los Angeles marked, the Times told its 
readers, “another significant departure from the usual theatrical procedure which brings new 
plays to the West Coast only after lengthy New York runs.”626 At last, the Times suggested, 
Los Angeles would no longer be relegated to importing goods created in New York and 
legitimated by the Broadway box office, but would finally be in a position to be an arbiter of 
artistic merit and to become an exporter in the national theatrical economy for the first time.  
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Obviously, striking this balance would need to be carefully executed through 
programming and operational management, but in this early stage when the company was 
just beginning to go public with its plans, messaging was particularly important. The 
company held its first press conference on December 22, 1966.627  The press conference 
marked the announcement that Broadway producer Elliot Martin had been named artistic 
director of Center Theatre Group. Elliot had turned to producing after having worked as an 
actor, stage manager, and production manager on Broadway and in London’s West End. As a 
producer, he was represented on Broadway by Never Too Late and Dinner at Eight.628 Martin 
was joined at the press conference by Lew Wasserman and Gordon Davidson. The men 
discussed the organizational structure of the theater, noting that Davidson would helm the 
Mark Taper Forum, which they said “promised bold, provocative drama.” In keeping with 
this imperative, Davidson revealed that the Taper had commissioned a piece from playwright 
William Murray. Witnesses, in the style of what Davidson called “theater of fact,” dealt with 
the recent killing of Kitty Genovese, and used as its primary textual sources “the words of 
actual testimony, police and court records.” Davidson offered no other specifics about the 
lineup in the Taper, but assured those at the press conference that the Taper would be 
committed to “contemporary plays relevant to the issues of our time.” 629  
No Center Theatre Group programming for the Ahmanson Theatre had been decided 
upon as of this December 1966 press conference. However, Martin said that while the Taper, 
                                                
627 Cecil Smith. “Center Theatre Group—Hope for Drama.” Los Angeles Times, December 23, 1966. ProQuest 
Historical Newspapers: The Los Angeles Times. 
628 Cecil Smith. “Firm Hands on the Drama Tiller.” Los Angeles Times, January 5, 1967. ProQuest Historical 
Newspapers: The Los Angeles Times.  
629 Cecil Smith, “Hope for Drama.” Los Angeles Times, December 23, 1966. ProQuest Historical Newspapers: 
The Los Angeles Times. 
 293 
with its semi-circular auditorium and thrust stage, was best suited for “free form 
experimental work,” the Ahmanson would produce “more conventional drama.” 
Furthermore, Martin said, while it was understood that the Taper would be a deficit 
operation, the Ahmanson would be expected to at least break even, although he doubted it 
would turn a significant profit, saying “in my experience, nonprofit ventures usually remain 
nonprofit.” He was careful, however, to temper the expectation that the Ahmanson would 
remain in the black by emphasizing that programming decisions would be driven as much as 
possible by providing the community with “the finest drama possible.” Much like Whitehead 
and Kazan before him at Lincoln Center, he told reporters he embraced “the opportunity to 
approach a script not from the standpoint of economics and Broadway tastes but on the basis 
of fine writing, depth of characterization and the important statement it makes.”  Here was a 
theater, he said, “not designed for the longest possible run and the highest return to its 
backers but on the excellence of the work itself.” 
Most importantly, he and Davidson promised that the theater would be defined by its 
“dedication to new works of depth, imagination and substance, cast out of the immense pool 
of theatrical talent here and mounted and staged in production equal to any on earth,”630 a 
promise that reflected how important the theater would be in establishing Los Angeles as a 
leading purveyor of culture that might eventually rival New York. Wasserman meanwhile 
was quick to emphasize that CTG was a producing theater “designed to create the finest 
dramatic productions in and for Los Angeles. It is not a ‘booking’ organization to house 
traveling companies in old Broadway shows and in no sense is either theater a ‘road show’ 
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house.”631 This emphatic insistence on Wasserman’s part was necessitated not only because 
of the longstanding history of Los Angeles being an importer of New York hits, but also 
because the Ahmanson was slated to open not with an original CTG production, but rather 
with a Civic Light Opera presentation of Man of La Mancha, a decision that put Center 
Theatre Group on the defensive in the press.   
The Times announced in early November 1966 that the Ahmanson Theatre would 
open in April 1967, six months ahead of schedule, with “that most brilliant of modern 
musical dramas, ‘Man of La Mancha,’” which would be presented by the Los Angeles Civic 
Light Opera Association.632 The decision to host the Civic Light Opera Association rather 
than open with an original production was in keeping with the plan that had emerged from 
the meeting with Whitehead wherein CTG would launch a series of plays in the Taper Forum 
in the spring, while preparing through spring and summer for a fall opening of the Ahmanson 
Theatre, construction of which was not expected to be complete until October. With 
construction so far ahead of schedule as to coincide with the April opening of the Taper, the 
board felt it was important not to let the theaters sit dark. However, generating an original 
production to meet that deadline “would have meant,” Cecil Smith argued, “a desperate, last 
minute assembling of a season, which would have done the CTG and the theater a 
disservice.”633 Opening with CLO’s La Mancha would at least allow the Music Center to 
capitalize on the simultaneous opening of the two buildings. Smith devoted several column 
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inches in his coverage of the La Mancha announcement to a laudatory description of the 
building, which he called “one of the most elaborate and flexible playhouses in the nation, a 
five-level structure in glistening white concrete panels linked to the Forum by a towering 
colonnade which surrounds both buildings.”634 Anticipating possible backlash from the 
choice to open the Ahmanson with a Broadway musical, he was quick to add that Man of La 
Mancha was “in no sense a conventional Broadway musical. Dale Wasserman wrote his play 
with serious, philosophical overtones, finding in the life of Cervantes a passionate plea for 
idealism and illusion.”635  
 Despite Smith’s preemptive efforts to shield Center Theatre Group from criticism, the 
company received what Smith called “some rather abrasive criticism in the eastern press 
concerning the Center Theatre Group and its plans for drama in the new theaters of The 
Music Center.”636 Most of the criticism, he said, grew out of misconceptions and 
misinformation, but he also faulted CTG for shrouding itself in a “cone of silence” after 
announcing that the Ahmanson would open with La Mancha. “During the silence,” he wrote, 
“it was duck soup for any critic worth his opening night pass to rip out a searing thousand 
words castigating the city for building a multi-million dollar citadel of art and opening it with 
a roadshow production of an established Broadway hit.”637 Elliot Martin sat down with Smith 
for an interview to set the record straight and offer a better explanation of his intentions for 
the Ahmanson. He confessed that he himself was disappointed that the Ahmanson would 
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open with a Broadway remount because it created “the false image of a roadshow house 
rather than a producing theater,” adding that he would be on a plane out of Los Angeles if he 
thought the job would be nothing more than booking productions created elsewhere.638 He 
identified establishing its own image as one of the most important goals for Center Theatre 
Group as its operations got underway and said he hated “the image that we will function on 
borrowings from the East or abroad, that we have no profile of our own.” Dispelling that 
image was proving to be easier said than done, as evidenced from the meetings he had had 
with playwrights and directors when approaching them about working with CTG.  “I have to 
spend the first hour telling them that we’re not a roadshow house, that we will create the 
productions we have, that we want to do new works that grow out of this western soil.”639 
Martin’s assertion that he wanted works growing out of “western soil,” however, seems to 
have had more to do with establishing the company as a producing organization as opposed 
to providing a platform for a specifically Californian or “western” point of view. There is 
little evidence to suggest a real commitment from either Martin or Davidson to the idea of 
placing meaningful emphasis on nurturing local playwriting talent. Instead, most of the plays 
selected for the first few seasons were from playwrights from Europe and those based in New 
York. However, as playwright Oliver Hailey, whose play Who’s Happy Now would be 
presented in the Taper’s first season, pointed out, CTG could hardly be faulted for that. 
 Hailey argued that despite the burgeoning regional theater movement, New York’s 
centrality remained tenacious, and even the most successful original play produced at a 
regional theatre still required the “New York stamp of approval” if it were to “rise above the 
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region.” Nonetheless, he viewed the Taper as a source of hope that perhaps the day might 
come when a play “could succeed in Los Angeles first and finally. And move from here 
directly into the American repertoire.”640 As matters stood at the moment of the CTG’s 
founding, however, entrée into the “American repertoire” still required the legitimation of a 
successful New York run, a reality that was fast becoming the conventional wisdom among 
many regional theaters throughout the country, particularly after the phenomenal success of 
The Great White Hope, which had originated at Arena Stage in the same year as the Taper’s 
inaugural season and then went on to take Broadway by storm.   
 The success of The Great White Hope was a major turning point in the regional 
theater movement for two reasons. First, it “swung the dominance for the production of new 
plays,” said Arena Stage artistic director Zelda Fichlander, “away from Broadway to the 
resident theatres outside New York.”641 Bolstered by foundation support, subscription 
audiences, and lower production costs than those plaguing Broadway, regional companies 
were proving able and willing to mount productions that seemed too risky to commercial 
producers. The successful reception of such a production at a regional theater could convince 
a commercial producer to take a risk they might not otherwise take. Secondly, The Great 
White Hope clearly demonstrated that the key to raising a regional theater’s stature was 
through the production of new works that could achieve the national recognition that could 
only be bestowed by a successful New York run. By the mid-1960s, many regional theaters 
had shifted their emphasis from classical repertoire to producing new plays. This trend came 
from, argues Zeigler, the “desire to move the theatre itself into a context of national and 
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historical influence.” In other words, there was a growing desire among resident theaters to 
claim a prominent place on the national stage by establishing their institutions as the 
progenitors of new drama. The success of The Great White Hope had clearly demonstrated to 
regional theater leaders that new plays were “one key to unlock a place in history for 
them.”642 Securing such a position of national importance was particularly important to CTG, 
which had a clear imperative to bolster Los Angeles’s profile. 
 The growing trend of resident theaters transferring productions to Broadway naturally 
exposed them to criticism for making programming decisions based on the potential for 
Broadway success, an accusation to which the Ahmanson was particularly vulnerable, given 
the fact that its programming was necessarily more commercially oriented than the Taper’s. 
Martin Gottfried decried Martin’s appointment, calling Martin a “right-wing Broadway 
producer” who was given overall control of Center Theatre Group “because such right-wing 
enterprises [like the Music Center] conceive of big-time theater as Broadway’s.”643 Martin 
pushed back against such criticisms by arguing that the Ahmanson’s mandate to break even 
meant that it “must try to be the best of both theater worlds.” It could not, he said “be set 
completely apart from the commercial theater and yet its responsibility to the community is 
to work at the highest cultural level attainable. It should not do ‘Getting Gertie’s Garter,’ but 
it must be able to reach and entertain a wide audience.”644 While purists like Gottfried would 
continue to liken associating with commercial producers to trafficking with the devil, 
Martin’s assertion that Center Theatre Group’s unique structure meant that the company 
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could not reject outright the commercial theater reflected the pragmatism that underscored 
the initial planning meetings among the CTG board and Whitehead and Cronyn. But even 
more important than that pragmatism based on the financial realities was Martin and 
Davidson’s desire to secure a place for CTG—and the city of Los Angeles—on the national 
stage.  
 As plans moved forward for the Taper, meanwhile, Davidson would have to find a 
balance between pursuing the adventurous work promised for the Taper, while navigating the 
complexities of operating in a County-owned facility and serving a broader audience than he 
had ever known. After having said little in public about the Taper’s upcoming season in the 
months that passed since the December press conference, Davidson laid out his guiding 
philosophy in a lengthy editorial that appeared in the Times in April 1967. The editorial 
reflected the combination of pragmatism and aspiration that would define Davidson’s 
leadership of the Taper. He began by refuting critics like Walter Kerr who argued that 
expensive theater buildings and cultural centers were “the curse of the creative man” and 
Robert Brustein who had railed against the proliferation of cultural centers, arguing that it 
was “high time we stopped building culture centers before we have built a culture.” Davidson 
responded by dismissing the constant invocation of the “edifice complex,” saying instead that 
all he could say was “thank God for the citizens of this community for contributing to the 
development of a million dollar edifice (in this case a $43-million complex), for without 
them I would not be writing and thinking and planning about making a theatre today.”645  
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 Taking a pragmatic view of the importance of buildings such as those that comprised 
the Music Center, he argued that theaters, to compete with cinema, needed to up the ante in 
the physical comfort and luxury they provided to audiences who had become accustomed to 
“being entertained in huge, comfortable movie palaces that abound in every major 
metropolis.” The nation’s relatively new affluence, he argued, “[made] its people more 
susceptible to live theater when it is performed in a beautiful modern facility.” Buildings like 
those at the Music Center provided a “desperately needed focus,” he insisted, in “the battle 
for the individual’s leisure time and entertainment dollar,” a battle which was, he said, “a 
deadly serious one.”646 Davidson’s defense of the Music Center buildings cast them as 
crucial weapons in an existential fight for survival of live theater in Los Angeles, a fight that 
would be lost if the seats remained empty. But as important as the buildings’ extravagance 
was in attracting audiences, the physical attributes of the Taper would serve a purpose higher 
than luring patrons by appealing to their desire for lush surroundings.  
 Davidson told readers he believed “that physical structures (environment) help shape 
the personality, in this case, of the theater, and have great influence on both participants—
actor and audience.” The Taper’s physically intimate environment offered unique 
possibilities for close interaction between artist and audience, fostering “the excitement of 
mutual expression.” Such mutual expression was at the heart of his vision for making the 
Taper not just a place to put on plays, he said, but to make it a creative theatrical community. 
He closed out the editorial with an appeal to readers. “We reach out to you to help us make 
that community, here in Southern California, a reality. . . .With your vigorous assistance, the 
dreams of Center Theater [sic] Group will be capable of tangible measurement, in our 
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lifetime, by the hours of enjoyment experienced at evenings in our theaters.”647  What had 
started out as a pragmatic defense of the “edifice complex” turned out to be a call to action to 
Angelenos not only to fill the seats in the auditoriums at the Music Center but to think of 
themselves as participants in the community Davidson hoped to foster.  
 More than a statement of his philosophy, this editorial by Davidson was also an 
important tactical maneuver in a fight with County supervisors and conservative leaders that 
began brewing just a month after CTG announced the lineup for the first season, in January 
1967, when the specter of censorship began to loom over the Taper and threatened to 
undercut the theater’s ambitions. Pushing back against the threat, Davidson, Chandler, the 
press, and other supporters of the theater would not only object to the scurrilous moral and 
political implications of censorship, but would also invoke the cultural maturity narrative that 
had been so important in garnering support for the Music Center and would be equally 
important in sustaining Center Theatre Group.    
In January 1967, Center Theatre Group announced that the Mark Taper Forum would 
open on April 9 of that year with a production of John Whiting’s The Devils, the first of four 
productions in the Taper’s inaugural season. Rounding out the lineup would be Romulus 
Linney’s The Sorrows of Frederick, the previously announced Witnesses by William Murray, 
and Durrenmatt’s The Marriage of Mr. Mississippi. In many ways, The Devils was an ideal 
production with which to launch the Taper. A sprawling intellectual drama with what New 
York Times critic Howard Taubman called “an Elizabethan sweep and richness of texture,” 
the play tells the story of a libertine priest in seventeenth-century France, Father Grandier, 
who impregnates a seventeen-year-old girl, is accused of diabolism by a scorned nun, and is 
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ultimately forced to trial and execution by the Catholic Church in retaliation for his 
opposition to Cardinal Richelieu. Episodic in structure, the play deals with questions of 
institutional power, faith, and the capacity of individuals and institutions to destroy others in 
furtherance of personal and political agendas.  
Having originally appeared in London in 1961, the play had a brief run from 
November 1965 to January 1966 on Broadway, before closing abruptly after only seventy-
five performances, despite a positive critical response.648 Howard Taubman called the play 
“one of the finest of our age” and marveled that it had taken so long—nearly five years—to 
reach New York from London when “our stage” was “in such desperate need of 
nourishment.”649 The play fit neatly in the tradition established by the Theatre Group of 
presenting challenging work appealing to the intellectual audience cultivated by Houseman 
and Davidson. It was also sure to provoke the “spirited dialogue between audience and 
artists” that Davidson had said would define the Forum.  
Davidson defined the premiere season’s theme in the program for The Devils as 
“affirmation and denial—a quest for values.”650 He confined his program note to discussing 
how the season’s plays reflected that overall theme, but affirmation, denial, and the quest for 
values could just as easily be said to define the unfolding story of the launching of the Mark 
Taper Forum. Its first seasons would be defined not just by the work on its stage but by the 
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development of its relationships with its audiences, the community at large, the County 
Board of Supervisors, and other theaters across the country. Although Davidson had two 
advantages Elia Kazan and Robert Whitehead did not enjoy at Lincoln Center—a supportive 
board of directors and a friendly press—he would not mount his first seasons without 
resistance from a variety of corners. He would soon discover, he recalled while looking back 
at the Taper’s first season, that the “reality, pressures, and responsibilities of living and 
working in a publicly owned facility (Los Angeles County) are enormous. Political 
sensitivity to the righteous wrath of taxpayer pressure is immediate and disconcerting.” 651 It 
was the controversy that arose from the selection of The Devils that would bring the Taper’s 
first exposure to the wrath of taxpayer pressure, and would prove to be a defining moment 
for the theater. 
A Dastardly Opening  
 The night of Sunday, April 9, 1967 marked the beginning of a week-long celebration 
of the opening of the Mark Taper Forum and the Ahmanson Theatre. That evening, the Taper 
was dedicated with a sneak preview performance of The Devils. With the dedication of the 
Taper, wrote Los Angeles Times staff writer Philip Fradkin, “Experimental theater in the 
United States was given a thrust forward.” Ronald Reagan, then governor of California, 
presided over the dedication ceremony preceding the performance and called the theater a 
“beautiful temple of our profession and art.”652 Also on hand were Dorothy Chandler, Mark 
Taper, and a host of other high profile figures including Mayor Sam Yorty, County 
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Supervisor Ernest Debs, and of course CTG’s leadership team, Davidson, Martin, and 
Whitehead.  
Despite the glamour of the dedication week festivities, a cloud had been hanging over 
the Taper and the Music Center since February, when County Supervisor L.S. Hollinger 
recommended that the Music Center’s Production Standards Committee “be expanded to 
include qualified members to review and make recommendations on dramas the new theater 
group plans to produce.” Hollinger’s recommendation stemmed from “numerous 
communications” about the “controversial nature” of The Devils, communications which 
“protest[ed] the use of a public owned facility for such productions.”653 Although the 
Standards Committee mentioned by Hollinger existed not to review content of productions at 
the Music Center but rather to ensure that any entities seeking to use the Music Center 
facilities met certain standards of professionalism and quality, he wanted its purview 
expanded to ensure that future productions of CTG would be reviewed for content. Lew 
Wasserman responded by dismissing the idea that any censorship board would hamper 
CTG’s efforts to produce important works in the new facilities at the Music Center.654 
Looking back years later, Wasserman called the controversy “a dangerous situation,” and he 
said that had CTG not been able to open with The Devils as they had planned, “it could well 
have compromised the vitality of the CTG for a long while, perhaps permanently.”655 Despite 
Wasserman’s resolve to ensure the creative freedom of CTG and to protect it from political 
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interference, he realized that the situation would need to be handled delicately because of the 
stakes involved not just for the theater but also for the reputation of Los Angeles.  
On February 22, 1967, the Board of Supervisors followed Hollinger’s suggestion and 
voted to “expand the present Music Center Standards Committee to include experts on 
drama.” Hollinger recommended that the authority of the expanded Standards Committee be 
written into the long-term operating lease which was due to be signed in June. The 
Supervisors “unanimously denied that censorship was intended but insisted that some form of 
standards must be maintained as long as the theaters are partially supported by public 
funds.”656 Just as the political complexities of the relationship between the theater and the 
County constituted new terrain for the Taper, so too was it new and treacherous ground for 
the county supervisors, who struggled to find the balance between pushing back against 
programming they found objectionable and not appearing to be engaging in explicit 
censorship.  
In early March 1967, William Severns, the head of the Music Center Operating 
Company, circulated a recent edition of the “Los Angeles Newsletter,” which he described as 
“a little scandal sheet that is circulated among public offices,” and which provided, he said, 
valuable insight into how the Supervisors’ minds worked.657 According to the newsletter, the 
supervisors, “who got publicly burned in the public flap” over an exhibit at the Los Angeles 
County Museum of Art, were trying to handle the situation with The Devils with a bit more 
                                                
656 Tom Goff. “Music Center Tax Proposal Deferred.” Los Angeles Times, February 22, 1967. ProQuest 
Historical Newspapers: The Los Angeles Times.  
657 “Los Angeles Newsletter.” February 18, 1967. Center Theatre Group Records, 316-M, 
University of California, Library Special Collections, University of California, Los Angeles. 
 306 
aplomb and “considerably more sophistication”658 Just a year earlier, the supervisors had 
been embroiled in a battle with the museum over an exhibit by local artist Edward Kienholz. 
The exhibit consisted of two tableaus, one depicting a house of prostitution and the other 
showing a couple embracing in the backseat of a car. In a unanimous vote, the Board of 
Supervisors had demanded that the museum remove the works. Supervisor Warren Dorn, 
whose vote against the museum coincided with the announcement of his candidacy for 
governor, said the works by Kienholz “were not art in the ordinary sense. My wife knows art. 
I know pornography.”659 Another supervisor declared the works were “not only in bad taste, 
but inconsistent with the repeatedly expressed views of this board in its efforts to halt the 
moral decline of the community.”660 The Museum’s trustees refused to acquiesce to the 
supervisors, arguing that doing so would establish a dangerous precedent. Eventually, the 
Museum and the supervisors arrived at a compromise allowing the works to remain in place, 
albeit behind a closed door, but the incident was embarrassing to the city on the national 
stage. New York Times art critic Philip Leider mocked the supervisors, noting that the events 
were remarkable “even for a city that has as great an appetite for disgracing itself culturally 
as Los Angeles.”661 By demanding the Museum shut down the exhibit under penalty of 
defunding, the supervisors had exposed themselves to accusations of abusing their authority 
and had portrayed Los Angeles in an unflattering light. Moreover, the Supervisors had 
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learned that banning an exhibit or production outright was a politically dangerous move, so 
they would need to find a more artful solution.  
However, even though they realized they could not press CTG to cancel the 
production, they could not escape the fact that the production would offend a large segment 
of the population, many of whom viewed the play as anti-Catholic, not to mention those who 
would be offended by the overt sexual content of the play. Further complicating matters was 
the fact that the supervisors had allocated a $35,000 subsidy for the Dedication Week 
festivities, which would prominently feature The Devils. Meanwhile, many of them had been 
working overtime acting as fervent defenders of decency on their constituents’ behalf. Frank 
Bonelli had just “made a swinging attack against ‘Filth’ in the UCLA Daily Bruin, only to 
find some of the same words to be uttered by actors in a county-owned theater.” Meanwhile, 
Kenneth Hahn “had to cope with constituents from the Southern Bible belt who were already 
raising hell about the painting of a nude woman in the City Hall Rotunda,” and “Supervisor 
Warren M. Dorn had to protect his image as the champion of the Decency Amendment.”662 
Given these efforts, the Supervisors “realized they could not openly subsidize ‘The Devils’ as 
a ‘historical’ pageant without a major flap.”663 
Sometime in February, a high-level meeting among the supervisors, Dorothy 
Chandler, and other leaders of the Music Center took place. The meeting resulted in a 
compromise in which the parties agreed as follows: the supervisors agreed not to interfere 
with the production, which would go on as scheduled; the Music Center and supervisors 
agreed to find some other way to spend the $35,000 earmarked for the dedication “without 
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directly subsidizing the play”; the Music Center would expand the Standards Committee to 
screen drama in addition to its current limitation to reviewing musical events in the Pavilion. 
Although there would likely be a “few cries of ‘censorship,’” the long term effect of the 
agreement, said the “Los Angeles Newsletter,” would be “to remove the Music Center 
productions from direct political control by supervisors who are probably better at making 
speeches than telling actors what they can say.”664 
Between the February meeting and the opening of The Devils, little was said in the 
press about the controversy. However, the play’s opening provoked renewed debate over 
whether it was appropriate to present, in a publicly-owned facility, a production considered 
by many to be licentious, an attack on religion, or both. A few weeks after the opening of the 
play, the Anchorettes, Catholic Women in Government Service decried The Devils, calling it 
“lewd, sordid, obscene and pornographic,” adding that it “derides and defames religion.”665 
An organization called Operation Moral Upgrade issued a radio advertisement calling upon 
theatergoers to boycott the production. “This is not UCLA,” they said, “where all costs are 
picked up by the captive taxpayers. A buying audience goes because they wish to—taxes for 
our state institutions [like UCLA] are paid because we have to.” Arguing that many “life time 
supporters of Los Angeles theater are not buying season tickets” at the Forum because of the 
play selections, they urged Angelenos, “Make your wishes felt, state your preference for [the] 
type of entertainment desired—for it is the public that has the final word.”666 The Times 
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published several letters to the editor both protesting and supporting the production of the 
play, and Gordon Davidson received a deluge of letters from subscribers and other 
Angelenos.  
Davidson said little in public about the matter, but responded to many of those who 
wrote him either in support of or opposition to his choice to mount The Devils. One such 
letter arrived in February 1967 from a UCLA Theatre Group subscriber named Adele 
Erenberg. After learning that the supervisors had voted to require the expansion of the 
Standards Committee, Erenberg was angered by Davidson’s lack of a public response, and 
wrote to Davidson to ask that her name be removed from CTG’s mailing list. “I do not wish 
to patronize any cultural endeavor that so meekly agrees to censorship,”667 she told 
Davidson, who replied a few days after receiving her letter. Davidson acknowledged receipt 
of Erenberg’s request to have her name deleted from the mailing list but said, “I’m afraid I 
can’t comply with your request because I think you’re too valuable a member of our 
audience. If people like you feel strongly about this issue and don’t support us, then indeed 
we will be in trouble.” He then went on to tell her that he was enclosing an order blank so 
that she could subscribe, closing out the letter by telling her, “I do mean it when I say I think 
you should be part of our first season.”668 Davidson had turned her protest around on her, 
seizing upon her sense of righteousness over the apparent acquiescence to censorship and her 
belief that such acquiescence represented a shirking of responsibility on Davidson and the 
Taper’s part. By choosing not to patronize the theater, Davidson pointed out, Erenberg 
                                                
667 Adele Erenberg to Gordon Davidson, February 22, 1967. Center Theatre Group Records, Box 1. Folder: 
“Subscribers – 1967 Season, Correspondence.” 
668 Gordon Davidson to Adele Erenberg, February 27, 1967. Center Theatre Group Records, Box 1. Folder: 
“Subscribers – 1967 Season, Correspondence.” 
 310 
herself would be guilty of shirking her own responsibility, as a member of the community 
concerned with the freedom of expression, to support the theater. In other words, the 
responsibility to resist censorship did not rest solely with the theater, but was a shared 
responsibility. 
In June 1967, shortly after The Devils closed, Davidson received a letter from a Dr. 
A. Giesbret, who chastised him for mounting a play in which the “artistic value of the acting 
and the plot is far outweighed by the destructive Christian attitudes.” The choice of the play 
was particularly “remarkable,” Giesbret wrote, “in these days when Christianity is being 
eliminated overseas and when internal insurrection is heavily weighed with anti-christian 
[sic] dogma.” Closing out the letter, he inquired, “May I have your opinion whether this is 
the nature of your personal policy, or the future character of plays?”669 Giesbret did not come 
out and ask Davidson to name any political parties he belonged to either currently or in the 
past, but by linking “internal insurrection” with what he perceived as the anti-Christian 
content of the play, he seems rather clearly to have been invoking anti-Communist sentiment 
in his closing inquiry to Davidson. Davidson, however, did not take the bait. Instead, he 
plainly said, “The play does not reflect my personal policy, other than my concern with 
issues of our time, and it is my hope to be able to find playwrights who will discuss all sides 
of all important questions.” Davidson also assured Giesbret that the play was not anti-
Christian, but in fact the opposite. The main concern of the play, Davidson said, was “man’s 
search for God and his attempt to find meaning in a world in which faith is often denied or 
destroyed.” In the end, Davidson said, the priest did in fact find God and was redeemed in 
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death. “His revelation,” wrote Davidson, “is not unlike Saint Joan’s and I am convinced that 
this play is a religious, Christian story of temptation, fall and redemption.” More important 
than the theme of the play, however, was the fact that the play “couldn’t help but stimulate 
talk and discussion. The very fact of your letter corroborates this.” Davidson closed the letter 
by entreating Giesbret to return to the Taper and said he hoped that Giesbret would “be 
moved to write when you are both disturbed and pleased by what you see and hear.”670   
 These were just two of dozens of letters Davidson received, but they demonstrate 
perhaps better than anything else Davidson’s vision of how a “civic” theater should operate. 
His final gesture in his letter to Adele Erenberg in which he implicitly demands that she buy 
a subscription was not the effort of a producer to get more bottoms in the seats, but rather a 
demonstration of his belief that just as playwrights, actors, and directors had a responsibility 
to produce compelling work in the Forum, audiences had an equal responsibility to show up 
and engage with the work.  Meanwhile, his response to Giesbret demonstrated his 
commitment to using the work of the theater to foster discussion within the community. 
Moreover, the volume of correspondence and his silence in the press while the censorship 
controversy played out suggests an astute decision to avoid publicly antagonizing the Board 
of Supervisors and to allow Chandler and Wasserman to handle much of the delicate 
negotiation while he worked “on the ground” to cultivate the Taper’s audience.   
The controversy reached its boiling point and ultimately its resolution in June 1967. 
At a May 31 meeting, the Board of Supervisors refused to approve an operating lease for the 
Ahmanson and the Taper because the “proposal did not give them enough control over the 
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quality of productions.” Supervisor Frank G. Bonelli defended the Board’s stance, saying, 
“We don’t want to be complete censors, but we need safeguards to see that something as 
dastardly as ‘The Devils’ does not come back again.”671 The lease already contained a 
paragraph detailing certain requirements that must be met by productions presented in the 
two theaters, saying that the companies operating therein would present “a season of 
productions and events which shall be dignified and thoroughly high class in caliber and cast 
no reflection upon the County of Los Angeles . . . or mar the reputation of The Music 
Center.” Further, nothing could be presented that “contain[ed] songs, speeches, or other 
dialogue . . . which are considered vulgar, obscene, licentious, indecent, immoral, illegal, 
scandalous or objectionable to a substantial segment of the public.”672  The Board of 
Supervisors, however, protested that the lease did not include any mention of the Standards 
Committee to be put in place to review spoken drama in the two theaters.673 Supervisor 
Bonelli declared he was “not at all happy with the lack of restrictions,” and said he would not 
ever try to interfere with what was presented in “private theaters,” but because of the 
County’s financial interest in the Center, “it should have control over the type of productions 
presented.”674 
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The supervisors felt pressure to take a stance after having received complaints from 
constituents and the Catholic Church. However, in the wake of the May 31 meeting, the 
public and the press voiced opposition to what they viewed as another attempt at censorship. 
Los Angeles Times reporter Art Seidenbaum mocked Bonelli’s characterization of The Devils 
as “dastardly,” saying the lease already promised productions would not be “‘vulgar, 
obscene, licentious, indecent, immoral, illegal. . . .’ See: not a single prohibition against a 
dastardly act. Maybe if the Theatre Group would throw in that one added adjective, a 
compromise lease will be signed this week.” Seidenbaum also suggested that supervisors 
were motivated by their desire to sell a parcel of land in the Civic Center adjacent to the 
Music Center and that Bonelli did not “want to see this territory applied to any potential 
dastards.” Bonelli, according to Seidenbaum said he was worried that there would be an 
attempt to get the land for more cultural facilities. “God forbid,” Bonelli said, “the day we 
put more money into cultural activities than we have now.” Seidenbaum shot back, “that’s 
what happens when you water the desert; greedy culturists expect more.”675 
Most major radio stations also issued editorials condemning the Board’s stance. In a 
statement read on the air on June 5, Robert P. Sutton, vice president of CBS Radio and 
general manager of local affiliate KNX, called the supervisors’ plan to require a review board 
un-American and a sham, arguing, “The marketplace—the box-office—that is the censorship 
in a democracy. What the people don’t want, they don’t buy. In Russia and Red China, the 
government tells the people what they can see and hear. Not in America.”676 Radio station 
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KABC argued that the restrictions demanded by the Supervisors threatened the integrity and 
vitality of the Music Center and would cast Los Angeles in a negative light, just as the 
Museum scandal had. “What kind of drama would we have,” the editorial asked, “if every 
presentation had to be so innocuous that no one would be scandalized?” Not only would that 
result in the Music Center becoming “a dead, uninspiring museum for period pieces,” they 
argued, but it would also stop in its tracks Los Angeles’s “effort to be a world-wide focal 
point for the arts. We’ve made a fine start. Let’s not destroy it all with foolish attempts at 
censorship.”677 
A week after the May 31 Board of Supervisors meeting, the supervisors finally 
approved the lease after receiving “assurances from the Performing Arts Council of The 
Music Center that its Standards Committee would review future productions in both theaters 
as well as the Dorothy Chandler Pavilion.” Moving to approve the lease, Bonelli reiterated 
his belief that “as long as taxpayer money is used in support of that complex of buildings . . . 
we must have a committee that can and will assure us proper standards will be maintained.” 
Ernest Debs, meanwhile, was quick to add that with the expansion of the Standards 
Committee, “We’ll have nothing to say,” as the Committee would have “sole determination” 
over what was deemed suitable or not. “I am hopeful,” Debs said, “that it will be absolutely 
clear that we are not acting in any way as censors.”678  
The supervisors had gotten what they wanted. By strong-arming the Music Center 
into expanding the Standards Committee they were able to demonstrate to some of their 
                                                
677 Transcript, “KABC Editorial. Transcript of Radio Address entitled “Double-Think Comes to Los Angeles 
Theater,” June 5, 1967. Center Theatre Group Records, Box 1. Folder: “Censorship.” 
678 Tom Goff. “Lease Approved for Two Music Center Theaters.” Los Angeles Times, June 7, 1967. ProQuest 
Historical Newspapers: The Los Angeles Times. 
 315 
constituents that they would not stand for “indecency,” while also disavowing themselves as 
censors. Center Theatre Group, meanwhile, emerged relatively unscathed. Although 
Chandler had agreed to expand the purview of the committee, she assured Davidson that he 
had her absolute support and that she would not interfere with his artistic decision-making. 
Davidson later recalled, “I felt I had complete freedom, and along with freedom comes 
responsibility.” Chandler, Davidson said, “mainly just wanted to be informed. Neither she 
nor Lew Wasserman wanted to be blindsided.” Chandler also told Davidson to let her know 
if he felt there were any productions she should avoid seeing. “Then,” she told Davidson, “I 
won’t have to have an opinion about it.”679   
As for the committee, Chandler asked UCLA Chancellor Franklin Murphy to chair it. 
When he expressed his objection to what he considered to be a “censorship board,” Chandler 
“shook her head. ‘Franklin, we’ve been told to form it,’ she said. ‘That doesn’t mean it ever 
has to meet.’”680 According to Davidson, the committee met only once. After calling the 
meeting to order, Murphy announced, “this is the first meeting of the standards committee. 
And it is the last meeting of the standards committee.”681 Chandler also knew that Murphy 
would be as committed as she was to protecting the integrity of Center Theatre Group. While 
Davidson’s concern was primarily the sanctity of artistic autonomy in the Taper, Chandler 
and Murphy viewed the stakes as being much higher. Both were intensely intent on elevating 
the national stature of Los Angeles and erasing the perception of the city as a cultural 
backwater. Murphy and Chandler had formed a close alliance in their work at UCLA—
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Murphy as Chancellor and Chandler as a Regent—motivated by their commitment to putting 
UCLA on the same level as Berkeley. Murphy’s commitment to this goal was aptly 
demonstrated early in his tenure at UCLA when he heard an administrative assistant answer 
the phone, announcing, “University of California, Los Angeles Branch.” Murphy responded 
by issuing an edict to all staff that they were henceforth to refer to the institution as UCLA, 
proclaiming, “We’ll make those four letters just as visible and indelible as MIT.”682 
Chandler, meanwhile, in addition to her efforts to bring the Music Center to fruition had been 
working since the early 1960s to shake things up at the Times and transform it from the 
“information bible” of the far right into a “modern paper” fit for a “contemporary city.”683 
Obsessed with the image of Los Angeles, Chandler was not about to allow the moralizing 
Supervisors to diminish the prestige of Center Theatre Group, which was gearing up in June 
1967 to present its first world premiere play.   
An Ambitious and Perilous Policy 
 While the censorship controversy over The Devils was playing out, rehearsals were 
already underway for the second offering of the Taper’s first season, The Sorrows of 
Frederick by Romulus Linney. The play, scheduled to open on June 23, 1967, was the first 
by the renowned novelist, and with it, wrote Cecil Smith in a typical puff piece, Center 
Theatre Group “embark[ed] on the ambitious and perilous policy it set for itself in its 
formation—the production of new plays.”684 Smith lauded Center Theatre Group for 
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breaking with the tradition of most institutional theaters, like the Repertory Theatre of 
Lincoln Center and the Guthrie, which dealt “almost exclusively in classics or established 
modern plays, proven works” and noted that in addition to the world premiere about to open 
at the Taper, the Ahmanson would soon launch its production of More Stately Mansions, 
marking the first American performance of that play.685 Both productions were expected to 
be exported to New York following their CTG productions, and promised to establish the 
company’s national prominence. With its world and American premiere productions, said 
Elliott Martin, Los Angeles, once a tributary to Broadway, was “now helping to erase the 
historic boundaries and [was] taking up a position of independence and equality.”686  
Although Frederick would ultimately not have a Broadway run, the Taper production 
marked an important moment in the early life of the Taper. In addition to demonstrating the 
company’s commitment to generating new work, it also made clear Davidson’s desire to 
establish its legitimacy not through a self-righteous rejection of Broadway carried out in an 
insular provincial theater, but rather through the cultivation of a mutually beneficial 
relationship with the commercial theater world. As passionately as Davidson believed in 
developing an adventurous local audience in Los Angeles, he also understood how important 
the city’s growing national prestige was to Los Angeles’s civic pride, which had been so 
important to Chandler and the backers of the Music Center. With The Sorrows of Frederick, 
Davidson made the first attempt to move the Taper toward national prominence when he 
entered into an agreement with Robert Whitehead and playwright Albert Marre to present the 
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play with Marre and Whitehead as producers, an undertaking that turned out to be, as Cecil 
Smith, had written, both “ambitious and perilous.”  
In February 1967, negotiations were finalized in an agreement among Center Theatre 
Group, Robert Whitehead, and Albert Marre for The Sorrows of Frederick. Whitehead and 
Marre would “present the play as a presentation at the Mark Taper Forum,”687 and the two 
would have joint authority with CTG on artistic decisions. They would negotiate all 
production-related contracts with actors, designers, and so forth. CTG would provide the 
theater facilities at no cost to the producers but would retain all box office receipts, and, if the 
play were to move on to a “first class stage production,” the organization would be given the 
right of first refusal to invest “all or part of the financing required for such production.” 
Further, the agreement specified that while CTG would contribute to the production 
financially in accordance with the “customary” costs of a CTG production, Whitehead and 
Marre would be responsible for any overages, which were expected to amount to 
approximately $75,000. Although Whitehead and Marre would not participate in box office 
receipts at the Taper, presenting the play at the Forum afforded them the benefit of a rent-free 
venue as well as CTG’s obligation to pay its “customary” production costs, which amounted 
to $125,572,688 thereby mitigating a significant part of the financial risk they would 
undertake were they to launch the production on Broadway or on a commercial tour rather 
than at the Taper. The Taper, meanwhile, benefited from the supplemental financing 
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provided by Whitehead and Marre, which allowed them to present a production more lavish 
than they otherwise could. Furthermore, the arrangement offered the possibility of significant 
financial rewards for CTG, as it stipulated that CTG would be entitled to participate in the 
proceeds from the sale of subsidiary rights obtained after the Taper production.  
While the scale of the production and the partnership with Whitehead and Marre 
demonstrated the ambition of the Taper’s policy of generating new work, the drama that 
unfolded behind the scenes demonstrated the perils of such a policy, perils stemming from 
the delicate balance that had to be struck between the interests of each of the parties involved 
in creating the production. In one corner was Center Theatre Group, which was working to 
lay the foundation for a company that not only generated compelling artistic work but that 
could also achieve longevity and institutional soundness. In another corner were Whitehead 
and Marre, commercial producers facing enormous financial risks. And in yet another corner 
sat the playwright, Romulus Linney, who looked to the Taper to provide him with a creative 
environment free from the constraints that had kept him away from writing for the theater up 
until that point. Davidson firmly believed, he would later say, “that the thrust and force” of 
the Taper lay in the generation of new work, “not just because it happens to excite and 
stimulate our audiences, but because I have a tremendous sense of obligation to the writing 
talent in the country to provide them with a responsible and highly professional environment 
in which they can create.”689 Davidson’s phrasing here is worth noting in that it demonstrates 
that his commitment to fostering creativity was strongly undergirded by a sense of 
responsibility to ensuring that the environment he hoped to provide could be sustained. 
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Davidson was happy to give playwrights, directors, and actors as much autonomy as 
possible, but he would intervene when he thought it necessary to protect the organization. 
 A week before Frederick’s opening, Romulus Linney sat down with Cecil Smith for a 
lengthy interview for the Times. Much of the interview focused on the play itself, but it was 
clear from the interview that the censorship cloud still hung over the Music Center complex. 
Linney’s main interest, he said, had always been the theater, but he had “worked in novels 
for the freedom of intellectual inquiry and the full exploration of serious themes in an era 
when there is little opportunity in the commercial theater for serious plays.” Linney believed 
that “the great opportunity for American drama” lay in institutional theaters like CTG, “if 
they [could] function freely.”690 Linney found the Taper to be an ideal venue for his play, he 
said, and noted that the Forum’s “broad, outthrust stage [was] ideal for the complex, 
experimental structure of the drama,” and he expressed his respect for Gordon Davidson and 
the artistic management of the Taper, where the work had “been conducted,” he felt, “in an 
atmosphere of sympathy and understanding.”  
Despite this praise for the company, however, an undercurrent of frustration emerged 
in the interview. Linney argued that a writer in the theater had to be “part artist and part 
streetfighter—part thug! You’ve got to battle every inch of the way against those who’d 
sabotage your work.”691 Linney said he “deplored” the general attitude of bureaucrats toward 
artists, saying, “There seems to be absolutely no attempt to understand the position of the 
artist, the author—his responsibility to his work. I’ve worked five years on this damned thing 
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and I wouldn’t let anybody destroy it.”692 He seemed to be speaking in general terms, rather 
than saying that CTG specifically had in any way interfered with his work. At least that’s 
how Smith painted it in his write up of the interview. But Linney was clearly suggesting that 
he had at least to a certain degree felt pressured to compromise his artistic work at the Taper. 
Although the interview did not explicitly say so, Linney had in fact been pressured by CTG 
to make changes to the play as the organization was still navigating its way through the 
censorship crisis spawned by The Devils. While Linney swore that he was not about to let 
anyone destroy the play he had worked on for five years, the management of CTG felt 
similarly strongly about protecting the viability of their own enterprise, causing a behind-the-
scenes row between Linney and CTG’s management that led Linney, several months later, to 
declare that the production had severely undermined his original vision. In the weeks 
preceding Linney’s interview with Smith, concern had grown within Center Theatre Group 
that Frederick presented potential problems that might require the intervention of the 
organization’s management, specifically the length of the play, which threatened, if not 
significantly trimmed, to run nearly four hours, and, more importantly, explicit language. 
When Linney resisted making changes in either regard, Davidson was left with no alternative 
but to intervene to protect the fledgling company.  
Davidson expressed his concern over the length of the play to Whitehead, Marre, and 
Linney early during the rehearsal period. He assured the creative team of his feeling that the 
Taper’s audiences were “mature enough to participate in a long evening.”693 However, he 
also believed that there always came “the point of diminishing returns” and said he “hope[d] 
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that during the course of the previews, we can honestly evaluate the flow of the play in 
relation to the dramatic effect so that the time factor becomes less important.”694 
Emphasizing that his main concern was the overall effectiveness of the play, he still said that 
he hoped the play could be kept to a total running time of three hours. With a curtain time of 
8:40,695 even a three-hour running time would mean the evening would not end until twenty 
minutes before midnight. Pushing it any further than that could, Davidson thought, anger 
many patrons. Whitehead suggested that the curtain time be moved up to 8:00. After 
consulting with the Music Center Operating Company, the CTG Board of Directors, and 
administrative staff, however, Davidson informed Whitehead, Linney, and Marre, that it was 
not possible to change the curtain time,696 thereby putting pressure on the creative team to 
reduce the play’s length.  
The more urgent matter for Davidson and CTG was the play’s use of explicit 
language, which Davidson urged, on behalf of the CTG’s board of directors and the Music 
Center Operating Company, be toned down significantly, and asked the three men to 
“consider the deletion of a number of words from the script.”697 Davidson affirmed his 
commitment to “the creative atmosphere that must exist here and the need for the theatre to 
be bold and daring and, most of all, supportive of artistic integrity.” He believed, he said, that 
the choice of plays for the season bore out that commitment. However, the memo in which 
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Davidson expressed these concerns was issued on June 5, two days before the Board of 
Supervisors finally approved the leases for the Taper and the Ahmanson, and less than a 
week after the Devils controversy had reached its climax with the threat that the lease would 
not be renewed. Davidson warned the men that the “ability of this theatre to continue forging 
a unique place for itself is in serious jeopardy,” and he pleaded with them to “help in the 
matter by giving this request your serious consideration.”698  
Marre and Whitehead were sympathetic to the situation, which they explained to 
Linney before asking him to make cuts to what was thought to be problematic language. 
Linney had not agreed to the cuts, prompting Davidson’s June 5 memo, which went 
unanswered. Ten days after Davidson’s memo, Elliot Martin intervened. He began by 
reminding Linney of the shaky ground on which the young organization stood. Although they 
had survived the Supervisors’ assault on CTG over The Devils, it was still “important that the 
creative momentum of this kind of theatre operation gather steam and confidence with each 
new play. . . . This kind of theatre complex,” he said, “must gain the confidence of theatre-
goers, over a period of time.”699 After expressing his confidence that the play’s production, 
which Center Theatre Group was “very proud” to be presenting as its first original work, he 
told Linney that it was now “absolutely imperative that certain lines in the play be deleted.” 
Linney would of course be free, Martin said, to reinstate those lines for his New York 
engagement, but he assured Linney that he, Whitehead, Marre, and Davidson believed that 
deleting the lines would make “no difference between success and failure in Los Angeles, or 
that the deletion of these lines [would] in any way impede the story line or the dramatic 
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impact of the work.”700 Martin made it clear to Linney that his communiqué with him was 
not an entreaty but a mandate, infuriating Linney. 
Previews of Frederick were already underway when Martin issued his directive to 
Linney—with the backing of Davidson, Whitehead, and Marre—to delete several specific 
lines. Linney refused to make the changes, but was overruled by Marre, a co-owner of the 
play. Marre was left to make the adjustments on his own after Linney walked off, “adamantly 
refus[ing] to touch a word, rewrite a scene or fully co-operate on the production.”701 After 
witnessing the changes that had been forced upon his play, Linney accused Marre and CTG 
of “violating” his play and argued that “the various cuts and deletions [had] turned his study 
of the founder of Prussian militarism and the lineal ancestor of Hitler into the portrait of a 
charming old king.”702 Over the course of several weeks once the production opened, he 
inundated Cecil Smith with letters and phone calls  in which he “loudly voiced his 
complaints.”  In the earlier and aforementioned interview with Smith, Linney had tempered 
his language about the frustrations he was experiencing in the creative process at the Taper, 
but after walking off the production, he now sought to publicly accuse CTG of sabotaging his 
work by trying to get Smith to publish his side of the story.  
Knowing that he could not ignore Linney’s letters and calls, Smith reported Linney’s 
objections, but staunchly defended CTG and dismissed Linney’s complaints. “My 
sympathies are usually with the writer,” Smith told his readers, “. . . but in Linney’s case, I 
think his objections are hogwash.” Smith said he had reread the original script paying close 
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attention to each of the cuts that Linney was demanding be reinstated, and said that he did 
“not believe they would make one whit of difference in the ultimate impact of the play.”703 
Smith had given the play a glowing review upon its opening, praising the “language, rich 
with wit, that floods the theater; the scenes that sear the mind; the gallery of 18th-century 
nobles, not uniforms stuck onto sticks, but fully realized and rounded humans!”704 He 
reiterated his praise of the play when reporting on Linney’s objections and also repeated his 
opinion that the play’s major shortcoming was its ending. More importantly, however, Smith 
argued that even with the play’s flaws, one “would feel that director Albert Marre working 
with Linney . . . by reshaping and reforging certain elements during the run here would end 
up with a really, important, cohesive drama.”705 Smith added that although Marre believed 
the play would likely be on Broadway in the fall, it should be remembered that preparing 
plays for commercial runs was “not the function of the CTG nor the purpose of the Forum.” 
What mattered, regardless of whether a show actually had a subsequent commercial 
production, was the “launching of a valid new drama.” Frederick was “the sort of play that 
art theater companies from Atlanta to Seattle are in search of,” Smith said, adding that it was 
“the function and purpose of this organization to do its utmost to make a new play of stature 
into a viable drama that is a valuable addition to American dramatic literature.”706  
Smith essentially turned Linney’s argument around on him. Linney had besieged Smith with 
protestations over the treatment of his play by CTG, ostensibly with the purpose of getting 
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Smith to report sympathetically on his plight as a writer whose work was being undermined 
by the bureaucratic machinations of CTG. Smith, however, turned the tables on Linney and 
essentially accused him of undermining his own play by refusing to collaborate and of 
impeding the Forum’s ability to carry out its primary purpose of expanding the American 
theatrical canon.  
Because of Linney’s dissatisfaction with the Taper production, The Sorrows of 
Frederick did not move on to a Broadway production. Nearly a year after its Taper 
production, Robert Whitehead told the New York Times he was still very much interested in 
mounting the play on Broadway, but there were “some present complications.” Just a few 
days before Whitehead spoke to the Times, Linney himself had told the paper that he “had 
not gotten along with Albert Marre while working on the Taper production. If there were to 
be a Broadway production, it would not be until after September 1968, when Marre’s option 
on the play ended. Linney said he might be willing to proceed with the play with Whitehead 
producing but refused to work with Marre on the production.707 Nonetheless, Frederick was 
an important milestone for the Taper, which had delivered on its promise to deliver a 
compelling world premiere drama. The episode also demonstrated Davidson’s pragmatism in 
finding the balance between producing bold and thematically controversial work while 
balancing that aspiration with his need to ensure the institutional survival of the theater. 
Furthermore, Smith’s intervention in the press provided Davidson and CTG cover by 
painting Linney’s reaction to the imposed changes as unreasonable because the production 
did not suffer from those changes and that the company had fulfilled an important part of its 
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mission by producing such an innovative original work in the first place. Meanwhile, by 
putting his foot down with Linney over some of the language in Frederick after having 
refused to back down in the face of the disgruntled supervisors during the Devils controversy, 
Davidson demonstrated to his board that they could trust that he would make minor 
compromises when necessary to protect the greater artistic freedom to tackle challenging 
work that might rankle some audience members.  
Moving into the second season, Davidson would continue to challenge the Taper’s 
audiences and critics with challenging and controversial work. Although he started the 
season with a canonical comedy, Moliere’s The Miser, starring Hume Cronyn and Jessica 
Tandy, the remainder of the season featured a revised version of Tennessee Williams’s 
Camino Real, the American premiere of the controversial In the Matter of J. Robert 
Oppenheimer, and an evening comprised of two one-act plays, The Golden Fleece by A.R. 
Gurney and Muzeeka by John Guare, that had been born out of the Taper’s original play 
workshop series “New Theatre for Now,” which had begun at the end of the first season 
under the leadership of director Ed Parone. The season was a huge critical success. At the 
end of the program note for the season’s final offering, Davidson commended his audience 
for “attempt[ing] four different and adventurous journeys with us.”708 With his choice of 
plays that season, Davidson affirmed his commitment to presenting work that was relevant, 
that pushed stylistic boundaries, and that challenged audiences.  
But perhaps even more important in the establishment of the Mark Taper Forum’s 
identity, the second season finally secured for Los Angeles its place on the national theatrical 
stage when Davidson directed a production of Oppenheimer at the Repertory Theatre of 
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Lincoln Center after Robert Whitehead passed on the production. The Taper had also 
attracted national press coverage for its own productions at an unprecedented level for any 
regional theater. By the end of the second season, the CTG Press Department could rightly 
report to the board of directors that “no theatre in Los Angeles can match [the Taper’s] 
record for national coverage and review, and all of it happening within a period of less than 
two years.”709  
With the success of the Taper’s first two seasons, Center Theatre Group finally 
fulfilled the aspirations of Dorothy Chandler and the Music Center’s backers to transform 
Los Angeles from a theatrical wasteland feeding on scraps from New York to a major arbiter 
of theatrical taste. Its earlier incarnation at UCLA had clearly demonstrated that Los Angeles 
was home to a sophisticated theater-going audience, while using the intellectual and cultural 
legitimacy of UCLA to affirm their audience’s desire to demonstrate their own sophistication 
and cultural prowess. Moving to the bigger arena of Downtown Los Angeles, Gordon 
Davidson effectively maintained the identity he had worked to develop for the company at 
UCLA, while working to broaden the company’s reach by enlisting his audience in the 
mission to make the Taper a space wherein Angelenos could build community by engaging 
with challenging works presented in bold productions.  The Devils proved to be an ideal 
choice for the opening of the company, not just because it fulfilled the company’s mission of 
presenting important and intellectually stimulating work, but because the threat posed by the 
Supervisors rallied artists, administrators, and the press to the defense of an institution that, 
more than any other of the Music Center’s constituents, could place Los Angeles at the 
forefront of the resident theater movement. Whereas the Repertory Theatre of Lincoln Center 
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never seemed able to make it clear why it even existed in the first place, Center Theatre 
Group established itself as a critical expression of the national and international aspirations 
of a city that was in the midst of a rise to global preeminence.   
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CONCLUSION 
 It has been my aim in this dissertation to examine the ways in which the organizations 
studied herein established their authority to represent their cities and the nation as civic 
institutions and to explore how they legitimated their identities as such. Lincoln Center and 
the Los Angeles Music Center were linked to differing degrees to urban renewal efforts in 
their respective cities, but both institutions relied on their founders’ ability to make the case 
that a pressing need existed to create new cultural venues on an unprecedented scale. Despite 
their purported cultural aspirations, both centers grew out of pragmatic desires to replace one 
vision of urbanity with another and to raise the national and international stature of their 
respective cities. Lincoln Center had no official designation as a national cultural center, but 
nonetheless was said to stand as a symbol of American cultural might by virtue of its location 
in New York, whose global profile was on the rise after World War II. Los Angeles, 
meanwhile, worked to reconcile its booming population with a decidedly un-metropolitan 
national image, while the business elite sought to wrest control of the city’s built 
environment from the political forces of the left, and the Music Center figured prominently 
into these efforts. 
 The centers’ theater constituents, meanwhile, were not directly linked to urban 
renewal efforts but were nonetheless strongly influenced by the conditions shaping Lincoln 
Center and the Los Angeles Music Center, particularly in relation to establishing the theaters’ 
legitimacy as civic institutions. In the case of Center Theatre Group, the organization 
effectively tapped Angelenos’ growing desire to demonstrate their cultural sophistication and 
the desire to establish Los Angeles as a city able to compete with New York and other cities 
as a center of theatrical production. The Repertory Theatre of Lincoln Center, on the other 
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hand, failed to establish a clear vision for an organization that was to be the presumptive 
national theater of the United States. Although the ousting of Kazan and Whitehead was 
largely the result of personal conflict between them and the theater’s board of directors, 
much of that conflict grew out of the pressure caused by the symbolic weight placed on the 
organization and its failure to respond to changing theatrical trends.   
The Permanent Capital of the World 
 When New York was negotiating with the United Nations Organization (UNO) to 
locate its headquarters in Manhattan, the press wasted no time in arguing that securing the 
UNO Headquarters would make New York “the permanent capital of the world,”710 and 
securing the United Nations inarguably bestowed an increased global preeminence on 
postwar New York. More importantly, though, the United Nations was, in the words of 
Samuel Zipp, “an opening episode in a decades-long attack on industry and blue-collar life in 
Manhattan on the part of urban redevelopment policies.”711 Making the case for the United 
Nations had been easy. Turtle Bay had long ago ceased to be a residential neighborhood and 
was occupied almost entirely with industry, mainly in the form of slaughterhouses. It would 
be difficult to argue against trading in slaughterhouses for the United Nations, particularly in 
the absence of large residential populations facing eviction. In the case of the UN, Robert 
Moses’s slum clearance ideal could be, to again borrow Zipp’s words, “reduced to its purest 
logic.”712 If ever there was a good case for the ethos of benevolent intervention in the urban 
landscape, this was it.  
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  Robert Moses established the legitimacy of his urban vision by demonstrating to the 
public that the neighborhoods razed to make way for his slum clearance projects not only had 
little intrinsic value but also threatened the general health and welfare of the city. It fell to the 
leaders of the institutions to be housed on the rubble to establish their civic importance. A 
few months before New York’s Board of Estimate gave final approval to the Lincoln Square 
Urban Renewal Project, Howard Taubman argued in the Times that the city should not only 
give its approval to the project but that they should also assume much if not most of the 
financial burden for the Center’s construction as a matter of civic pride.  
 But while Taubman suggested that the city’s failure to fully back the Center 
financially might rob the institution of its rightful civic stature, the Lincoln Center Board of 
Directors used their reliance on private donors and foundations as a means of establishing the 
institution’s legitimacy as a symbol not just of America’s cultural maturity but as a symbol of 
the virtues of capitalism. “As a symbol before the world,” they said, “Lincoln Center will be 
all the better because it will be built and supported by the freely given gifts of private 
individuals, foundations, and corporations.”713 While Lincoln Center would from the moment 
of its inception—and indeed to the present day—face sharp criticism for elitism, the logic of 
the Cold War, with its valorization of unabashed capitalism, allowed the Center to frame 
private support from the wealthy elite—and even institutional control by a board of directors 
drawn from those same circles—as being demonstrative of the civic values of the Center, 
even while they argued that the Center would offset the belief that Americans cared only 
about material wealth and placed little value on cultural enlightenment.  
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 While the rhetoric of cultural maturity and spiritual aspiration was plentiful, so too 
was language that explicitly cast the Center as a weapon against dangerous others, foreign 
and domestic. Promoting Lincoln Center in a speech to the University Club, board member 
C.D. Jackson declared, “Culture is no longer a sissy word. Today, it is a word of immense 
worldwide political significance.” It was “absolutely fantastic,” he said, “that, from out of the 
seething postwar world, it is culture that should have emerged as a dynamic concept, an 
aspiration of whole nations, a force capable of swaying the masses, an element of decisions 
in the minds of the uncommitted.” Jackson went on to say that the “cultural offensive” 
against Cold War threats was no less important than the arms race or the race to achieve a 
high living standard.714 Such rhetoric effectively lent the Center the air of urgency it needed 
to claim its status as a symbol of national and civic importance.  
 The architecture of the Center, with its austere travertine facades and the blunt edges 
and stark modern lines that characterized its buildings further demonstrated the force with 
which the nation was ready to deploy its cultural resources in the fight against communism. 
Moreover, the physical transformation of the cityscape helped to “boast new urban places 
equal to those of classical Europe,” and would serve, according to Samuel Zipp, to “preserve 
the influence in the United States of a threatened European culture.” Although the Center’s 
backers and leaders never publicly said as much, internal documents cited by Zipp show that 
an early draft of a public statement regarding the Center asserted that the arts “help to keep 
alive and meaningful our cultural and blood ties to Great Britain and the Continent.” As Zipp 
observes, such rhetoric shows the urban elite’s growing discomfort with the changing 
demographics of the city. In the face of postwar suburbanization, deindustrialization, and a 
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massive influx from the black South and Puerto Rico, argues Zipp, “the traditional markers 
of elite stewardship, influence and power were slowly eroding. Lincoln Center promised 
some symbolic support for this endangered social infrastructure.”715 The Center, then, 
derived its legitimacy not just through the artistic stature of the organizations to be housed 
within, but also through its function as a fortress protecting the western  heritage of high art 
and culture. More important to the Center’s leadership than expressing a distinctly American 
identity through the works on its stages was the unequivocal demonstration of the cultural 
and economic might of the United States, a demonstration executed through the very process 
of clearing the landscape to make way for the Center, constructing a citadel equal to those 
found across the Atlantic, and ensuring the institution’s sustainability over the long term.  
 With the eyes of the world on Lincoln Center, the Repertory Theatre was subject to 
intense scrutiny from the moment of its inception. Howard Taubman predicted in 1961 that 
the Repertory Theatre would be “the Center’s most searching test and most challenging 
opportunity.” Unlike Lincoln Center’s other constituents like the Met and the Philharmonic, 
which were “going concerns,” the theatre represented a “new beginning.” 716  It was not, 
Taubman suggested, merely to be the new beginning of just one organization, but rather a 
new beginning for the American theatre itself, which would at last have a permanent 
repertory company in its theatrical capital city that would help to raise theatrical standards to 
theretofore unknown heights. Kazan and Whitehead, he said, were “assuming an enormous 
burden,” with the obligation “to create a theatre that has coherence, continuity, and a 
commitment to the fine, gay, and ennobling achievements of the past and to the spirited, 
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adventurous, provocative work of our own day.”717 As it turned out, it was a burden too 
heavy for the Repertory Theatre to bear, and the weight of that burden came largely from the 
expectations placed on the theater by a sense of expectancy that it would rise to be the long 
sought-after answer to the quest for a permanent national theater to rival such European 
institutions as the Old Vic and Comedie Francais.   
 With no existing institution ready to take up residency as the theatrical constituent of 
Lincoln Center, Rockefeller turned to Broadway icons Elia Kazan and Robert Whitehead, 
hoping that their track record of artistic and box office success would be a solid foundation 
on which to build a sustainable theater that could match the preeminence of its neighbors at 
the Center. However, as Kazan and Whitehead would soon learn, creating a venerable 
theatrical institution, particularly one that could live up to its de facto national theater status, 
was far more challenging than either of them, particularly Kazan, could have imagined. 
Certainly, the personal conflicts among the artistic leadership and the theater’s board of 
directors chronicled in Chapter Two of this dissertation played an important role in the 
unraveling of the Kazan/Whitehead administration. That conflict grew, however, not from 
simple personal animosity, but rather from a confluence of factors, each of which was unique 
to the theater’s location within Lincoln Center. 
 Chief among these factors was the simultaneous bestowment of unofficial “national” 
theatre status and a failure to define exactly what the expectations of such an institution 
should be. The one factor that everyone seemed to agree on from the outset was that any 
theatrical institution at Lincoln Center should operate on a repertory basis, which seems to 
have been almost universally viewed as a panacea against the commercial hit-flop model that 
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had for so long stunted the artistic progress of American theatrical art. Robert Brustein, for 
example, had argued that “America will never develop a satisfactory dramatic tradition until 
it can develop a unified company with plenty of rehearsal time and a vigorous, intelligent, 
and continuous artistic policy.”718 Tyrone Guthrie argued that repertory was particularly 
important for young actors who needed the training and grounding that can only come from 
“a quick succession of well contrasted parts” on a regular basis.719  
 But perhaps more important than any reason for Lincoln Center to use the repertory 
model was the simple fact that the United States lacked a permanent repertory theater, while 
such institutions were commonplace in Europe, a fact emphasized by Repertory Theatre 
board member Eugene Black, who argued after Kazan and Whitehead’s ousting that it was 
critical that the Repertory Theatre continue to operate. “[T]his country does not have a 
national quality repertory company, such as the National Theater in England and the 
Comedie Francaise,” he said, “and it is important that we have such an instrument in this 
country to perform the great plays of history in an imaginative, qualitative, and worthwhile 
manner.”720 Black wrote these comments in a memo he called “A Concept for Lincoln 
Center,” which he drafted days after the departure of Kazan and Whitehead and which was 
intended to propose a guiding artistic policy for the continued operation of the theater. Chief 
among his proposals was a strict limitation on the number of new plays produced by the 
theater (a maximum of one every one to two seasons) and an almost exclusive focus on 
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“proven” plays.721 In Black’s mind, what would establish the national importance of the 
theater was not innovation, risk taking, or the fostering of new playwriting talent, but rather 
only “the greatest excellence in both the constant quality of plays and acting and 
directing.”722 To put it another way, the function of this “national” theater in Cold War 
America was not to give voice to new emerging American voices but to ensconce works 
from “proven” playwrights. 
 Although Black did not make any pronouncements about what might constitute 
appropriate thematic content for the repertoire moving forward, he laid bare what had been 
one of his deepest concerns about Kazan and Whitehead—that their selection of plays 
revealed the same “left-wing” thinking that had defined the Group Theatre, with which 
Kazan had such a long history. As evidence he pointed to Marco Millions, “one of the most 
anti-business or Establishment plays written this century,” and The Mad Woman of Chaillot, 
which he noted Arthur Miller had once called “the most reactionary play of our time.”723 
Although there is little other evidence to suggest the board tried in any way to censor play 
selection based on content, this memo demonstrates how much of the conflict that emerged 
within the Repertory Theatre stemmed from its location on what was clearly the 
Establishment’s turf.  
 While the Board of Directors might have viewed some of Kazan and Whitehead’s 
programming as being too left-leaning or anti-Establishment, much of the criticism leveled at 
the Repertory Theatre by the press and theater insiders came from those who felt that the 
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Repertory Theatre had, by cozying up to an Establishment represented not just by its board 
but by Kazan and Whitehead themselves, squandered an important opportunity to revitalize a 
stagnant American theater, and it was an argument not without merit. For all of Kazan’s early 
talk about striving to develop a theater of “themes” and his wish to push theatrical 
boundaries, little of that was borne out in his work onstage or in his deliberations reflected in 
the surviving records. Instead, it appears he was more concerned with preserving the legacy 
of the postwar tradition of theatricalized realism and psychological truth embodied in his 
collaborations with Williams, Miller, and designer Jo Mielziner, who in addition his work as 
set designer on several of Kazan’s productions, also designed the auditorium of the 
Beaumont. Just as the founders of Lincoln Center sought to protect their rule over the urban 
and cultural landscape, the Repertory Theatre could provide Kazan, Whitehead, and 
playwrights like Miller the opportunity to monumentalize their legacies as progenitors of 
American theatrical identity while the forces of the avant-garde, Off-Broadway, and Off-off 
Broadway threatened to exert their influence and challenged the primacy of these men who 
had established themselves at the forefront of American theatrical art during the postwar 
period.  
 By the time the Repertory Theatre was incorporated in 1960, Broadway was not only 
experiencing a sharp economic decline, but had also ceased to be an incubator for work 
grappling with important socio-political issues. Christopher Bigsby has argued that it was not 
just economic factors that impacted the economic and artistic decline of Broadway, but that 
“more crucially, it was a matter of attitudes and a basic cultural parochialism,”724 an 
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argument echoed by many other theater historians and critics. Arnold Aronson, for example, 
argues that the emergent Cold War culture in the 1950s undermined both the entertainment 
and discussion-forum function of mainstream theatre by delivering a double whammy of 
sorts, noting that by the 1950s, “much of the entertainment function had been ceded to 
television, and the political atmosphere stifled the more open and visible forms of public 
debate.”725 Bruce McConachie, meanwhile, argues that by the 1950s, “whole areas of 
working-class life vanished from the [Broadway] theater,” a result of the “triumph of capital 
over labor in the years after World War II,” which “underwrote and legitimated the business-
class orientation of Broadway theater.”726  
 When the political consensus of the 1950s finally began to crack toward the end of 
the decade, Broadway had long since lost its authority as the primary venue for the 
expression of American theatrical identity. “Consensus politics had collapsed,” argues 
Bigsby, adding that if indeed there had ever been a singular audience to be addressed, that 
was no longer the case. “There were now many audiences,” Bigsby says, “some defined 
racially, some politically, some aesthetically, and Off-Broadway, Off-off Broadway (which 
also began to emerge in 1959), a newly constituted regional theatre were ready to address 
them.”727 The rise of theaters like La Mama and the Living Theatre sent a clear message that 
postwar psychological realism could no longer contain the aesthetic direction in which the 
theater was heading, and the voices of this incipient generation of playwrights were no longer 
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looking to the theater of Broadway, which had come to represent the Establishment from 
which they sought to break, an Establishment to which Kazan undeniably now belonged.  
 When it came to developing the programming for what was to be ostensibly to be a 
representation of American theatrical identity, Kazan and Whitehead seem to have paid little 
attention to the emergent voices of the Off-Broadway movement and the avant-garde. Rather, 
Kazan’s view of the American theatre as an institution seems forever rooted in the tradition 
of the Group Theatre, the Actors Studio, and his Broadway career defined by his stature as 
“the man responsible for the ‘cult of directors’ as it existed in the Broadway theatre of his 
day.”728 As unhappy as Kazan was during his tenure with the Repertory Theatre, there is little 
question he had some hope of shielding the legacy of the theater he helped create within the 
citadel that was Lincoln Center just as the founders of Lincoln Center worked to hold on to 
their power by erecting the great travertine monument.  
 Neither he nor Whitehead could see beyond the recent theatrical past for inspiration, 
and they were thus unable to meet the expectations thrust upon them from every conceivable 
direction. By the time the theater opened in 1964, American theatrical identity had become 
too large to be contained in the walls of one institution on Manhattan’s Upper West Side. As 
the regional theater movement gained momentum, theatrical identity would have to be 
negotiated and legitimated on a more local scale. While Lincoln Center might have been 
equipped to stand as a national symbol of American cultural maturity, the Repertory Theatre 
proved unable to convince the public that it could stand as a nationally representative 
institution.  
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The Twentieth Century Parthenon 
 It is difficult to imagine an urban transformation more drastic than that which 
happened in Los Angeles in the two decades following World War II. Having defeated public 
housing and politically crippling the left, the city’s pro-growth coalition, led by the Times 
and its allies in business, culture, and government, unleashed their vision of the modern 
metropolis on downtown Los Angeles. Although it would take decades for skyscrapers now 
dominating Bunker Hill to rise, the die had been cast and the corporate modernist vision of 
the city had clearly triumphed over the utopian aspirations of the now defeated New Deal 
coalition. In the space of just a few years, urban renewal proponents in Los Angeles forged a 
new identity for the city intended to supplant the image of Los Angeles as hick town with 
that of modern marvel.  
 Cold War paranoia had given the business elite the weapon they needed to ensure 
their control over the vision for Los Angeles and to portray their culture-and-commerce-
driven vision as a more “American” alternative to public housing. Culture and leisure spaces 
like the Music Center, the Los Angeles County Museum of Art, and Dodger Stadium would, 
city leaders argued, demonstrate to the nation that Los Angeles was ready to assume its place 
on the national stage and to rival New York as a leading metropolis. Moreover, the urban 
spaces that emerged through these projects would function as a spatial expression of 
containment by essentially turning their backs to the street and creating plazas that could 
function not to promote organic social interaction but rather to provide an oasis from the city 
streets and to “exclude the social liabilities of modern downtown—the poor, the denizens of 
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skid row, the homeless.”729 This approach to urban planning was a defining feature of 
downtown renewal in cities across the country, but it was particularly important in Los 
Angeles, where the suburban ethos of, to borrow a phrase from Eric Avila, “social and spatial 
isolation,” reigned supreme. Dodger Stadium, Avila argues, is just one example of how the 
institutions that defined the “new” downtown reinforced white suburban identity even as city 
leaders sought to counter suburban sprawl by recentralizing downtown. He argues that 
Dodger Stadium “shared the spatial culture that defined the suburban periphery” of Los 
Angeles. Unlike Ebbets field, “which epitomized the heterogeneous and rambunctious public 
life of the streetcar metropolis,” the new Dodger Stadium “ensconced baseball fans within a 
corporate arena tailored to the privatized, sanitized, and disciplined nature of public life after 
World War I.”730  
 The Music Center similarly ensconced its audiences on a plaza that was not simply 
tucked away from the street, but elevated above it, its refined environment standing in the 
sharpest imaginable contrast to the purported dangerous and sleazy streets of the now-razed 
Bunker Hill. Upon the opening of the Dorothy Chandler Pavilion in December 1964, Time 
magazine described it as a “masterful combination of warmth and tasteful luxury,” noting 
that those attending the opening performance “mounted an elegant, cantilevered marble 
staircase that crossed a pool filled with white azaleas set in the lobby’s floor” and “saw 
themselves multiplied into infinity in tall wall-sized mirrors.” The feature in Time also noted 
how the interior of the Pavilion contrasted “the sharp-edged angularities and cool-toned 
décor” of Lincoln Center’s Philharmonic Hall and instead “was all curves and warm shades 
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of gold, coral and beige.” 731 Such rhetoric about the building’s elegance was common, and 
differed significantly from the rhetoric surrounding Lincoln Center’s architecture which 
tended to emphasize not elegance and refinement but power and masculinity.  
 This distinction highlights one of the key differences in the legitimation strategies of 
the two institutions. While Lincoln Center was sold almost explicitly as a kind of citadel 
where cultural treasures of the United States would be protected and displayed as an 
important part of America’s cultural arsenal, the Music Center, with its affectionate moniker 
of “our twentieth century Parthenon on our downtown Acropolis,” 732 would provide for a 
newly expanded social elite a space where they could demonstrate their cultural 
sophistication safe atop a hill protected by an “acropolis” fortified by corporate capital. In 
creating the Music Center, Chandler and her associates had achieved their goal of “creating 
the social conditions for upper-class recognition around the country” and ensuring that by 
creating “an expanded elite,” the Times and its allies would maintain their power, at least for 
the time being.733 
 While expanding entrée into the social elite of the city had been an important strategy 
in gaining support for the project from many influential individuals, garnering public support 
also required creating an urgent need for the Center in the public imagination. One of the key 
strategies deployed in this regard, dating all the way back to the initial GLAPI proposals and 
coming to a head with the Hollywood Bowl’s closure and rescue, was the promulgation of 
the idea of Los Angeles as a “have-not” city when it came to cultural institutions. Although 
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the GLAPI proposals failed to convince the electorate of the need for a civic auditorium, it 
certainly was not for lack of trying. The Times had put the full force of its editorial power 
behind the initiative and argued tirelessly that erecting such a facility was essential to 
progress for the city, especially as it had grown to be one of the largest in the nation.  
 Although they failed to convince the public of the “urgent need” for GLAPI’s 
proposed auditorium, the near loss of the Hollywood Bowl helped to give the notion of the 
reputational importance of culture to the city’s stature more credibility. Whereas the 
auditorium proposed by GLAPI was little more than an abstraction to the general public, the 
potential loss of the Hollywood Bowl and the national embarrassment it would cause was all 
too palpable and helped ignite widespread support for saving the Bowl, which Chandler 
would transform in later years into support for the Music Center project. As embarrassing as 
the potential loss of the Bowl was, it also proved to be important in that the national attention 
it brought to the city demonstrated unequivocally that the rest of the country was indeed 
watching what was happening in Los Angeles with a sharply critical eye, a fact that played 
an important role in the development of Center Theatre Group. 
 Tapping into the growing desire to bestow national stature on the city was critically 
important in establishing the civic importance and cultural legitimacy of CTG. By the time 
the Music Center announced that the Theatre Group would become the Center’s theater 
constituent, the Group had already established local and national prestige through its work at 
UCLA, which was widely praised by critics and which had earned the company significant 
financial support from the Ford Foundation. Foundation support, critical praise, and the 
affiliation with UCLA were important factors in demonstrating the company’s legitimacy, 
but also important was the emphasis that the theater and the press placed on the 
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sophistication of its audiences, who were frequently lauded as ideal theatergoers, as 
intellectually curious as they were adventurous. The Group demonstrated, said John 
Houseman and the press alike, that Los Angeles was a town teeming with audiences hungry 
for serious theater and not the confections that passed through Los Angeles on second-rate 
Broadway tours.  
 The press played a hugely important role in establishing not only artistic legitimacy 
through their reviews of the Group’s work, but also by constantly reinforcing the notion that 
the Group’s success at the box office disproved the widely-held view that Angelenos were 
vapid sunbathers uninterested in cultural matters. Of the scores of newspaper articles written 
about the Group, particularly in the Los Angeles Times, virtually none of them failed to 
mention the organization’s devoted audience or to remind readers that the Group was the 
only game in town when it came to serious, challenging theater. In a retrospective on the 
Group’s tenure at UCLA published upon the opening of their final production, Cecil Smith 
called the Group’s effect on “the arid theatrical atmosphere” of Los Angeles 
“immeasurable.” The Group was, Smith wrote, “the single factor most responsible for the 
astonishing growth of interest in serious theater here and the deepening awareness of drama 
that probes and explores the human condition, not as a casual diversion but in a critical 
attempt to define the measure of man.”734 Such rhetoric, simultaneously lauding the “interest 
in serious theater” and lamenting the theretofore “arid theatrical atmosphere,” went a long 
way in establishing CTG as an institution urgently needed by Los Angeles to put it on equal 
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footing with other cities across the country and to help affirm Angelenos’ growing sense of 
cultural sophistication. 
 The established need for the theater and the way in which audiences looked to it to 
demonstrate their gravitas was also an important factor in the Taper’s survival of the 
censorship controversy that arose with its opening production of The Devils. Despite mixed 
opinions of the artistic merits of the play itself, the press and the community overwhelmingly 
came out to defend the Taper against interference from the county supervisors, motivated not 
simply by a moral objection to censorship but also by the reputational damage sure to befall 
Los Angeles if the supervisors successfully intervened in determining the Taper’s 
programming. The episode was a defining moment in the Taper’s history that helped to 
delineate the boundaries between the theater and Board of the Supervisors who had argued 
that because the theater enjoyed the financial benefit of being housed on county-owned land, 
the county should have some say in the company’s programming. That the supervisors failed 
in exercising such control can of course be attributed to the outcry from the public and the 
press, but Dorothy Chandler’s unqualified support of Davidson’s artistic autonomy was also 
an important factor in the Taper’s victory. While the press and other media outlets were most 
deeply concerned with the slippery slope presented by such censorship, Chandler understood, 
perhaps even more so than Davidson, that caving in to the supervisors would only serve to 
demonstrate the very kind of cultural parochialism for which the city had long been ridiculed 
and which she had fought to counter with her efforts to create the Music Center. The success 
of the Taper, Chandler understood, would rely on its ability to generate new work and to 
challenge audiences. While the Music Center and its more traditional constituents like the 
Philharmonic and the Civic Light Opera would put Los Angeles on equal footing with other 
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metropolises, it was the Taper’s commitment to bold experimentation that could potentially 
put Los Angeles on the cutting edge and move it to the front of the pack nationally, and it 
was this potentiality that audiences were continually reminded of not only through the 
theater’s programming but also through the rhetoric that ran through virtually everything 
written about the theater by the organization itself and in the press.  
 Of course, the Taper was only one part of the CTG operation. The Ahmanson 
Theatre, with an audience capacity three times that of the Taper’s, was initially committed to 
producing primarily new works, American premieres, and to hosting prestigious companies 
like the Royal Shakespeare Company. Although Elliot Martin maintained the new works 
policy for the first several seasons, he continually faced criticism from critics that the 
Ahmanson seemed to be more concerned with the potential financial returns of a Broadway 
run following a successful run at the Ahmanson. Critic Dan Sullivan suggested that Martin’s 
contract, which allowed him to personally produce and take a slice of the financial pie of 
subsequent commercial productions, was problematic because the potential for box office 
returns in the commercial arena might influence his decisions when programming a season at 
the Ahmanson. In other words, Sullivan argued, it was reasonable to question whether 
Martin’s programming’s decisions were truly “indifferent” to commercial potential.735 Martin 
took umbrage to Sullivan’s innuendo that he was motivated by personal profit in his 
programming decisions for the Ahmanson and rebutted Sullivan in a Los Angeles Times 
editorial. He argued that while it was true that he had the contractual right to participate 
personally in the proceeds from commercial productions of works originated at the 
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Ahmanson, it was not the potential of personal profit that motivated his programming 
decisions, but rather the fact the Ahmanson received no subsidy whatsoever, a reality that 
“dictate[d] a programming policy of quasi commercially oriented theater.” Moreover, he 
argued, he had an obligation not only to mount programming that could ensure that the 
Ahmanson could meet its financial obligations but also to reach an audience broader than that 
of the Taper. “We must vary our bill of fare,” he argued, in order to “keep [audiences] 
coming and establish the theatergoing habit.”736 While the Taper fulfilled an important need 
for bold and daring original works appealing to the intellectually adventurous audience like 
that cultivated by the Group at UCLA, the Ahmanson, Martin argued, had an obligation to 
fill the void on the more commercially-oriented end of the theater spectrum, although he 
would still work to ensure that productions were chosen by their artistic merit over all else, 
financial realities notwithstanding.  
 Despite the criticisms leveled at Martin and the Ahmanson, the organizational 
structure of CTG was an important factor in ensuring the organization’s success for a few 
reasons. The first of these reasons is financial as discussed above; the break-even policy at 
the Ahmanson helped to subsidize the Taper. More importantly, however, the Ahmanson 
provided a broader audience, not quite as adventurous as the Taper’s audience, the 
opportunity to don their fine feathers and attend high profile theatrical events like the 
American premiere of O’Neill’s More Stately Mansions. Moreover, when the Taper 
instituted its “New Plays for Now” series, which provided playwrights an opportunity to 
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workshop experimental work in an environment off limits to reviewers, it expanded CTG’s 
audience even further.  
 When Joseph Ziegler spent a weekend taking in performances at CTG during its 
inaugural season, he noted the variety among audiences of the Ahmanson, Taper mainstage, 
and the New Plays for Now lineup. Attending More Stately Mansions at the Ahmanson on a 
Saturday night, he encountered an audience decked out in “rats-nest hairdos, beaded gowns, 
and sling-back shoes.” The next night, attending Durrenmatt’s The Marriage of Mr. 
Mississippi at the Taper, he found himself “among a healthy smattering of pageboy hairdos, 
madras dresses, and sensible shoes.” Then on Monday, attending three short plays in the New 
Theatre for Now program, he was seated “in the midst of a grab bag of straight hair, pants, 
and sandals.” There was “not much overlapping of audiences,” he noted, “but there was 
clearly an extensive spread.”737 Ziegler’s description of these audiences helps illustrate just 
how important the organizational structure of CTG—which remained remarkably unchanged 
from that which was first proposed at that 1966 meeting with Whitehead and the board of 
directors—was in allowing a wide range of upper and middle class Angelenos to turn to the 
theater to affirm their cultural gravitas and their alignment with Los Angeles’s purported 
deepening interest in culture. However, it is also glaringly obvious, if only by omission in 
virtually all the contemporary coverage of the organization, that little effort was made to 
expand the reach of the Music Center or Center Theatre Group beyond mostly white upper 
and middle class Angelenos at least in those first few seasons. In subsequent years, the Taper 
would work to more adequately reach a more diverse audience, but for the time being, there 
was no escaping that the Music Center had successfully claimed downtown Los Angeles as 
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the domain of the elite and that, the theatrical boldness of the Taper notwithstanding, the 
definition of culture as reflected in its programming was skewed toward the middle and 
highbrow.  
Final Thoughts 
 A significant body of literature has emerged over the last three decades, most of it in 
the social sciences, that examines the intersection of cultural production and the cityscape. 
Much of that scholarship grapples with the ways in which cultural amenities like theaters 
function to make gentrification more politically palatable by allowing developers and city 
leaders to point to the civic value of the arts and culture and the economic benefits that a 
vibrant cultural scene can bestow on a city, even while large parts of the population are 
forced out of their neighborhoods. Such scholarship effectively explicates the ways in which 
cultural institutions shape the built environment of the city, and it has been my aim with this 
dissertation to turn the gaze inward to better understand how the identities of cultural 
institutions are in turn shaped by their imbrication in the local and national political, social, 
and economic imperatives that drive the shaping of cities.  
 As I argued in the introduction to this dissertation, theatrical institutions play as 
important a role on the stage of theater history as do playwrights, directors, actors, and 
individual texts and performances. Examining these institutions in relation to the cities in 
which they emerge makes visible influences on the work generated therein that might not be 
otherwise apparent. Such analysis provides valuable fodder for the theater historian seeking 
to identify points of intersection among a wide range of the social, artistic, and economic 
factors that influence cultural production. To be sure, a body of theatrical texts offers the 
historian important insight to the ways in which artists responded to social and cultural 
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conditions within a given historical period. However, the explicit study of the material 
conditions that shape the places and institutions where such works are created and 
legitimated illuminates the mutually constitutive relationship between cultural production 
and larger social, political, and economic realities.  
Buildings like those at Lincoln Center and the Los Angeles Music Center stand as 
monuments to a society’s commitment to providing its citizenry with cultural and spiritual 
uplift. However, the very act of monumentalization is a function of the power to create and 
control a narrative, which becomes an important means of bestowing cultural legitimacy on 
the ephemeral performances presented in buildings defined by their permanence and 
monumentality.  Only by peeling back the marble curtain and looking within the institutions 
housed in these edifices can we begin to unearth the histories that reveal how power was 
acquired and wielded and how the wielding of that power has amplified some voices while 
silencing others. The stories told in the preceding chapters demonstrate just how inextricably 
linked artistic legitimation is to a seemingly infinite number of forces both concrete and 
intangible. A close study of the material conditions shaping the intersection of those forces is 
crucial to the study of theater history if we are to arrive at an understanding of the ways in 
which institutionalized power works to determine whose vision of national, civic, and 
aesthetic progress attains the authority to stand as representative of the culture at large.  
 
 
 
   
   
